K. C. BHANU, J. ( 1 ) THESE criminal petitions are filed to quash the proceedings by which the calendar cases covered by the petitions, which had earlier ended in acquittal, were re-opened following the judgment of Raj Deo Sharma v. The S tate of bihar (hereinafter to be referred to as the 2nd Judgment ). ( 2 ) THE Anti Corruption Bureau filed some case against the accused-petitioners in the years 1994 and 1995. The plea of the accused was recorded in the year 1994 in some cases and in 1995 in some cases. Following the judgment of the Apex Court in Raj Deo Sharma v. The State of Bihar (hereinafter to be referred to as the 1st Judgment ), the trial Courts closed the prosecution evidence since two years period was completed from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charges framed. Aggrieved by the judgments of acquittal, the Anti Corruption Bureau filed a batch of criminal appeals before this Court. Following the 2nd Judgment, this Court by its common judgment, dated 30-12-1999, set aside the judgments of acquittal passed by the trial Courts and allowed the prosecution to lead evidence within a period of one year from the date the orders on the applications moved by the prosecution for leading evidence were passed by the trial Courts. Consequent to that judgment, the trial Courts re-opened the calendar cases. Assailing the re-opening of the cases, the accused filed the present petitions. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the respective petitioners, raised four contentions, namely, (i) as the petitioners were acquitted following the 1st Judgment, which attained finality, the cases cannot be re-opened in view of the subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in P. Ramachandra rao v. State of Karnataka, (for the sake of brevity, hereinafter to be referred to as the constitution Bench Judgment) (ii) the directions of this Court in the batch of criminal appeals, dated 30-12-1999, were not strictly complied with by the trial Courts, (iii) the right of speedy justice guaranteed to the petitioners has been grossly violated by not commencing the trial till date from the year 1994 or 1995, as the case may be, and (iv) even if the contents of the charges are taken into consideration, petitioners are not guilty of the offences alleged against them. ( 4 ) WITH regard to the first contention, relevant portion of paragraph 34 of the constitution Bench Judgment is to be extracted below:"and lastly, it is clarified that this decision shall not be a ground for reopening a case or proceeding by setting aside any such acquittal or discharge as is based on the authority of common Cause and raj deo Sharma cases and which has already achieved finality and reopen the trial against the accused therein. " ( 5 ) THE Constitution Bench Judgment was rendered on 16-4-2002. By then, the acquittal orders passed in criminal cases in pursuance of the 1st and the 2nd Judgments were set aside by this Court on 30-12-1999. What their lordships said in the Constitution Bench judgment was that the decision in that case shall not be a ground for re-opening a case or setting aside an acquittal or discharge based on the authority of the 1st and the 2nd judgments. Therefore, under no stretch of imagination, can it be said that the criminal cases have to be opened in pursuance of the constitution Bench Judgment because all the criminal cases have not attained finality because following the 2nd Judgment this court set aside the acquittals passed by the respective trial Courts in pursuance of the 1st Judgment. Furthermore, the judgment of this Court in the batch of Appeals, dated 30-12-1999, attained finality in view of the fact that the Supreme Court dismissed the special Leave Petitions on 25-7-2002 filed by the accused against the judgment of this court, dated 30-12-1999. So, the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is devoid of merits. ( 6 ) THE second contention is that the directions of this Court in the batch of criminal appeals were not complied with by the trial Court. The directions given by this court in the batch of criminal appeals read as follows:"in the result, I allow these appeals, remand the cases back to the learned trial Courts. In the light of what has been stated in the second judgment of Raj Deo sharma s case certain directions need to be given which should be kept in mind by the trial Courts after they start proceeding in these matters. In the light of what has been stated in the second judgment of Raj Deo sharma s case certain directions need to be given which should be kept in mind by the trial Courts after they start proceeding in these matters. The extention of one year for adducing evidence shall not be automatic but shall only be given in those cases where exceptional reasons in the interest of justice are given. That makes it imperative that the prosecution should apply giving reasons for extention of period of one year. Therefore, I direct that in those cases in which prosecution wants extension of time, they should move applications within two weeks from the date they appear before the Courts below and in cases in which such applications are made the trial Court should pass orders after hearing the accused persons without fail, within two weeks. The applications may be allowed where the court finds exceptional reasons in the interest of justice and the applicaticns should be dismissed where no such reasons are available. In cases in which no applications are made within the time stipulated by this Court, the evidence can be once again closed and the next step can be taken by the trial Courts. The supreme Court had ordered extension of one year in cases which were pending at the time the first judgment in Raj Deo sharma s case was pronounced. The supreme Court had also ordered that the time during which the first judgment was stayed by the Supreme Court should be excluded from the one year period. In these cases that schedule cannot be adhered to because the judgments in these cases were passed during the intervening period of two judgments of the Supreme Court. Therefore, I direct that a maximum period of one year be granted by the trial Courts for adducing evidence from the date they pass the orders on the applications, if any, moved by the prosecution. In order to avoid any confusion in the matter and to avoid further delay, I direct the prosecuting agency through their learned counsel and also the respondents through their counsels to appear before the concerned court on or before 28th January 2000. In order to avoid any confusion in the matter and to avoid further delay, I direct the prosecuting agency through their learned counsel and also the respondents through their counsels to appear before the concerned court on or before 28th January 2000. " ( 7 ) BASING on the above directions, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the Prosecution did not file any such applications and, therefore, the evidence must be deemed to have been closed and the proceedings have to be quashed. ( 8 ) THE 1st Judgment and the 2nd Judgment were overruled by the Constitution Bench judgment, in paragraph 29 of which their lordships held as under:"for all the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that in Common Cause case (I) as modified in Common Cause case (II) and Raj Deo Sharma (I) and (II), the Court could not have prescribed period of. limitation beyond which the trial of a criminal case or a criminal proceedings cannot continue and must mandatorily be closed followed by an order acquitting or discharging the accused. In conclusion we hold: (1) the dictum in A. R. Antulay case is correct and still holds the field. (2) The propositions emerging from article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in A. R. Antulay case adequately take care of right to speedy trial. We uphold and reaffirm the said propositions. (3) The guidelines laid down in a. R. Antulay case are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard-and-fast rules or to be applied like a strait jacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact situation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made. (4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in several directions made in Common cause (I), Raj Deo Sharma (I) and Raj deo Sharma (II) could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial or by the directions made in Common Cause case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and (II ). The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial or by the directions made in Common Cause case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and (II ). At the most the period of time prescribed in those decisions can be taken by the courts seized of the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration the several relevant factors as pointed out in A. R. Antulay case and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any Court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the Court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused. (5) The criminal courts should exercise their available powers, such as those under Sections 309,311 and 258 of the code of Criminal Procedure to effectuate the right to speedy trial. A watchful and diligent trial Judge can prove to be a better protector of such right than any guidelines. In appropriate cases, jurisdiction of the high Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. and Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief or suitable directions. " ( 9 ) THERE cannot be any dispute that whenever a previous decision of a Bench of less strength is overruled by a Bench of higher strength, the previous decision is completely wiped out and Article 141 of the Constitution of India would have no application to the decision which has been overruled and the court would have to decide the case according to the law laid down by the latest decision and not by the decision which has been expressly overruled. This has been clearly enunciated in Rajlal Das Guru Namal pamanani v. State of Maharashtra. Therefore, the observations of the Supreme Court in the constitution Bench Judgment that time limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any Court as a Bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the Court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused, supercede the observations in the 1st and 2nd judgments. ( 10 ) IN pursuance of the Directions of this court, even though a time limit was fixed following the 2nd Judgment, the lower Court was given liberty to close the evidence and proceed to the next step. That was not done, because the order of this Court in the batch of criminal appeals, were initially stayed by the supreme Court and the stay orders were vacated while dismissing the special leave petitions by the Supreme Court on 25-7-2002. When the Supreme Court granted stay, there was no possibility for the trial court to proceed with the matter, during the period the stay was in force, in pursuance of the Directions of this Court in the batch of criminal appeals. So, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the directions of this Court were not strictly complied with by the trial Court cannot be accepted. Even assuming for a moment that the Directions of this Court have not been followed, still that cannot be a ground to close the prosecution evidence in view of the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the constitution Bench Judgment. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners on this aspect is devoid of merits. ( 11 ) AS regards the third contention, there is no dispute that fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. On this aspect, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon a decision in Durgesh Chandra v. Bimal Chandra wherein their Lordships held as follows:"we may indicate here that if criminal case is kept pending for a very long time without any just cause thereby seriously affecting the guarantee under Art. 21 against deprivation of personal liberty, the law is well settled that the Court, in an appropriate case may quash the criminal proceeding as indicated in the constitution Bench decision of this Court in A. R. Antulay case. " ( 12 ) TO the same effect is another decision in Santosh De v. Archna Guha, wherein their lordships held as under:"in our opinion,this unexplained delay of eight years in commencing the trial by itself infringes the right of the accused to speedy trial. " ( 12 ) TO the same effect is another decision in Santosh De v. Archna Guha, wherein their lordships held as under:"in our opinion,this unexplained delay of eight years in commencing the trial by itself infringes the right of the accused to speedy trial. In the absence of any material to the contrary, we accept the finding of the High Court that this delay of eight years is entirely and exclusively on account of the default of the prosecution. Once that is so there is no occasion for interference in this appeal. " ( 13 ) IN the Constitution Bench Judgment, the case of A. R. Antulay has been referred to, and it is held in paragraph 28 as follows:"the other reason why the bars of limitation enacted in Common Case (I), common Cause (II) and Raj Deo Sharma (I) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) cannot be sustained is that these decisions, though two-or-three-Judge Bench decisions, run counter to that extent to the dictum of the constitution Bench in A. R. Antulay case and therefore cannot be said to be good law to the extent they are in breach of the doctrine of precedents. The well-settled principle of precedents which has crystallized into a rule of law is that a bench of lesser strength is bound by the view expressed by a Bench of larger strength and cannot take a view in departure or in conflict therefrom. We have in the earlier part of this judgment extracted and reproduced passages from a. R. Antulay case. The Constitution Bench turned down the fervent plea of proponents of right of speedy trial for laying down time-limits as bar beyond which a criminal proceeding or trial shall not proceed and expressly ruled that it was neither advisable nor practicable (and hence not judicially feasible) to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Having placed on record the exposition of law as to right to speedy trial flowing from article 21 of the Constitution, this Court held that it was necessary to leave the rule as elastic and not to fix it in the frame of defined and rigid rules. Having placed on record the exposition of law as to right to speedy trial flowing from article 21 of the Constitution, this Court held that it was necessary to leave the rule as elastic and not to fix it in the frame of defined and rigid rules. It must be left to the judicious-discretion of the Court seized of an individual case to find out from the totality of the circumstances of a given case if the quantum of time consumed up to a given point of time amounted to violation of Article 21, and if so, then to terminate the particular proceedings, and if not, then to proceed ahead. The test is whether the proceedings or trial has remained pending for such a length of time that the inordinate delay can legitimately be called oppressive and unwarranted, as suggested in A. R. Antulay. In Kartar Singh case the Constitution Bench while recognizing the principle that the denial of an accused s right of speedy trial may result in a decision to dismiss the indictment or in reversing of a conviction, went on to state; "92. Of course, no length of time is per se too long to pass scrutiny under this principle nor the accused is called upon to show the actual prejudice by delay of disposal of cases. On the other hand, the court has to adopt a balancing approach by taking note of the possible prejudices and disadvantages to be suffered by the accused by avoidable delay arid to determine whether the accused in a criminal proceeding has been deprived of his right of having speedy trial with unreasonable delay which could be identified by the factors - (1) length of delay, (2) the justification for the delay, (3) the accused s assertion of his right to speedy trial, and (4) prejudice caused to the accused by such delay. " ( 14 ) THE delay in the present cases is only four or five years i. e. , from the institution of the cases in 1994 or 1995 till 2000. The Apex court granted stay on 31-5-2000 and ultimately dismissed the special leave petitions on 25-7-2002. From the material available on record, can it be said that the right of the accused to speedy trial is infringed? The Apex court granted stay on 31-5-2000 and ultimately dismissed the special leave petitions on 25-7-2002. From the material available on record, can it be said that the right of the accused to speedy trial is infringed? The attendant circumstances, such as the nature of the offences, number of witnesses, workload of the Court concerned, prevailing local conditions etc. , have to be taken into consideration so as to arrive at a conclusion whether there is any violation of right of speedy trial. ( 15 ) THERE is no material at this stage to show that the accused demanded a speedy trial and it was rejected by the trial Courts. A petition based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account should first be addressed to the High Court, as per the decision in A. R. Antulay s case. So, where there is a complainant of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. In the present cases, there is no material to show that there was a complaint of denial of right to speedy trial by the accused. This Court while disposing of the batch of appeals considered the aspect of the right of the accused to speedy trial. Therefore, this Court was conscious of the fact about the law in a. R. Antulay s case at the time of passing the judgment in batch of criminal appeals on 30-12-1999. Thereafter the accused preferred slps before the Supreme Court were vacated on 25-7-2002. Therefore, there was no possibility for the prosecution to commence trial from March 2000 to July 2002. In pursuance of the dictum laid down by the constitution Bench Judgment, some appropriate order can be given to the trial courts to conclude the trial within a fixed time. But, as the petitioners failed to show that their right to speedy justice was grossly violated, the proceedings cannot be quashed on that ground. ( 16 ) THE offences in the present cases are under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The object of the Act was to make effective provision for the prevention of bribe and corruption rampant amongst the public servants. It is a social legislation designed to curb illegal activites of public services. ( 16 ) THE offences in the present cases are under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The object of the Act was to make effective provision for the prevention of bribe and corruption rampant amongst the public servants. It is a social legislation designed to curb illegal activites of public services. The procedural delays and technicalities of law should not be permitted to defeat the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The overall public interest and social object is required to be kept in mind in deciding the cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act. ( 17 ) THE last contention that the contents in the charges do not make out a prima facie case is only devoid of merits. On this aspect, learned counsel for the petitioners are unable to show by any material that the charges do not constitute the offences alleged against the accused. ( 18 ) IN view of the above discussion, I am of the considered view that there are no grounds to quash the proceedings. Accordingly the petitions are dismissed. However, in view of the fact that the cases are pending since 1994/1995, the trial Courts are directed to dispose of the cases on merits in accordance with law within eight months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.