JUDGMENT B. P. DAS, J. — This appeal is at the behest of the claimants with a prayer for enhancement of the compensation awarded by the learned District Judge-cum-M.A.C.T., Phulbani in M.A.C. No. 54 of 1995. 2. The brief fact leading to this appeal, as transpires from the appeal memo as well as the judgment so impugned, is that on 30.7.1995 at about 10.30 A.M. while Jhunu, a boy aged about 10 years, was going on the public road in village Kanabangar, a Tempo Trax bearing registration No. OR-07-A-0227 being driven in a rash and negligent manner ran over the boy from behind causing his instantaneous death. The unfortunate father and mother of the child filed claim application under Section 166 of the M.V.Act, 1988 before the Tribunal. 3. The Tribunal framed as many as five issues and on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence came to hold that the death of the deceased occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the Tempo Trax and that the vehicle was duly insured with the insurer. The Tribunal ultimately awarded a lump sum compensation of Rs. 50,000/- with interest at the rate of 9% from the date of claim petition and directed the insurer to pay the aforesaid amount. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is at a lower side and the appellants are entitled to get more amount of compensation and at least the amount they have claimed i.e. Rs. 1,00,000/-. 5. In order to find the reason behind awarding a lump sum amount of Rs. 50,000/- I find that the Tribunal has dealt with the same under issue Nos. 3 and 5 and observed as follows : “So far as the quantum of compensation is concerned, the deceased was admittedly a minor boy and a student having no income at all. Though it is stated by P.W.1 that the deceased was a very good student and was getting scholarship in the school no document to that effect has been filed. Of course, like every parents the petitioners must have a high hope that time would come when their son would earn a lot and maintain them in their future life in the old age. But future of everybody is uncertain. Of course, like every parents the petitioners must have a high hope that time would come when their son would earn a lot and maintain them in their future life in the old age. But future of everybody is uncertain. So it is not possible to say what would have been the occupation and income of the deceased and how much he would have contributed towards main¬tenance of the family in future, had he been alive. In such situation it is not possible to calculate the quantum of compensation in the structural form. In any opinion and having regard to the occupation of the father of the deceased (driver), a lump sum of Rs. 50,000/- will be just and reasonable compensation to the parents of the deceased”. 6. No doubt the lump sum amount of compensation of Rs. 50,000/- is the outcome of some guess work of the Tribunal, which is usually adopted in such a situation. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that if the deceased was not earning anything, the learned Tribunal should have taken a notional income for the purpose of assessing the compensation when the case of the parents of the deceased was that the deceased was their only son and that they were green card-holders and had no chance of begetting any child in future, and further no compensation has bene awarded towards the loss of love and affection. According to him, the Tribunal having not followed the provisions envisaged in the second schedule to Sec¬tion 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 relating to the notional income of the deceased has committed an error in passing the impugned judgment which requires interference of this Court and the judgment is liable to be set aside. 8. In this regard my attention is drawn to a decision of this Court reported in 2000 (3) TAC 98, M/s. Powmex Steel Limited v. Gopal Krushna Chand and others, wherein this Court enhanced the quantum of compensation from Rs. 1,00,000/- to Rs. 1,50,000/- considering the fact that the deceased was +2 student. 9. In the aforesaid case this Court has taken into consid¬eration the family status of the deceased while enhancing the amount of compensation. 10. 1,00,000/- to Rs. 1,50,000/- considering the fact that the deceased was +2 student. 9. In the aforesaid case this Court has taken into consid¬eration the family status of the deceased while enhancing the amount of compensation. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant draws my attention to the case reported in 2003 (1) TAC 110 (Raj) : Amb Lal and another v. Ikramuddin and others, wherein the Rajasthan High Court held that that where the income of a person is not capable of exact assessment, a minimum amount of Rs. 1500/- per month will have to treated as correct income. In the aforesaid decision a boy aged about 15 years hailing from a labour class died in a motor vehic¬ular accident and this Court held thus : “It is not doubt true that in normal circumstances a boy of 15 years of age may not be an earning member of the family but the deceased who hailed from a labourer class whose parents also were labourers, it is not difficult to infer that even a boy of 15 years of age must not have been sitting idle and he was bound to earn his living by undertaking some job. xx xx xx xx Thus, it will have to be taken into consideration that the principle which governs the method of assessment of income where the income of a person is not capable of exact assessment, a minimum amount of Rs. 1500/- (Rupees fifteen hundred) per month will have to be treated as correct which would be Rs. 15,000/- per annum......”. 11. In the case of M/s. Powmex Steel Limited (supra) the deceased was a +2 student and his family status was taken into consideration while enhancing the amount of compensation. In the case of Amb Lal and another (supra), the Rajasthan High Court has inferred that even a boy of 15 years of age from labour class must not have been sitting idle and he was bound to earn his living by undertaking some job. In the present case, the age of the deceased was 10 years. In the case of Amb Lal and another (supra), the Rajasthan High Court has inferred that even a boy of 15 years of age from labour class must not have been sitting idle and he was bound to earn his living by undertaking some job. In the present case, the age of the deceased was 10 years. According to the learned counsel for the respondent in this Case, there cannot be a presumption that the deceased must be earning as done in the case of Amb Lal and another (supra) in which the deceased hailed from a labour class and in the case of M/s. Powmex Steel Limited (supra) the para¬mount consideration was that the deceased was a +2 student and hailed from a family having higher social status. The sum and substance of the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 is that the case of the present appellant cannot be equated with the facts and circumstances of the cases cited above. 12. It is profitable to mention here that Clause 6 of the second schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act provides notional income for granting compensation to those who had no income prior to the accident, Clause 6(a) of the second schedule of the M.V. Act covers non-earning persons. 13. The question falls for consideration in this case whether the deceased person must be of the age of earning to come under the sweep of Clause-6 of the Schedule ? 14. On a bare reading of the second schedule the irresistible conclusion would be that Clause 6(a) of the Second Schedule covers all non-earning persons including children irrespective of the question whether they can be expected to earn at that age or not. This view of mine gets support from the decision reported in 2003 (1) TAC 255 (Ker) in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Muneer, wherein it was held that the quantum of compensation under Sections 166/168 of the Motor Vehicles Act could never be lesser than the amount prescribed in the struc¬tured formula stipulated under Section 163-A of the Act. While considering the case of a deceased child aged about four years, the Court held as follows : “7. Ltd. V. Muneer, wherein it was held that the quantum of compensation under Sections 166/168 of the Motor Vehicles Act could never be lesser than the amount prescribed in the struc¬tured formula stipulated under Section 163-A of the Act. While considering the case of a deceased child aged about four years, the Court held as follows : “7. Going by the structured formula under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is evident that the deceased in this case - a four year old child, is one who had no started earning. A child aged 4 years according to us would certainly fall under the head of non earning persons under Clause 6(a) of the 2nd Schedule tot he Motor Vehicles Act. We find no merit in the contention that a deceased person must be “of the age of earning” and then only the assumption of notional income under Clause 6 of the Schedule can be invoked. This approach is obviously incorrect as we find that first entry in Clause 1 of the Second Schedule relates to “persons up to 15 years”. It is idle to assume that the Legisla¬ture was not aware of the embargo against child labour in this country and had while fixing the quantum of compensation payable for persons up to 15 years of age assumed that such children would also be working and earning the income stipulated under the table in the Second Schedule. Obviously therefore the conclusion appears to be inevitable that non-earning persons in entry 6(a) of the Second Schedule must take within its sweep all non-earning persons including children irrespective of the question whether they can at all be expected to earn at that age or not. According to us notional income can be pressed into service under the Second Schedule in cases where the persons concerned are not actually earning or have not reached the age of earning. In both cases the notional income under Clause 6 of Schedule 2 can be assumed. Any contra interpretation would nullify the purpose of Section 163-A and the laudable objectives, which the amendment was intended to achieve. For all children up to 15 years compensation would be payable depending on their earnings if any or the notional income which they are assumed to earn. For persons aged upto 15 years and who earn (or are assumed to earn) Rs. 15,000/- Rs. For all children up to 15 years compensation would be payable depending on their earnings if any or the notional income which they are assumed to earn. For persons aged upto 15 years and who earn (or are assumed to earn) Rs. 15,000/- Rs. 3,00,000/- is the compensation payable in re¬spect of death as per the table in Clause-1 of the Second Sched¬ule. Out of this one third has to be reduced. In that event also Rs. 2 lakhs would be payable as compensation. In the instant case the compensation awarded is only Rs. 1,50,000/- The claimants do not appear to have preferred any appeal. This appeal at the instance of the appellant/insurer does therefore, in these circum¬stances, deserve to be dismissed. The appeal does not deserve admission”. 15. In another decision reported in 2001 (3) TAC 560 (Cal) : Fatama Matul Bibi and another v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and another, a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court while dealing with a case of death of two children who were aged 12 years and were students of Class III and IV, held thus : “Different High Courts considered the future prospects of the child and also dependency benefits or accretion to the estate, but fact remains that in ultimate analysis in the matter of assessment, no guideline as applied and we do not find any reason on what basis ultimately the amount which was awarded in each case, which appears to us, to be quite nugatory. We are not in¬clined to follow such decisions. The reason is as pointed out hereinbefore, although we are concerned that in determination of compensation element of speculation may be more in case of minor, and future dependency benefit or accretion to the estate in such cases can be determined after taking into consideration the family background, academic achievement of the child and other material available but even such determination, it appears to us, remains in the realm of speculation. We are of the view that structured formula is a safer guidance for arriving at the amount of compensation in any other matter, even in case when the child is victim......” 16. Now let me turn to the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Kushnuma Begum and others v. New India Assurance Co. We are of the view that structured formula is a safer guidance for arriving at the amount of compensation in any other matter, even in case when the child is victim......” 16. Now let me turn to the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Kushnuma Begum and others v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and others reported in 2001 (1) TAC 649 (SC), wherein it was observed that though it was formulated for the purpose of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, we find it a safer guidance for arriving at the amount of compensation than any other method. 17. In this regard, it was argued by the respondents that in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Trilok Chandra : (1996) Vol. II, TAC 285 or 1994 (4) SCC 362, the apex Court held that Section 163 (1) cannot be operated as the schedules are full of mistakes. But in the case of United India Insurance Co. etc. and etc. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan etc. etc. reported in AIR 2002 SC 2607 , the apex Court observed as follows : “We, therefore hold that ordinarily while awarding compensation the provisions contained in the second schedule may be taken as a guide including the multiplier, but there may arise some cases, as one in hand, which may fall in the category having special feature or facts calling for deviation from the multiplier usually applicable”. 18. That apart, even though the Supreme Court has indicated some error/inaccuracy in the second schedule requiring correc¬tion, it has not declared Section 163-A as void. 19. In the aforesaid factual backdrop and the discussion made and having regard to the judicial pronouncements narrated in the foregoing paragraphs, in my considered opinion since the deceased was 10 years old at the time of his death and a non-earning person, the notional income of Rs. 15,000/- per annum should be taken into account for the purpose of determining the compensation which is in terms of the structured formula. As the age of the child was below 15 years, the multiplier of 15 would be just and proper. After deduction of 1/3rd towards personal expenses it comes to Rs. 1,000/- and on application of multiplier of 15, the amount of compensation comes to Rs. 1,50,000. But in the case at hand the appellants have claimed compensation of Rs. As the age of the child was below 15 years, the multiplier of 15 would be just and proper. After deduction of 1/3rd towards personal expenses it comes to Rs. 1,000/- and on application of multiplier of 15, the amount of compensation comes to Rs. 1,50,000. But in the case at hand the appellants have claimed compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- Learned counsel for the appellants tries to persuade the Court that the compensation can go beyond Rs. 1,00,000/- as this Court an enhance the compensation even in absence of any challenge to the award made by the claimant. In the instant case, I am not inclined to accept the above submission for which the compensation is confined to Rs.1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh). The respondent is directed to pay the awarded amount within a period of nine weeks hence. Interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the enhanced amount shall run from the date of passing of this order. 20. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. Appeal disposed of.