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2003 DIGILAW 446 (PNJ)

Makhan Singh v. Amar Kaur

2003-03-25

M.M.KUMAR

body2003
Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. This petition filed under Sub-section 5 of Section 15 of the East Punjab (Urban Rent Restrictions) Act, 1949 (for brevity `the Code) challenging the judgment and decree dated 30.9.2002 passed by the Appellate Authority, Barnala holding that the demised premises are required by the landlady-respondent for her own occupation and use. It has also been found that the necessity of the landlady-respondent is bonafide and is not a mere wish as she required the demised shop for opening a grocery business therein. The analysis of the evidence and the view of the Appellate Authority passed thereon read as under : Amar Kaur, petitioner appeared as AW-1 and stated that her husband was killed, by the extremist, about eight years before her statement. At that time, she had four children. Her eldest child Babu Singh, was aged about 13 years, at that time. His second child Veena Kaur was aged about eight years, at that time. Her third child Rinu Bala aged about five years at that time. Her younger child Nitu, at that time was aged about 1 year. It was, in this view of the matter, that at that time, she rented out the demised premises. It was further stated by her that her eldest daughter was studying in 12th class, on the date of her statement, whereas, her younger son was studying in 4th class. She further stated that her eldest son Babu Singh was a post-man, in the post office. She further stated that she required the demised premises for running the grocery business, therein. Her children are growing. With a view to meet the expenditure of their education and day to day necessities, she requires more income. Her children are also likely to be married in the near future. For that purpose too, she needs money. It is only by way of running the grocery business in the demised premises, that she can augment her income. For running grocery business, no experience or expertise is required. During the course of her cross examination, no doubt, she stated that with the income, she was having, at this time, they could comfortably live. However, this statement, made by Amar Kaur, petitioner, during the course of her cross examination, does not mean her requirement is not bonafide. For running grocery business, no experience or expertise is required. During the course of her cross examination, no doubt, she stated that with the income, she was having, at this time, they could comfortably live. However, this statement, made by Amar Kaur, petitioner, during the course of her cross examination, does not mean her requirement is not bonafide. If a person can properly live with income, he or she is getting at a particular time, that does not mean that she or he is not entitled to augment the same, keeping in view his or her future needs. The income which is available to the petitioner, at this juncture, may be sufficient to live comfortably, but the same may not be sufficient for meeting the needs of her children in future. The requirement of the petitioner, therefore, represents the element of need. It is not merely the wish of the landlady to seek ejectment of the respondent, from the demised premises. She thus bonafide requires the demised premises for the purpose of running the grocery business, therein." 2. It is pertinent to mention that the plea of the tenant-petitioner highlighting that the landlady-respondent has acquired another property was rejected and it was held that there is no worthwhile evidence to conclude that the landlady-respondent owned any other shop or non-residential premises within the urban area of Barnala or she has vacated any other non-residential premises. The landlady-respondent is an unfortunate widow. Her husband was assassinated by the terrorist during the days of violence in this part of the country. 3. Mr. Amarjeet Markan, learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner has vehemently argued that the landlady-respondent who used to live on the first floor of the shop rented out to the tenant-petitioner, has vacated the same and has occupied a residential accommodation elsewhere. The learned counsel has suggested that in these circumstances, the tenant-petitioner can be accommodated on the first floor of the demised shop. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Deena Nath v. Puran Lal, 2001(2) Rent Law Reporter 248 : 2001(2) RCR (Rent) 130 (SC) and argued that the hardship of the tenant-petitioner may also be taken into consideration because he would be completely uprooted from the demised shop. 4. 4. After hearing the learned counsel and pursuing the judgment of both the Courts below, I am of the considered opinion that this petition is devoid of merit and is thus liable to be dismissed. It is well-settled proposition of law that the landlord is the best judge of his needs and necessities. The tenant does not have any say in these matters. This view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 and Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co., (2001) 1 SCC 679 : 2000(1) RCR (Rent) 135 (SC). 5. It is also pertinent to mention the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord would not give rise to any substantial question of law and it has to be decided on the reappreciation of evidence. It is well-settled that this Court under Sub-section 5 of Section 15 would not enter into reappreciation of evidence in order to reverse the findings of facts as is well-settled by the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Vineet Jain v. Jagjit Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 1 : 2000(1) RCR (Rent) 507 (SC); Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119 : 1998(2) RCR (Rent) 533 (SC) and Kanchana v. P. Mahian, JT 2002 (Suppl. 1) S.C. 36. Therefore, there is no room to interfere the findings of facts that the landlady-respondent bonafide requires the demised premises for her personal use and necessity. 6. The argument of the learned counsel that the landlady-respondent has vacated the first floor of the demised shop, where she used to live is also devoid of merit because no findings of facts by the Courts below have been recorded that any additional accommodation has become available to the landlady-respondent. In the present case, the accommodation, which is required to be available has to be non-residential in nature. If the argument of the learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner is accepted then it would not be possible for the landlady-respondent to rent out the residential accommodation on the first floor of the demised shop to the tenant-petitioner for commercial purposes unless she violates the Section 11 of the Act. Moreover, there is no law which may compel the landlord to accommodate the tenant in any accommodation. Moreover, there is no law which may compel the landlord to accommodate the tenant in any accommodation. It has been found by the learned Appellate Authority that the landlady-respondent does not own any other shop or non-residential premises within the urban areas of Barnala nor she has vacated any such building. 7. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Deena Nath (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel would not advance his case because in that case, a non-residential shop during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings have become available to the landlord which constituted the basis for concluding that the requirement of the landlord in that case was not bonafide. Therefore, I do not feel persuaded to take a view different than the one taken but the learned Appellate Authority. The instant petition is devoid of merit and is thus liable to be dismissed. For the reasons recorded above, this petition fails and the same is dismissed.