JUDGMENT - BRAHME P.S., J.:---Heard Shri S.A. Jaiswal, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri Bhushan Gavai, learned Public Prosecutor for respondents. 2. The petitioner has challenged through this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the validity and legality of the order of detention dated 25-11-2002 passed by the respondent No. 2, the Commissioner of Police, Nagpur in exercise of powers under section 3(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slum Lords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (Amendment of 1996) (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act"). 3. The said order of detention as well as the grounds of detention also of the same date and documents relied upon by the Detaining Authority were served on the petitioner on 27-11-2002. The order of detention was approved by the State Government on 4-12-2002. The State Government made reference under section 10 of the said Act to the Advisory Board on 5-12-2002. The Advisory Board gave opinion for confirmation of the order of detention on 26-12-2002. The order of detention came to be confirmed by the State of Maharashtra on 31-12-2002. 4. The petitioner had committed "12" offences in the past, details of which have been given in para 2 of the Grounds of Detention (Annexure-2). Reference to these past offences is just to show his inclination tendencies towards commission of criminal acts which were prejudicial to maintenance of public order. The Detaining Authority noticed that the petitioner was earlier externed from Nagpur city for two years with a view to prevent him from indulging in criminal activities. The petitioner was also detained under the said Act vide Order No. DET/MPDA/Zone-I PCB/5/2000 dated 1-2-2000. However, there was no effect on the petitioner in as much as after release, he continued his violation and desperate acts with renewed vigor. The Detaining Authority then referred to petitioner's recent criminal activities committed in the year 2002 vide three criminal offences registered at Police Station, Ajni, viz. 1) Crime No. 20/2002 under section 324, r/w 34 I.P.C., 2) Crime No. 3115/2002 under sections 294, 506-B of I.P.C. and 3) Crime No. 52/2002 under sections 452, 302 of I.P.C. Details of these offences are given in para 6.1.1. to 1.1.7., 6.2.1. to 6.2.5. and 6.3.1. to 6.3.10. of the grounds of detention. 1) Crime No. 20/2002 under section 324, r/w 34 I.P.C., 2) Crime No. 3115/2002 under sections 294, 506-B of I.P.C. and 3) Crime No. 52/2002 under sections 452, 302 of I.P.C. Details of these offences are given in para 6.1.1. to 1.1.7., 6.2.1. to 6.2.5. and 6.3.1. to 6.3.10. of the grounds of detention. In the third crime which was arising out of the incident that took place on 24-2-2002, the petitioner was released on bail on 24-6-2002. After his release, he continued his criminal activities. He was terrorizing the people. He created reign of terror. But none could dare to give report to the Police Station. It was after the victims were taken in confidence and being assured to keep secret their name, that police authorities could record statements on 21-8-2002 of witness 'A' and 'B' which are referred in para 7.1 and 7.2 in the grounds of detention. These in camera statements relate to the incidents that took place on 19-8-2002 and 20-8-2002. 5. On 3-10-2002 one application signed by people residing in Parvatinagar locality was received by Police Inspector, Police Station, Ajni, Nagpur complaining about petitioner's notorious criminal activities including extracting money by extortion and threatening to kill. The Detaining Authority, taking into consideration material placed before him when proposal was made, including three recently crimes, in camera statements of witnesses A and B, complaint made to Police Station by the people of Parvatinagar Locality, found that since after release on bail the petitioner has been indulging in such criminal offences and he was likely to indulge in activities extremely prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in near future. The Detaining Authority after having formed subjective satisfaction that the petitioner should be detained under the said Act with a view to curb and prevent him from committing criminal acts which would be extremely prejudicial to maintenance of public order, passed the impugned order of detention. 6. The petitioner has challenged this order of detention on various grounds averred in the petition. But Counsel for petitioner, restricted his challenge on following grounds: (1) The impugned order of detention is vitiated as Detaining Authority has not specified in the order of detention initial period of detention. (2) There is no livelink between the criminal activity committed by the petitioner and the order of detention. But Counsel for petitioner, restricted his challenge on following grounds: (1) The impugned order of detention is vitiated as Detaining Authority has not specified in the order of detention initial period of detention. (2) There is no livelink between the criminal activity committed by the petitioner and the order of detention. (3) Translation of documents, in the language which petitioner knows and understands is not supplied and thereby his right to make effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India is violated. (4) Detaining authority has not given progress report of the previous order of detention and externment. (5) The Detaining Authority has considered old and stale criminal cases and previous detention orders. As such there is no livelink and therefore, there was no application of mind by the Detaining Authority. (6) There has been total non-application of mind in as much as the Detaining Authority has, in fact, considered the material relating to old criminal cases which is said to have been not considered and documents in support of them were not supplied to the petitioner. (7) The Detaining Authority has not considered the representation made by the petitioner on 4-12-2002 which in turn violated his right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. (8) The Detaining Authority, instead of taking recourse to action for cancellation of order granting bail to the petitioner, at once resorted to stringent action of detention of petitioner. This indicates non-application of mind. (9) There is undue delay in passing impugned detention order which vitiates the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. 7. In his return filed vide Stamp No. 495/03 the Detaining Authority replied all the grounds raised by the petitioner in his petition. The same would be referred to hereinafter while dealing with grounds placed into service by the Counsel for the petitioner. 8. We now deal with the grounds one by one. (Ground No. 1) : Mr. Jaiswal, learned Counsel placing reliance on the decision of this Court in (Criminal Writ Petition No. 443/2002)1, submitted that this Court has held that the order of detention is vitiated on the ground that period of detention is not specified by the Detaining Authority in the order of detention. That decision in Criminal Writ Petition No. 443/2002 was by the Division Bench of which one of us (Brahme, J.) was member. That decision in Criminal Writ Petition No. 443/2002 was by the Division Bench of which one of us (Brahme, J.) was member. It is apparent from the judgment in that writ petition that placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in 1988 (Supp.) S.C.C. page 568 (Commissioner of Police and another, appellants v. Gurubax Anandram Bhiryani, Respondent)2, this Court has held that the order of detention is vitiated for the reason that initially period of detention has not been mentioned or specified in the order of detention. Mr. Gavai, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for respondents pointed out that the said decision in 1988(Supp.) S.C.C. 568 (supra) has been overruled by the Apex Court in subsequent decision by the Apex Court in (Miss T. Devaki, Petitioner v. Government Tamil Nadu and others, respondents)3, reported in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1086. In para 12 the Apex Court has observed: "Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug Offenders Act, 1981 is identical in terms to section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Act. Section 3 of Maharashtra Act does not require the State Government, District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police to specify period of detention in the order made by them for detaining any person with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Section 3(1) confers power on the State Government to make order directing detaining of a person does not require the State Government to specify the period of detention. Similarly sub-section (2) or (3) of section 3 do not require the District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police to specify period of detention while exercising their powers under sub-section (1) of section 3. The observations made by Apex Court in Bhiryani's case that the scheme of Maharashtra Act was different from the provisions contained in other similar Acts and that section 3 of the Act contemplated initial period of detention for three months at a time are not correct. The scheme as contained in other Acts providing for detention of a person without trial, is similar." 9. In para 15 the Apex Court further observed as under: "It is thus clear that view taken in Gurubux Bhiryani's case, 1988 (Supp.) S.C.C. 568, on the interpretation of section 5 of the Maharashtra Act is incorrect. The scheme as contained in other Acts providing for detention of a person without trial, is similar." 9. In para 15 the Apex Court further observed as under: "It is thus clear that view taken in Gurubux Bhiryani's case, 1988 (Supp.) S.C.C. 568, on the interpretation of section 5 of the Maharashtra Act is incorrect. This Court has while considering the question of the validity of the detention order made under different Act, consistently taken the view that it is not necessary for the Detaining Authority or the State Government to specify the period of detention in the order. In the absence of any period being specified in the order of detenu is required to be under detention for the maximum period prescribed under the Act, but it is always open to the State Government to modify or revoke the order even before the completion of the maximum period of detention. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order of detention is not rendered illegal on account of Detaining Authority's failure to specify period of detention in the order." 10. In subsequent decision of the Apex Court in case of (Mrs. Harpreet Kaur Harvinder Singh Bedi, Appellant v. State of Maharashtra and another, Respondents)4, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. page 979, has observed that---"the proviso to section 3(2) only lays down that period of delegation of powers specified in the order to be made by the State Government under sub-section (2), delegating to the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, the powers in sub-section (1) shall not in the first instance exceed three months. The proviso therefore has nothing to do with the period of detention of the detenu. The maximum period of detention is prescribed under section 13 which lays down that a person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order made under the Act, which has been confirmed under section 12. It cannot therefore, be said that the order of detention in the instant case was vitiated because it was for a period of more than three months. 11. It cannot therefore, be said that the order of detention in the instant case was vitiated because it was for a period of more than three months. 11. It goes without saying that while deciding the Criminal Writ Petition No. 443/2002 the decision of the Apex Court in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1086 was not brought to the notice of the Court and therefore, this Court decided that matter on the basis of the decision of the Apex Court in Gurubax, 1988 (Supp.) S.C.C. 568 (supra). In view of the decision of the Apex Court in 1990 S.C. 1086 and also in A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 979, the order of detention is not vitiated on the ground of failure on the part of the Detaining Authority in specifying the period of detention in the order of detention. This is the correct legal position as now stands. Therefore, there is no substance in the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner. 12. Ground No. 2: The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that there is no livelink between the criminal activity of the petitioner and the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority. The third Crime No. 52/02 was in respect of offence committed on 24-2-2002. The order of detention is passed on 25-11-2002. In the intervening period no offence has been registered against the petitioner. Admittedly, the proposal for consideration for issuing the detention order against the petitioner was made to the Detaining Authority on 25-9-2002. Mr. Gawai, learned Public Prosecutor pointed out and it is also crystal clear from the grounds of detention that on 21-8-2002 in-camera statements of witnesses 'A' and 'B' came to be recorded by the Police Inspector attached to Police Station, Ajni. It is also borne out from the record that is made available to the Court by learned Public Prosecutor that both the in-camera statements were relating to the incidents that took place on 19th and 20th August, 2002. It is also matter of record that since after release on bail on 26-4-2002 the petitioner continued indulging in criminal activities and has created reign of terror. But the persons who were sufferers and the victims did not dare to make report to the Police Station against the petitioner. It is also matter of record that since after release on bail on 26-4-2002 the petitioner continued indulging in criminal activities and has created reign of terror. But the persons who were sufferers and the victims did not dare to make report to the Police Station against the petitioner. That is how in-camera statements were recorded on 21-8-2002 by the concerned Police Officer by taking the victims in confidence and giving assurance that their names would be kept secret . Therefore, there is no delay as such on the part of the police authorities. Having regard to the fact that complaints have been received against the petitioner in respect of the criminal activities of the petitioner, it is clear that the Detaining Authority has taken into consideration the recent criminal activities of the petitioner. If that is so then there is no substance in the contention of the petitioner that there is no livelink. The Detaining Authority had subjective satisfaction on the basis of the recent criminal activities of the petitioner that the petitioner has not only tendency to indulge into criminal activities, but also has indulged into such prejudicial acts. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner was already enlarged on bail, he was likely to indulge in criminal activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order creating reign of terror. This also shows that the Detaining Authority has rightly applied his mind in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner should be detained by issuing detention order under the Act. In our opinion this is an additional factor which totally falsifies the contention of the petitioner that there was no livelink. 13. Ground No. 7: As regards not deciding representation by the Detaining Authority, the Government Pleader pointed out that the Detaining Authority received three copies of representation made by the petitioner on 4-12-2002. As requested by the petitioner two copies of the representations were submitted to the Government of Maharashtra and Advisory Board on 6-12-2002. He further submitted that Government's approval letter to his detention was also received on 4-12-2002 by the Detaining Authority. The Detaining Authority has no power to consider the representation made by the petitioner and to revoke the detention order once the State Government approved the detention order. 14. It is a matter of record that on 4-12-2002 the Detaining Authority received the representation submitted by the petitioner. The Detaining Authority has no power to consider the representation made by the petitioner and to revoke the detention order once the State Government approved the detention order. 14. It is a matter of record that on 4-12-2002 the Detaining Authority received the representation submitted by the petitioner. It is no doubt true that Detaining Authority has to decide that representation before it is approved by the State Government. As per the provisions contained in the said Act the life of the detaining order passed by the Detaining Authority is in exercise of powers under section 3(1) of the said Act is of 12 days only. In the instant case the Detaining Authority has specifically stated in his affidavit that the State Government has approved the detention order on 4-12-2002 and he has received Government's approval letter to the detention on 4-12-2002. Therefore, the Detaining Authority committed no mistake or illegality in not deciding the representation made by the petitioner. 15. Ground No. 3 : As regards non-supply of translation of the documents a grievance has been made by the petitioner Counsel raising a specific ground in that regard that because of non-supply of translated documents when the petitioner was not knowing either English or Marathi or Hindi language, his right to make effective representation is hampered and on that ground itself the order is vitiated. The Detaining Authority has elaborately dealt with this objection in his return. There is no dispute that if translation of the documents on which the Detaining Authority has relied upon is not supplied to the detenu and that too in the language which he knows and understands, that is detrimental to his right to make effective representation. 15-A. The Apex Court in 2000(5) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)170 : 2000 Criminal Page 42 in the case of (Sophia Gualam, Appellant v. State of Maharashtra, Respondent)5, has observed that the representation could be made and the order of detention can be assailed only when all the grounds on which the order is based are communicated to the detenue and the same material on which these grounds are based are also disclosed and copies thereof are supplied to the person detained in his own language. Thus in the case (Vijay Damaji Gaidhane v. State of Maharashtra)6, reported in 2001(Supp. Thus in the case (Vijay Damaji Gaidhane v. State of Maharashtra)6, reported in 2001(Supp. 2) Bom.C.R. (N.B.)289, also observed that the grounds and documents in support of the detention order should be served on the detenue in the language known to him. Non-supply of documents relied upon by the Detaining Authority in the language known to the detenu had deprived the detenue of exercising his right of making effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. In that case on facts it was found that the right of detenue therein to make effective representation was affected as the material translation of the documents was not supplied. 16. The Detaining Authority has met these objection by contending that the grounds of detention and relevant documents were served on the petitioner on 27-11-2002 and the Police Inspector (Detention Cell) Crime Branch, Nagpur had explained to the petitioner each and every document in Hindi and as the record shows the petitioner has acknowledged and so to say certified in his own hand that the contents of the documents have been explained to him. It is further a matter of record that the petitioner has made representation to the State Government as well as Advisory Board. The petitioner was heard before the order was confirmed by the State Government on the recommendation by the Advisory Board. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the petitioner that his right to representation has been hampered on the ground that the copies of translated documents were not supplied to him. In the background of the fact that the petitioner was explained the documents in the language which he knew and understood, by the Police Officer there is substantial compliance of the requirements and as such there is no room for petitioner to make grievance about the same. It is further eloquent that representation has been made by the petitioner through his Counsel. It is a matter of record that even representation to the Detaining Authority was submitted by the petitioner through his Counsel. If that is so, then the grievance of the petitioner that the documents were not explained to him in his language does not survive. 17. It is a matter of record that even representation to the Detaining Authority was submitted by the petitioner through his Counsel. If that is so, then the grievance of the petitioner that the documents were not explained to him in his language does not survive. 17. Ground No. 9 : Learned Counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the order passed by the Detaining Authority suffers from latches in as much there is inordinance delay in passing the order of detention against the petitioner on 27-11-2002 when the proposal for the same was made on 25-9-2002. The proposal to the Detaining Authority was made on 25-9-2002 which shows that there is delay of almost 7 months from the last criminal activity alleged to have been committed by the petitioner. The Investigating Officer recorded in-camera statements of witnesses "A" and "B" on 21-8-2002. Having regard to the fact that the last offence alleged to have been committed was on 24-2-2002, there is inordinance delay in initiating action against the petitioner for his detention. It is submitted, that Detaining Authority has not explained the delay. The learned Counsel placed reliance on decision in (Writ Petition 327/2001)7, of this Court as also the decision of the Apex Court in (Pradeep Nilkanth Paturkar, Appellant v. Rammurthi and others, respondents)8, 1993 S.C.C.(Cri.) page 392. 18. Learned Public Prosecutor repelled the submissions of the Counsel for the petitioner and submitted that there is absolutely no delay on the part of the Detaining Authority in passing the order of detention after the proposal was received by him. After the last crime was registered on 24-2-2002, the petitioner was released on bail on 24-6-2002. Thereafter, he continued in indulging in prejudicial activities and offences of extortion came to light when in-camera statements of witnesses "A" and "B" were recorded on 21-8-2002. Thereafter, again the complaint was received from the residents of locality Parvati Nagar. The authorities therefore sent proposal to the Detaining Authority on 25-9-2002 and after taking stock of all this material against the petitioner, the Detaining Authority after having satisfied passed the order on 27-11-2002. Therefore, there is no delay as such. It is also submitted that the petitioner has not raised specific ground of delay in the petition. Had he done so, the Detaining Authority would have explained the delay. He further submitted that mere delay by itself is not fatal. Therefore, there is no delay as such. It is also submitted that the petitioner has not raised specific ground of delay in the petition. Had he done so, the Detaining Authority would have explained the delay. He further submitted that mere delay by itself is not fatal. He placed reliance on decision reported in (Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra)9, 1982(2) Bom.C.R. 218 , (Hasan Khan Ibne Haider Khan Appellant v. R.H. Mendonca)10, 2000(5) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)814 19. The Apex Court in 1993 S.C.C.(Cri.) 392 in case of Pradeep Nilkanth Paturkar, Appellant v. S. Rammurthi and others, Respondents, considered the question whether the delay in passing the order of detention has vitiated the said order. In that case the High Court before which the similar contention was raised has negatived that contention observing that the period of 4 months required by the authorities to pass the order can by no stretch of imagination be treated as unduly wrong and therefore, the order of detention did not suffer from the vice of delay. The Apex Court referred to earlier decision in (T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala)11, 1989(4) S.S.C. page 741, in para 10 observed thus:--- "10. The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the livelink between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guide lines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guide lines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the Court has to scrutinise whether the Detaining Authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the Court has to investigate whether the casual connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case." The Apex Court in paragraph 10 observed that: "Delay ipso factor in passing an order of detention after an incident is not fatal to the detention of a person, for, in certain cases delay may be unavoidable and reasonable. What is required by law is that the delay must be satisfactorily examined (sic explained) by the Detaining Authority." 20. The Apex Court taking into consideration all unexplained delay whether short or long, especially when the appellant has taken a specific plea of delay, was constrained to quash the detention order. It is therefore, clear that mere delay ipso facto in passing the order of detention after the incident is not fatal to the detention of a person. In certain cases delay may be unavoidable and reasonable. What is required by law is that delay must be satisfactorily explained by the Detaining Authority. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. The test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. It is also clear that where the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the livelink between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 21. It is also clear that where the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the livelink between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 21. This Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 327/2001 on considering the facts of the case came to the conclusion that Detaining Authority has failed to explain the delay and therefore, this Court found that the order of detention is vitiated on that ground. 22. The Apex Court in 2003(3) S.C.C. 511 In case of Hasan Khan Ibne Haider Khan, Appellant v. R.H. Mendonca and others, while considering the objection to the order of the detention on the ground of delay after considering the facts held that it cannot be said that there was undue delay in passing the order and action was being taken in a routine manner as after completion of the enquiry the matter had to be examined at various levels before passing of the final order. In that case, that criminal proceeding was registered against the detenue with reference to the occurrence which took place on 9-12-1998. Thereafter, the statement of witnesses was recorded. Enquiry was complete in the month of February, 1999 and final order of detention was passed on 12-4-1999. In such circumstances, the Apex Court found that there was no delay at all. 23. In that case on facts it was found that detenue was extorting money from businessmen giving threats to people at public places and assaulting the witnesses near their places of business and when they were seeking help none came forward out of fear of the detenu. The Apex Court held that thereby even tempo of life of the society was affected and such activities amounted to disturbance of public order and disturbance of law and order. In that case the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by detenu wherein the order was challenged on the ground of delay. The Apex Court also dismissed the appeal holding that there was no delay and that the activities of the detenu amounted to disturbance of public order. 24. In that case the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by detenu wherein the order was challenged on the ground of delay. The Apex Court also dismissed the appeal holding that there was no delay and that the activities of the detenu amounted to disturbance of public order. 24. The Apex Court in the case of Smt. Hemlata Kantilal Shah, Petitioner v. State of Maharashtra and another, Respondents, reported in A.I.R. 1982 S.C. page 8, wherein challenge was to the order of detention on the ground of delay, observed that delay ipso facto in passing an order of detention after an incident is not fatal to the detention of a person, for, in certain cases delay may be unavoidable and reasonable. What is required by law that the delay must satisfactorily examined by Detaining Authority. 25. The factual position so far as the case at hand is concerned it can hardly be said that there was delay on the part of the Detaining Authority in passing the order of detention. Even accepting the fact that the last offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner was in the month of February 2002, in the month of August 2002 when statement of witnesses "A" and "B" were recorded, it came to the knowledge of the police authorities that the petitioner has continued in indulging into prejudicial activities, after he was released on bail on 24-6-2002. In addition to that the persons in the locality of Parvati Nagar, filed complaint application making serious allegations against the petitioner pointing out that the petitioner was indulging into the criminal activities including extortion. Thereafter, proposal was made on 25-9-2002 and the Detaining Authority within two months thereafter passed the order of detention. It is pertinent to note that after the petitioner committed offence of murder vide Crime No. 52/2002 and after he was released on bail, he continued in indulging into criminal activities. The police authorities taking into consideration all these subsequent activities, made proposal on 25-9-2002, Had it been the fact that since after 24-2-2002 the petitioner had not committed any offence or indulged into criminal activities, then the Detaining Authority would have been blamed for delay. In view of this factual position, there is no delay and as such the objection by the petitioner to the order of detention does not survive. 26. Ground No. 6:---Mr. In view of this factual position, there is no delay and as such the objection by the petitioner to the order of detention does not survive. 26. Ground No. 6:---Mr. Jaiswal, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Detaining Authority has taken into consideration the extraneous and irrelevant material and it is apparently seen that irrelevant and extraneous material has influenced mind of the Detaining Authority and stealthily crept into a decision of the said authority directing detention of the petitioner. To substantiate his contention, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1272 in (Vashisht Narain Karwaria, Appellant v. State of U.P. and another)12. In that case the Apex Court found that in the ground of detention it was mentioned that detenue created panic and terror at the place of auction of liquor shop and that many cases were registered against the detenue and copies of the documents were supplied to the detenue also. However, these extraneous matters were not referred to in the grounds of detention. Therefore, the Apex Court held that the averments which are extraneous touching the character of the detenue though not referred in the grounds of detention might have influenced the mind of the Detaining Authority to some extent one way or the other in reaching the subjective satisfaction to take a decision of directing the detention of the detenu. 27. This Court in Vijay Damaji Gaidhane v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2001(1) Mh.L.J. page 159, having regard to the extraneous material supplied to the Detaining Authority held that the submissions which were extraneous touching to the character of the detenue though not referred in the grounds of detention might have influenced the mind of the Detaining Authority to some extent one way or the other in reaching the subjective satisfaction to take decision of directing the detention of the detenu. 28. In the case at hand, the Detaining Authority in para 2 of the grounds of detention has very specifically stated that the petitioner was involved in the past in as many as 12 offences mentioned in paragraph 2 which shows his inclination/tendencies towards the commission of serious and grave offences which are against the maintenance of public order. The Detaining Authority has further specifically stated that these offences have not been considered while formulating the order of detention against the petitioner. The Detaining Authority has further specifically stated that these offences have not been considered while formulating the order of detention against the petitioner. However, the copies of the F.I.Rs. are enclosed and supplied to him to show his criminal tendency. The petitioner has made no grievance as to receipt of documents relating to past criminal offences as referred to in paragraph 2 of the grounds of detention. The grounds of detention if taken into consideration, it clearly shows that the Detaining Authority had subjective satisfaction about the prejudicial activities of the petitioner on the basis of the recent criminal offences committed by the petitioner in the year 2002, as also complaints against him in respect of offences of extortion committed by him in the month of August 2002 and the complaints against the petitioner by the persons in the locality of Parvati Nagar. It is therefore, clear that the Detaining Authority had subjective satisfaction as to prejudicial activities of the petitioner on the basis of recent involvement of the petitioner in crimes and that he was not influenced by the past conduct of the petitioner. The Detaining Authority made it clear that offences committed by the petitioner in past were referred to in the grounds of detention only to show the tendency and inclination of the petitioner. In the absence of recent involvement of the petitioner in commission of serious offences and also indulging into prejudicial activities, it could have been said that the Detaining Authority was influenced by the past criminal conduct and the activities of the petitioner and the order of detention was crept in as a result thereof i.e. being influenced by the past conduct of the petitioner. It is needless to say that past conduct or antecedents history of a person can appropriately be taken into account in making detention order and it is usually from prior offences showing tendency or inclination of commission of offences, that an inference can be drawn whether he is likely in future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. Therefore, mere knowledge of the Detaining Authority of the previous criminal conduct of detenu/petitioner, as gathered from the copies of documents as stated in the grounds of detention, was only to show the tendency and inclination of the petitioner. Therefore, mere knowledge of the Detaining Authority of the previous criminal conduct of detenu/petitioner, as gathered from the copies of documents as stated in the grounds of detention, was only to show the tendency and inclination of the petitioner. When the order of detention is passed placing no reliance on the recent activities of the petitioner and also his actual involvement in prejudicial activities, mere mention of the past conduct or commission of the crime by the petitioner, did not have any bearing on the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. In view of this the objection to the order of detention on this count does not survive. 29. Ground No. 4 : The grievance of the Counsel for petitioner is that Detaining Authority has not given the progress of the previous orders of detention and preventive order in respect of externment proceeding against the petitioner. The Detaining Authority considered previous detention orders and externment proceedings as the same has been referred in the grounds of detention. When the Detaining Authority has formed subjective satisfaction on the basis of this material relating to previous orders of detention and externment proceedings, then it was imperative for the authority to give progress of the said proceedings. The Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision in (Vijayraj Jivraj Solanki petitioner v. Union of India and others)13, respondents 1997(Supp.) Bom.C.R. 1. In this case in the order of detention which was under challenge before the High Court, the Detaining Authority had made reference to earlier order of detention. The factual position was that earlier order of detention was already quashed by the High Court and as such the same ceased to exist. But inspite of that Detaining Authority had referred the earlier order of detention. This Court therefore, held that when a reference is made to earlier order of detention which had been set aside, the subsequent order of detention which was passed upon such a fact of earlier detention is itself vitiated. In passing the impugned order of detention the Detaining Authority could not have relied upon the fact that the earlier order of detention had been passed when the said order had been set aside later on by the High Court. Therefore, it was impermissible for the Detaining Authority to refer to such fact as to earlier order of detention which was non est in the eyes of law. 30. Therefore, it was impermissible for the Detaining Authority to refer to such fact as to earlier order of detention which was non est in the eyes of law. 30. Mr. Gavai, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that it is not imperative for the Detaining Authority nor it is required by law that the Detaining Authority has to give the progress and fate of the previous orders of detention and externment proceedings, if any, against the detenu. Referring to the decision of this Court in 1997(1) Mh.L.J. 454 (supra), the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that in that case on facts it was found that the previous order of detention was non est as the same had been quashed and set aside by the High Court when the Detaining Authority passed the impugned order of detention. In the case before hand, it is not the contention of the petitioner that previous order of detention and externment order passed against the petitioner were set aside by the Court and therefore, these orders were not in existence, when the Detaining Authority passed the impugned order of detention. The petitioner has not averred even a word in his petition about the cancellation of the previous order of detention and order of externment. The petitioner has not produced any material to show that the earlier order of detention has been quashed and set aside and was non est when the impugned order of detention was passed. Even it is not the contention of the petitioner that in his representation which he made to the Detaining Authority, Advisory Board and State Government, he has contended that the previous order of detention and order of externment have been quashed and set aside. If that is the factual position, it is very difficult to quash and set aside the impugned order of detention merely on the ground that previous order of detention as also the order of externment have been referred and considered by the Detaining Authority for forming his subjective satisfaction to pass the order of detention. The objection raised by the petitioner in this regard also does not hold water for the reason that Detaining Authority has passed the order of detention basically taking into consideration the recent offences registered against the petitioner as also his subsequent involvement in prejudicial criminal activities as also the conduct of the petitioner of creating a reign of terror. 31. The objection raised by the petitioner in this regard also does not hold water for the reason that Detaining Authority has passed the order of detention basically taking into consideration the recent offences registered against the petitioner as also his subsequent involvement in prejudicial criminal activities as also the conduct of the petitioner of creating a reign of terror. 31. Ground No. 8 : Much has been made of the fact that the Detaining Authority did not resort to other remedies provided under the law when the Detaining Authority opted for passing the impugned order of detention. It is contended that the action of the preventive detention is very stringent and last remedy to be resorted to. After the petitioner was arrested in last three crimes, he was released on bail by the orders of the Court. The Detaining Authority apprehended that the petitioner was likely to indulge in criminal activities since he has been released on bail. It is therefore, contended that the Detaining Authority should have instead of resorting to pass impugned order of detention, directed the police authorities to challenge the impugned order of bail passed by the courts by initiating proper proceedings in the higher Court. To substantiate this submission, the learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in (Ramesh Yadav, Petitioner v. District Magistrate, Etah and others, Respondents)14, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 315. In this case the Detaining Authority passed the order of detention as the Detaining Authority was apprehensive that in case the detenu was released on bail he would again carry on his criminal activities in the area. It is in this context the Court held that if the apprehension of the Detaining Authority was such then the bail application should have been opposed and in case bail was granted should have challenged the order in the higher forum. Merely on the ground that the accused is in detention as a under trial prisoner was likely to get bail order, the order of detention should not ordinarily be passed. 32. We have already observed that the Detaining Authority having satisfied that the criminal activities of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, having regard to his involvement in recent criminal cases in the year 2002 also his indulging in criminal activities after he came to be released on bail, passed the order of detention. 32. We have already observed that the Detaining Authority having satisfied that the criminal activities of the petitioner were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, having regard to his involvement in recent criminal cases in the year 2002 also his indulging in criminal activities after he came to be released on bail, passed the order of detention. The Detaining Authority also found that the previous prosecution and prevention action against the petitioner had no effect on the criminal attitude and conduct of the petitioner. Therefore, the Detaining Authority had no other option than to claim order of detention on him with a view to curb his terrorizing activities. It is not that merely there was apprehension in the mind of the Detaining Authority that the petitioner was likely to indulge in criminal activities as he was released on bail, that the Detaining Authority passed the order. Therefore, the Detaining Authority has passed the order on proper application of mind taking into consideration the factual position as to the involvement of the petitioner in criminal activities and also his conduct of creating a regign of terror in the localities. It is true that the police authorities should have first opposed the bail application moved by the petitioner and also should have challenged the order of granting bail by initiating action in the higher forum. But then failure on the part of the police authorities as also the Detaining Authority in not doing so, by itself does not render the order of detention illegal. In any case mala fide intention can not be attributed to the Detaining Authority for passing the order of detention without resorting to the other remedy of initiating action for cancellation of bail. 33. In this context we also refer to the decision of Apex Court in (Ayya Alias Ayub, Petitioner v. State of U.P. and another, Respondent)15, reported in 1989(1) S.C.C. 374 , wherein the Apex Court observed thus : "If the only ground or justification for the detention is the apprehension that the detenu was likely to be enlarged on bail, the detention might be rendered infirm on the ground that the detention was solely for the purpose for rendering nugatory order of bail, the grant of which the Detaining Authority had then considered imminent. The Apex Court further observed that : "The contention as to the impermissibility of order of detention being made against a person already in judicial custody is also without merit. Even if a prosecution against a person fails or bail is granted, the order of detention could be passed drawing satisfaction therefor from the facts and circumstances involved in the criminal proceedings. The offender might secure an acquittal by intimidating the witnesses, it depends upon the circumstances of each case. But it is necessary for the Detaining Authority to resist to prefer and substitute as a matter of course the earlier expedience of prevention detention to the cumbersome one of punitive detention." 34. As we have stated earlier in the case before hand, the Detaining Authority has on consideration of the facts and circumstances then prevailing in the matter has reached to satisfaction that the detenu/petitioner should be detained under the said Act and that was the only alternate action required to be taken to curb the prejudicial activities of the petitioner. 35. For the reasons stated above, none of the grounds raised by the Counsel for petitioner is sufficient to quash and set aside the order of detention. The petitioner squarely fails. The same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. Petition dismissed. -----