JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This second appeal has arisen put of the judgment dated 22.10.1990, and decree, dated 5.11.1990, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati, in Title Appeal No. 1 of 1987, dismissing the appeal and affirming the judgment and decree, dated 19.11.1985 and 3.2.1986, respectively passed by the learned Assistant District Judge No. 1, Kamrup, Guwahati, in Title Suit No. 48 of 1977, whereby the suit of the plaintiff-appellant, late Sena Singh, was dismissed. 2. I have heard Mr. G. N. Sahewalla, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellants, and Mr. P. C. Deka, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-defendants. 3. In a narrow compass, the facts and various stages leading to this appeal may be stated as fellows : The appellant-plaintiff, late Sena Singh, instituted Title Suit No. 48 of 1977 aforementioned seeking, inter alia, a decree declaring his possessory right over the suit land. By the judgment and decree, dated 19.11.1985 and dated 3.2.1986, respectively, the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff-appellant, then, preferred Title Appeal No. 1 of 1987 aforementioned. While preferring the said appeal, the plaintiff-appellant also made an application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal within time, the appeal being barred by 1 year 2 months 27 days. The prayer for condonation of delay as well as the appeal were heard together and disposed of by the impugned appellate judgment, dated 22.10.1990. 4. It appears from the order, dated 11.12.1990, that this appeal was admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law : (A) Whether the learned lower appellate Court was right and has not acted beyond jurisdiction in passing the impugned judgment and decree without taking into consideration of the documentary evidence exhibited in the case particularly the Exhibit-1 being the Khatian, i.e., the concerned land record of the suit land as filed in the case record ? (B) Whether the learned Courts below were right and have not acted beyond jurisdiction in passing the impugned judgments and decrees without taking into consideration the evidence on record particularly the Exhibit-1 coupled with the evidence of Respondent No. 4 which had conclusively determined the rights of the parties over the suit land. (B) Whether the learned Courts below were right and have not acted beyond jurisdiction in passing the impugned judgments and decrees without taking into consideration the evidence on record particularly the Exhibit-1 coupled with the evidence of Respondent No. 4 which had conclusively determined the rights of the parties over the suit land. Accordingly, the appellant being a 'Rayat', i.e., tenant under the Respondent No. 4 being the original pattadar, i.e., land lord as per Exhibit-1, the appellant is having statutory right over the suit properties inasmuch as he being a tenant is protected under Section 5 of the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955. (C) Whether the learned Courts below were right and have not acted beyond jurisdiction in passing the impugned judgments and decrees without taking into consideration the basic concept of Section 34 of the Specifics Relief Act, 1963, under which the appellant had filed the suit for declaration of his rights and to restrain the Respondent No. 1 to execute the decree obtained fraudulently behind the back of the appellant without the appellant being made a party to it and which was as such not binding on the appellant. (D) Whether the learned lower appellate Court was right and has not failed to exercise jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act inasmuch as it should have received a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant. Thus, an appeal not presented within the prescribed time does not cease to be an appeal inasmuch as the Limitation Act bars the remedy but right is not extinguished. 5. What is, however, of paramount importance to note is that if the answer to Question No. (D), which is the question framed on the point of condonation of delay, is answered in the negative and against the plaintiff-appellants, the question of entering into the merit of the appeal does not arise at all. This position is not disputed before me by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 6. While considering the question of condonation of delay, the learned first appellate Court noticed that the judgment was passed by the learned trial Court as early as on 19.11.1985 and the decree was drawn on 3.2.1986, but the appeal was filed as late as on 17.3.1987. 6. While considering the question of condonation of delay, the learned first appellate Court noticed that the judgment was passed by the learned trial Court as early as on 19.11.1985 and the decree was drawn on 3.2.1986, but the appeal was filed as late as on 17.3.1987. Explaining the cause of delay in preferring the appeal, the plaintiff stated, inter alia, that he had been lying bed-ridden since 1.11.1985 due to severe heart attack and he remained so confined to bed on medical advice till 24.2.1987, his heart ailment having been diagnosed as essential hypertension leading to myocardial infraction and it was only on 24.2.1987 that the doctor declared him fit for movement and, accordingly, the plaintiff went to his Advocate on 25.2.1987 and came to know that his suit had been dismissed. The plaintiff-appellant, then, applied for certified copy on 25.2.1987 itself, the certified copy was made available to the plaintiff-appellant on 28.2.1987 and he preferred the appeal on 17.3.1987, The learned first appellate Court, however, noticed that apart from the fact that the plaintiff-appellant had adduced no evidence in support of his ailment, even the medical certificate submitted by the plaintiff-appellant was not convincing. This apart, the learned first appellate Court also found that after drawing of the decree on 3.2.1986, the plaintiff-appellant had already collected, on 3.7.1986, the documents exhibited in the suit and that the same had not been returned by the plaintiff-appellant. This indicated that the plaintiff-appellant had taken steps in the suit on 3.7.1986 and his plea in the appeal preferred on 17.3.1987 that the was completely unaware of dismissal of the suit till 25.2.1987 was untrue. 7. It has been pointed out by Mr. Sahewalla that to the application for condonation of delay, the respondents-defendants had not filed any objection and the averments made by the plaintiff-appellant in his application for condonation of delay had remained undisputed and, hence, the learned first appellate Court ought to have treated the averments made in the said application as admitted and true and, accordingly, ought to have condoned the delay. This apart, points out Mr. Sahewalla, the medical certificate, in question, clearly indicated that the appellant-plaintiff had been bed-ridden and there were sufficient reasons for the plaintiff-appellant for not coming to know about the dismissal of the suit. As regards the fact that the plaintiff-appellant had withdrawn the exhibited documents of the suit on 3.7.1986, Mr. This apart, points out Mr. Sahewalla, the medical certificate, in question, clearly indicated that the appellant-plaintiff had been bed-ridden and there were sufficient reasons for the plaintiff-appellant for not coming to know about the dismissal of the suit. As regards the fact that the plaintiff-appellant had withdrawn the exhibited documents of the suit on 3.7.1986, Mr. Sahewalla points out that there is nothing on the record to show that these documents had been taken away by the plaintiff-appellant. 8. Controverting the above submissions made on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, Mr. P. C. Deka, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, has submitted that the medical certificate gives no indication that the plaintiff-appellant could not have given instructions to any one to find out the out-come of his suit nor is there any material to show that the plaintiff-appellant had not been in touch with his counsel. This apart, the ailments which the plaintiff-appellant allegedly suffered, according to Mr. Deka, were not serious at all and the same had been magnified to make a case for seeking, condonation of delay. It is further submitted by Mr. Deka that the order of the learned first appellate Court clearly shows that the documents exhibited in the suit had been taken away by the plaintiff-appellant on 3.7.1986 and this assertion has not been disputed by the plaintiff-appellant in his Memo. of Appeal. 9. On a careful scrutiny of the Memo. of Appeal, I find that the plaintiff-appellant has, nowhere, asserted that he had not obtained the exhibited documents from the learned trial Court on 3.7.1986 as has been noticed by the learned first appellate Court. What is also pertinent to note is that question of condonation of delay is basically a question, which has to be answered by the Court on the basis of the materials on record and the law relevant thereto. It is not really an inter parte proceeding, where the question of condonation of delay has to be decided on the basis of the averments made by the contesting parties. If from the application for condonation of delay, the Court is convinced that no cause for condonation of delay is made out, the Court may refuse to condone the delay even without giving any notice to the other party. 10. If from the application for condonation of delay, the Court is convinced that no cause for condonation of delay is made out, the Court may refuse to condone the delay even without giving any notice to the other party. 10. Situated thus, it is clear that notwithstanding the fact that no objection has been filed by the respondents-defendants to the prayer for condonation of delay, it was the duty of the learned first appellate Court to consider the question of delay in preferring the appeal independent of the fact whether any objection had been filed by the respondents or not. Viewed from this angle, the fact that the learned first appellate Court has dealt with the matter on its own merit is not an erroneous approach. 11. In the case at hand, undisputedly, the judgment was passed on 19.11.1985 and the plaintiff-appellant preferred the appeal on 17.3.1987. Thus, there was delay of 1 year 2 months and 27 days in preferring the said appeal. The onus was on the plaintiff-appellant to satisfactorily explain before the Court the reasons for such delay. In this regard, the most distinctive feature is that the record revealed that the plaintiff-appellant had withdrawn the exhibited documents of the suit as early as on 3.7.1986. In the face of this discovery of fact, it cannot be said that the plaintiff-appellant had no information or knowledge about the judgment, dated 19.11.1985, and/or the decree, dated 3.2.1986. This apart, the medical certificate, as correctly noted by the learned first appellate Court, indicates that the plaintiff-appellant's illness was hypertension, which had led to myocardial infraction. There is nothing in the certificate to show that the plaintiff-appellant was not in a position to contact his counsel nor is there anything to show that the appellant could not have sent any one to find out the progress of his suit. This apart, even in the application for condonation of delay, the plaintiff-appellant did not state at all as to why he did not make an enquiry about the progress of the suit through any one or from his counsel even while remaining at home. 12. In the face of the faces noted above, the plaintiff-appellant, it is clear, miserably failed to make out any case for seeking condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. 12. In the face of the faces noted above, the plaintiff-appellant, it is clear, miserably failed to make out any case for seeking condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. Hence, the findings arrived at by the learned first appellate Court in this regard are correct and the learned first appellate Court was wholly justified in turning down the prayer for condonation of delay. 13. In view of the above, Question No. (D) afore-mentioned is answered in the negative. In the face of this finding on question No. (D), there is no reason for this Court to enter into the merit of the appeal. 14. In short, I hold that this appeal is not maintainable and is, accordingly, dismissed. 15. There shall be no order as to costs. 16. Send back the LCRs alongwith a copy of this judgment and order. Appeal dismissed.