JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the appellant. This appeal is directed against the order of learned Single Judge dated 10th February, 2003 by which the writ petition filed by the petitioner-appellant challenging the award of the Labour court dated 30th April, 2002, has been dismissed. 2. The respondent-workman was appointed as daily rated employee on 23.1.92 and his services were terminated on 16.2.93. The termination order having been made in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for brevity hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1947"). The fresh appointment was given to another person namely; Bheem Singh Meena on the very next date of the termination of the services of the respondent-workman. The same was in violation of Section 25H of the Act of 1947. 3. The writ petition was filed before this Court as S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2518/93. In the said writ petition the interim order was passed on 21.5.93 directing the present appellant that if any vacancy in Class IV is available, the petitioner (workman) should be appointed against that vacancy till further orders. Pursuant thereto, the respondent-workman was taken back on duty and he continued to work until 18.2.96. 4. The S.B. Civil Writ Petition `Jo. 2518/93 was ultimately dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court on 8.1.96 by holding that the petitioner has an alternative remedy available to him by way of approaching the Labour i Court and therefore, he was left free to avail the alternative remedy with one month from the date of that order. It was further observed that the period spent in pursuing the remedy under extraordinary jurisdiction will not come in his way. 5. In the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner's services were again terminated by order dated 19.2.96 after the writ petition was dismissed on 8.1.96 as aforesaid. This led to raising of an industrial dispute and reference was made to the Labour Court, Jodhpur, under section 10 of the Act of 1947 vide Notification dated 25th August, 1998 about the validity of termination order dated 19.2.96. 6. In reply to the claim petition, it was admitted that the respondent-workman has worked until 19.2.96. His appointment on 28.1.92 and first termination order dated 17.2.93 was not in dispute nor his working during this period was ever denied. 6. In reply to the claim petition, it was admitted that the respondent-workman has worked until 19.2.96. His appointment on 28.1.92 and first termination order dated 17.2.93 was not in dispute nor his working during this period was ever denied. The fact that the termination order whether on 17.2.93 or 19.2.96 had taken place without complying with the provisions of the Act of 1947, were not in dispute. The fact that after terminating services of the respondent-workman, another person was appointed in same capacity as a daily rated workman, was also not in dispute. 7. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Labour Court found the termination of the petitioner's services on 19.2.96/17.2.93 to be invalid, being in violation of the provisions of the Act of 1947 and directed reinstatement with 25% of the back wages. 8. The award was challenged by the employer, State of Rajasthan. The learned Single Judge has not found any reason to interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court. 9. In the facts and circumstances noticed above, we are in agreement with the learned Single Judge as termination being in violation of provisions of the Act of 1947 is an admitted fact so also giving appointment to another person in the same capacity after terminating the petitioner's services is also an admitted fact. In these circumstances there was apparent breach of Section 25F of the Act of 1947 to sustain termination, so also giving employment to Bheem Singh Meena without offering such opportunity to the retrenched workman in first instance was in violation of Section 25H of the Act of 1947. Such breach also did not justify keeping the respondent-workman out of job by again terminating his service on 19.2.96. The order of termination in these circumstances being in breach of the provisions of the Act of 1947, could not have been sustained. Hence, award of the Labour Court was not liable to be Interfered with. 10. The appeal is dismissed in limine.Appeal Dismissed in Limine. *******