( 2 ) WITH the consent of the parties the matter is taken up for final hearing. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has not challenged the denial of the reinstatement in view of the fact that the award is of the year 1998 and the petition suffers from unexplained laches. The Tribunal relied upon the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High court in Karnal Central Co-op. Bank Ltd. Vs. Industrial Tribunal, Rohtak and Others, 1994 LLR Punjab and Haryana, 248, in which the law laid down is to the effect that it is now well settled that Industrial workers who do not complete 240 days of service have no industrial rights under the Act and cannot, therefore,avail of the machinery provided under the Act for the settlement of their disputes. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner questioned the statement of law recorded by the Tribunal that those industrial workers who do not complete 240 days of service have no industrial rights under the Act and for this purpose reliance has sought to be placed on the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High court, 1994 LLR Punjab and Haryana, 248 (Karnal co-op Bank s case) Learned counsel has submitted that the position of law laid down in the Judgment of Hon ble supreme Court in Samishta Dube Vs. City board, Etawah and Anr. , 1999 II AD (S. C.) 257, it is very clear that even workman who had put in less than 240 days has industrial rights under the Act such as those pertaining to Sections 25 (G) and (II ). The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under: "we shall next deal with the point whether, in case employees junior to the appellant were retained, the directions issued by the Labour Court could be treated as valid Section 6-P of the U. P. Act (which corresponds to section 25-G of the Central Act of 1947) states that where any workman in an industrial establishment is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, - in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workmen in this behalf-the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workmen who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded, the employer retrenches any other person. Now this provision is not controlled by conditions as to length of service contained in Section 6 (N) (which corresponds to Section 25f of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ). Section 6-P does not require any particular period of continuous service as required by Section 6-N. In Kamlesh singh Vs. Presiding Officer [1986 suppl. SCC 679. ] in a matter which arose under this very Section 6-P of the U. P. Act, it was so held. Hence the high Court was wrong in relying on the fact that the appellant had put in only three and a half months of service and in denying relief. [see also in this connection Central Bank of India Vs. S. Satyam and Others 1996 (5) SCC 419 ]. ( 5 ) IN my view the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is correct and accords with the law laid down by the Hon ble supreme Court. The Tribunal has erred in law holding that the industrial workers who do not complete 240 days of service has no industrial rights under the Act at all. There are certain rights such as those under Section 25 g and H of the Act which are available as evident from the perusal of the judgment of the hon ble Supreme Court. Accordingly while disposing of the writ petition, it is made clear that the finding in paragraph 20 of the Award cannot stand and I am unable to agree with the view taken by Punjab and Haryana High court. ( 6 ) THUS if any workman who has put in less than 240 days, it will be open for him to seek the redressal of his grievance under Section 25g and H of the Act. ( 7 ) THE writ petition stands disposed of accordingly.