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2003 DIGILAW 451 (PAT)

Paras Nath Singh v. State Of Bihar

2003-04-18

RADHA MOHAN PRASAD

body2003
Judgment 1. In both these writ petitions, the question involved is common and thus, with consent of parties, they have been heard together for disposal by a common order. 2. In these writ applications, the grievance of the petitioners, who initially were appointed in the Schools run by the District Board which were later taken over by the Government as Government Schools with effect from 1.1.1971 by virtue of the provisions, contained in section 3 of the Bihar Non-Government Elementary Schools (Taking Over of Control) Act, 1976, is that they have not been paid differential salary on account of the revision of pay for the period 1.1.1971 to 31.3.1973 with statutory interest besides the amount of G.P.F for the period prior to 1976 and in C.W.J.C. No. 1292 of 2003 the grievance is also on account of non-payment of leave encashment. 3. In the first case (C.W.J.C. No. 1292/2003), counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the District Superintendent of Education, Patna (respondent no. 4) and also a separate counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the District Provident Fund Officer, Patna (respondent no. 5) whereas in the second case (C.W.J.C. No. 1339 of 2003) counter affidavit has been filed only on behalf of the District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad (respondent no. 2). 4. In the first case, learned counsel for the State has submitted that the sanetion for difference of salary and leave encashment has been accorded, vide letters no. 1830 and 1829 dated 5.4.2003, with direction to the concerned drawing and disbursing officer to ensure that payment against the said items be made. 5. Today, a supplementary counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no. 4 in first case in which it is stated that the bills against difference of salary and leave encashment have been passed by the Sub-Treasury, Mokama on 12:4.2003, as has been informed by the concerned Area Education Officer, vide letter no. 350 dated 12.4.2003. A photo copy of the said letter has been annexed as Annexure E. On, instruction from D.S.E., Patna, who is personally present in Court, learned counsel for the State has submitted that on enhancement, the said amount has already been credited in the account of the petitioner. 6. 350 dated 12.4.2003. A photo copy of the said letter has been annexed as Annexure E. On, instruction from D.S.E., Patna, who is personally present in Court, learned counsel for the State has submitted that on enhancement, the said amount has already been credited in the account of the petitioner. 6. As regards G.P.F. in the said supplementary counter affidavit it is stated that the concerned "District Provident Fund Officer has, vide Memo No. 378 dated 9.4.2003, raised certain objections i.e. basic pay figure has not been mentioned and the final withdrawal application does not bear the signature of the petitioner. It is further stated that the said query has been met vide letter no. 1103 dated 9.4.2003 and the concerned D.P.F.O. has also been requested to issue necessary authority slip as, in the meantime, attempts are being made to obtain the signature of the petitioner. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is presently not available as he has gone to Ayodhya. However, on return from Ayodhya the petitioner may contact the DSE, whereupon the DSE shall immediately get the necessary formalities completed and forward it to the District Provident Fund Officer forthwith for issuance of authority. The District Provident Fund Officer is directer to issue authority immediately on receipt of the application signed by the petitioner. 8. In the second case, it is stated that the Office of the D.S.E., Jehanabad (respondent no. 2) came into existence in 1988 and before that Office of the D.S.E Gaya (respondent no. 4) was the parerent office. Regarding payment of G.P.F. prior to 1976, it is stated that at that time the deduction of G.P.F. was made by Gaya district which was lying with the DSE, Gaya and recently a cheque of Rs. 50,00,000/- had been received by respondent no. 2 from respondent no. 4 and the said cheque has been deposited in the current account of respondent no. 2 and, according to him the amount has not been cleared by the Bank and came in his account. As soon as the cheque is cleared by the Bank, immediately thereafter the amount of G.P.F. prior to 1976 will be paid to the petitioner with up-to-date statutory interest. 9. In view of the said statement, respondent no. 2 and, according to him the amount has not been cleared by the Bank and came in his account. As soon as the cheque is cleared by the Bank, immediately thereafter the amount of G.P.F. prior to 1976 will be paid to the petitioner with up-to-date statutory interest. 9. In view of the said statement, respondent no. 2, who is personally preser in Court, is directed to ensure payment the said G.P.F. amount with up-to-date statutory interest within three days of credit of the said amount in his account. 10. As regards the differential of salary it is stated that the same has been sanctioned vide Memo No. 702 dated 16.4.2003 and the concerned Headmaster-cum-drawing and disbursing officer has been directed to ensure payment of the same immediately. 11. Accordingly, the D.S.E. (respondent no. 2) as well as the concerned Headmaster are directed to ensure encashment/payment of the said amount to the petitioner positively within three days. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners in both the writ cases have submitted that the petitioners are entitled for statutory interest on the differential salary as per the rate applicable in the G.P.F. account in view of the Government resolution no. 763 dated 9.2.1973. 13. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, has submitted that this Court in the case of Pradyuman Prasad Singh V/s. The State of Bihar & others, disposed of on 18.2.2003), under similar circumstances, held that the question of payment of interest does not arise. 14. Learned counsel for the State has also produced a photo copy of the certified copy of the order. From perusal of the said order it appears that the learned Court has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court, reported in (2001) 8 SCC 373 (para 13) to hold that the claim of the petitioner would appear to be time barred. 15. I do not find any such decision on page 373 of (2001) 8 SCC. Learned counsel for the State, however, has submitted that the reference of the said decision in fact, is on page 470 and not 373. 16. I am unable to appreciate as to how the said decision will have any application to the facts of the present case. In the said decision, the Apex Court was dealing with the provision of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 16. I am unable to appreciate as to how the said decision will have any application to the facts of the present case. In the said decision, the Apex Court was dealing with the provision of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In paragraph 13, their Lordships held as follows : "13. Apart from the language, "express exclusion" may follow, from the scheme and object of the special or local law : "[E]ven in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation." (SCC p. 146, para 17) 17. Be that as it may, it appears from the order of the learned single Judge in the case of Pradyuman Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar & others (supra) that the provision regarding deposit of differential salary in the G.P.F. account laid down in Resolution No. 763 dated 9.2.1973 was not brought to the notice of learned Judge and, accordingly, his Lordship said in his order that there is no provision for payment of interest. As per paragraph 10 of the said Government resolution, all Primary Schools other than run by minority, TISCO and other organization were converted into a Government School with effect from 1.1.1971 and teachers working in such schools were treated as Government servants. According to sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 10, all such teachers were directed to be paid in the scale applicable to the teachers of Government schools with effect from 1.4.1973 and as regards arrear of differential salary with effect from 1.1.1971 to 31.3.1973 the decision was to deposit the amount in their G.P.F. account. Thus, obviously the teachers became entitled for statutory rate of interest as applicable in the G.P.F. on the said amount with effect from the date of the resolution i.e. 9.2.1973. 18. In fact, the Government and the authorities of the Government also understood the said decision, as mentioned above, as is evident from the fact that in many cases teachers of various districts of the State have been paid the differential salary with statutory interest whereas the petitioners of the present cases have been arbitrarily kept deprived of the said amount. In fact, the Government and the authorities of the Government also understood the said decision, as mentioned above, as is evident from the fact that in many cases teachers of various districts of the State have been paid the differential salary with statutory interest whereas the petitioners of the present cases have been arbitrarily kept deprived of the said amount. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner appearing in the second case in this regard referred to letter no. 9/P-0257/91 Bha. 857 dated 27th May, 1992 wherein the Director, Primary Education communicated the said decision of the Government to all the District Superintendents of Education that the differential salary for the period 1.1.1971 to 31.3.1973 with interest must be deposited in the G.P.F. account of the teachers forthwith. 20. Thus, this Court finds that the petitioners are entitled for statutory interest on the differential amount at the rate as is applicable for deposits made in the G.P.F. account for the period from the date of resolution of 1973 up to the date of payment. 21. Accordingly, this Court directs the respective Superintendents of Education of these two writ petitions to get the amount of interest calculated and pay the same within one week. 22. In case of non-compliance of any part of this order, the concerned authority shall be liable to pay a cost of Rs. 1,000/- (one thousand) each from his pocket to the respective petitioners and the respective petitioners will be at liberty to file two pages affidavit for revival of these matters and for taking appropriate action. 23. Both these writ petitions, are, thus, disposed of accordingly.