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2003 DIGILAW 426 (GAU)

Nepal Chandra Poddar v. Swapan Kumar Roy

2003-09-11

TINLIANTHANG VAIPHEI

body2003
JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. This revision petition under Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the order dated 22.07.2002 passed by the learned District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in R.C.C. (Re vision) 9 of 1997 and also the order dated 24.6.2003 passed by the same District Judge in Civil Misc. (Review) 202 of 2002 declining the review the order passed by him in the said revision case. 2. The facts relevant for the purpose of this petition are that the respondent in this case had filed an application before the learned Rent Control Court, Agartala, West Tripura seeking eviction of the petitioner under Section 12(3) of the Tripura Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1975 (hereinafter called 'the Act') on the ground of bonafide need. It would appear that originally the father of the respondent was the owner of the rented premises and during his life time he gifted the same to the mother of the respondent in the year 1986 by a registered gift deed and that the respondent purchased the said premises from his mother by a registered sale deed in the year 1992 and be came the landlord of the petitioner. The respondent is Ex-serviceman and after his retirement he wanted to start a business in the rented premises for which he sought for eviction of the petitioner from the said premises. The petitioner contented the said case and submitted his written objection denying the claim of the respondent that the rented premises was required for his bonafide purpose to start a business. The petitioner also stated that the rented premises is the only source of his livelihood and his son, daughter and wife are solely dependent upon the income of the petitioner and that he has no other premises to run his business except the suit premises. It was also the case of the petitioner that the respondent and his mother and brother have got so many shop huts adjacent to the suit premises and they have rented those premises to other persons and other shop keepers were giving higher rent as demanded by the respondent and as such they were not asked to be evicted from the said premises. The petitioner also denied that the respondent required the premises to run a business therein. The petitioner also denied that the respondent required the premises to run a business therein. After hearing the parties, the learned Rent Control Court passed final order on 13.03.1996 allowing the said eviction petition on the ground of bonafide need of the respondent. It was ordered therein that the petitioner was to hand over the possession of the rented premises to the respondent within a period of six months observing that the petitioner can built a suitable building in his house which is located in the same locality for carrying his business. Aggrieved by the order dated 13.03.1996 the petitioner filed an appeal before the learned Appellate Court being R.C.C. Appeal No. 12 of 1996. After hearing the parties, the learned Appellate Court by the Judgment dated 18.8.1997 set aside the order dated 13.03.1996 passed by the learned Rent Control Court with the finding that the respondent has been getting pension from Armed Force regularly to maintain his family, whereas the petitioner has no other alternative source of in come other than the income from the business carried on in the lease hold premises. Thereafter, the respondent filed a revision petition be fore the learned District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala which was numbered as R.C.C. (Re vision) 9/1997 to set aside the order of the learned Appellate Court and to uphold the order of the learned Rent Control Court. After hearing the parties, the District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala by the Judgment dated 22.7.2002 allowed the revision petition filed by the respondent and set aside the order passed by the learned Appellate Court and affirmed the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Control Court vide Judgment dated 13.03.1996. Aggrieved by the said Judgment dated 22.7.2002, the petitioner filed a review petition before the learned District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala which was registered as Civil Misc. (Review) 202/2002, but the learned district Judge by Judgment dated 24.06.2003 dismissed the review petition mainly on the ground that a mere error of law or erroneous finding of fact cannot be a ground for review. It is under the aforesaid circumstances that the petitioner has filed this second revision petition. 3. Heard Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. D. Chakraborty learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 4. It is under the aforesaid circumstances that the petitioner has filed this second revision petition. 3. Heard Mr. S.M. Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. D. Chakraborty learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 4. It is contended by the petitioner that the order passed by the learned District Judge in the review petition suffers from non-application of mind and is not sustainable in law in that the learned District Judge ought to have appreciated that at the time of passing the order on 22.07.2002 in revision petition the learned court did not give any finding as to why the order passed by the learned Appellate Court is wrong. It is also contended by the petitioner that the learned District Judge has grossly failed to exercise its review power to correct an apparent error because of absence of discussion as to the restrictions imposed in second proviso to sub-section 3 of Section 12 of the Act. The petitioner also contends that the learned District Judge ought to have appreciated that the order passed by the learned Rent Control Court was contrary to law and the evidence on record. On the other hand, Mr. D. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the respondent raising preliminary objection on the maintainability of the present revision petition has forcefully urged that a second revision petition does not lie in view of Section 22(1) of the Act. 5. The short question of law to be determined is whether a second revision petition lies on the facts and circumstances of the case. Before dealing with the main point, it may be stated that this revision petition is directed mainly against the order dated 22.07.2002 passed by the learned District Judge in R.C.C. (Revision) 9/1997. Even though an attempt was made by the petitioner that it was not really so by purportedly challenging the order passed by the learned District Judge in the said review petition. In my considered view, the real grievance of the petitioner is against the order passed by the learned District Judge in R.C.C. (Revision 9/1997. 6. Moreover, the District Judge has no power to review his own order within four corners of the Act. A review being a creature of statute, such power cannot be assumed by the District Court unless empowered by a statute. Therefore, the review petition itself was not maintainable. 6. Moreover, the District Judge has no power to review his own order within four corners of the Act. A review being a creature of statute, such power cannot be assumed by the District Court unless empowered by a statute. Therefore, the review petition itself was not maintainable. To appreciate the rival contentions of the parties it will be relevant to reproduce hereunder the provisions of Section 20(5) and 22(1) of the Act: 20(5). The decision of the appellate authority, and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law, except as provided in Section 22. 22(1). In cases where the appellate authority empowered under Section 20 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Judge, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit A bare reading of Section 20(5) of the Act shows that an order of the Rent Control Court unless interfered with by the appellate authority shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law, except as provided in Section 22. The above provision obviously contemplates that there shall be an end to litigation except for the provision contained therein. Sub-section (1) of Section 22 of the Act gives Revisional jurisdiction against the order passed by the Appellate Court in the District Court, if the Appellate Authority is a subordinate Judge and the High Court is vested with the power of revision, if the Appellate Authority is the District Judge. A combined reading of the aforesaid sections thus demonstrates that the scheme of the Act do not con template a second revision by the High Court where a District Judge has already exercised a Revisional power in relation to an order passed by a Judge subordinate to him. 7. A combined reading of the aforesaid sections thus demonstrates that the scheme of the Act do not con template a second revision by the High Court where a District Judge has already exercised a Revisional power in relation to an order passed by a Judge subordinate to him. 7. In Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, reported in AIR 1987 SC 203 , the Hon'ble Apex Court had an occasion to deal with a case of this nature while interpreting the provisions of Sections 18 and 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. For better appreciation of the case, the relevant portions of the aforesaid Judgment are reproduced hereunder: 18. Appeal (1)(a) The Government may, by general or special order notified in the Gazette, confer on such officers and authorities not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge the powers of appellate authorities for the purpose of this Act in such areas or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order. (b) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court may, within thirty days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. In computing the thirty days aforesaid, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded. (2) On such appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may order stay of further proceedings in the matter pending decision on the appeal. (3) The appellate authority shall send for the records of the case from the Rent Control Court and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either directly or through the Rent Control Court, shall decide the appeal. Explanation: The appellate authority may while confirming the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court, grant an extension of time to the tenant for putting the landlord in possession of the building. (4) The appellate authority shall have all the powers of the Rent Control Court including the fixing of arrears of rent. (5) The decision of the appellate authority, and subject of such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law, except as provided in Section 20. 20. (5) The decision of the appellate authority, and subject of such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law, except as provided in Section 20. 20. Revision: (1) In cases where the appellate authority empowered under section 18 is a Sub ordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. (2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub section (1) shall be in its discretion. 8. The Hon'ble Apex Court after interpreting the aforesaid provisions and after discussing the case laws held as under: Under the scheme of the Act it appears that a landlord who wants eviction of his tenant has to move for eviction and the case has to be disposed of by the Rent Control Court, that is provided by sub-sec.(2) of Section 11 of the Act. From the Rent Control Court, an appeal lies to the Appellate authority under the conditions laid down under sub-sec. (1)(b) of 18 of the Act. From the Appellate Authority a revision in certain circumstances lies in case where the appellate authority is a Subordinate Judge to the District Court and in other cases to the High Court. Where the District Judge has passed an order in revision under 20 of the Act, a second revision to High Court under Section115, Code of Civil Procedure against such order is not maintainable. C.R.P. Nos. 1643 and 2552 of 1980, D/-20.8.1985(Ker), Reversed, AIR 1969 Ker 103 (FB), Overruled. Sub-Sec. (5) of Section 18 clearly states that such decision of the appellate authority as mentioned in Section 18 of the Act shall not be liable to be questioned except in the manner under Section 20 of the Act. C.R.P. Nos. 1643 and 2552 of 1980, D/-20.8.1985(Ker), Reversed, AIR 1969 Ker 103 (FB), Overruled. Sub-Sec. (5) of Section 18 clearly states that such decision of the appellate authority as mentioned in Section 18 of the Act shall not be liable to be questioned except in the manner under Section 20 of the Act. There was thereby an implied prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under Section115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court when a revision has been provided under Section 20 of the Act in question. When Section 18 (5) of the Act specifically states that "shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law" except in the manner provided under Section 20, it cannot be said that the High Court which is a Court of law and which is a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure could revise again an order after revision under Section 20of the Act. That would mean there would be a trial by four Courts, that would be repugnant to the scheme manifest in the different sections of the Act in question. Public policy or public interest demands curtailment of law's delay and justice demands financially within quick disposal of case. The language of the provisions of Section 18(5) read with Section 20 inhabits further revision. The Courts must so construe. The expression in Section 18(5) of the Act means what it says that subject to the decision of the appellate authority, the decision of the Rent Controller shall be final and could only be questioned in the manner provided in Section20 and in no other manner. The intention of the legislature in enacting the said Act is clear and manifest from this section and the scheme of the Act, that is to say, to regulate the leasing of buildings and to control the rent of such buildings and to provide a tier of Courts by themselves for eviction of the rented premises. (1908) AC 327 and AIR 1965 SC 1442 , Rel. on. 9. In the light of the observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court as reproduced above, I am of the view that the instant case is squarely covered by the aforesaid decision. (1908) AC 327 and AIR 1965 SC 1442 , Rel. on. 9. In the light of the observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court as reproduced above, I am of the view that the instant case is squarely covered by the aforesaid decision. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted and the re vision petition is accordingly entertained, I am afraid, the object of the legislation, namely, to put an end to litigation in the case of this nature as well as the scheme of the Act limiting the scope of interference by higher Courts will be defeated. Under the circumstances, I hold that this revision petition does not lie. 10. It is also contended by the petitioner that even if it is held that this second revision petition does not lie, this Court has the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the impugned order to correct great error of law committed by the learned Courts below. In the above cited case, the Hon'ble Apex Court also held as follows: 24. It was urged that in case we are of the opinion that a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not lie, the case should be remitted to the High Court for consideration as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. We are unable to accede. A petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is different from revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The two procedures are not inter changeable though there are some common features. It must, however, be emphasised that we are not dealing in this appeal with the constitutional powers of the High Court under Article 227of the Constitution nor are we concerned with the powers of the High Court regulating appeals under the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. We are concerned in this case whether the High Court, in view of the scheme of the Act, had jurisdiction to interfere under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We reiterate that to vest the High Court with any such jurisdiction would be contrary to the scheme of the Act, would be contrary to the public policy, and would be contrary to the legislative intent as manifest from the different sections of the Act. The aforesaid observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court completely answer the contention of the petitioner. 11. The aforesaid observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court completely answer the contention of the petitioner. 11. In the result, this revision petition is not maintainable and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed