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2003 DIGILAW 446 (RAJ)

Shiv Shanker Ranga v. Khadi Gramodhyog Pratishthan, Bikaner

2003-03-27

ANIL DEV SINGH, H.R.PANWAR

body2003
JUDGMENT 1. (Oral)- This appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 20th January, 2000 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 641/1994, whereby the award of the Labour Court dated 16th February, 1993 was set aside. The facts giving rise to the appeal are as follows : The appellant, while in the employment of the respondent, is alleged to have embezzled a sum of Rs.4,000/-, along with one Raman Lal. A criminal case was registered against the appellant and Raman Lal. This led to filing of charge-sheet against the appellant and Raman Lal in the trial court. While the criminal trial was pending, the services of the appellant were terminated sometimes in the year 1962. Later, the trial resulted in the conviction of the appellant and he was sentenced to undergo three years' rigorous imprisonment. In appeal, however, the, order of conviction and sentence was set aside and the matter was remanded to the trial court. While the matter was pending before the trial court, the appellant agreed to pay a sum of Rs.4,000/- to the respondent No. 1. An agreement to that effect was executed by the appellant on 11th September, 1974. By that agreement, the appellant also gave up all his claims relating to salary against the respondent No. 1. In view of the agreement of the appellant, the respondent No. 1 did not produce its witnesses before the trial court. As a result thereof, the appellant was acquitted by the trial court sometimes in October, 1976. On 2nd November, 1977, the appellant filed an application under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the appropriate Government. On 8th March, 1978 a reference was made by the appropriate Government to the Labour Court for adjudication of the questions, namely, whether or not the termination of service of the workman was valid and if not, to what relief he was entitled to. Thereupon, the respondent No. 1 employer, filed a writ petition in the year 1978 inter alia on the ground that the reference was not competent, as it was made after 16 years. This writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. 2. Thereupon, the respondent No. 1 employer, filed a writ petition in the year 1978 inter alia on the ground that the reference was not competent, as it was made after 16 years. This writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. 2. Thereafter a second writ petition was filed by the respondent No. 1 on the basis that the termination was in consonance with the agreement of the appellant dated 11th September, 1974 and there was no dispute which the Labour Court was required to adjudicate. This writ petition was also dismissed on 22nd October, 1991 on the ground inter alia that the respondent No. 1 was raising issues piecemeal which are to be considered by the Labour Court. The learned Single Judge also noticed that by the agreement dated 11th September, 1974, the appellant had relinquished all his claims towards the salary. The learned Single Judge, however, was of the opinion that in so far as the question of termination was concerned, the appellant did not forgo his right to challenge the same. 3. Since the writ petitions filed by the respondent No. 1 were dismissed, the Labour Court decided the reference on 16th February, 1993. The Labour Court came to the conclusion that on the basis of evidence adduced before it under Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it was sufficiently proved that the workman was guilty of embezzlement and his removal was justified. In spite of this finding, the Labour Court held the appellant entitled to receive salary from 2nd November, 1977 to 15th February, 1993 as the order of termination was passed by the respondent No. 1 without holding an enquiry. The respondent, being aggrieved by the award passed by the Labour Court, challenged the same before this Court. 4. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the appellant having earlier given up his claim against the respondent No. 1 by means of the agreement dated 11th September, 1947 and the respondent responded by not leading any evidence in the criminal trial, the appellant was not entitled to salary from 2nd November, 1977 to 15th February, 1993. 4. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the appellant having earlier given up his claim against the respondent No. 1 by means of the agreement dated 11th September, 1947 and the respondent responded by not leading any evidence in the criminal trial, the appellant was not entitled to salary from 2nd November, 1977 to 15th February, 1993. The learned Single Judge also found the order of the Labour Court unsustainable in view of the fact that once the Labour Court itself had recorded a finding of fact that the workman had admitted his guilt and had agreed to deposit the amount embezzled by him, how it could have been held by the Labour Court that the termination of the appellant could not have been ordered by the respondent No. 1 without holding a full fledged enquiry into the charges. The appellant, not being satisfied with the order passed by the learned Single Judge, has filed the instant appeal. 5. It is admitted that the appellant had agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 4,000/- alleged to have been embezzled by him, to the respondent No. 1. The appellant despite the agreement did not deposit the said sum of Rs.4,000/-. As a consequence thereof, the respondent No. 1 filed an First Information Report against the appellant under Section 380 of the Indian Penal Code. In the trial, the appellant was convicted but on appeal the matter was remanded to the trial court for fresh consideration. The appellant again persuaded the respondent No. 1 to accept the sum of Rs.4,000/-. The appellant also agreed to forgo all claims against the respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 acting on the agreement of the appellant accepted the said sum of Rs.4,000/-. Due to the agreement dated 11th September, 1974, the respondent No. 1 also did not lead evidence before the trial court, with the result that the appellant was acquitted. After the appellant was acquitted, in contravention of the agreement dated 11th September, 1974, he started fresh round of litigation by filing an application before the Government under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 6. It needs to be noticed that the services of the appellant were terminated in the year 1962 on admission of his guilt and the :dispute was raised by him in the year 1977, after a period for 15 years. 6. It needs to be noticed that the services of the appellant were terminated in the year 1962 on admission of his guilt and the :dispute was raised by him in the year 1977, after a period for 15 years. We fail to appreciate that once the appellant had entered into an agreement dated 11th September, 1974, how he could re-agitate the matter in breach thereof, by means of an application under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. This was clear abuse of the process of law. In spite of the fact that the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the misconduct of the appellant was proved and his termination was valid, still on queer logic, held the appellant entitled for salary from 2nd November, 1977 to 15th February, 1993. It appears to us that since the appellant had agreed to forgo his claim for salary, there was no justification for the Labour Court to have arrived at the conclusion that the appellant was entitled for salary for the aforesaid period. The order holding the appellant entitled for salary, amounts to putting premium on dishonesty. Proper weight was not attached by the Labour Court to the fact that the appellant had admitted his guilt and had agreed to deposit the sum of Rs.4,000/- which was found to be deficit in the books of account of the respondent. The Supreme Court in Channabasappa Basapaa Happali v. The State of Mysore, AIR 1972 SC 32 held that where action is taken against a delinquent on his admission of facts which amount to a plea of guilt, the action cannot be held to be violative of the principles of natural justice. 7. In the circumstances, we do not find any ground to interfere with the well reasoned order of the learned Single Judge. 8. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.Appeal Dismissed. *******