JUDGMENT 1. - These three appeals arise out of a common judgment passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal dated 23.2.1995 decreeing the three claim petitions for different amounts, and holding the Insurer also jointly and severely liable for the entire amount. All the three claim petitions arise out of the same accident, as all the victims were passengers in the same jeep, and as such these appeals are being decided by this common judgment. 2. Brief facts of the case are that on 10.7.1992 deceased Padma Ram, Chaina Ram, and the injured Hamu Ram, were travelling in Jonga Jeep No. RSF-8247, being driven by the respondent Neemb Singh, during the night while going on the road leading from Barmer to Jaisalmer about 29 kms. from Bariyada towards Jaisalmer, the accident occurred as a result of fast, and negligent driving of the Jeep, resulting into death of two deceased, and injuries to the third claimant. 3. The legal representatives of the deceased so also the injured filed 15 three separate claim petitions. 4. Neemb Singh and Insurance Company filed reply in all the three claim petitions, while Narpat Singh respondent filed reply only in two claim petitions having been filed by Hamu Ram and Chhothi Devi etc., and did not file any reply in claim petition filed by Varju. 5. The stand taken by Narpat Singh is that he had already sold away the vehicle to Neemb Singh before accident, and had delivered a duly signed sale letter to him, and as such he is not liable for any compensation. It was also pleaded that after the accident it was Neemb Singh who obtained the delivery of the vehicle from the Court projecting himself to be the owner. 6. Neemb Singh came forward with the plea of having driven the vehicle with care and caution, and with slow speed. In para 8 he denied to have caused any accident. Then in other paras he maintained the plea of absence of any negligence, and therefore, no liability to be accruing against him, or the owner. The claim was also contended to be highly exaggerated. 7. Insurance Company admitted the vehicle to be insured with it, and contended that since information of transfer was not given to the Insurer, it is not liable. The claim was also contended to be highly exaggerated. 7. Insurance Company admitted the vehicle to be insured with it, and contended that since information of transfer was not given to the Insurer, it is not liable. The other plea taken was that until and unless the vehicle is shown to have been plied under and in accordance with the legal valid permit, during the course of employment, and under the direction of the owner of the vehicle by a valid license holder, the Insurer cannot be held liable. Yet another important plea taken was that the vehicle was insured for private use only, while at the time of accident it was being used as a taxi, and therefore, also the Insurance Company is not liable. The next plea taken was that the vehicle was overloaded with passengers, which also amounts to breach of the policy conditions. 8. The learned trial Court framed six issues in all the claim petitions. All the three claim petitions were separately tried so far as the evidence of the claimants is concerned, however, since no evidence was led by the defendant Narpat Singh and Neemb Singh, and the Insurance Company examined NAW 1 R.R. Munot, whose statements were recorded in Claim Petition No. 74 of 1992, and with consent of the parties, the copy of his statement was taken on record in the other two claim petitions also. After completing the trial the learned trial Court decreed the claim petitions as above. 9. While deciding the claim petitions, the learned Trial Court considered the evidence of all the five witnesses, whose statements were recorded in different claim petitions (together), and while deciding issue No. 1 it was held that Neemb Singh had driven the vehicle negligently, which results into accident causing death of Padma Ram and Chaina Ram. so also causing 10 injuries to Hamu Ram, in the opinion of the learned trial Court nothing could be elicited in the cross-examination of the witnesses, and thus issue No. 1 was decided in favour of the claimants. While deciding issue No. 2 considering the evidence of different claimants, the claimants were held to be entitled to different amounts, in different claim petitions. Issue No. 3 which 15 related to maintainability of claim petitions, for want of it being in prescribed Performa, was decided against the defendants. While deciding issue No. 2 considering the evidence of different claimants, the claimants were held to be entitled to different amounts, in different claim petitions. Issue No. 3 which 15 related to maintainability of claim petitions, for want of it being in prescribed Performa, was decided against the defendants. Then while deciding other issues, relating to liability of Insurance Company, it was held that the witness of the Insurance Company did depose that the vehicle was being driven in violation of the policy conditions, but then he had admitted that the insurance 20 cover was issued covering third party risk, for which a premium of Rs. 240/- was charged, and Rs. 15/- was charged as premium, and that the policy was issued for personal and professional use, as such it cannot be said that by carrying passengers in the Jeep any violation of the policy conditions was committed. With these findings the Insurance Company was held liable. 10. Assailing the impugned judgment, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that, it is clearly established on record that the Jeep was hired for a sum of Rs. 450/- for carrying the 'Barat (marriage patty), and while returning after marriage, those 'Barat is' were travelling in the Jeep when the accident occurred. Learned counsel relied upon the relevant 30 stipulation in the policy, confining the use of the vehicle for private and professional purposes, by referring to the policy Ex.N.A.1 and cover note Ex A/3, and for the purpose of establishing that the vehicle was not supposed to be used for carrying the passengers for hire and reward. Learned counsel relied upon the certified copy of the First Information Report available on record having been produced by the claimants, and lodged by the nephew of the bride groom, who was an occupant of the Jeep. 11. On the basis of the above it was contended that since it is clearly established that the vehicle was being used for carrying passengers for hire and reward, while the vehicle was insured and registered for private use only, Insurance Company is not liable, and the learned trial Court has erred in holing it liable. 12. 11. On the basis of the above it was contended that since it is clearly established that the vehicle was being used for carrying passengers for hire and reward, while the vehicle was insured and registered for private use only, Insurance Company is not liable, and the learned trial Court has erred in holing it liable. 12. On the contrary, learned counsel for the claimants contended that no evidence had been led by the insured about the vehicle being used for carrying passengers for hire or reward, the First Information Report, act according to the learned counsel has not been proved, nor marked exhibit. It was also contended that there is even no clear plea on the side of Insurance Company has failed to prove the plea sought to be advanced before this Court, and in view of the language of Section 149(2)(i)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act Insurance Company is liable. 13. On the authority of the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satpal Singh, 2000 ACJ 1 & National Insurance Co. v. Nirmla Bai, 2000 ACJ 932 , it was contended that under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Insurance Company is liable for death, or bodily injury to any person' which includes every person, who incurs death, caused by, or arising by, use of any vehicle, and that the passenger in the vehicle is covered by 'third party risk', and therefore, since the policy did cover 'third party risk' the Insurance Company is liable to the claimants, so as to cover the 'third party risk'. 14. An alternative argument was also raised on the authority of judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in New Asiatic Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pessumal Dhanamal Aswani, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1436 & in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kamla, reported in 2001 ACJ 843 (SC) , to contend that even if it is found that there has been a breach of the conditions of the policy, still Insurer should pay the amount, and it may be held to be entitled to recover it from the insured. 15. I have considered the rival submissions, and have closely gone through the record. 16. 15. I have considered the rival submissions, and have closely gone through the record. 16. Before proceeding to undertake the legal exercise on the question of liability of the Insurance Company, I think it appropriate to first clear that factual controversy, as to whether it is established on record that at the time of accident the vehicle was being used for carrying passengers for hire or reward. The Insurance cover is an admitted document as it has been admitted in Claim Case No. 82 of 1992 Chothi Bai v. Neemb Singh , and even otherwise it is clearly proved from the evidence of NAW 1 R.R. Munot, and this cover note clearly restricts the use of the vehicle for private and 25 professional case, i.e. only in connection with the in sured's business,. A reading of the various clauses of liabilities and exceptions, contained in the policy, do make it clear that the policy is an "act policy" only, inasmuch as the liability is restricted to the extent as is necessary to meet the requirement of Motor Vehicles Act, subject to the vehicle being used in accordance with 30 the limitations as to use. Likewise in additional pleas the Insurance Co. has clearly taken a plea, that the vehicle was authorised to be used for private purposes only while at the time of accident it was being used by way of taxi. During the course of arguments various dictionaries were referred to the learned counsel, and now it is not in dispute that using the vehicle as taxi,obviously means, using of the vehicle for carrying passengers for hire or reward. 17. In this background taking up evidence of the parties, NAW 1 R.R. Munot has clearly deposed, in his examination in chief, that at the time of accident the vehicle was being used as taxi, while according to the policy 40 conditions it could be used only for private purposes. In cross-examination he has maintained that the policy was issued only for private and professional use of the vehicle. Regarding premium he has deposed that Rs. 240/- were charged to cover 'third party risk' and Rs. 15/- were charged to cover the risk of driver under Workmen's Compensation Act. Nothing has been put to this 45 witness to discredit his statement about the vehicle being used as taxi. Regarding premium he has deposed that Rs. 240/- were charged to cover 'third party risk' and Rs. 15/- were charged to cover the risk of driver under Workmen's Compensation Act. Nothing has been put to this 45 witness to discredit his statement about the vehicle being used as taxi. Then coming to the evidence of the claimants, in the claim petition of Chothi, AW 1 Chothi herself has admitted in cross-examination that the vehicle wherein the marriage party was carried was Jonga Jeep and was taken for hire. Then AW 2 Bagta Ram has deposed in cross- examination that, deceased Padma Ram and Chaina Ram were his nephews, Jonga Jeep was hired by Luna Ram, and that they have no relations with Neemb Singh, or Narpat Singh. It is also admitted that the marriage party was of his nephew. Likewise in the claim of Varju also AW 2 Bagta Ram has deposed the same things as mentioned above. In this background in the claim of Hamu Ram, in the cross-examination he has deposed that he is not aware as to how much fare was paid for the vehicle. Thus, in my view even from the evidence of the claimants, it is clear that, even according to them, the vehicle was hired one. 5 -hen a look at the First Information Report which is a certified copy, obtained from the criminal file, shows that it purports to be lodged by Rana Ram, alleging that some 10-12 persons had gone to village Tej palta in the marriage party of his newphew Maga Ram on 8.7.1992, and while returning in the Jeep No. 8247 belonging to Neemb Singh, hired for Rs. 4501-, which was being driven by Neemb Singh himself, was driven negligently, and without light, the accident occurred. 4501-, which was being driven by Neemb Singh himself, was driven negligently, and without light, the accident occurred. True it is the FIR has not been formally proved, nor formally tendered in evidence, but then the fact remains that, from the perusal of the record it is clear that the certified copy has been produced by the claimants themselves, and in view of the judgment of this Court, in is A.S.R.T.C. v. Nand Kishore, reported in 2002 ACJ 1564 , which proceeds on the basis of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court Madamanchi Fiamappa v. Muthalum Bojjappa, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1633 , that if the document is certified copy of the public document, it need not be proved by calling a witness, and that strict rules of Evidence Act are not to be insisted on by the Tribunal having limited jurisdiction. It has also been observed in Nand Kishore's case that the Tribunal, while dealing with the case of compensation of motor vehicles accident, are to allow such summary procedure as it thought fit, and the certified copy of the FIR, inspection map and site inspection memo, Panchhnama, injury report, or the postmortem report, as the case may be and, other relevant documents prepared by the police or the doctor, while discharging official duty are admissible in evidence without there being a formal proof. In that view of the matter it is overwhelmingly clear that, at the time of accident the vehicle was being used for carrying passengers for hire and reward. 18. The question then remains is as to whether the Insurance Company is liable to indemnify for the death or bodily injuries to such passengers, being carried for hire and reward in a private vehicle. 19. Since the policy is a policy covering the risk only to the extent as is necessary to meet the requirements of Motor Vehicles Act, it is to be seen as to what are the requirements of the Act, and the clear answer is that the requirements are mentioned in Section 147 of the Act, as it existed at the relevant time of accident, which I may gainfully reproduce as under "147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability. Requirements of policies and limits of liability. (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2). (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the 45 death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; Provided that a policy shall not be required (I) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee or a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee. (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is pubic service engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle; or (ii) to cover any contractual liability. Explanation. For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in pubic place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place." 20. The thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the claimants is that in view of the clear language of Section 147 as it then existed, the insurer is required to insure against the liability which may be incurred in respect of "death of or bodily injury to any person" "or damage to property of any third party". According to the learned counsel for passengers, even in a private car is covered by the expression "any person" so also by the expression "third 25 party", and therefore, even if they are held to be passengers of private car the Insurance Company is liable. Strong reliance in this regard has been placed on a judgment of this Court in Nirmla Bai's case. A perusal of this judgment shows that in that case the Car No. RNO 900 while going from Jaipur to Jodhpur turned down near Beawar, in which an occupant Prakash Rai died, and the claim was laid by the legal representatives. The claim was decreed and the Insurance Co. was held liable. The policy is that case was also act only policy and it covered third party risk according to Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In that background it was contended on the side of the claimants that Section 147 of the Act has completely changed the position of law which was occurring in 1939 Act, and the provisions which was occurring in proviso (ii) to Section 95(1)(b) stand omitted in Section 147 of the Act 1988, and the Insurance Co. is not absolved in respect of the persons carried in or upon the vehicle, and that the term 'any person' used in section 147(1)(b)(i) of the Act includes every person who incurs death of or bodily injury caused by use of any motor vehicle and the passenger of any vehicle is covered by third party risk. This Court in para 6 held that the expression 'third party' has not been defined, and then proceeded to hold that normally and ordinarily, a contract of insurance has two parties to it, the insurer and the insured. Therefore, any party other than the contracting party of the contract of insurance becomes and can be called as third party. The use of the words and expression 'third party' clearly indicates that, it refers to a party, who is neither the first party, nor the second party to a contract of insurance. Therefore, any party other than the contracting party of the contract of insurance becomes and can be called as third party. The use of the words and expression 'third party' clearly indicates that, it refers to a party, who is neither the first party, nor the second party to a contract of insurance. With this logic it was held that the expression 'third party' includes every person being a person travelling in vehicle, or any other vehicle, or one walking on the road. Then quoting the part of language of Section 147(1)(b)(i) it was held that 'any person' used in this provision included every person who incurs death caused by or arising out at the use of the vehicle, and the passenger in the vehicle is covered by the third party risk. Reliance was placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amrit Lal Sooci v. Smt. Kaushalya Devi Thapar, reported in 1998 ACJ 531 : JT 1998(2) SC 484 , wherein it was observed that, the expression any person' would undoubtedly include an occupant of the car who is gratuitously travelling in the car. It was also relied 5 from this very judgment that once the Company has undertaken liability of third party incurred by the person specified in the policy the third party's right to recover any amount under or by virtue of the provisions of the Act is not affected by any condition in the policy". With this the proposition of the insure about the policy not covering liability in respect of a passenger including a gratuitous person, passenger travelling in the car in question itself was not accepted. 21. I may immediately come to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amrit Lal's case, relied upon in Nirmla Bai's case, and I find that in para 4 it has categorically been held as under : "The liability of the insurer in this case depends on the terms of the contract between the insured and the insurer as evident from the policy. Section 94 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 compels the owner of motor vehicles to insure the vehicle to in compliance with the requirements of Chapter VIII of the Act. Section 94 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 compels the owner of motor vehicles to insure the vehicle to in compliance with the requirements of Chapter VIII of the Act. Section 95 of the Act provides that policy of insurance must be one which insures the person against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of death or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of third party caused by or rising out of the use of the vehicles in a public place. The section does not however require a policy to cover the risk to passengers who are not carried for hire or reward. The statutory insurance does not cover injury suffered by occupants of the vehicle who are carried for the hire or reward and the insurer cannot be held liable under the Act. But that does not prevent an insurer from entering into a contract of insurance covering a risk wider than the minimum requirement of the 30 statute whereby the risk to gratuitous passengers could also be covered. In such cases where the policy is not merely a statutory policy, the terms of the policy have to be considered to determine the liability of the insurer." (Emphasis supplied) 22. Then on a plain reading of the judgment find that on interpretation of the policy in para 5, it was found that in that case the policy was admittedly a 'Comprehensive policy' being All risk insurance', and therefore, it was found that so far as the gratuitous passengers are concerned there is no limitation in the policy as such, therefore, it was found that under the terms of the policy the insurer is liable to satisfy the award passed in favour 40 of the claimants. Thus, the ratio of the case is that the statutory requirement do not require the covered risk of gratuitous passenger in a private car but it is always open to the insured to obtain an extended cover covering a higher risk which in view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court had been obtained in that case, and therefore, the Insurance Co. was held liable. was held liable. That apart in Amrit Lal's case the accident occurred on 25.8.1970, and thus the matter was covered by the provisions of the old Act while in the present case the accident is of the year 1992, and therefore, is to be covered by the provisions of the New Act of 1988. 23. Thus, with all humility at my command, I am constrained to find that the judgment in Amrit Lal's case is not authority for the proposition to the effect that in cases of act policy only, the insurer would be liable or death or bodily injury to gratuitous passenger of a car, and since judgment of this Court in Nirmla Bai's case is of no assistance to the claimants. The question then, is as to whether the expression any person' used in Section 147(1)(b)(i) includes gratuitous passenger of a private car, or such person falls within the s meaning of 'third party' as contemplated by the aforesaid clause (i). 24. For a proper interpretation of Section 147, it would be beneficial to recapitulate the old corresponding provision of the Old Act of 1939, contained in Section 95. Language whereof is substantially in pari-materia with Section 147, for the present purposes. Section 95 of the old Act reads as under : "95. Requirement of policies and limits of liability. (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which - (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer or by a co-operative society under section 108 to transact the business of an insurer; and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2). (I) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; Provided that a policy shall not required (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee - (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle; (ii) except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of occurred of the event out of which a claim arises, Or (iii) to cover any contractual liability. (2) Subject to the proviso to sub-section (1), a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident up to the following limits, namely (a) where the vehicle is a goods vehicle, a limit of one lakh and fifty thousand rupees in all, including the liabilities, if any, arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of. or bodily injury to, employees (other than the driver), not exceeding six in number being carried in the vehicle; (b) where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, (i) in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward, a limit of fifty thousand rupees in all; (ii) in respect of passengers, a limit of fifteen thousand rupees for each 1 individual passenger; (c) save as provided in clause (d), where the vehicle is a vehicle of any other class, the amount of liability incurred; (d) irrespective of the class of the vehicle, a limit of rupees six 5 thousand in all in respect of damage to any property of a third party." 25. A combined perusal of Section 147(1)(b)(i), as it existed in the year 992, and of Section 195(1)(b)(i) does show that the language of this clause is erbatirri the same, and therefore, for the purpose of comprehending the meaning and scope of the term "third party" assistance may well be taken Horn the judgments arising under old law as well. 26. In that sequence I may refer to judgment Hon'ble Supreme Court Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. M/s. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co, reported in 1977 ACJ 343 , wherein dealing with a case of gratuitous passenger in a private car who died in an accident and considering the is question of liability of insurance Company on the provisions of Section 95 it was I eld as under : "The plea that the word "third party" are wide enough to cover all persons except the persons and the insurer is negatived..." 27. On the facts, in that particular case, since the insurer had issued on extended cover covering risk of passengers, and therefore, up to the scale undertaken, the Insurance Co was held liable to the extent of Rs. 15,000/-and for the balance amount it was not held liable. Thus, it is clear that according to this judgment the term "third party" cannot be said to include any passenger. 15,000/-and for the balance amount it was not held liable. Thus, it is clear that according to this judgment the term "third party" cannot be said to include any passenger. The judgment in Nirmla Bai's case taking a contrary view in para 6 on the logic of the victim being neither first party, nor the second party to the contract of insurance is included in the term "third party", and, therefore, be not said to be binding on the face of judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pushpa Bai's case. 28. Learned counsel for the claimants has then relied upon another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. v. Rula, reported in AIR 2000 SC 1082 wherein it has been held as under : "...The manifest object of this provision is to ensure that third party, who suffers injury due to use of motor vehicle, may be able to get damage from the owner of the vehicle and recover ability of the damages may not depend on the financial condition or solvency of the driver of the vehicle who had caused the injuries. Thus any contract of insurance under Chapter 11 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 contemplates a third party who is not a signatory or a party to the contract of insurance but is, nevertheless, protected by such contract. The rights of the third party to get indemnified can be exercised only against the insurer of the vehicle." 29. On an over all reading of this judgment it becomes more then clear that it predominantly proceeds on the basis of the provisions of the Contract Act as is clear from para 4 and 5 of the judgment, and then in as para 6 it has been discussed as to when it becomes enforceable, and was Held that : "Normally, a liability under the contract of insurance would arise only on payment of premium if such payment was made a condition precedent to the Insurance Policy taking effect. But such a condition which is intended for the benefit of the insurer can be waived by the insurer... These are the principles relating to an ordinary contract of insurance relating to motor vehicles has to be understood in the light of the various provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988." 30. But such a condition which is intended for the benefit of the insurer can be waived by the insurer... These are the principles relating to an ordinary contract of insurance relating to motor vehicles has to be understood in the light of the various provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988." 30. Then the provisions of Sections 146, 147(5), and then Section 149 was referred, and in that backdrop the above observations were made in para 9 of 5 the judgment. Thus this judgment really speaking is an authority on the question of privity of contract between the victim or his legal representatives on the one hand and the insurer on the other hand, and in that context the victim has been addressed as a "third party", and has decided the scope and effect of the provisions of Section 147(5) of the Act. But Hon'ble Supreme Court has not at all laid down in this judgment that for the purposes of and within the meaning of the expression used in Section 147(1)(b)(i) the victim of the claimants are "Third Party". Hence this judgment is not of any help to the claimants in the present case. 31. I may further dilate a bit on this aspect. According to Section 95(1)(b), 15 or for that matter Section 147(1)(b), the Insurance Policy must insure the person or class of person specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2). Under Section 95(2) the limits of liability was prescribed, and a look at sub-section (2) as quoted above would show that under clause (a) it provided a total liability of Rs. 1,50,000/- in all including liabilities, if any, arising under 20 Workmen's Compensation Act in respect of death or bodily injury to the employee other than driver not exceeding six member being carried in the vehicle, in cases of vehicle in which passengers were carried for hire or reward or by reason or in pursuance of contract of employment, under clause (b)(i) in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward a limit of Rs. 50,000/- in all was prescribed, while under clause (b)(ii) in respect of passengers a limit of Rs. 15,000/- for each individual passenger was fixed. 50,000/- in all was prescribed, while under clause (b)(ii) in respect of passengers a limit of Rs. 15,000/- for each individual passenger was fixed. Then in clause (c) except otherwise provided in clause (b) where the vehicle is of an other class the extent of liability fixed was, the amount of liability incurred, clause (b) of course related to limit for property damage. Thus a reading of these various clauses and sub-clauses of sub-section (2) makes it clear that, there was a distinction made by the legislature, dividing the victims in two categories; one being the passengers in the vehicle, and the second being others. The passengers again did fell in various categories, like, driver, or conductor examining tickets in the vehicle, or the employee not exceeding six a number being carried in the vehicle, or passengers being carried for hire or reward; and in respect of each of such person different limits were prescribed. At the same time without giving any nomenclature to the other victims, no specific limit was prescribed about the liability of Insurance Co. except that over all limits was prescribed depending on the 40 nature of the vehicle. 32. Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.K. Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutty, reported in AIR 1987 SC 2158 considered the aspect of limit of liability of Insurance Co. in detail, and held that the limits prescribed by various clauses of sub-section (2) are the limits upto which the Insurance Co. is 45 liable subject to over all limits. This also shows that definite distinction is maintained to categorize the victims in two categories, being, passengers, and other than passengers, which can appropriately be defined as "third parties." 33. Obviously according to the logic of Nirmla Bai's case the so passenger travelling in the vehicle in whatever capacity except the owner is never a party to the contract of insurance whether as a first party or second party, and therefore, if such passenger were also to be taken as third party then the persons becoming victims though not travelling in the vehicle also stood at par with the passenger being third party, in that view of the matter the distinction made by the legislature about the extent of limit of liability became meaningless. 34. 34. Thus, I am not inclined to subscribe to the view that gratuitous s passenger in a private car can be included in the expression "third party" within the meaning of Section 147(1)(b)(i). 35. Coming to the expression "any person" again, in my humble opinion a bare comprehensive, harmonious, and meaningful reading of Section 147, by itself makes it clear that the words any person" do not include passengers. A reading if Section 147(1)(b)(i) shows that it requires the insurance cover, to cover the liability in respect of death, or bodily injury, obviously to person, so also damage, obviously to property, and it is to quality this that the word "any" has been prefixed to "person", so also to property, when it incorporates "death of or bodily injury to any person", "or damage to any property of a third party". Therefore, this clause (i) rather comprehends the requirement of risk to he covered qua "third parties", whether it be risk to person or risk to property. Then clause (ii) requires the cover of risk i.e. death or bodily injury to any passenger, and significantly this provides for passenger of a public service vehicle. Then the proviso again comprehends the requirement of risk to be covered qua specified nature of passenger like driver, conductor, or employees, being carried in the goods vehicle, and provides that, the liability required to be covered is, only the one arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 36. I may pause here and express myself that if the expression "any person" in clause 9(i) were to be so comprehensive enough, as to include all victims, then all these subsequent clauses and proviso, to say the least are bare surplusage. It is settled law that on canons of interpretation of statutes, the statute is not to be interpreted in such a manner as may be render any provision redundant, and therefore, if harmoniously construed, the only conclusion deducible is that, clause (i) comprehends "third party" while clause (ii) comprehends "passenger", and since the risk to passenger required to be covered is only for such passengers who are passengers of public service vehicle, and therefore, risk to gratuitous passengers to be covered, unless of course the insured takes an extended cover, which it is always open to insurer to issue, and which in the present case, admittedly, is not issued. 37. 37. I may also refer to yet another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani, reported in JT 2002(10) SC 162 , which partly overruled the earlier judgment of Hon'ble Supreme 40 Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satpal Singh, reported in 2000 ACJ 1 . These cases though related to cases of victims travelling in the goods vehicle, and the provisions of Section 147(1)(b)(i), as incorporated in the 1988 Act, and as amended by Amendment Act of 1994, were considered. By amendment of 1994, after the words "any person", the words "including 45 owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle" were inserted and partly overruling Satpal Singh's case, it was held that, prior to the amendment of 1994, it was not necessary for the insurer to insure the risk of the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in the goods vehicle, while it was required to be covered after the amendment. Rather in Asha Rani's case in para 10. Hon'ble Supreme Court in less categoric term held as under : "....even if widest interpretation is given to the expression "to any person" it will not cover either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in the vehicle..." 38. Then Hon'ble the Supreme Court continued to hold as under : "The objects and reasons of clause 46 also states that it seeks to amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle for the purposes of liability under the insurance policy, it is no doubt true that sometimes the legislature amends the law by way of amplification and clarification of an inherent position which is there in the statute, but a plain meaning being given to the words used in the statute ,as it stood prior to its amendment of 1994 and as it stands subsequent to its amendment in 1994 and bearing in mind the objects and reasons engrafted in the amended provisions referred to the earlier, it is difficult for us to construe that the expression "including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle' which was added to the pre-existed expression 'injured to any person' is either classificatory or amplification of the pre-existing statute. On the other hand it clearly demonstrates that the legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of section 147 and making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in case of a goods vehicle, the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle...." 39. This judgment does further make it clear that the expression "any person" cannot be given a meaning as intended to be given by the learned counsel for the claimants nor can it be said that the passenger in the vehicle 25 falls within the expression "third party" within the meaning of Section 147(1)(b)(i). 40. At this place I may also refer to yet another recent judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in T.V. Jose v. Chacko P.M., reported in AIR 2001 SCW 3910 , wherein dealing with the question of liability of Insurance 30 Co. for death of passenger of a private car where the policy was third party (act policy) and dealing with the expression "any person" and the term "third party" previous judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amrit Lal Sood's case Pushpa Bai's case so also in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore, reported in AIR 1988 SC 719 , were also considered and in para 9 it was held as under : "... As has been set out herein above the law on this subject is clear, a third party policy does not cover liability to gratuitous passengers who are not carried for hire or reward..." 41. Taking up the aspect of non-liability of the insurer on account of the 40 breach of conditions of the policy, suffice it to say that as found above, under section 147 of the risk of passengers of a public service vehicle is required to be covered. The term "public service vehicle" has been defined in Section 2(35) to mean any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a maxi-cab, a motor-cub contract carriage, and stage carriage. The term "public service vehicle" has been defined in Section 2(35) to mean any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a maxi-cab, a motor-cub contract carriage, and stage carriage. Likewise Section 2(33) defines a "private service vehicle" to mean a motor vehicle construed or adapted to carry more than six persons including the driver and ordinarily used by or on behalf of the owner of such vehicle for the purpose of carrying persons for, or in connection with, his trade or business otherwise than for hire or reward but does not include a motor vehicle used for public purpose. 42. Leaving apart the question as to whether vehicle was registered as a public service vehicle or not, it was not insured as a public service vehicle, rather it was insured as a private vehicle. which obviously does not require to I cover the risk of passengers. Much was contended on the side of the claimants on the basis of judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kamla , (supra) that even if there is breach of condition of policy, the Insurance Company should make payment and should recover it from the insured, and for that purpose reliance was placed on the provisions of Section 149(4). I may reproduce the relevant sub-section (4) along with its proviso, or ready reference, which reads as under : "(4) Where a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (3) of Section 147 to the person by whom a policy has been effected, so much of the policy as purports to restrict the insurance of the persons insured thereby by reference to any conditions other than those in clause (b) of sub-section (2) shall, as respects such liabilities as are required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 147, be of no effect : Provided that any sum paid by the insurer in or towards the discharge of any liability of any person which is covered by the policy by virtue only of this sub-section shall be recoverable by the insurer from that person." 43. A bare look at this provision shows that it is merely intended to provide a remedy to the insurer to recover back the amount which it may have been compelled to pay for any reason, under the orders of the Tribunal, and thus not to leave it remedy less. Likewise it comprehends a situation only where the policy has been effected "as respects such liabilities as are required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 25 147", and as discussed above none of the clauses of Section 147(1)(b) requires the coverage of risk of passenger in a private car. As such the contention toes not hold good. Obviously, therefore, I need not go into aspects of breach of conditions of the policy, in the present case. 44. Learned counsel for the claimant has also relied upon a Division 30 Bench judgment of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Bhanwari Devi, reported in 2001(2) WLC 440 to contend that the gratuitous passenger is included in the expression "third party", and the expression "any person" is wide enough to include a gratuitous passenger as well as the person who sits in goods vehicle after paying money. Suffice it to say that while defining the term "third party" this Court has only considered the Stroud's Judicial Dictionary meaning and has followed the Privy Council decision in Digby v. General Accidents Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, 1943 AC 121 and then has followed the philosophy propounded by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in New Asiatic Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Peesumal's case. While as discussed above this expression has sufficiently been a subject matter of adjudication of Hon'ble Supreme Court it number of recent Supreme Court judgments which have all not been considered in this judgment. Likewise regarding the term "any person", the judgment proceeds on one judgment of Hon'ble Orissa High Court reported iii AIR 1996 Orissa 120 and Satpal Singh's case. Likewise regarding the term "any person", the judgment proceeds on one judgment of Hon'ble Orissa High Court reported iii AIR 1996 Orissa 120 and Satpal Singh's case. In this regard also suffice it to say that in Asha Rani's case, the decision in Satpal Singh's case has Expressly been overruled and in view of the decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court referred to above there is ample authority of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to the effect that expression "any person" do not include so gratuitous passenger but then all these judgments have not been considered b this Court in Bhanwari Devi's case. 45. In that view of the matter, despite Banwari Devi's case being a Division Bench judgment since it proceeds on a judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court which has subsequently been overruled, and it has not taken into account various other Supreme Court judgments referred to 5 herein above, this judgment cannot be said to be a binding precedent on me. 46. The net result of the aforesaid discussion is that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court on the question of liability of the appellant cannot be sustained and are required to be set-aside. 47. Accordingly the present appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment and award is modified in the manner that while maintaining the award of compensation to the claimants, it is held that the Insurance Co., the appellant, is not liable for payment of compensation. However, it is made clear that whatever amounts may have so far been paid by the appellant, it shall be entitled to recover from the owner and/or driver. The parties are left to bear their own costs. *******