JUDGMENT : The legal representatives of the defendant, one Mangati Venkatrama Reddy, are the appellants in the present second appeal. The legal heirs of late Suseelamma had instituted O.S.No. 368 of 1980 on the file of I Additional District Munsif, Tirupati for the relief of specific performance of the contract of agreement of sale and also in alternative for the relief of refund of Rs. 2,400/- at least by way of damages for breach of contract to execute the sale deed with interest thereon at 12% per annum from the date of the suit till the date of realization and for costs. Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned counsel representing the appellants had made the following submissions: The learned counsel in all fairness submitted that though the defendant had taken a stand denying the execution of the agreement of sale, in view of the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below, the same cannot be assailed in the present second appeal. The learned counsel also had taken me through the findings recorded by both the Courts below and also the reasoning adopted why the suit was instituted after a period of about 13 years after the execution of the agreement of sale. However, the learned counsel pointed out that in view of the fact that alternative relief was prayed for definitely the relief of specific performance is not available to the respondents for the reason that the land had been acquired by the Railways which is clearly evident by Ex. B-4 proceedings which was marked by way of additional evidence at appellate stage. The learned counsel also further submitted that in view of the subsequent event, the contract itself is frustrated because of the impossibility in performing the said contract. The learned counsel had drawn my attention to Sec. 56 of the Indian Contract. Act. B-4 proceedings which was marked by way of additional evidence at appellate stage. The learned counsel also further submitted that in view of the subsequent event, the contract itself is frustrated because of the impossibility in performing the said contract. The learned counsel had drawn my attention to Sec. 56 of the Indian Contract. Act. Further the learned counsel submitted that even otherwise in view of the subsequent event, the performance of the contract became impossible even in view of Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 since a seller is bound to deliver possession of the property at the time of the execution of the registered sale deed in pursuance of the agreement of sale and this cannot be done because of the reason that the Railways had acquired the said property and hence it is not in the hands of the appellants to effect delivery even in the event of a direction being given to execute a regular registered sale deed in pursuance of the agreement of sale, the subject-matter of the present suit. The learned counsel had pointed out that this is the only question of law which arises for consideration in the second appeal and had taken me through the substantial questions of law framed which had been specified in the grounds of appeal in general and ground No. 2 in particular. 2. Per contra, Sri Mukunda Rao, the learned counsel representing the respondents had contended that even from E.B-4 it is not clear that the acquisition proceedings by Railways were completed and in fact, the property is available and in view of the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below, the appellants cannot take advantage of Ex. B-4 and try to escape from their liability of executing a regular registered sale deed which the respondents are ready and willing to take. B-4 and try to escape from their liability of executing a regular registered sale deed which the respondents are ready and willing to take. The learned counsel also had explained that the recitals in the agreement of sale clearly go to show that there is a condition that the sale deed will be executed after conversion of the area in question into plots and an admission was made that in the year 1980 only this area was converted into plots and consequently, in view of the recital, a notice was given and since the defendant was not willing to perform his part of the contract, a suit was instituted and hence perfectly, the suit is within the period of limitation. The learned counsel also had taken me through the findings recorded in A.S.No. 80 of 1987 on the file of Additional District Judge, Tirupati and had submitted that the plaintiffs are ready and willing to take the property as it is, as it stands on today. 3. Heard both the counsel. 4. The short question which falls for consideration in this second appeal is whether the relief of specific performance can be ordered even in the light of Ex. B-4 a subsequent event or whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondents-plaintiffs are entitled to the alternative relief of the refund as prayed for by them in the suit- 5. The facts in brief which would be relevant for the present purpose are as hereunder: The parties are referred to as plaintiffs and defendant as arrayed in the original suit for the purpose of convenience. The case of the plaintiffs as pleaded in the plaint is that the defendant agreed to sell 80 ankanams of land at the rate of Rs. 30/- per ankanam in S.No. 191/2-A1 in Tirupati town when the defendant converted the land into house plots and received an advance of Rs. 10/- from the first respondent herein representing his wife Smt. Suseelamma on 27-5-1967 and executed an agreement of sale on the even date in favour of said Smt. Suseelamma, the wife of the first plaintiff, which was marked as Ex. A-1. 10/- from the first respondent herein representing his wife Smt. Suseelamma on 27-5-1967 and executed an agreement of sale on the even date in favour of said Smt. Suseelamma, the wife of the first plaintiff, which was marked as Ex. A-1. It was also pleaded that the defendant agreed to inform the conversion of land into house plots so that the said Suseelamma may pay the balance of said consideration and get a regular registered sale deed in her favour executed by the defendant. However, the said Suseelamma died intestate in June 1978 leaving plaintiffs 2 to 7 as legal representatives and when they came to know that the aforesaid land was being converted into house site plots, a demand was made and the first plaintiff also got issued a notice dated 8-3-1980 calling upon the defendant to execute a registered sale deed as per the stipulations in the contract and also claimed the alternative relief of damages for breach thereof. 6. The defendant filed a written statement denying the very execution taking a stand the agreement of sale is a forged or a fabricated one. A specific stand was taken stating that the allegations mentioned in paras 5 & 6 of the plaint are not true and correct since the land of the defendant situated in S.No. 191/2-A1 has been acquired by the Railways about a year ago. It is also pleaded that the claim of damages in the facts and circumstances, cannot be sustained and the suit is barred by limitation. In the Court of first instance on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.W. 1 to P.W. 3 were examined. Likewise. D.W. 1 and D.W. 2 were examined on behalf of the defendant. Exs. A-1 to A-4 and Exs. B-1 to B-3 were marked. The court of first instance on the strength of the evidence of P.W. 1 and also P.W. 2, one of the attestors of Ex. Likewise. D.W. 1 and D.W. 2 were examined on behalf of the defendant. Exs. A-1 to A-4 and Exs. B-1 to B-3 were marked. The court of first instance on the strength of the evidence of P.W. 1 and also P.W. 2, one of the attestors of Ex. A-1 well supported by the evidence of P.W. 3 had arrived at the conclusion that the agreement of sale executed by defendant in favour of Smt. Suseelamma is true, valid and binding on the defendant and also came to the conclusion that the suit is within limitation since in view of the recital and also demand made by D.W. 1, the land was converted into plots in the year 1980 and consequently a notice was issued and immediately a suit was instituted and hence from the time fixed for the performance of contract, it is within the period of limitation. Aggrieved by the same the defendant had preferred an appeal in A.S.No. 80 of 1987 on the file of Additional District Judge, Tirupati and inasmuch as the defendant died, the legal representatives-appellants 2 to 6 were brought on record in A.S.No. 80 of 1987 in I.A.No. 164 of 1990 dated 5-10-1990 and in the appellate Court I.A.No. 633 of 1993 was filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for receiving of additional evidence and the appellate Court had allowed the said application and marked the document, the communication letter dated 12-4-1993 as Ex. B-4. The appellate Court had discussed the additional evidence at length at Para 11 of the Judgment. After framing the points for consideration, the appellate Court had confirmed the findings of the trial Court and had dismissed the appeal, however, allowing the application if I.A.No. 633 of 1993 for receiving of additional evidence and marking the letter specified supra as Ex. B-4. Ex. B-4 is the letter addressed to one of the appellants by the Divisional Engineer, Works, Guntakal Branch, S.C. Railways dated 6-4-1993. 7. Both the counsel in all fairness had submitted that the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below on factual aspects cannot be assailed in the present second appeal and hence the findings relating to the validity of Ex. A-1 and also the findings relating to the question of limitation recorded by both the Courts below are hereby confirmed. 7. Both the counsel in all fairness had submitted that the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below on factual aspects cannot be assailed in the present second appeal and hence the findings relating to the validity of Ex. A-1 and also the findings relating to the question of limitation recorded by both the Courts below are hereby confirmed. But the only question which survives is the effect or impact of the subsequent event Ex. B-4. No doubt an attempt was made by the learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs that in fact, the land is available and this land is not the subject-matter of the acquisition proceedings and the parties are prepared to accept a regular registered sale deed in the event of the present second appeal being dismissed. It may be relevant at this stage to have a look at Ex. B-4, the letter which was marked by the appellate Court and the said letter reads as hereunder: With reference to your letter cited above, it is advised that the piece of land 0-05 cents in S.No. 191/2-A1, the Mandal Surveyor, Tirupathi and the Town Surveyor, Tirupati, have measured the land and conferred the land is under occupation of the Railway Department now for which the dept. has to send acquisition proposals.' In this connection, you are hereby advised that by name Sri A. Govindaswamy, resident to Tirupati is also claiming the 0-05 cents in S.No. 191/2-A1 of his own and Sri P.V. Srinivasadevar, B.A.B.L., Advocate from Tirupati has served a notice in this regard on behalf of A. Govindaswamy. The Railway Administration cannot processes your request for exchange of land when the said land is under dispute. It is further clarified that revenue authorities only have to decide that who is the real owner of this 0-05 cents of land in S.No. 191/2-A1, you are hereby advised to contract the concerned Revenue authorities for further clarification and decision in this matter.'- 8. In view of Ex. B-4 it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the contract is frustrated in view of the subsequent event and in the light of Sec. 56 of the Indian Contract Act, the relief of specific performance definitely cannot be granted. However, the counsel for the respondents had emphasized stating that as on the date of the entering into agreement of Ex. However, the counsel for the respondents had emphasized stating that as on the date of the entering into agreement of Ex. A-1 or as on the date of the institution of the suit, there was no acquisition proposal at all and hence it cannot be said that there is impossibility in performance of the present contract. Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 deals with agreement to do impossible act and the provision reads as hereunder:'Agreement to do impossible act:- An agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void. Contract to do act afterwards becoming impossible or unlawful.Agreement of sale contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful.............'-The words 'by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent'- make the position clear. Illustration "B' also may be relevant which reads as hereunder:'(b)A and B contract to marry each other. Before the time fixed for the marriage, A goes mad. The Contract becomes void.'- 9. Hence, in view of this legal position, the contention advanced by the counsel for the respondents cannot be accepted. Apart from this aspect of the matter, Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 dealing with the rights and liabilities of buyer and seller specifies that the seller is bound to effect delivery of the property and in view of the same, in the event of the land acquisition proceedings by railways being true, in my considered opinion, the sale deed cannot be executed for the reason that the seller may not be able to perform the legal obligation which such a seller is bound to comply with under law. In the appeal as referred to supra Ex. B-4 was marked. Order 41 Rule 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure dealing with points to be defined and recorded reads as hereunder:' Points to be defined and recorded.Where additional evidence is directed or allowed to be taken, the Appellate Court shall specify the points to which the evidence is to be confined, and record on its proceedings the points so specified.'- 10. In the present case, the appellate Court having received additional evidence in view of the fact that Ex. In the present case, the appellate Court having received additional evidence in view of the fact that Ex. B-4 has a direct bearing on the performance of the contract, the subject-matter of the suit, the appellate Court could have permitted both the parties to let in evidence on this aspect and could have recorded findings in this regard whether there is impossibility of performance of contract in view of the facts and circumstances and if so, whether the plaintiff are entitled to the main relief of specific performance or the alternative relief of refund of consideration with interest as prayed for- Instead of adopting this method, the appellate Court had simply confirmed the findings of the Court of first instance despite receiving Ex. B-4 as additional evidence. Though several contentions had been advanced by the counsel representing the respondents to convince the Court that the subject-matter of the suit, in fact, is available and it was not acquired by the Railway Authorities, there is no material available on record to this effect and hence in the light of Ex. B-4 the subsequent event, the question whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of specific performance or alternative relief of the refund of amount with interest thereon in the light of the subsequent event may have to be decided. Hence, I am inclined to frame the following issues:(1)whether Ex. A-1 can be enforced in view of the acquisition proceedings specified in Ex. B-4- &(2)Whether Ex. A-1 is covered by any acquisition proceedings at all and if so, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the main relief of specific performance or the alternative relief of refund of consideration with interest thereon as prayed for by the plaintiffs-'-Since the position is not clear, I am of the considered opinion that in the light of Ex. B-4 both the parties to be given an opportunity to let in further evidence on this aspect only which had been referred to supra. In view of the findings recorded above, this Court is left with no other option except to remand the matter to the appellate Court for the purpose of deciding the issues referred to supra after giving opportunity to both the parties to let in evidence in this regard and decide the matter in accordance with law. 11. In view of the findings recorded above, this Court is left with no other option except to remand the matter to the appellate Court for the purpose of deciding the issues referred to supra after giving opportunity to both the parties to let in evidence in this regard and decide the matter in accordance with law. 11. Accordingly, the judgment and decree of the appellate Court are hereby set aside and the matter is remanded to the appellate Court for the purpose of deciding the issue referred to supra in accordance with law, no doubt, after affording opportunity to both the parties to let in evidence in this regard. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. Since an order of remand is being made, both the parties do bear their own costs.