ORDER : Ruma Pal, J. - Leave granted. 2. The second respondent, a junior co-employee of the 1st respondent in the employment of the appellant Corporation, was granted promotions from the post of conductor to ticket examiner and then to the post of Traffic Supervisor, after going through the procedure required by the rules and selection by the Departmental Promotion Committees constituted in accordance with the applicable service rules. 3. The 1st respondent was removed from service and came to be reinstated sometime in the year 1985 and nursed a grievance that he was being victimised and discriminated against. The cause of the so-called discrimination appears to have started from 29-8-1985 when the appellant Corporation issued an order to the second respondent appointing him to the post of ticket examiner pursuant to an interim direction made by the Industrial Court and Labour Court in a pending case before them. Irrespective of whether this grievance was justified or not, the first respondent did nothing in the matter till the year 2000. 4. On 26-8-2000, the first respondent moved an application under Section 31(3) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 putting forth his grievance and seeking the relief that he be promoted to the post held by the 1st respondent co-employee, second respondent. The application was opposed by the appellant Corporation, inter alia, on two grounds which are of some merit. It was first pleaded that the application was hopelessly time-barred since the cause of action, if any, had arisen more than 15 years ago. It was also contended that under the departmental rule there was no question of leap-frogging promotion from the post of conductor to Traffic Supervisor as there were two promotional stages in between. 5. The first respondent examined himself before the Labour Court and candidly admitted the basic facts, namely, that he had moved the court after 15 years for relief and that the channel of promotion was from the post of conductor to booking agent to ticket examiner and thereafter to Traffic Supervisor. An application was made by the first respondent for production of some documents. These documents were not produced by the appellant without good reason. The Labour Court, without giving any reason as to why such a hopelessly delayed application should have been entertained for granting relief, held that the claim could not be treated as time-barred. An application was made by the first respondent for production of some documents. These documents were not produced by the appellant without good reason. The Labour Court, without giving any reason as to why such a hopelessly delayed application should have been entertained for granting relief, held that the claim could not be treated as time-barred. It also took the view that as the appellant employer had failed to produce the relevant documents, an adverse inference should be drawn against it. With this reasoning the Labour Court granted the relief resulting in leap-frogging promotion to the 1st respondent from the post of conductor to the post of Traffic Supervisor. An appeal to the Industrial Court resulted in an order which is equally laconic. The Industrial Court, though using different language, has merely reiterated the findings of the Labour Court and dismissed the appeal holding it ?not being worthy of admission". 6. The writ petition of the petitioner was dismissed by the High Court which affirmed the Industrial Court’s judgment by taking the view that it had examined the merits of the case in the context of the evidence led by the parties and that there were no reasons to take a different view of the matter. 7. After hearing learned counsel of both the parties we are satisfied that the decisions of the three courts below, though concurrent, are required to be interfered with. There is no answer to the question as to why and under what circumstances the first respondent did not move for relief for a long period of 15 years. There is also no satisfactory reason as to how the court could have granted the leap-frogging promotion contrary to the rules and bypassing the procedure thereunder. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, maintained that the appellant had indulged in the pernicious practice of granting such leap-frogging promotions to other employees. Even if true, in our view, that is clearly a ground on which the relief could not have been founded. Assuming that the appellant had done something wrong in other cases, it cannot afford a ground to find relief to the first respondent. The learned counsel for the first respondent was fair enough to concede that under the rules no such leap-frogging promotions could have been granted. 9. In our view, the two courts below and the High Court have erred on both counts. The learned counsel for the first respondent was fair enough to concede that under the rules no such leap-frogging promotions could have been granted. 9. In our view, the two courts below and the High Court have erred on both counts. Firstly, in entertaining the claim for relief, after such a belated period without good reasons, and second, in granting relief contrary to the applicable statutory provisions. For both reasons, we allow this appeal and set aside the judgments of the High Court, the Industrial Court and the Labour Court and dismiss the application of the first respondent. This does not, however, prevent the appellant from considering the case of the first respondent for promotion in accordance with the applicable rules. 10. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.