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2003 DIGILAW 448 (PAT)

Satyendra Dikshit v. State Of Bihar

2003-04-17

P.N.YADAV, S.N.JHA

body2003
Judgment S.N.Jha and P.N.Yadav JJ. 1. The petitioner has been datained by the District Magistrate, Gopalganj under section 12 (2) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 (hereinafter called the Act) vide memo no. 3037/C dated 29.8.2002 of the office of the District Magistrate. The detention was approved by the State Government under section 12 (3) of the Act on 9.9.2002 and confirmed under section 21 (1) read with section 22 of the Act. The petitioner seeks quashing of these orders and his release. 2. The solitary point urged on behalf of the petitioner in support of the petition is that there was inordinate delay in disposal of the representation depriving him of the right of expeditious consideration of the representation. The relevant facts in this regard are as follows: 3. After service of the grounds of detention along with the detention order on 31.8.2002 the petitioner filed representation on 23.9.2002. The representation was received in the department on 25.9.2002. On the same day the District Magistrate was asked to send his comments. The comments were received in the department on 4.10.2002. On 5.10.2002 the representation was dealt with by the Office. The Deputy Secretary and the Secretary of the Department concerned considered the matter on 7.10.2002 and 8.10.2002 respectively. Agreeing with their opinion the Minister Incharge rejected the representation on 9.10.2002. The rejection was communicated on 16.10.2002. 4. On behalf of the petitioner, it was submitted that the period between 25.9.2002 and 4.10.2002 has not been explained by the respondents and thus in the absence of any explanation the Court should hold that there was wilful delay in consideration of the representation and in the circumstances the detention should be quashed. 5. Learned Standing Counsel No. VIII informed the Court that the District Magistrate requested the Superintendent of Police to send his comments in the context of petitioners representation. The Superintendent of Police submitted his comments on 29.9.2002 and on 1.10.2002 the District Magistrate sent his comments to the Government which was received in the department on 4.10.2002. 6. 5. Learned Standing Counsel No. VIII informed the Court that the District Magistrate requested the Superintendent of Police to send his comments in the context of petitioners representation. The Superintendent of Police submitted his comments on 29.9.2002 and on 1.10.2002 the District Magistrate sent his comments to the Government which was received in the department on 4.10.2002. 6. Learned Standing Counsel No. 8 submitted that though there may be delay of one or two days in between it would appear that the file kept moving from one place to another and, therefore, it cannot be said that the authorities sat over the representation and the petitioner thus is not entitled to urge that there was wilful delay on the part of the government andor its authorities. He submitted that the Sureme Court has clarified that what is significant is not the amount of delay but the explanation. 7. We find sufficient force in the submission of the learned Standing Counsel. From the sequence of events narrated above, it is clear that the consideration of the representation took place with due despatch. It is settled practice to send for comments on the representation from the detaining authority which was done on the same day the representation was received. The District Magistrate thought it proper to seek the comments of the Superintendent of Police. This Court cannot question the satisfaction of the District Magistrate in this regard. No sooner the Superintendent of Police submitted his comments than the District Magistrate sent his own comments on 1.10.2002. Within five days of receipt of the comments the matter was dealt with at different levels including the government. In this manner, all told, it took only 15 days to decide the representation of the petitioner and in the circumstances it cannot be held that there was delay, muchless unexplained delay, so as to warrant interference. 8. The solitary point urged on behalf of the petitioner having been rejected, we find no merit in this writ application which is accordingly dismissed.