ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition has been filed challenging the judgment and order dated 12th July, 2002 passed by the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal in R. N. Case No. 227 of 2000*. ( 2 ) BY the said judgment, the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the said Tribunal") passed an order, inter alia, holding that the process of making refined soyabean oil and refined til oil from the input edible soyabean oil and til oil docs not amount to manufacture and as such, the impugned orders which were challenged before the Tribunal, were upheld. ( 3 ) THE material facts of the case are that the petitioner claims to be a manufacturer of til oil and refined soyabean oil having its factory at 120k, G. T. Road, Kotrang, District, Hooghly. The petitioner claims to be a registered dealer, having been registered both under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 and the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954 as also under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The petitioner claims to have permanent S. S. I. registration certificate. The case of the petitioner is that for availing benefit under Rule 3 (66a) under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, the petitioner made an application for grant of eligibility certificate in the year 1994. It is not in dispute that on the basis of the said application the petitioner was granted an eligibility certificate for one year only, i. e. , from April 24, 1993 to April 24, 1994. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER, on March 11, 1994 the petitioner applied for renewal of the said certificate. But upon inspection of the factory premises of the petitioner by respondent No. 1 on December 19, 1994 the prayer for renewal was refused by an order dated September 4, 1995. In the said order of refusal it has been made clear that the authority refusing the same, viz. , the respondent No. 1, personally inspected the factory of the petitioner on December 19, 1994. This fact has also not been disputed by the petitioner. It was recorded in the said order that upon such inspection it was found that no manufacturing process is involved in the factory of the petitioner. , the respondent No. 1, personally inspected the factory of the petitioner on December 19, 1994. This fact has also not been disputed by the petitioner. It was recorded in the said order that upon such inspection it was found that no manufacturing process is involved in the factory of the petitioner. In that order it was held that the petitioner was reselling refined soyabean oil and til oil under the same category of vegetable oil after importing the same from outside Bengal. Against the said order, a revision application was filed by the petitioner on December 14, 1995 before the Deputy Commissioner and the revisional authority came to the same finding in respect of soyabean oil. Insofar as til oil is concerned, no order was passed as the revisional authority found that proper investigation is required to be made for determining the position in respect of til oil. As such the revisional authority set aside the order dated September 4, 1995 and directed the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes for passing a fresh order after allowing the petitioner a fresh opportunity of being heard. The said order of revisional authority was passed on February 12, 1996. Against the said order of the revisional authority dated February 12, 1996, the petitioner went to the Taxation Tribunal and made a prayer for sending back the entire case on remand. ( 5 ) THE West Bengal Taxation Tribunal*, after hearing the counsel for the parties, set aside both the orders of the revisional authority, viz. , the Assistant Commissioner dated September 4, 1995 and the Deputy Commissioner dated December 14, 1995 in respect of soyabean oil. The matter was remitted to the Assistant Commissioner for a fresh determination with the following directions :"the matter is remitted to the Assistant Commissioner for a fresh determination as to whether the applicants are actually manufacturing edible soyabean oil as claimed by them and thereafter for disposal of the application for renewal of eligibility certificate in respect of soyabean oil for the period already mentioned. The order of remand already made by the Deputy Commissioner in his order dated December 14, 1995 in respect of til oil should also be carried out by the Assistant Commissioner as directed by the Deputy Commissioner. Let it be made clear that all the issues by the applicants are left open. The order of remand already made by the Deputy Commissioner in his order dated December 14, 1995 in respect of til oil should also be carried out by the Assistant Commissioner as directed by the Deputy Commissioner. Let it be made clear that all the issues by the applicants are left open. " ( 6 ) THEREAFTER the Assistant Commissioner again passed an order October 9, 1998 rejecting the application for renewal of the petitioner. In the said order it was again found that the petitioner simply brings refined soyabean oil and til oil and sold the same in different containers and no manufacturing is done by the petitioner and no new commodity with distinct character and identity comes out. It was made clear that the activities carried on in the petitioner's factory are merely packing activity and there is no manufacturing activity. Against the said order dated October 9, 1998 another revision application was filed and the revisional authority reiterated the finding of the original authority. The revisional authority found that there is a change in the refined oil but all changes do not amount to manufacture. The authority found that manufacture implies a change as a result of which a new article must emerge having a distinct name, character and use. The mere change with regard to degree of fitness or edibility does not bring out a new commodity. Therefore, the revisional authority refused to hold that there is a case of manufacture. Against the said order the Tribunal was moved and the impugned order dated July 12, 2002 was passed by the Tribunal. This writ petition is directed against the aforesaid order. ( 7 ) THE question which has fallen for consideration before this Court is whether this Court in exercise of its power of judicial review can set aside the order of the Tribunal as invalid. From a perusal of the said order, which runs into several pages, it appears that in the said order the factual background of the case has been noted along with the main issues. In paragraph 4 of the order, the Tribunal found that the main issue is whether the processes undertaken by the petitioner for producing edible soyabean oil and til oil for sale in the market can be called manufacture within the meaning of Section 2 (dd) of the Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1941. In paragraph 4 of the order, the Tribunal found that the main issue is whether the processes undertaken by the petitioner for producing edible soyabean oil and til oil for sale in the market can be called manufacture within the meaning of Section 2 (dd) of the Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1941. Section 2 (dd) of the said Act of 1941 is set out below :" 'manufacture' with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means producing, making, extracting or blending any goods ; but does not include such manufactures or manufacturing processes as may be prescribed. " ( 8 ) IT is an admitted position that there has been no prescription under the Rules. In paragraph 5 of the main judgment, the learned Tribunal noted the manufacturing processes which are involved in the factory of the petitioner. It has not been disputed before us by the learned counsel that in noting the process involved in the factory of the petitioner, there has been any error committed by the Tribunal. In paragraph 7 of the judgment, the learned Tribunal held, and in our view rightly, that the expression "manufacture" in the context of sales tax law has now acquired a settled legal connotation. According to the settled position "manufacture" in sales tax law implies a change but it is equally well-settled that every change is not "manufacture". Only a change as a result of which a new different and distinct article emerges with distinct character and use would amount to manufacture. It is also equally settled that there may be several processes involved but even after going through those processes, manufacture may not take place, if no new commercial commodity emerges as a result of such processes. It has also been held by the learned Tribunal and we affirm the said finding that if over certain goods some labour is employed and even thereafter the goods remain essentially the same commercial item, it cannot be said that the final product is a result of manufacture. ( 9 ) THE Tribunal considered the National Test House Report as also the report of the chemist. We have also seen the test report given by the National Test House dated April 20, 1999. From the said report it appears that the sample is one of soyabean oil. ( 9 ) THE Tribunal considered the National Test House Report as also the report of the chemist. We have also seen the test report given by the National Test House dated April 20, 1999. From the said report it appears that the sample is one of soyabean oil. There is no dispute that as a result of the processes employed by the petitioner, the oil may become refined oil but that does not satisfy the requirement of manufacture inasmuch as no new and distinct commercial commodity comes into existence. Therefore, we are of the view that the Tribunal has come to the right conclusion by observing as follows :"however, we may take note that when a complete transformation in the original article takes place--so much so--that a new commercial article or commodity emerges, the said process may be termed as manufacturing activity. But in the case before us we do not find that the original article--til oil and vegetable oil which are edible oil input have been completely transformed into a different article. " (Para 7)Again in para 7 at page 11* of the judgment of the Tribunal, the following observations have been made which are also affirmed by us :"here in the instant case, though admittedly edible soyabean oil and edible til oil go through several processing and come out in the end as more refined and more edible soyabean oil/til oil, the ultimate product is not regarded as a separate and distinct article--either in trade or common parlance. In other words, the output has no distinct or independent identity from its input. " ( 10 ) SITTING in the High Court it is not open to us to come to a contrary conclusion from the one which have been arrived at by the Tribunal inasmuch as we are of the view that the Tribunal has duly applied its mind and has come to a conclusion which is based on proper reasoning and due consideration of the materials on record. The judgment of the Tribunal cannot be questioned as either perverse or having been vitiated by non-consideration of the relevant materials. The judgment of the Tribunal cannot be questioned as either perverse or having been vitiated by non-consideration of the relevant materials. ( 11 ) FROM two challans issued by Goyal Brothers--a cloth, cotton merchant and commission agents, the learned counsel for the petitioner wanted to urge that the raw materials purchased by the petitioner is unfit for human consumption but after processing it becomes fit for human consumption and becomes edible. These materials appear to have been produced for the first time in this honourable Court and not before any fact finding authority. We therefore cannot place any reliance on these materials as these are pure questions of facts. ( 12 ) IN attacking the said judgment of the Tribunal the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on various judgments. Some of the judgments deal with the question of interpretation of taxing statute. ( 13 ) IN the instant case there is no question of interpretation of taxing law. The question of interpretation comes into play in a situation where two interpretations are possible. And in such a situation the interpretation which supports the contention of the taxpayer may have to be accepted. But in the instant case on repeated inspection of the processes involved in the factory of the petitioner it was found by the proper fact-finding authority, that as a result of the processes undergone in the factory of the petitioner, manufacturing does not take place. In other words, as a result of employment of various processes, no new commercial commodity with distinct identity, character and use comes into existence. A mere change between the input and output through the processes will not amount to manufacture. This has been found by several authorities on actual inspection of the processes involved in the petitioner's factory and those findings have not been properly assailed before us. So it is not a case involving any interpretation of statute. Therefore, the various judgments which have cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner on interpretation of the statutes, are not relevant. So it is not a case involving any interpretation of statute. Therefore, the various judgments which have cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner on interpretation of the statutes, are not relevant. ( 14 ) RELIANCE was placed on the decision in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal v. Vegetable Products Ltd. In the context of examining the penalty provision under Section 27 (1) (a) (i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the apex Court observed that in interpreting the language of the penal provision, if the court finds that it is ambiguous or is capable of more than one meaning, the one which favours the assessee is to be accepted. ( 15 ) HERE we are not concerned with any penalty provision nor is there any ambiguity in any part of the statute which has fallen for consideration of the court in this case. ( 16 ) THE learned counsel cited the decision in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Amritsar v. Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. The said case was dealing with the question of grant of concessional rate of duty, higher development rebate and deduction from profits in paper and pulp industry which was a priority industry at that point of time. The question was whether the expressions in the Schedule "paper and pulp" would include strawboard. It was held by the learned Judges that the expression "strawboard" is covered by the term paper and pulp and as such the respondent/company was entitled to higher rebate. Here no such question is involved. Therefore, principles of interpretation in taxing statute about a law providing for concessional rate of tax, is not attracted to the facts of this case. ( 17 ) THE decision in the case of Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax also involves the question of interpretation of statute, viz. , Section 15c of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The said section read as a whole is intended for encouraging industrialisation by permitting an assessee to set up a new industrial undertaking to claim relief from tax to the extent of tax on 6 per cent of the capital employed every year. But the Legislature made it clear to restrict such benefit only to those undertaking which were new in form and substance, by providing that the undertaking should not be formed in any manner provided in clause (i) of Section 15c (2 ). But the Legislature made it clear to restrict such benefit only to those undertaking which were new in form and substance, by providing that the undertaking should not be formed in any manner provided in clause (i) of Section 15c (2 ). By the said restriction the Legislature wanted to control any abuse of the beneficiary provision. But the court held that the intention of the Legislature was not to deny the benefit to genuinely established new industrial undertaking. ( 18 ) IN the context of those facts the observation of the honourable Supreme Court about liberal construction of taxing statute were made. But here, those questions are not at all relevant, as pointed out above. Here no question of interpretation is involved inasmuch as there is no scope for two opinions on the end-product which emerges as a result of the processes employed in the factory of the petitioner. ( 19 ) ON the question of interpretation of the taxing statute, the learned counsel also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Industrial Coal Enterprises reported in [1999] 114 STC 365. That was also a case of granting an exemption to new industrial unit. On consideration of the facts of the case, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion in para 11 of the judgment, by relying on the previous decisions in Strawboard and Bajaj Tempo, that a provision granting incentive for promoting economic growth and development in taxing statutes should be liberally construed. For the reasons indicated above, the ratio in the case of Industrial Coal Enterprises is not attracted to the facts of this case. ( 20 ) SIMILARLY, in the case of Cemento Corporation Ltd. v. Collector, Central Excise, a similar question came up. The question was whether lympo being manufactured by the appellant was cement or not and whether such items are not classifiable under item 23 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Act, 1944 and whether such goods is to be classified under item 68. The Supreme Court held that the lympo was not classifiable under item 23 (1) or 23 (2) but under item 68 of the Schedule to the 1944 Act. Here no such dispute is involved. The Supreme Court held that the lympo was not classifiable under item 23 (1) or 23 (2) but under item 68 of the Schedule to the 1944 Act. Here no such dispute is involved. ( 21 ) THEREFORE, the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Cemento Corporation [2003] 129 STC 313, in paragraph 17 was made in a totally different factual context and its ratio is not attracted to the facts of this case. ( 22 ) TWO judgments were cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the general question of the court's power to do justice. The decision in Lily Thomas v. Union of India is on the question of interpretation of various provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Indian Penal Code. In that context, Court's power of review came' up for consideration and the court held that the power of review is not an inherent power. The said decision has no application here. ( 23 ) SIMILARLY in the decision in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, the apex Court was examining the scope and content of articles 32, 137 and various other articles of the Constitution and especially about the scope of the writ of certiorari. ( 24 ) WHILE examining those questions, the court, in paragraph 42, page 413 of the report, expressed the opinion that the court has inherent power to do justice. ( 25 ) WE are unable to appreciate the relevance of that ratio to the issues involved in this case. ( 26 ) THE ratio of two other judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is actually against the contentions of the petitioner and supports the view taken by the Tribunal. ( 27 ) IN Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. Kutty Flush Doors and Furniture Co. (P.) Ltd. , it was held that manufacture may imply a change but every change is not a manufacture. There must be transformation and a new and a different article must emerge having a distinct name, character and use. ( 28 ) APPLYING the said ratio, we hold that in the facts of this case the processes employed in the petitioner's factory do not amount to manufacture. ( 29 ) SIMILAR is the ratio in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law) v. Coco Fibres. ( 28 ) APPLYING the said ratio, we hold that in the facts of this case the processes employed in the petitioner's factory do not amount to manufacture. ( 29 ) SIMILAR is the ratio in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law) v. Coco Fibres. The apex Court held that coconut husk is a different commodity from coconut fibre. In commercial parlance both the commodities, namely, coconut husk and coconut fibre are two distinctly different commodities. The same is not true of refined soyabean oil and til oil. ( 30 ) SO the decision in Coco Fibres, does not support the petitioner's case. ( 31 ) ON the other hand three cases cited by the learned counsel for the respondents support their stand that unless a new commodity emerges, manufacture does not take place under sales tax law. [please see : (a) State of Maharashtra v. Mahalaxmi Stores, (b) State of Tamil Nadu v. O. P. Aliyar, reported in [1992] 87 STC 339 (Mad.) and (c) Divisional Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Bherhaghat Mineral Industries reported in [2000] 120 STC 205 (SC)]. ( 32 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The writ petition is dismissed. The judgment of the Tribunal is affirmed. There will be no order as to costs.