ORDER 1. Heard both sides. 2. The petitioner, a teacher in the school of Respondent No. 2, challenges the decision of the Presiding Officer-cum-Authority, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in BSE Case No. 11 of 1985 under Section 26 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 in so far as it relates to the punishment imposed on her by that Authority, The litigation has had a chequered career. 3. The petitioner was removed from service on 8.7.1985 on being found guilty of misappropriation of funds. She challenged that order before the Appellate Authority under Act. That Authority set aside the order of the Management and by order dated 6.2.1989, directed her reinstatement with back wages. That order of the Appellate Authority was challenged in this Court by the Respondent No. 2. Though, this Court accepted the case of the petitioner that the finding of misappropriation of funds was not justified, it held that she was guilty of misconduct as was guilty of habitual negligence in work. The High Court also directed the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs. 9,101/- subject to scrutiny of accounts. Finding that the punishment of dismissal was too harsh, this Court directed the Appellate Authority to consider the question of punishment afresh in the light of the finding rendered in the judgment. The petitioner challenged this decision before the Supreme Court. But the Supreme Court declined to entertain the petition for Special Leave to Appeal. Thereafter, the Appellate Authority, by order dated 10.9.1991, held that the petitioner be reinstated in service without back wages, but with all other benefits. In other words, the Appellate Authority imposed the punishment of nonpayment of back wages for the period from 8.7.1985 till 10.9.1991. The direction for deposit of the sum of Rs. 9,101/- in the concerned account within one month of her joining was also incorporated indicating that the aforesaid deposit will be subject to refund of excesses, if any, found on auditing and verification of the accounts. This writ petition has been filed by the petition challenging the punishment thus imposed. 4. The direction for deposit of the sum of Rs. 9,101/- in the concerned account within one month of her joining was also incorporated indicating that the aforesaid deposit will be subject to refund of excesses, if any, found on auditing and verification of the accounts. This writ petition has been filed by the petition challenging the punishment thus imposed. 4. In view of the prior order of remand made by this Court, we are not concerned with the question, whether an appeal under the Act before the Appellate Authority was maintainable or not in this case, since not only the parties but we are also bound by the decision of a co-equal bench of this Court remanding the proceeding to the Appellate Authority for the purpose of fixing the punishment. Therefore, we are not referring to the arguments attempted to be advanced on the question of maintainability of the Appeal filed by the petitioner before the Appellate Authority under the Act. 5. It is true that normally this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would not readily interfere with the punishment awarded by an Appellate Authority under the Act unless it be held that the punishment imposed was so shocking as to trouble the conscience of this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner keeping in mind the nature of jurisdiction of this Court submitted that the Appellate Authority was not justified in directing non-payment of back wages from 8.7.1985 till 10.9.1991. He submitted that this Court on 30.7.1990 had remanded the matter only to fix the quantum of punishment holding the petitioner guilty of negligence of duty and holding that punishment of dismissal was not warranted and in that situation, depriving the petitioner of back wages from 8.7.1985 to 10.9.1991, was unjustified and the punishment was too harsh and required to be interfered with. 6. Counsel for Respondent No. 2, on the other hand, submitted that the punishment imposed cannot be said to be so shocking as to trouble the conscience of this Court and there is no reason to interfere with that punishment. Counsel further pointed out that during the period from 8.7.1985 till she was reinstated, the petitioner had in fact not worked in the School. 7. Counsel further pointed out that during the period from 8.7.1985 till she was reinstated, the petitioner had in fact not worked in the School. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of the Supreme Court, in Desh Raj Gupta v. Industrial Tribunal IV, U.P., Lucknow and Anr., reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court 2174, with particular reference to Para-9 thereof to submit that since the order of dismissal has been set aside and another punishment has been imposed, the punishment cannot relate back to the original order of dismissal with effect from 8.7.1985 and there was no justification in depriving the petitioner of back wages on the basis of a punishment which took effect from 8.7.1985. We think that, taking note of the long pending litigation and the nature of the charge proved, and the totality of circumstances available, we would be justified in interfering to some extent with the punishment awarded by the Appellate Authority under the Act. it is no doubt true that in a situation where we are interfering with a decision of the Appellate Authority, the proper course to adopt would be to quash that part of the order of the Appellate Authority and send the matter back to that Authority for a afresh decision. But considering the long pendency of this dispute and taking note of the fact that this is a dispute between a teacher and an educational institution, we think that we should play an active role while exercising our certiorari jurisdiction. We think that in the circumstances of the case, we should not stop by only demolishing the order but we should also pass an order with a view to put an end to the dispute between the parties. 8. We find that the petitioner was removed from service on 8.7.1985. That order was set aside by the Appellate Authority on 6.2.1989 directing Respondent No. 2 to reinstate the petitioner with back wages. In the circumstances, we feel that it may not be just and proper to deprive the petitioner of back wages from 6.2.1989, the date on which she was directed to be reinstated. That order was set aside by the Appellate Authority on 6.2.1989 directing Respondent No. 2 to reinstate the petitioner with back wages. In the circumstances, we feel that it may not be just and proper to deprive the petitioner of back wages from 6.2.1989, the date on which she was directed to be reinstated. At the same time, we take note of the fact that she had not worked from 8.7.1985 to 6.2.1989 and even thereafter till 4.10.1991 and in that situation the requirement would be met by holding that the petitioner would not be entitled to back wages for the period from 8.7.1985 when she was removed from service till 6.2.1989 when she was directed to be reinstated. In other words, instead of depriving of her of back wages from 8.7.1985 till 10.9.1991, we hold that she would not be entitled to the back wages only for the period 8.7.1985 to 6.2.1989. In other words, she will be entitled to back wages from 6.2.1989 until her reinstatement. We make it clear that other parts of the order of the Appellate Authority are not being interfered with by us. 9. We thus partly allow the writ petition and modify the punishment imposed by the appellate authority as indicated above. We make no order as to costs.