ORDER Heard Mr. Rajni Kant Singh for the appellants and Mr. Shailendra Kumar for the respondent. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 16.9.1999, passed by the learned 3rd Additional Tribunal Judge, Rohtas at Sasaram, In M.V. Case No. 24 of 1994 (Shanti Devi & another Vs. The New India Assurance Company Limited), whereby the application of the claimants under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), has been allowed in part, and the respondent Company has been directed to pay as compensation lumpsum amount of Rs. 50,000/- with interest at the rate of 12 per cent for the date of accident till the date of payment. The claimants have approached this Court by way of present appeal for enhancement of the amount awarded. 2. The case of the claimants is that the son of claimant, Ganesh Chourasia, died in a road accident on 2.2.1994, at 1.00 P.M. by rash and negligent driving of the driver of truck no. U.G.Z. 1387. The grand-father of the deceased lodged a case which was registered as Sasaram (M) P.S. under Sections 279 and 304A of the I.P.C. The police after investigation submitted charge-sheet. According to the claim case, the deceased was the only son of his parents who was an extraordinary student and was also helping his father in his grocery shop and his (the son's) monthly income was Rs.550/- per month, besides the income of his father. The claimants advanced their claim of Rs. 4,75,000/-. The loss caused to them in terms of loss of earning expectation, loss of love and affection, care, mental torture, pain and suffering etc. The claimants further claimed the interest at the rate of 18% from the date of accident. The claim petition further showed that opposite party no. 1 is the owner of the said truck, opposite party no. 2 is the New India Assurance Company and opposite party no. 3 is the driver of the truck in question. 3. The opposite party nos. 1 and 3 did not appear before the learned Tribunal. Opposite party no. 2 (the New India Assurance Company) appeared and filed written statement in the case. The case of opposite party no. 2 is that the interest of opposite party no.1 with respect to truck no. 3. The opposite party nos. 1 and 3 did not appear before the learned Tribunal. Opposite party no. 2 (the New India Assurance Company) appeared and filed written statement in the case. The case of opposite party no. 2 is that the interest of opposite party no.1 with respect to truck no. U.G.Z. 1387 is admitted subject to the compliance of Section 4 of the Insurance Act 1938, and section 149(2) of the M.V. Act, 1988. The age, occupation and income of the deceased as alleged in claim petition was challenged. The claim was opposed on a number of grounds. 4. On the basis of the pleadings the learned Tribunal framed the following issues for determination of the claim : (1) Whether the death of Ganesh Chaurasia is a result of rash and negligent act of the driver of truck no. U.G.Z. 1387 on 2.2.1994, at about 1.00 P.M. on G.T. road, Amara Talab? (2) Whether such death caused loss to the claimants and whether the claimants are entitled for compensation and if so up to what extent and from whom? (3) Whether the claimants are entitled to relief or any other relief? 5. On a consideration of the evidence on record and the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, the learned Claims Tribunal held that the death of Ganesh Chaurasia was due to rash and negligent driving of the truck driver of truck no. U.G.Z. 1387 on 2.2.1994, at 1.00 P.M. at Amaratalab. He, however, did not decide the dispute as to the exact date of birth of the deceased. The case of the claimants was that the child was born on 7.1.1982, and was 12 years of age on the date of the accident, whereas the respondent Insurance Company claims that according to the Doctor, who had examined the claimants' son, he was eight years of age. The learned Claims Tribunal only observed that the child was in any case minor, unmarried, was in nursery stage of education and was helping his father in the grocery business. He, therefore, decided that lumpsum amount of Rs. 50,000/- with interest at the rate of 12 per cent from the date of accident till the date of payment would be sufficient compensation. It may be stated that appellant no. 1 (Shanti Devi) is mother of the child, and appellant no. He, therefore, decided that lumpsum amount of Rs. 50,000/- with interest at the rate of 12 per cent from the date of accident till the date of payment would be sufficient compensation. It may be stated that appellant no. 1 (Shanti Devi) is mother of the child, and appellant no. 2 (Brij Mohan Prasad), is the father of the deceased child, and raised a claim of Rs. 4,75,000/- with interest. Hence this appeal at the instance of the claimants. 6. While assailing the validity of the impugned judgment, learned counsel for the appellants (claimants) submits that the father of the deceased is invalid and admittedly he (the deceased child) was the only son of his parents. The parents (claimants) are, therefore, entitled to a higher sum. He relies on the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court reported in 2001 (1) Transport and Accident Cases, page 110 (Khushiram and another Vs. Hafiji and others). He submits that Section 163-A of the Act read with the second schedule was inserted by Act 54 of 1994, and on account of the nature and content of the amendment, will apply to all pending claims. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned judgment and submits that determination of the compensation amount is dependent on three factors to be taken into account simultaneously, namely, (i) status of the family, (ii) financial position of the family and (iii) the educational merit of the deceased. He relies on the judgments reported in 1997 (1) P.L.J.R. page 804 (Ram Surat Pandey and another Vs. Smt. Indu Devi and another) and 1998 (2) P.L.J.R. page 616 (National Insurance Company Vs. Smt. Phoolbharan Devi and others). He next submits that law is well settled that in the event of death of such a minor child, the parent should not treat it as a windfall, and 50,000/- has traditionally been considered to be the appropriate amount of compensation. He relies on a judgment of this Court reported in 1999 (2) P.L.J.R. page 577 (The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Kedar Prasad Rai and another). He next submits that the second schedule read with Section 163-A was inserted by Act 54 of 1994, with effect from 14.11.1994, and, therefore, not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. This provision of law has prospective application. Ltd. Vs. Kedar Prasad Rai and another). He next submits that the second schedule read with Section 163-A was inserted by Act 54 of 1994, with effect from 14.11.1994, and, therefore, not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. This provision of law has prospective application. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1974 SC page 1969, para 48 and 49 (Katikara Chintamani Dora and others Vs. Guatreddi Annamanaidu and others). He lastly submits that the second schedule to the Act in any case applies to the minors who have an income which ranges between Rs. 60/- per month to 800/- per month. He submits that there is no evidence to show that the boy was aged between 8 to 12 years, was reading in the nursery class, and was helping his father in his grocery shop. He had no income of his own. 8. I have perused the materials on record including the impugned judgment and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the respondent is right in his submission that Section 163A read with schedule thereto was inserted by Act 54 of 1994, with effect from 14.11.1994. There is no indication in the Act that it was intended to be applicable in any manner other than prospectively. In other words, there is no indication either in Section 163-A or the second schedule thereto that it was intended to be applicable to the pending claims also. Learned counsel for the respondent has, therefore, rightly relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Katikara Chintamani Dora and other Vs. Guatreddi Annamanaidu and others (supra), paragraphs 48 and 49 of which are relevant in he present context and are set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference : "48. Let us, therefore, see whether there is anything in the Amending Acts 17 and 18 of 1957 which in clear language gives them a retrospective effect. A plain reading of these Amending Acts would show that there is nothing of this kind, in them, which, expressly or by necessary intendment, affects pending actions. Let us, therefore, see whether there is anything in the Amending Acts 17 and 18 of 1957 which in clear language gives them a retrospective effect. A plain reading of these Amending Acts would show that there is nothing of this kind, in them, which, expressly or by necessary intendment, affects pending actions. The only major change introduced by Act 17 of 1957 was that it gave to the Government a right to file an appeal to the Tribunal, if it felt aggrieved against the decision of Settlement Officer under sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the Abolition Act, within one year from the date of the decision, or, if such decision was rendered before December 23, 1957 i.e., the commencement of Act 17 of 1957, within one year from such date. It further entitled the Government to get its appeal, if any, dismissed, as incompetent by the Tribunal restored within one year of the commencement of the Amending Act. Likewise, the only effect of the Amending Act, 18 of 1957 was that it enlarged the definition of 'inam estate' for the purpose of abolition Act by taking in post 1936 Inams." "49. There is no non obstante clause in these Amending Acts of 1957 with reference to pending or closed civil actions. Nor is there anything in the scheme, setting or provisions of these Amending Acts which fundamentally alters the conditions on which such actions were founded. No back date or dates of their commencement have been specified in the body of these statutes as was done in Madras Estates Land Amendment Act II of 1945 which was expressly enforced with effect from date of the commencement of Act 18 of 1936. These Amending Acts were published in the Government Gazette on December 23, 1957, and will therefore, be deemed to have come into force that date only. The provisions of these Amending Statutes are not merely procedural but affect substantive rights, and impose new obligations and disabilities. In then the Legislature has not spoken in clear language that they would unsettle, settled claims or take away or abridge rights already accrued, or cause abatement of pending actions. These Amending Acts, therefore, can be construed as having a prospective operation only. In then the Legislature has not spoken in clear language that they would unsettle, settled claims or take away or abridge rights already accrued, or cause abatement of pending actions. These Amending Acts, therefore, can be construed as having a prospective operation only. They cannot be interpreted as taking away the rights of the litigants in suits O.S. 47 of 1953 and O.S. 101 of 1954 (which were at the commencement of these Amendments pending at the appellate or original stage) to have their respective claims determined in accordance with the law in force at the time of the institution of the actions." 9. I, therefore, hold that the provisions of Section 163-A read with schedule are prospectively applicable and do not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The accident and the death of the child, took place on 2.2.1994, whereas the said provisions were enforced with effect from 14.11.1994. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent is further right in his submission that second schedule in any case applies in a situation where the minor had an income. In the present case, it is manifest on a perusal of evidence on record that the child was aged somewhere between 8 to 12 years. The claimants led evidence to the effect that the deceased child was aged 12 years on the date of his accident whereas the respondent Insurance Company led evidence to the effect that the child was aged eight years. The learned Claims Tribunal did not decide this question. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I also do not see necessity of deciding this question because, in any case, he (the deceased child) was less than 12 years of age, was reading in nursery school, and was helping his father in the grocery business. He had obviously no income of his own. Therefore, the second schedule is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent has rightly submitted that the compensation amount of such a minor child should be determined on a lumpsum basis and relied upon the following reported judgments : (i) 1997 (1) PLJR page 804 (Ram Surat Pandey and another Vs. Smt. Indu Devi and another); (ii) 1998 (2) PLJR page 616 (National Insurance Company Vs. Smt. Phoolbharan Devi and others). Smt. Indu Devi and another); (ii) 1998 (2) PLJR page 616 (National Insurance Company Vs. Smt. Phoolbharan Devi and others). The High Court had under similar circumstances granted lumpsum compensation of Rs. 50,000/-. The Tribunal has in the present case awarded a sum of Rs. 50,000/- with interest from the date of submission of the claim application till the date of payment. Therefore, the question for consideration is whether or not the same is appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Three factors appear to my mind relevant in the present context, firstly, the deceased child was the lone issue of his parents. Secondly, an important consideration which weights in my mind is the age of the father of the deceased, namely, Brij Mohan Prasad, who was 30 years of age as on 1.8.1997, as per the affidavit sworn by him before the learned Claims Tribunal. There is indication on record that the father is partially invalid. Thirdly, a learned Single Judge of this Court in the judgment in the case of the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Kedar Prasad Rai and another (supra) held that the amount of compensation in the case of death of child under the M.V. Act should not be determined in the form of windfall or gain to the father of the deceased. 12. Taking into account these aspects of the matter, I am of the view that the interest of justice would be served if the amount of compensation is determined on lumpsum basis and enhanced to Rs. 75,000/- with interest from the date of accident. There shall be further modification in the impugned award which is occasioned by the provisions of Section 171 of the Act which lays down that in addition to the amount of compensation, simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as the Court may specify in this behalf. In that view of the matter, interest at the rate 12 per cent simple interest shall commence from the date of filing of the application till the date of payment. The claim case was filed before the learned Claims Tribunal on 9.3.1994. 13. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part. The amount of compensation is enhanced to a sum of Rs. The claim case was filed before the learned Claims Tribunal on 9.3.1994. 13. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part. The amount of compensation is enhanced to a sum of Rs. 75,000/- with interest at the rate of 12 per cent from 9.3.1994 till the date of payment. The respondent-Company shall ensure payment of the decretal amount within a period of two months from today directly to the father of the deceased child, namely, Brij Mohan Prasad (appellant no. 2 herein) after adjusting the amount already paid to him.