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2003 DIGILAW 398 (CAL)

NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. SAILENDRA NATH BERA

2003-08-06

PRABIR KUMAR SAMANTA

body2003
SAMANTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS application by the insurance company is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 29. 3. 2000 as passed by the Motor accidents Claims Tribunal in a petition for review of original award dated 6. 1. 2000 by the claimant. ( 2 ) THE facts which are not disputed are as follows: the claimant faced a motor accident on 27. 9. 1997 while he was employed in Gun and Shell Factory, Cossipore, Calcutta with a monthly salary of Rs. 7,526 only. The said claimant filed a claim case before the motor Accidents Claims Tribunal alleging that he suffered permanent partial disablement. Considering the age of the claimant on the date of determination of the aforesaid claim case, the multiplier of 8 was selected as per the Second Schedule to the motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the purpose of computation of the compensation for the disability caused by such non-fatal accident. In view of the finding by the doctor that the claimant had suffered permanent disablement to the extent of 35 per cent computation was made on the question of financial loss by applying 8 as multiplier in respect of the annual income of claimant which turned out to be Rs. 2,52,000. A sum of Rs. 25,000 was awarded apart from a sum of Rs. 1,000 for pain and suffering endured by the claimant. ( 3 ) THE said award was sought to be reviewed by making an application by the claimant and on such review application, the aforesaid award was modified by the impugned order. On the basis of the said application it was held that the claimant had actually suffered a total financial loss of Rs. 4,00,000 for the loss of his service. Consequently, the original award was modified by awarding a further sum of rs. 4,00,000 in addition to the original award for a sum of Rs. 2,53,000. ( 4 ) IN this petition, the petitioner insurance company has raised two points. It has been contended that the Motor Accidents claims Tribunal being a creature of the statute has no power to review its own order as the statute does not provide such power explicitly. Secondly, the Tribunal has modified the award to the extent to which it has no jurisdiction as per the second Schedule to the Act. It has been contended that the Motor Accidents claims Tribunal being a creature of the statute has no power to review its own order as the statute does not provide such power explicitly. Secondly, the Tribunal has modified the award to the extent to which it has no jurisdiction as per the second Schedule to the Act. ( 5 ) ON the contrary, on behalf of the claimant/opposite party it has been contended that upon construction of the provisions of sub-rule (4) of rule 342 of the west Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, the power of review by the Claims Tribunal can be traced by necessary implication. Upon such contention, it has further been contended that since a power of review by the Claims Tribunal can be inferred then the order so made upon review would be appealable in view of the provisions of order 43, rule 1 (w) of the Code of Civil procedure. ( 6 ) ON the question as to the power of review by the Motor Accidents Claims tribunal, it is necessary to consider the provisions of rule 342 of the aforesaid rules which reads as under: ( 7 ) SUB-RULE (4) of the said rule thus clearly lays down that the Claims Tribunal may in the circumstances shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the powers of the civil court as may be necessary in any case for discharging its functions for the purpose of determination of compensation for the loss suffered either by the victim or by his heirs and legal representatives in a motor accident. Exercise of all or any of the power of the civil court for such purposes would, therefore, obviously include not only the power to review its own order but also an inherent power to rectify its own mistake and error in making an order, if it is necessary for the interest of justice. The Apex Court decision in Patel Narshi thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsitighji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 , as cited on behalf of petitioner/insurer has no manner of application in the facts and circumstances of this case. The Apex Court decision in Patel Narshi thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsitighji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 , as cited on behalf of petitioner/insurer has no manner of application in the facts and circumstances of this case. The Apex Court while dealing with the provisions of Saurashtra land Reforms Act observed that the said act having not provided any power of review of its own order made under section 63, no such power can be conferred by law as Government had no power to review its own order without any sanction under the statute. In the said decision it was observed that no provisions of the Act was brought to the notice of the Apex Court from which it could be gathered that the Government had the power to review its own order. The other Supreme Court decision in M. M. Thomas v. State of Kerala, (2000) 1 SCC 666 , is also not of much consequences. It was observed therein, though not in relation to the issue involved in the said decided case, that unless the law has conferred a power of review the inferior courts and the Tribunals cannot exercise any such power of review. Upon interpretation of section 8-C of the Kerala Private Forest (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 held that the Forest Tribunal created under the said Act can exercise power of review only in conformity with section 8-C of the Act. ( 8 ) ON the other hand, the decision of the Apex Court in United India Insurance co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh, 2000 ACJ 1032 (SC), is relevant on the issue as it is a case decided on the provisions of the motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Apex Court upon consideration of the provisions of section 169 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, held that the remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree cannot foreclose and no court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order, if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basisof the claim. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in the decision in Rajan v. Sukumaran, 1997 ACJ 778 (Kerala), in dealing with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, held that Motor Accidents Claims tribunal having all the attributes and trappings of a civil court has in appropriate cases the power to review its own order. Though section 169 of the Motor Vehicles act, 1988, stipulates that the Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil court for the limited purpose as mentioned in sub-section (2) of the said section but the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 provided under sub-rule (4) of rule 342 that for the purpose of discharging its functions under the Act, the Claims Tribunal may exercise all or any of the powers of the civil court as may be necessary. Such powers shall be exercised by the claims Tribunal, if necessary, for the purposes other than those specified in sub-rule (1) of rule 342 and for the ends of justice. It, therefore, can be held that by necessary implication the Motor Accidents claims Tribunal has been vested with the power of review of its own order, if it is necessary for the ends of justice and particularly when error is apparent on the face of the record in making an award. In such consideration, I repel the contention on behalf of petitioner that the Claims Tribunal had acted without jurisdiction by exercising its power of review for correcting the errors crept in the award made on the basis of the application made by the claimant. ( 9 ) ON the next question as raised on behalf of the claimant-opposite party that the impugned order made upon review by the Claims Tribunal having the effect of amending the award which substantially formed an ultimate award passed in the aforesaid claim case, the impugned order is appealable under the provisions of section 173 of the aforesaid Act, I am of the view that the power of review as exercised by the Claims Tribunal is not a power exactly in terms of the provisions of Order 47, rule 1 of the Code, but a power conferred by necessary implication of section 169 of the motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the rule 342 of the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. The power so exercised by the Motor accidents Claims Tribunal for review of its own order is a power analogous to the provisions of review under Order 47, rule 1 of the Code and, therefore, not a power strictly in terms thereof. All the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure being not applicable in its terms in the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal the power of review can be derived by necessary implication and upon construction of the aforesaid provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. I am therefore of the view that the provision of Order 43, rule 1 (w) as also the provisions of Order 47, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code will not apply in its term in respect of an order made by the claims Tribunal in exercise of its power of review of its own order. In such consideration, I am further of the view that this application under Article 227 of the constitution of India against the order impugned is maintainable and, therefore, reject the contention as made on behalf of the claimant/opposite party as to the non-maintainability of this petition. ( 10 ) NOW coming to the merits of the impugned order it is evident from the original award that a sum of Rs, 25,000 has been awarded for the financial loss suffered by the claimant. It is not in dispute that the claimant faced with the motor accident on 27. 9. 1997 for which he suffered permanent partial disablement. It is also not in dispute that because of permanent partial disablement suffered by the claimant, his services were terminated on and from 26. 11. 1998. The Second Schedule to motor Vehicles Act, 1998 has prescribed the mode for calculation of compensation in case of disability in non-fatal accidents under clause 5 as under:"disability in non-fatal accidents. The following compensation shall be payable in case of disability to the victim arising out of non-fatal accidents; loss of income; if any, for actual period of disablement not exceeding fifty-two weeks. The following compensation shall be payable in case of disability to the victim arising out of non-fatal accidents; loss of income; if any, for actual period of disablement not exceeding fifty-two weeks. PLUS either of the following: (a) In case of permanent total disablement the amount payable shall be arrived at by multiplying the annual loss of income by the multiplier applicable to the age on the date of determining the compensation, or (b) In case of permanent partial disablement such percentage of compensation which would have been payable in the case of permanent total disablement as specified under item (a) above. Injuries deemed to result in permanent total disablement/permanent partial disablement and percentage of loss of earning capacity shall be as per Schedule I under Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. "thus under clause 5 of the said Schedule the claimant was entitled to compensation for the loss of his income for the actual period of disablement but not exceeding 52 weeks. Undoubtedly, the claimant had lost his service due to his permanent disablement as suffered by him. He was entitled to be compensated for loss of income for a period of about one year and, therefore, the determination of financial loss at rs. 25,000 as made in the original award suffered from an error apparent on the face of the record. The annual income of claimant has been determined by the original award as Rs. 90,000 which determination has not been disputed by the insurance company. Therefore, claimant was entitled to a further sum of Rs, 90,000 as being the loss of income for the actual period of disablement not exceeding 52 weeks. On such consideration the review application is maintainable and the claimant/opposite party is entitled to the same in modification of the award made for compensation on account of financial loss suffered by him. Said clause 5 (b) having provided further compensation as per the computation prescribed thereunder and there being no other provision for making a grant of compensation for the actual financial loss suffered by the claimant for the entire period for which he has been deprived of his service benefit till before his superannuation, I am also of the view that the Motor Accidents claims Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction by making a further grant of compensation to the extent of Rs. 4,00,000 for the financial loss suffered by claimant because of his termination from employment. The motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in exercise of its power of review is only entitled to correct the errors. These were appearing on the face of award. In exercise of jurisdiction of review which is limited to the extent of correcting the apparent errors and mistakes on record, the said Tribunal is not at all within its jurisdiction to make a fresh award on the merits of the claim. Reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715 . It has been held therein that under Order 47, rule 1 of the code the judgment may be open to review, inter alia, if there is mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47, rule 1 of the Code. The impugned order making a further grant of Rs. 4,00,000 on account of financial loss suffered by the claimant was made by the Motor Accidents claims Tribunal upon fresh reasonings. That apart there is no scope for making an award of compensation for the actual financial loss suffered by the claimant because of termination of his services. The impugned order thus suffers from jurisdictional error so far as it relates to the amount of rs. 4,00,000 as awarded on that score. In all such considerations, I modify the impugned order by holding that claimant shall be entitled to an award of Rs. 2,52,000 as being the compensation under clause 5 (b)of the Second Schedule of the said Act plus rs. 90,000 as being the compensation for loss of income for actual period of disablement not exceeding 52 weeks along with a further sum of Rs. 1,000 for pain and suffering endured by the claimant. In total claimant will get a sum of Rs. 3,43,000 by way of compensation on all such accounts and the impugned order shall accordingly stand modified to the above extent. 1,000 for pain and suffering endured by the claimant. In total claimant will get a sum of Rs. 3,43,000 by way of compensation on all such accounts and the impugned order shall accordingly stand modified to the above extent. ( 11 ) THIS application is thus disposed of, ( 12 ) IF urgent xerox certified copy of this order is applied for by the parties, the same should be given expeditiously. Petition partly allowed.