Judgment :- Krishnan Nair, J. The unfortunate victim in this case is one Rajimol, aged 9 years, who was the daughter of P.W.1, Omana. Rajimol was studying in the Vth standard in the K.M.U.P.School, Mallassery. On 1-12-1997, at 7 a.m. as usual, she left her house for attending the tuition class and after the tuition, she went to the school. She used to return home at 4.30 p.m. But, on that day, she did not return. P.W.1 made enquiries about her missing daughter. When she met P.W.2, a classmate of the deceased, she was told that P.W.2 along with Rajimol returned from the school as usual and when they reached in front of the oil Mill at Vattakulanji junction, the, the deceased went towards east in the company of the accused through the colony road. At about 9.30 p.m. P.W.1 and others went to the house of the accused and made enquires about the deceased. The accused told them that he did not see her. At about 10.30 p.m., P.W.1 went to pathanamthitta Police Station and gave Ext.P1, P.W17, the then Sub Inspector of police, Pathanamthitta, registered Crime No.756/97 of the pathanamthitta police Station under Ext.P1 (a) F.I.R. P.W.19, the then Circle Inspector of Pathanamthitta police Station took up the investigation in the case. On getting suspicion the accused was arrested in connection with the crime. On the basis of the information given by the accused, the dead body was recovered form a paddy field. P.W.19 held inquest over the dead body and prepared Ext.P11 inquest report. He recovered form the dead body M.O.2 blouse, M.O.3 shuddy and M.O.14 kolous. The post mortem examination of the dead body was conducted by Dr. Velayudhan (P.W.5) Assistant professor of Forensic Medicine and Deputy Police surgeon, Medical College, Kottayam. On 3-12-1997, on the basis of Ext.P7 (a) disclosure statement, P.W.19 recovered M.O.11 grass mat and M.O.2 thorthu form the house of the accused. He also recovered M.O.8 kailli, M.O.9 shirt and M.O.10 thorthu from the house of the accused. On further interrogation of the accused, pursuant to Ext.P8 (a) statement, M.O.1 skirt and M.O.7 earring were recovered. On the basis of Ext.P9 (a) information furnished by the accused the school bag belonging to the deceased was recovered under Ext.P9 mahazar, P.W.19 questioned the witnesses and recorded their statements. On further interrogation of the accused, pursuant to Ext.P8 (a) statement, M.O.1 skirt and M.O.7 earring were recovered. On the basis of Ext.P9 (a) information furnished by the accused the school bag belonging to the deceased was recovered under Ext.P9 mahazar, P.W.19 questioned the witnesses and recorded their statements. P.W.18, the successor of P.W.19 verified the investigation conducted by P.W.19 and laid the charge before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Pathanamthitta. The Magistrate took the case on file as C.P.No.7/99 and committed the same to the court of Sessions, Pathanamthitta from where it was made over to the Additional sessions Judge. 2. The accused denied the charge. In order to prove the guilt of the guilt of the accused, the prosecution examined P.Ws. 1 to 19, marked Exts.P1 to P16 and identified M.Os. 1 to 14. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the accused was examined under section 313 of the code of Criminal Procedure with regard to the circumstances appeared against him in the prosecution evidence. He denied the prosecution evidence and pleaded innocence. On the side of the defense, Ext.D1 was marked. On an elaborate consideration of the evidence brought on record, the learned Additional Sessions Judge found the accused not guilty of the offences and acquitted him. Hence this appeal by the state. 3.The learned Public prosecutor strongly contended that the order of acquittal passed by the lower court is clearly illegal and cannot be sustained either in law or on facts. According to him, the judgment of acquittal passed by the lower court is perverse and has resulted in grave and substantial miscarriage of justice. He further contended that the circumstances proved in this case points out only to the guilt of the accused and is wholly and indisputably inconsistent with the innocence of the accused. He also contended that the court below has not properly scanned or weighed the evidence in this case. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the trial court passed the order of acquittal after fully considering the evidence and doubting the veracity of the prosecution case by giving cogent reasons. He pointed out that the jurisdiction of the appellate court to interfere with the order of acquittal should be exercised only in exceptional cases and this case cannot be included in the category of exceptional cases. 4. He pointed out that the jurisdiction of the appellate court to interfere with the order of acquittal should be exercised only in exceptional cases and this case cannot be included in the category of exceptional cases. 4. We are fully aware that the appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal, unless the same is found to be perverse. In this connection it is relevant to note the following observations of the Supreme Court in K.Ramakrishnan Unnithan V. State of Kerala ({1999} 3 SCC 309): “The plenitude of power available to the court hearing an appeal against acquittal is the same as that available to a court hearing an appeal against the order of conviction. But, however the court will not interfere solely because a different plausible view may arise on the evidence. In a case of murder, if the reasons given by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses are not sound, then there should be no hesitation on the part of the High Court in interfering with an order of acquittal. If the judgment of the trial court was absolutely perverse, legally erroneous and based on wrong testimony, it would be proper for the High Court to interfere and reverse the order of acquittal�. Having examined the judgment of acquittal and on scrutinizing the evidence in this case, we are clearly of opinion that in view of the illegal and erroneous approach made by the learned Additional Judge to the evidence and circumstances of this case, the order of acquittal passed by the lower court has resulted in a grave and substantial miscarriage of justice. We have no hesitation to say that the judgment of the lower court suffers from the vices of perversity. 5. It is not seriously disputed before us that the deceased Rajimol had a homicidal death. It is gatherable from the evidence that she was first raped and then murdered. P.W.5, Dr. Velayudhan has deposed that he conducted post mortem examination on the dead body on 3-12-1997. Ext.P2 is post mortem certificate. According to the Doctor, the deceased died of violence applied to the face and neck. He has also stated that injury No.6 noted in Ext.p2 is fatal and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. P.W.5, Dr. Velayudhan has deposed that he conducted post mortem examination on the dead body on 3-12-1997. Ext.P2 is post mortem certificate. According to the Doctor, the deceased died of violence applied to the face and neck. He has also stated that injury No.6 noted in Ext.p2 is fatal and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. According to him, even though the hymen was intact, the margin of hymen was contused and that indicates application of force to the hymen by some object. He opined that if penis is attempted to be introduced such contusion is possible. He would say that there was partial penetration since the hymen was contused. He further opined that if there was full penetration hymen would have been ruptured. He has also stated that full penetration is not necessary to constitute rape, only vulgar penetration is sufficient. We see no reason to discard the evidence of P.w.5 and Ext.P2. According to us, the medical evidence in this case would support the case of the prosecution that the deceased girl was raped and thereafter she was murdered. 6. Then the question for consideration is whether there is reliable material on record to connect the accused with the crime. There is no eyewitness to the occurrence and the prosecution case rests upon circumstantial evidence. The law relating to circumstantial evidence is now clearly well settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts. The essential ingredients to prove guilt of an accused by circumstantial evidence are: (a) the circumstances from which the conclusion is drawn should be fully proved; (b) the circumstances should be conclusive in nature; (c) all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt and inconsistent with innocence; (d) the circumstances should to a moral certainty, exclude the possibility of guilt of any person other than the accused (see Vitahl Tukarm More v. State of Maharashtra, {(2002) 7 SCC 20}. As observed by the Supreme Court in Subhash Chand v. State of Rajasthan {(2002) 1 SCC 702} though the offence is gruesome and revolts the human conscience but an accused can be convicted only on legal evidence and if only a chain of circumstantial evidence has been so forged as to rule out the possibility of any other reasonable hypothesis excepting the guilt of the accused. The Supreme Court further observed: “Between may be true and must be true there is a long distance to travel which must be covered by clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence by the prosecution before an accused is condemned as a convict.� 7. Keeping in mind the above principles of law, let us examine the circumstances, which have been proved in this case. We shall first enumerate the circumstances projected by the prosecution against the accused. I) The deceased was last seen in the company of the accused; ii) the dead body was recovered as pointed out by the accused; (iii) The recovery of the school bag and umbrella belonging to the deceased pursuant to the disclosure statement given by the accused; iv) some of the hair collected from the scene of occurrence and the hair collected from the accused were found to be similar on scientific examination. 8. The first circumstances relied on by the prosecution is that the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused. The prosecution mainly relies on the evidence of P.Ws. 2to 4 to prove this circumstance. P.w.2 was the classmate of the deceased in the K.M.U.P. School, Mallassery at the relevant time. She deposed that the deceased came to the school on 1-12-1997 and she was in the school till 4p.m. Thereafter she left the school and they together reached up to Vattakulanji junction from where the deceased Rajimol went towards east along with a person with black face and rolled hair. She identified the accused as the person who was seen with the deceased. According to the court below, “though P.W.2 is a vigilant girl, her evidence is not inspiring�. According to us, the reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge to discard the evidence of P.W.2 are no reasons at all. The lower court found fault with the investigating officer on the ground that he did not make enquiry as to whether the deceased attended the school on the day till evening or she was roaming hither and thither with somebody else. As stated earlier, P.W.2 had asserted in her evidence that the deceased attended the school till 4p.m. and thereafter she left the school in the company of the deceased and when they reached Vattakulanji junction the deceased went to east along with the accused. In view of the above evidence of P.W.2 it was the accused. As stated earlier, P.W.2 had asserted in her evidence that the deceased attended the school till 4p.m. and thereafter she left the school in the company of the deceased and when they reached Vattakulanji junction the deceased went to east along with the accused. In view of the above evidence of P.W.2 it was the accused. In view of the above evidence of P.W.2 it was not necessary for the investigation officer to make further enquiry as to whether the deceased attended the school on the date of occurrence. “Another reason company of the accused. The prosecution mainly relies on the evidence of P.Ws. 2 to 4 prove this circumstance. P.W.2 was the classmate of the deceased in the K.M.U.P. School, Mallassery at the relevant time. She deposed that the deceased came to the school on 1-12-1997 and she was in the school and they together reached up to vattakulanji junction from where the deceased Rajimol went towards east along with a person with black face and rolled hair. She identified the accused as the person who was seen with the deceased. According to the court below, though P.W.2 is a vigilant girl, her evidence is not inspiring�. According to us, the reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge to discard the evidence of P.W.2 are no reasons at all. The lower court found fault with the investigating officer on the ground that he did not make enquiry as to whether the deceased attended the school on the day till evening or she was roaming hither and thither with somebody else. As stated earlier, P.W.2 had asserted in her evidence that the deceased attended the school till 4 p.m. and thereafter she left the school in the company of the deceased and when they reached vattakulanji junction the deceased went to east along with the accused. In view of the above evidence of P.W.2 it was not necessary for the investigating officer to make further enquiry as to whether the deceased attended the school on the date of occurrence. Another reason given by the learned Additional Sessions Judge to discard her evidence is her failure to disclose the name of the accused. On going rough her evidence we find that she had no case that the name of the accused was know to her previously. Another reason given by the learned Additional Sessions Judge to discard her evidence is her failure to disclose the name of the accused. On going rough her evidence we find that she had no case that the name of the accused was know to her previously. It is relevant to note the following question and answer in the cross examination of P.W.2…. 9. Therefore, it cannot be said that failure of this witness to disclose the name of accused to the police casts doubt on the veracity of her evidence. We cannot also agree with the court below that P.W.2 is a tutored witness. No doubt, P.W.2 being a child witness her evidence should be scrutinized with great care and caution. But, as observed by the Supreme Court in Panchhi v. State of UP. {(1998) 7 SCC 177} it is not the law that if a witness is a child, its evidence shall be rejected. It cannot be said that a child witness would always stand irretrievably stigmatized. In Surayanarayana v. State of Karnataka {2001{1} Scale 7) it has been held that there is no infirmity in the evidence of a child witness shown to have stood the test of cross examination and then a conviction can be based upon such testimony alone. It is also held that corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence. We have carefully gone through the evidence of P.W.2. We find no reason to doubt her evidence. She is a most natural witness and she has no reason to falsely implicate the accused. 10. Another witness cited and examined by the prosecution to prove the circumstance is P.W.3. According to him, while he was driving his auto rickshaw he saw the accused and the deceased proceeding towards east at about 4.30 p.m. His evidence was discarded by the court below mainly on the ground that he did not know the name of the person, who hired the auto rickshaw. An auto rickshaw driver is not expected to know the names of the passengers traveling in the auto rickshaw. Another reason given by the lower court to discard his evidence is that though he went to the place where the dead body was found he was unable to say where the umbrella was lying. An auto rickshaw driver is not expected to know the names of the passengers traveling in the auto rickshaw. Another reason given by the lower court to discard his evidence is that though he went to the place where the dead body was found he was unable to say where the umbrella was lying. According to us, that is no reason to discard his evidence. We find that the evidence of P.W.3 is cogent, convincing and trustworthy. 11. P.W.4 has stated in his evidence that on 1-12-1997 in the evening he saw the deceased proceeding to her house from the school in the company of the accused. According to him, he was standing in the curt yard of his house waiting for his daughter who had gone to the school. He also deposed that he along with P.W.1 and others went in search of the deceased and after taking his supper, he took a mat and went to his rubber estate as usual. One of the reasons given by the court below for discarding his evidence is that he stated to the police that he was sitting in his house whereas he stated before the court that he was standing in the courtyard. According to the lower court, he was not seen in the locality after the occurrence and he returned to the house only on 4-2-1997 and therefore his conduct was suspicious. It appears that the court below placed reliance on the defense suggestion that he was involved in the crime and he was saved by the police at the instance of his brother-in-law. According to us, even if P.W.4’s evidence is not taken into consideration, the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 is sufficient to prove that the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused. 12. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohibur Rahman v. State of Assam {(2002) 6 SCC 715} the learned counsel for the respondent strongly contended that the circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily load to the inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. It was also held in that case that where the event of last seen together did not bear such close proximity with the death of the victim by reference to the time or place, the conviction could not be maintained. It was also held in that case that where the event of last seen together did not bear such close proximity with the death of the victim by reference to the time or place, the conviction could not be maintained. No doubt, there must be a close proximity between the event of the accused having been last seen with the deceased and the factum of death of the deceased. In this case the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused at about 4.30 p.m. on 1-12-1997. The dead body was recovered pursuant to the statement given by the accused on 2-12-1997. In the Supreme Court case relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent, the dead body had been recovered about 14 days after the date on which the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused. The distance between the tow places was also about 30 to 40 kms. In such circumstances the Supreme Court held that the event of the accused persons having departed with the deceased and the last seen together does not bear such close proximity between the event of the accused having been last death of the deceased. Therefore, Mohibur Rahman’s case would not help the accused in this case. 13. In this case the prosecution has established the fact the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused at 4.30 p.m. on 1-12-1997 and the dead body of the deceased was recovered form the paddy field on 2-12-1997. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the accused to explain how he parted company with the deceased. In Sahadevan v. State ({2003} 1 SCC 534) it has been held by the Supreme Court that a person who is last found in the company of another, if later found missing, then the person with whom he was last found has to explain the circumstances in which they parted company. In this case the accused had no explanation as to how and in what manner the deceased parted company with him. Therefore, we are of the view that the fact that the deceased was last see in the company of he accused can be taken as one of the circumstances to connect the accused with the crime. 14. In this case the accused had no explanation as to how and in what manner the deceased parted company with him. Therefore, we are of the view that the fact that the deceased was last see in the company of he accused can be taken as one of the circumstances to connect the accused with the crime. 14. Another circumstances pointing out in the direction of the guilt of the accused is the recovery of the dead body on the basis of the information furnished by the accused. P.W.19, the investigating officer has stated in his evidence that on getting suspicion the accused was arrested on 2-12-1997 and on the basis of Ext.P11 (a) statement given by the accused the dead body of the deceased was recovered. The lower court was not inclined to place any reliance on the evidence of recovery of the dead body on the ground that there is nothing in the statement pursuant to which the recovery is alleged to have been made to indicate that the accused is the author of the concealment. Ext.P11 (a) runs as follows: 15. … No doubt there is nothing in Ext.P11 (a) to indicate that the accused is the author of concealment. But, we are not inclined to discard the evidence in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Suresh {2000 SCC (Crl.) 263}. It has been held in that case that "There are three possibilities when an accused points out the place where a dead body or an incriminating material was concealed without stating that it was concealed by him. One is that he himself would have concealed it. Second is that he would have seen somebody else concealing it. And the third is that he would have been told by another person that it was concealed there. But if the accused declined to tell the criminal court that his knowledge about the concealment was on account of one of the last two possibilities the criminal court can presume that it was concealed by the accused himself�'. In this case the accused has not offered any explanation as how else he came to know of the concealment. Therefore it has to be presumed that it was concealed by the accused himself. 16. In this case the accused has not offered any explanation as how else he came to know of the concealment. Therefore it has to be presumed that it was concealed by the accused himself. 16. The learned counsel for the respondent further contended that since the recovery was made from a public place, no reliance can be placed on the evidence of recovery. We cannot agree. It is true that in this case the dead body of the deceased was recovered from a paddy field. But nobody has a case that before the recovery of the dead body it was visible to others. In this connection it is relevant to note the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar (A.I.R. 2002 S.C.16). In that case a grinding stone which contained blood was recovered from tall grass. At the instance of the accused his full pant and underwear and the underwear belonging to the deceased were recovered from a sugarcane field where he had buried them. It was contended before the Supreme Court that since they were found in an open place, no reliance can be placed on such recoveries. Relying on an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in State of Him.Pradesh v. Jeet Singh ({1999} 4 SCC 370), the Supreme Court rejected the contention. The Supreme Court held that the plant and underwear were buried and they were out of visibility of others in normal circumstances. The Supreme Court observed. “Until they were disinterred, at instances of respondent, their hidden state had remained unhampered. The respondent alone knew where they were until he disclosed it.� In view of the settled position, we are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that since the recovery is made from an open place, no reliance can be placed on such recoveries. According to us, the recovery of the dead body pursuant to the statement made by the accused is a strong circumstance to connect him with the crime. 17. Another circumstance relied on by the prosecution is the recovery of M.O.4 to M.O.6 on the basis of the information furnished by the accused. M.O.4 is the school bag, which belonged to the deceased and the books in the bag were marked as M.O.5 series. Umbrella is marked as M.O.6. 17. Another circumstance relied on by the prosecution is the recovery of M.O.4 to M.O.6 on the basis of the information furnished by the accused. M.O.4 is the school bag, which belonged to the deceased and the books in the bag were marked as M.O.5 series. Umbrella is marked as M.O.6. Ext.P9 (a) is the disclosure statement under which school bag and umbrella were recovered and Ext.P9 is the mahazar prepared at that time. There is reliable evidence to show that M.Os. 4 to 6 were recovered at the instance of the accused. The lower court has discarded the evidence on the ground of lack of authorship of concealment. In view of the Supreme Court decision in State of Maharahstra v. Suresh referred to above, since the accused has not offered any explanation as how else he came to know of the concealment, it can be presumed that it was the accused who concealed the same. 18. The last circumstance relied on by the prosecution is that some hair collected from the scene of occurrence were similar to those of the accused. It is in evidence that P.W.14, Dr. Vinodkumar, Scientific Assistant (Biology) District police office, D.C.R.B. Pahanamthitta, collected hair from the scene of occurrence and they were packed, sealed and handed over to the investigating officer. The sealed packets were sent to chemical examination and Ext.P13 report was obtained. It was P.W.15, Sri. S. Parameswaran Nair, Assistant Director (Biology) F.S.L., Thiruvananthapuram, who examined the hair and sent the report. He has sworn that some of the hair-collected form the scene of occurrence were found to be similar to the hair collected from the accused. It is also in evidence that on 29-1-1998 Dr. Umesh along with the investigating officer went to the sub jail and collected the scalp hair and public hair of the accused. According to the court below, the recovery of scalp hair and public hair etc. are suspicious in nature since most of the recoveries were made by P.W.11 on different dates. Therefore the court below placed no reliance on the scientific evidence. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that by laboratory examination of hairs it would be possible to say that it cannot belong to a particular individual, but it cannot be opined that it definitely belongs to him. Therefore the court below placed no reliance on the scientific evidence. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that by laboratory examination of hairs it would be possible to say that it cannot belong to a particular individual, but it cannot be opined that it definitely belongs to him. We cannot agree with the learned counsel that the result of scientific examination of hair should not be relied upon to connect the accused with the crime. The science of hair identification is a fast advancing science and even if it is assumed that individualization is not possible the results of scientific examination of hair can be relied upon along with other circumstances connecting the accused with the crime. In Kanbikarasan Jadav v. State of Gujarat (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 821) it was held that the results of scientific examination of hair can be relied on along with other circumstances connecting the accused with the crime. In this connection it is also relevant to note a Division Bench decision of this Court in Mohanan Kani v. State of kerala (1992 (2) KLT 839). In that case that the scalp hair recovered from the dead body were similar to the scalp hair of the accused in all the parameters chosen for comparison. It was held that chemical examination of scalp hair can be considered as an acceptable piece of evidence to connect the accused. The learned counsel for the respondent brought to our notice another Division Bench decision of this Court in Fr. George Cherian v. State of Kerala (ILR 1989 (2) Ker.95) in support of his contention that chemical examination of scalp hair cannot be relied on for identifying the accused. In Mohan Kani’s case the Division Bench considered the decision in Fr. George Cherian’s case and observed as follows: “In that case, there was no other circumstance pointing to the guilt of the accused. That decision also shows that if there are other circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused, the results of scientific examination of hair also can be pressed into service. In this case, as already noticed, there are other strong circumstances to connect the accused with the crime. Therefore, the results of scientific examination of hair can be relied on along with the other circumstances connecting the accused with the crime. 19. In this case, as already noticed, there are other strong circumstances to connect the accused with the crime. Therefore, the results of scientific examination of hair can be relied on along with the other circumstances connecting the accused with the crime. 19. Thus we have considered the various circumstances, which the prosecution has put forward to bring home the guilt of the accused. All these circumstances when put together lead to the irresistible conclusion that it was the accused who had caused the death of the deceased. According to us, the circumstantial evidence in the case is wholly and indisputably consistent with the guilt of the accused. The court below has, on a wrong process of reasoning and an erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of this case, acquitted the accused and the order of acquittal has resulted in grave and substantial miscarriage of justice. 20. For the reasons stated above, we set aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial court and find the accused guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 364, 376, 302 and 201 of the Indian penal Code and convict him there under. 21. What remains is the question of sentence to be imposed on the accused. We heard him on the question of sentence in detail. He repeats his plea of innocence, which we have already rejected. He says that he has to look after his aged mother and four sisters. Therefore a lenient view may be taken in the matter of sentence. The crime committed by him is heinous and brutal. However, we are not inclined to include this case in the category of rarest of rare cases. The offences were committed on 1-12-1997. More than 5 ½ years have elapsed after the commission of the offences. He had been acquitted by the trial court. Taking into consideration all these aspects we are inclined to take a lenient view in the matter of awarding sentence. He is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years under Section 376 I.P.C., imprisonment for life under Section 302 and 3 years under section 201 of the I.P.C. The sentences are allowed to run concurrently. The period of detention, if any, he has undergone, as an under trial prisoner during investigation, enquiry, or trial of this case shall be set off against the term of imprisonment.