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2003 DIGILAW 455 (ALL)

Raghini Mallick v. State Bank of India

2003-02-28

JAGDISH BHALLA, KAMAL KISHORE

body2003
JAGDISH BHALLA, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER, who is an Officer in the State Bank of India and was posted in Central Zonal Office, Lucknow has preferred this writ petition praying inter-alia for quashing of Charge-sheet no. VIG/443 dated 19. 6. 1998 and the transfer order dated 30. 11. 1999. The reliefs sought by the petitioner in the writ petition read as under:- "a] To issue order, direction or writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned charge shet no. VIG/443 dated 19. 06. 1998. b] To issue an order, direction or writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the malafide transfer of the Petitioner to Bareilly vide serial no. `17 of Office Order 17/1999 dated 30. 11. 1999. c] To command the Respondents to grant exemplary compensation to the petitioner for the harassment suffered over an extended period of time by issuing an order, direction or writ of mandamus, d] To grant exemplary costs. e] Any other order or orders as this Honble Court may deem just and proper in the circumstances may kindly be passed in the favour of the Petitioner and against the respondents. " ( 2 ) LATER on at the belated stage petitioner by an amendment of the writ petition also prayed for :- "a (i) To issue order, direction or Writ in the nature of certiorari to declare void the Rules No. 68 (2) (iii) and 68 (a)and (b) of the 1992 State Bank of India Officers Service rules to the extent that they fail to specify that the likely evidence to prove the charges [ or the list/copies of documents by which and witnesses by whom the Bank intents to prove the charges] must be enclosed with the charge sheet and as such are violative of Articles 14 and 16 and 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. " ( 3 ) AT the initial stage an interim order was passed on 16. 3. 2002 by a division Bench of this Court comprising of Honble Mr Ashish n. Trivedi[late] and Honble P. C. Verma, JJ. :- " The petitioner appears in person. She is aggrieved with the orders of transfer from Lucknow to Bareilly during the pendency of the proceedings. 3. 2002 by a division Bench of this Court comprising of Honble Mr Ashish n. Trivedi[late] and Honble P. C. Verma, JJ. :- " The petitioner appears in person. She is aggrieved with the orders of transfer from Lucknow to Bareilly during the pendency of the proceedings. The petitioner states that despite her best efforts she could not serve the duplicates of the writ petition on Sri N. K. Seth, learned Counsel for the state Bank of India. We have heard the petitioner in person and having considered the submissions made by the petitioner and material on record, we provide that till the next date of listing the petitioner shall not be relived, if she has not already been relieved. List on 27. 3. 2000. " ( 4 ) ON 20. 4. 2000 this writ petition came up for orders before a division Bench comprising of Honble Ashish N. Trivedi and Honble khem Karan, JJ. and following orders were passed: "notice on behalf of opposite parties has been accepted by sri N. K. Seth, Advocate. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties may filed counter affidavit after serving its duplicate on the Counsel for the petitioner within four weeks, who may, if she so desire file rejoinder affidavit within next two weeks. ( 5 ) LIST on 10th July, 2000. Till then, further disciplinary proceedings pending against the petitioner shall remain stayed. ( 6 ) THE petitioner has given an undertaking to the Court that she shall positively report at the place of posting on 1. 6. 2000 where she has been transferred from Lucknow to Bareilly. If she does so, the opposite parties are expected not to take any disciplinary or adverse action against the petitioner for her not complying with the order of transfer. It may be made clear that if possible the writ petition would be finally disposed of on the date of admission i. e. 10th July, 2000. " ultimately on 4. 5. 2000, a Division Bench of this Court comprising honble Ashish N. Trivedi and Honble P. C. Verma, JJ while declining to interfere either with the order of transfer and disciplinary proceedings dispose of the writ petition finally with the following orders:- " We have heard Ms. Ragini Mallick, petitioner in person and Sri N. K. Seth, learned Counsel for the respondents. Ragini Mallick, petitioner in person and Sri N. K. Seth, learned Counsel for the respondents. This petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the charge sheet as well as the disciplinary proceedings. She has also challenged the transfer order by which she has been transferred from lucknow to Bareilly. " We by order dated 20. 4. 2000 in the matter of transfer provided as under:-"notice on behalf of opposite parties has been accepted by Sri n. K. Seth, Advocate. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties may filed counter affidavit after serving its duplicate on the counsel for the petitioner within four weeks, who may, if she so desire file rejoinder affidavit within next two weeks. List on 10th July, 2000. Till then, further disciplinary proceedings pending against the petitioner shall remain stayed. The petitioner has given an undertaking to the Court that she shall positively report at the place of posting on 1. 6. 2000 where she has been transferred from Lucknow to Bareilly. If she does so, the opposite parties are expected not to take any disciplinary or adverse action against the petitioner for her not complying with the order of transfer. It may be made clear that if possible the writ petition would be finally disposed of on the date of admission i. e. 10th July, 2000. " After hearing the petitioner in person and the learned counsel for the respondents and perusing record, we are of the opinion that no interference is called for either with the impugned order of transfer or the disciplinary proceedings. "in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is directed to report for duties at the place of transfer on 1. 6. 2000 and the respondents are directed not to take any disciplinary or adverse action against the petitioner for the period of her absence from the date of her allegedly being relieved from Lucknow till the date of her joining at Bareilly. The petitioner has given an undertaking that she shall report for duties in the forenoon of 1. 6. 2000 at Bareilly. There is no reason why the respondents shall not pay to the petitioner her full pay and allowances from the date of the order of her relieving from Lucknow till 31. 5. 2000. With the aforesaid observations the writ petition is disposed of finally. 6. 2000 at Bareilly. There is no reason why the respondents shall not pay to the petitioner her full pay and allowances from the date of the order of her relieving from Lucknow till 31. 5. 2000. With the aforesaid observations the writ petition is disposed of finally. " ( 7 ) THEREAFTER on 24th May, 2000 petitioner made an application for recall of the final order dated 4. 5. 2000 passed in the writ petition and simultaneously also filed a Special Leave Petition before the Honble supreme Court. The order dated 5. 6. 2000 by which Special Leave petition was dismissed as withdrawn runs as follows:- "learned Counsel states that the petitioner has already applied for recall of the order and, therefore, seeks leave of the Court to withdraw the petition. The special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn. " ( 8 ) DURING the pendency of the application for recall made by the petitioner with regard to final order dated 4. 5. 2000, petitioner also preferred a Review Petition, which was allowed with certain observations. The order passed in the review petition reads as under:- "we have heard Mrs. Ragini Mallick, who has appeared in person and has made her submissions justifying her prayer for review of the final order dated 4. 5. 2000 passed in writ petition No. 374 (SB) of 2000. One of the grounds taken by the petitioner is that on the date on which the writ petition was finally disposed of was not fixed for final disposal and instead 10. 7. 2000 was fixed for final disposal and, therefore, the Court ought not to have proponed the hearing of the petitioner without sufficient justification. It is submitted that if the case was taken upon on 10. 7. 2000, the petitioner could have been in a position to engage a counsel to represent her in the court but she could not do so at the time of presentation of the writ petition or soon after, as the Bar Association of this Court had decided to abstain from work for few days in that period. Great emphasis has been laid by the petitioner on the ground taken in the review application that without hearing the petitioner, we had passed the impugned order dated 4. 5. Great emphasis has been laid by the petitioner on the ground taken in the review application that without hearing the petitioner, we had passed the impugned order dated 4. 5. 2000 and thus serious prejudice has been caused to the petitioner resulting in miscarriage of justice, inasmuch, as the Relief claimed by the petitioner for quashing the charge sheet had not even been considered by the Court while disposing of the writ petition finally by the impugned order dated 4. 5. 2000. We do wish to make any adverse comments for the allegations made or the grounds taken by the petitioner. We however do state that it is a fact that the petitioner is not true in alleging that she was not heard before passing the order dated 4. 5. 2000 finally disposing of the writ petition was dictated in open Court. It is settled law that justice should not only be done but must appeared to be done and there is no reason for the petitioner to be hurt if she truly believes that she had not heard by this court finally, while disposing of the writ petition. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances stated above, the Review Application is allowed and the final order dated 4. 5. 2000 passed in Writ Petition No. 374 (SB) of 2000 is recalled and the writ petition is restored to its original number and shall be listed before another Bench but shall not be treated as tied to this Bench. The petitioner states that the case may be listed tomorrow i. e. 2. 8. 2000, but we refrain to pass such order in the facts and circumstances of this case. It is, however, open for the petitioner to make a request to the Appropriate Authority who is vested with the powers directing the case to be listed in this Court. " ( 9 ) BY the order dated 23. 8. 2001, the Honble the Chief Justice passed an order assigning the writ petition for hearing by a bench presided over by one of us, namely, Jagdish Bhalla as such this writ petition came up for hearing before this Bench. Every effort was made to expedite the hearing but on account of filing of one application or the other, hearing of the writ petition could not be concluded at the earliest. When the parties concluded their arguments, judgment was reserved on 25. Every effort was made to expedite the hearing but on account of filing of one application or the other, hearing of the writ petition could not be concluded at the earliest. When the parties concluded their arguments, judgment was reserved on 25. 10. 2002. Petitioner thereafter submitted written arguments on her own. Before the judgment could be pronounced, an application for further hearing registered as C. M. Application No. 32593 of 2002 was moved by the Counsel appearing for the Bank stating therein that in order to meet further written submissions made by the petitioner, the counsel may be allowed to make further submissions in the case. This application was made on 6. 1. 03 before another Bench, which ordered for listing the application before the Honble the Senior Judge as early as possible. On 24. 1. 2003, the Honble the Senior Judge passed an ordered for putting the application before the appropriate Bench. Thereafter the case was listed before this Bench and on 19. 2. 2003, the judgment was reserved again after the parties concluded their arguments. We are constraint to record here that the petitioner has made even wild allegations against Sri N. K. Seth, learned Counsel appearing for the bank. Since the petitioner was appearing in person, we asked her to keep restraint as we thought that it might be due to frustration. ( 10 ) THE main grievance of the petitioner is that the impugned order of transfer is prejudicial and vindictive for the reason the disciplinary proceedings are pending at Lucknow and the transfer would handicap her defence as it would be impossible to attend hearings at Lucknow. Not only this, it will also affect the growth and development of her 10 years old daughter because her husband is posted at New Delhi and there will be no one to look after her at Bareilly on the days of hearing. She has further stated that the transfer is against the policy and procedure of the bank, which prohibits transferring of an employee during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. Adding further, petitioner submitted that a representation was preferred against the impugned order of transfer by her but no action was taken by the respondents on it. She has further stated that the transfer is against the policy and procedure of the bank, which prohibits transferring of an employee during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. Adding further, petitioner submitted that a representation was preferred against the impugned order of transfer by her but no action was taken by the respondents on it. ( 11 ) PETITIONER has also challenged the disciplinary proceedings initiated against her on the grounds that on denial of promotion when she preferred Appeal, the respondents Bank re-opened the matter regarding absence from duty, non-sanction of extraordinary leave cum restoration of seniority to cover up the mistake committed by the authorities in the matter of promotion. She submitted that the charge sheet is against all the canons of service jurisprudence and principles of natural justice. There was no occasion or fresh evidence to justify reconsideration and further the charges leveled in the charge sheet are false and vague. In fact there was no loss to the Bank and it was on account of her efforts and follow up action that the loss was averted. The charge sheet in question has been issued in violation of the relevant Rules. Petitioner is charged with the violation of Rule 50 (4) of the State Bank of India Officer service Rules on the basis of charge no. 1 and 2, which are not enumerated on, specified as misconduct in the Service Rules and thus cannot be treated as misconduct. ( 12 ) ACCORDING to petitioner, she has been arbitrarily discriminated against and her substantive right under SBI Officer Service Rule 68. 2 to submit her written defence statement in reply to charge sheet and it consideration by the Disciplinary Authority before the commencement of enquiry has been violated as such the enquiry proceedings are vitiated and cannot be allowed to continue. Further, the documents demanded by the petitioner were not supplied inspite of repeated requests. Even the petitioners request for inspection and perusal of certain documents on which the Bank intended to prove the charges was not considered. Elaborating further, petitioner submitted that the Bank had deliberately not supplied the documents demanded by the petitioner for the reason that if those documents were supplied then the Bank would not be able to prove charges. The Bank has not even produced a single prosecution documents even though sufficient time has elapsed since the appointment of the Enquiry Officer. Elaborating further, petitioner submitted that the Bank had deliberately not supplied the documents demanded by the petitioner for the reason that if those documents were supplied then the Bank would not be able to prove charges. The Bank has not even produced a single prosecution documents even though sufficient time has elapsed since the appointment of the Enquiry Officer. The Inquiring Authority even had not furnished the list of documents by which, and a list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be proved, which is violative of Rule 68 of the SBI Service Rules. Petitioner has further alleged that there is nexus between the personnel department and the Vigilance to harass and cause injury to her. ( 13 ) PETITIONER, as stated above, has also challenged the vires of Rule 68 (2) (iii) and 68 (a) and (b) of the State Bank of India Officer Service Rule on the ground that these provisions suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and are contrary to well settled law and principles of natural justice. The impugned provisions deny equal protection of law and as such, same are against the spirit of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Petitioner in order to support her contention that transfer and the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner are on account of malafide and bias attitude of the authorities has relied upon following cases:-1. S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab; AIR 1964 SC 72 2. Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others; 1971 vol. 3 SCC 132 3. State Bank of India v. Anjan Sanyal; 2001 SCC 260 4. R. Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan and another; AIR 1999 SC 1723 5. Arvind Dattatraya Dhande v. State of Mahrastra; 1997 SC on line Case No. 494 ( 14 ) PETITIONER has challenged the action of the respondent-Bank and the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of it being violative of principles of natural justice as adequate opportunity was not afforded to her and the departmental proceedings have been launched after a lapse of several years. She in support of the above contentions has relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman Sadashiv Waishampayan; AIR 1961 SC 1623 , Triloknath v. Union of India and others; 1967 SLR SC 759, State Bank of India v. D. C. Aggarwal; 1992 SC On Line case No. 068, and State of U. P. vs. Shatrughan Lal 1998 SC On Line Case No. 035. ( 15 ) PETITIONER in support of her contention that the administrative action should be in conformity with the relevant regulations or provisions of law has placed reliance on the decision rendered in A. L. Kalra v. PEC (India) Ltd. 1984 Vol. 3scc 316. She also relied upon State of Punjab and others V. Chaman Lal Goyal 1995 Vol. I SLR 700, Ramanand chaudhry v. State of Bihar and others; AIR 1994 SC 948 and Narinderjit singh Sahni and another vs. Union of India and others 2002 Vol. 2 SCC 210 in support of her arguments that delay in concluding the enquiry also vitiates the entire disciplinary proceedings because continued delay is not only causing her mental harassment and injury but it also results in loss of reputation amongst the colleagues. One of the contentions raised by the petitioner was that when she made Appeal against the denial of her legitimate right of promotion, the Bank reopened the proceedings which stood already concluded as such the action of the Bank is unfair and in support of her arguments, she has relied upon a decision of Privy Council in the case of R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State; AIR 1937 PC 27. Petitioner placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal; (2002) 1 SCC 100 , State of Bihar and others Jain Plastic and Madhukar D. Shende vs. Tarabai Aba Shedage; AIR 2002 has submitted that the duty of the Court is to advance justice and not to wipe out such justice in the name of correcting the error of law. Therefore, the existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in exercise of powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, the existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in exercise of powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution. On the strength of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dhanajay Sharma v. State of Haryana and others; JT 1995 (4) SCC, the petitioner submitted that the respondents have filed false affidavits as such the Court should not rely upon the averments made in the affidavits and better would be to reject the same. ( 16 ) SRI N. K. Seth appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, denied the allegations made by the petitioner and submitted that the petitioner has not been picked up alone for transfer but a large number of Officers including the petitioner were transferred in the usual course and in accordance with law. In the order of transfer dated 19. 2. 2000, it was specifically mentioned that the petitioner would stand relieved after availing her leave from 17. 2. 2000 to 26. 2. 2000. It is wrong to say that the petitioner has been transferred from Lucknow to Bareilly in order to harass the petitioner and to deprive her from effective participation in the enquiry proceedings which is going on against the petitioner at Lucknow. ( 17 ) MAIN grievance of the petitioner in the writ petition is that she has been transferred from Lucknow on account of ulterior motives and with malafide intention. According to petitioner, her transfer to Bareilly would handicap her defence, as it would be impossible for her to attend hearings at Lucknow regularly. Validity of the transfer order has also been challenged on the ground of it being against the policy of the Bank, which provides that generally the employees against whom disciplinary proceedings are pending should not be transferred. In the supplementary Counter Affidavit dated April 20, 2000 sworn by Sri maheep Kumar, Chief Manager ( Personnel and H. R. D.) it has been stated that in the year 1987 petitioner was transferred from Delhi to Lucknow on her personal request and was given the post of Desk Officer. Thereafter she was posted in the Zonal Office, Lucknow. In 1992 she was transferred from Lucknow to Kanpur Main Branch. On 14. 5. 1992 she was relieved w. e. f. 18. 5. 1992 but she immediately proceeded on leave w. e. f 14. 5. 1992. Thereafter she was posted in the Zonal Office, Lucknow. In 1992 she was transferred from Lucknow to Kanpur Main Branch. On 14. 5. 1992 she was relieved w. e. f. 18. 5. 1992 but she immediately proceeded on leave w. e. f 14. 5. 1992. She evaded to receive communications sent by the bank. Petitioner remained on unauthorized leave from 19. 5. 1992 to 23. 1. 1996. Petitioner voluntarily reported for duties on 24. 1. 1996 and she was allowed to resume her duties at Staff Training Centre, Lucknow. ( 18 ) N. K. SETH, Counsel for the Bank next argued that Rule 47 of the State Bank of India Officers Service Rules empowers the Bank to transfer any officer to any office or Branch of the Bank or to any place or to any place or deputation to any other Organization in India. Rule 49 prescribed the joining time available to an Officer. Rule 50 casts an obligation on the employee to comply with the directions and orders, which are issued to him from time to time. Petitioner by the impugned order has been transferred in accordance with law. It is not the case of the petitioner that the order of transfer has been passed in violation of service Rules but has contended that the order of transfer is malafide and on account of transfer to Bareilly, she would not be able to effectively contest the enquiry at Lucknow resulting in denial of opportunity apart from mental tension and other difficulties. ( 19 ) WE have examined the submissions made by the rival parties in this behalf and the materials on record and we find no infirmity in the order of transfer. In a plethora of cases including N. K. singh v. Union of india (1994) 6 SCC 98 the Supreme Court has laid down that interference with the order of transfer is justified only in cases of malafide or infraction of any professed norm or principle. In National Hydroelectric power Corporation Ltd. Shri Bhagwan and another (2001)8 SCC 574 held that transfer from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service. In National Hydroelectric power Corporation Ltd. Shri Bhagwan and another (2001)8 SCC 574 held that transfer from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service. The relevant portion reads as under:- "no government servant or employee of a public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of malafide exercise of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the courts or the tribunals cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they were the appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned. " ( 20 ) IN the matter in hand, Petitioner alone has not been singled out for transfer. Alongwith the petitioner several other persons have been transferred to different places in routine course of service. Further, in jaunary, 2000 the post of Chief Manager, Consumer Finance Centre, lucknow on which the petitioner was working prior to his transfer order dated 30. 11. 1999 was abolished by the Bank vide letter dated 29. 1. 2000. Moreover, the Bank after considering the problems of the petitioner, has also transferred the Enquiry Officer, Sri A. K. Shivpuri from lucknow to Bareilly as would be apparent from the affidavit dated April 20,2000 filed by the Respondents-Bank. In this affidavit, it has been clearly stated that the Disciplinary Proceedings will be conducted by the bank at Bareilly for the convenience of the petitioner. ( 21 ) IT would be significant to mention here that the petitioner, as stated above, did not join the new place of posting on one pretext or the other when she was transferred earlier. Further, Sri N. K. Seth, learned counsel appearing for the Bank has assured the Court that the Enquiry would be held at the place of the posting to avoid any inconvenience to the petitioner. Further, Sri N. K. Seth, learned counsel appearing for the Bank has assured the Court that the Enquiry would be held at the place of the posting to avoid any inconvenience to the petitioner. We are of the considered opinion that the transfer is not only an exigency of service but it is a condition of service. We further find that the petitioner has not been able to make out any strong ground of malafide in passing the impugned order of transfer. In these circumstance, we do not find any reasonable ground to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to show our interference with the order of transfer and the cases referred to above relied upon by the petitioner are not applicable in the instant case. ( 22 ) STATE Bank of India Officers Service Rules have been framed by the Central Board of the State Bank of India in exercise of powers conferred under Section 43 of the State Bank of India Act. Rule 68 (i)provides that the Disciplinary Authority may institute disciplinary proceedings on its own or on the orders issued by the Superior Authority. Rule 68 (2) (i) provides that the Disciplinary Authority may for the purposes of inquiry into the truth of any imputation of misconduct against an officer, the Disciplinary Authority himself can enquiry or may appoint any Officer or a public servant to inquire into the truth. Rule 68 (iii) lays down that the Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite and distinct charges on the basis of allegations against an employee. The articles of charge together with the statement of allegation shall be communicated in writing to the Officer concerned, who may submit his statement of defence within the time prescribed by the Disciplinary authority. Rule 68 (vi) empowers the Bank to appoint any officer or a public servant to be known as the"presenting Officer". Rule (vii) provides that the charged officer may take the assistance of an officer, who will be known as Representative. Rule 68 (1) (viii), 68 (2), 68 (3), 68 (4) and 68 (5)lays down a detail procedure to be adopted by the Inquiry Officer. ( 23 ) FURTHER, a specific stage has been prescribed for furnishing the delinquent employee, a list of document by which and list of witnesses by whom the Articles of Charges are proposed to be proved. Rule 68 (1) (viii), 68 (2), 68 (3), 68 (4) and 68 (5)lays down a detail procedure to be adopted by the Inquiry Officer. ( 23 ) FURTHER, a specific stage has been prescribed for furnishing the delinquent employee, a list of document by which and list of witnesses by whom the Articles of Charges are proposed to be proved. The charged officer has ample opportunity to inspect and take note of documents and cross examine any witness or to produce defence witness in the enquiry. The delinquent employee has opportunity to state his/her defence orally or in writing and thereafter produce oral and documentary evidence in support of his defence. ( 24 ) SET of Rules known as State Bank of India Service Rules framed by the Central Board of the State Bank of India in exercise of powers conferred under sub-section (1) of Section 43 of the State Bank of India act, 1955 have been considered and approved by the Honble Supreme court in the case of State Bank of India v. Anjan Sanyal; (2001) SCC 100. Rule 68 is very exhaustive and lays down the path and procedure to be followed by the Enquiry Officer on every step. Sufficient provisions have been laid down providing that the charged officer shall be given ample opportunity to defend himself, to produce oral and documentary evidence and even if, the list of documents and witnesses are not furnished to the delinquent employee along with charge sheet, it shall not prejudice the case of the charged employee in any manner. The rules have been designed to provide an adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer to cross-examine the witnesses effectively and thereby defend himself properly. In State Bank of India v. C. B. Dhall; (1998) 2 SCC 544 the supreme Court held that the Service Rules had been framed by the State bank in exercise of its statutory powers under Section 43 of the State bank of India Act. We have carefully examined the provisions of the aforesaid Rule and we find the same to be in consonance with the provisions of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution and as such we decline to grant relief a (i),as quoted above, sought by the petitioner. We have carefully examined the provisions of the aforesaid Rule and we find the same to be in consonance with the provisions of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution and as such we decline to grant relief a (i),as quoted above, sought by the petitioner. ( 25 ) PETITIONER, as stated above, has also challenged the disciplinary proceedings initiated against her on the grounds that on denial of promotion when she preferred Appeal, the respondents Bank reopened the matter regarding absence from duty, non-sanction of extraordinary leave cum restoration of seniority to cover up the mistake committed by the authorities in the matter of promotion. She submitted that the charge sheet is against all the canons of service jurisprudence and principles of natural justice. ( 26 ) DISCIPLINARY Proceedings were initiated against the petitioner on 8th may, 1999. Petitioner was served with the charge sheet dated 19. 6. 1998 on 17. 7. 1998. Sri A. K. Sheopuri was appointed as an enquiry Officer. Shri d. J. Agarwal was appointed as Presenting Officer vide order dated 4. 2. 2000 after the transfer of Shri Deepak Jain. On 8. 5. 1999, the petitioner submitted a statement against the issuance of charge sheet and on the same date, the Enquiry Officer passed order for submissions of list of Bank documents and witnesses , getting the Bank documents inspected by the Charge Officer and submission of list of defence documents and witnesses by the Charged Officer. Thereafter for the purpose of enquiry dates such as 9. 7. 1999, 19. 7. 1999, 10. 8. 1999, 21. 8. 1999, 31. 8. 1999 and 17. 9. 1999 were fixed by the Enquiry Officer but the petitioner did not appear. Petitioner thereafter appeared before the Enquiry Officer only on 13. 10. 1999, 11. 11. 1999 and 9. 12. 1999. Thereafter, several dates were fixed by the Enquiry Officer but the petitioner did not appear before the Enquiry Officer as is evident from the supplementary Affidavit dated 12th December, 2001 filed by Laxman singh, Chief Manager ( Personnel and HRD), Zonal Office, Lucknow. ( 27 ) THE aforesaid clearly reflect the conduct of the petitioner so far as it relates to participation in the enquiry. Although the bank authorities, on the other hand, have been repeatedly intimating the petitioner about the fixing of date by the Enquiry Officer. Petitioner received the charge sheet dated 19. 6. ( 27 ) THE aforesaid clearly reflect the conduct of the petitioner so far as it relates to participation in the enquiry. Although the bank authorities, on the other hand, have been repeatedly intimating the petitioner about the fixing of date by the Enquiry Officer. Petitioner received the charge sheet dated 19. 6. 1998 on 17. 7. 1998 and started appearing before the enquiry Officer. She never questioned the legality and the correctness of the Charge-sheet before any Forum. She also did not complain about the intentional delay in concluding the Enquiry. She started leveling various kind of allegations such as that enquiry proceedings initiated against her against the relevant Service Rules and are wholly illegal and unjust apart from being violative of the principles of natural justice, when she was transferred from Lucknow to Bareilly by the impugned order dated 30. 11. 1999. These facts reflected in the record negate the plea of mala -fide urged by the petitioner. Further, the petitioner wanted this to show interference by examining the charges which, in our opinion, would amount to relegating this Court to a position of a Enquiry Officer. It is a settled view that the Court shall generally avoid in verifying the correctness of the charges, which are to be verified and examined on the basis of documents and evidence by the Enquiry Officer prior to submission of his report. ( 28 ) IN catena of decisions, the Apex Court as also this Court has held that the Court should generally avoid in interfering with the disciplinary proceedings unless there is gross violation of relevant law and the provisions of natural justice or there is a strong case of malafide. In the instant case, we have carefully examined the materials and we do not find any malafide or bias attitude of the Enquiry Officer against the petitioner. Allegations made by the petitioner in this behalf are wholly misconceived and frivolous. The submission of the petitioner that she was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend herself inasmuch as copies of the documents have not been supplied to her is devoid of force. On the contrary, the Bank has stated in unequivocal terms in the affidavits that disciplinary proceedings are pending against the petitioner and the same could not be finalized and concluded due to non-cooperation of the petitioner with the enquiry Officer. On the contrary, the Bank has stated in unequivocal terms in the affidavits that disciplinary proceedings are pending against the petitioner and the same could not be finalized and concluded due to non-cooperation of the petitioner with the enquiry Officer. Although large number of sittings have been done by the enquiry officer/authority but the petitioner has failed to appear in the same despite notices having been sent to participate in the said enquiry proceedings. Further, whenever disciplinary authority sent a notice of fixation of the date of hearing, the petitioner reiterates that she would not participate in the proceedings and this fact is clearly evident from the perusal of Annexures 42 and 45 to 49 annexed with the writ petition. The Bank has further stated that the Bank proposes to conclude and finalise the departmental proceedings except if the petitioner participates in the same. Moreover, the departmental proceedings will be conducted by the Bank in accordance with the State Bank of India Officers Service Rules, which govern the service of the petitioner. ( 29 ) IN Apparel Export Corporation Council v. A. K. Chopra; (1999) 1scc 763, the Honble Supreme Court has held that the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact finding authorities. Apex Court reiterated its earlier principle in the case of Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam v. Girja Shankar Pant and others; 2000 (7) Supreme 112 that in a departmental proceeding, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and the Court generally should not interfere with the factual findings. In the present case, the departmental proceedings are still pending and the Enquiry Officer has yet not arrived at any conclusion. The Court, generally, does not entertain any petition or appeal at the interlocutory stage of the disciplinary proceedings. In the present case, the departmental proceedings are still pending and the Enquiry Officer has yet not arrived at any conclusion. The Court, generally, does not entertain any petition or appeal at the interlocutory stage of the disciplinary proceedings. The cases referred to above relied upon by the petitioner are those in which orders have been passed by the Disciplinary Authority inflicting punishment or the appointing Authority not adopting due procedure of law prior to passing of final order and as such are of no avail to the petitioner for the reason disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner are still pending and no order whatsoever yet has been passed either by the Disciplinary authority or by the Appointing Authority causing prejudice to the petitioner. ( 30 ) WE, before parting, would like to mention that now, it is well settled that the Punishing Authority cannot rely upon the documents, which have been demanded by the charged officer but were not supplied, by the Enquiry Officer. However, we think it appropriate to direct the bank to supply Xerox copy of the documents, which have been demanded by the petitioner, as far as possible and in case it is not feasible for the Bank to supply Xerox copy of the document, the petitioner shall be allowed to inspect the same. We further provide that in case the petitioner cooperates in the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer shall make every endeavour to conclude the same within three months. On the wake of the aforesaid, we are unable to record our concurrence with the submissions of the petitioner. Writ petition is dismissed. There shall however be no order as to costs. Interim orders shall stand discharged with immediate effect. . .