JUDGMENT B. PANIGRAHI, J. — The sole defendant in Title Suit No. 49 of 1990 of the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Dhenkanal is the appellant in this appeal after having suffered a decree of eviction passed by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court. 2. The plaintiff filed the suit for demarcation of the suit land measuring 24 decimals out of 91 decimals in Hal Plot No. 176 of Khata No. 229 of Mouza Mahinsapat described in the ‘A’ Schedule of the plaint, recovery of possession and for declara¬tion of her right, title and interest in respect thereof. 3. The plaintiff’s case in short was that she obtained the suit land on the basis of a lease granted in her favour on 24.2.1950 and from then onwards she claimed to have been in possession of the same. Her name was separately mutated and patta was accordingly issued in the year 1986. After obtaining the land on lease, she had planted 35 coconut trees and had been raising gingili and early variety of paddy over the suit land on alterna¬tive year. After her marriage the brother of the plaintiff used to look after the suit land on her behalf. The plaintiff's brother Basanta Kumar Satpathy, being an employee of OSRTC was posted at Rourkela, therefore, he could not keep close watch over the suit land. Taking advantage of his absence, the defendant attempted to encroach upon the southern portion of the suit land as she was having her own land on its north. The plaintiff’s brother after getting information about the aforesaid encroachment immediately came to Dhenkanal, contacted the defendant and ascertained about the encroachment from her. On the suggestion of the defendant service of an Amin was requisitioned by filing a demarcation case before the Tahasildar, Dhenkanal. The Tahasil Amin although went to the suit land on 4.7.1989, but due to the defiant attitude of the defendant, it could not be measured. 4. The appellant’s case in the trial Court was that she is the owner in possession of Sabik Plot No. 15/1941 corresponding to Hal Plot No. 188 which situates to the adjoining west of the suit land. She had purchased that land under a registered Sale deed bearing No. 3094 dated 6.5.1988 from one Rebati Dei and has constructed her residential house thereon. She had purchased that land under a registered Sale deed bearing No. 3094 dated 6.5.1988 from one Rebati Dei and has constructed her residential house thereon. It is further stated that at the time of her purchase, the appellant’s vendor was in possession of the said land and accordingly delivery of posses¬sion of the same was given to her. Since then she has been con¬tinuing in possession peacefully without resistance from any other quarter. She also claimed that she had various fruit bear¬ing trees and dug a well on the suit land. 5. A plea of adverse possession has been taken by the defendant-appellant against the plaintiff. Thus it is claimed that she has acquired absolute title over the suit land and, therefore, prayed that the plaintiff should be non-suited. Many pleas have been taken by the defendant to the effect that the suit was under-valued and the trial Court did not have pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit and some other points relating to title to the suit land. 6. The trial Court considering the evidence on record however, arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiff has got title over the suit property and directed the plaintiff to deposit deficit Court fee and other fees for deputation of a Civil Court Commissioner after which the suit land could be demarcated and the defendant was directed to give delivery of possession to the plaintiff. The appellate Court also dismissed the appeal on simi¬lar grounds. 7. Mr. B. N. Mishra, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has reiterated the same points as advanced by the appellant in the appellate Court. At the out-set a ground has been taken against the plaintiff regarding the valuation men¬tioned in the plaint and also with regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. It has been submitted that when the defendant herself had purchased the land in the year 1988, it appears strange to note why she did not file the sale deed in the trial Court, so as to determine up the valuation of the suit and also prove the title of the land which she claimed to be adjoin¬ing to the west of the suit land. Two sale deeds have been filed by the plaintiff’s brother in which valuation of Ac. 0.01 decimal of land reveals to be Rs. Two sale deeds have been filed by the plaintiff’s brother in which valuation of Ac. 0.01 decimal of land reveals to be Rs. 1,000/- Therefore, according to the appellant’s counsel, the valuation for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction at least should have been at Rs. 24,000/- but not Rs. 4,000/- Firstly, it is to be seen whether the plaintiff obtained the suit land on lease from the Government or by pur¬chase. Secondly, why did the defendant who is the adjacent owner of the suit land not file her sale deed to ascertain the valua¬tion had the sale deed been filed, it could have thrown some light with regard to valuation of the suit property. Thirdly, the question valuation is between the plaintiff and the Court, but the defendant could only bring to the notice of the Court regard¬ing arbitrary valuation of the suit if made by the plaintiff. 8. The plaintiff has filed the suit for the purpose of demarcation of her land since on her own showing it is said to have been amalgamated with the defendant’ land adjacent on its western side. The suit has been valued under Section 7 (iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act. In the suit, a declaration and consequential relief of possession has been sought for after demarcation of the suit land. The real valuation of the entire suit land is not the criteria while fixing the valuation under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act. But at the same time, it should neither be arbi¬trarily low or unjustifiably valued disproportionate to its real valuation. The said point has been already discussed by the lower appellate Court on the basis of the decision reported in AIR 1958 SC 245 in the case of S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar V. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has, however, that the facts of the said case are entirely different from that of the present one. In the above case, a suit for partition was filed. Therefore, it was incapable of valuation being estimated. For that reason the plaintiff was given option to put his own valuation. But such analogy cannot be stretched to the present case. In this case, it is found that the plaintiff did not purchase the suit land, but she obtained it by way of lease, and, therefore, fixed valuation at Rs. Therefore, it was incapable of valuation being estimated. For that reason the plaintiff was given option to put his own valuation. But such analogy cannot be stretched to the present case. In this case, it is found that the plaintiff did not purchase the suit land, but she obtained it by way of lease, and, therefore, fixed valuation at Rs. 4,000/- under Section 7 (iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act which has been accepted by both the Courts below. 10. Mr. Mishra, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon a judgment reported in 1999 (II) OLR 199 in the case of Kanhu Charan Mohanty V. Prafulla Chandra Mishra. In the aforesaid judgment, it is found that the learned Judge has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1976 SC 989 in the case of Meenakshisudaram Chettiar v. Venkatachalam Chetti¬ar, wherein it has been held as follows : “It is now well-settled by the decisions of this Court in Sathappa Chettiar V. Ramanathan Chettiar (supra) and Meenakshi¬sundaram Chettiar V. Venkatachalam Chettiar (supra) that in a suit for declaration with consequential relief falling under Sec¬tion 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, the plaintiff is free to make his own estimation of the reliefs sought in the plaint and such valuation both for the purpose of Court-fee and juris¬diction has to be ordinarily accepted. It is only in cases where it appears to the Court on a consideration of the facts and cir¬cumstances of the case that the valuation is arbitrary, unreason¬able and the plaint has been demonstratively undervalued, the Court can examine the valuation and can revise the same”. (Underline supplied for emphasis) 11. On a rationale of the above judgment, it appears that the plaintiff has been given option to but/his valuation which shall not be arbitrary, unreasonable and demonstratively under valued. The Court can examine the valuation and can fix it prop¬erly. The learned trial Court after through consideration of the evidence found that Rs. 4,000/- would be appropriate valuation for the purpose of Court fee as well as the valuation under Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. This portion of the finding has been approved and affirmed by the First Appellate Court. Therefore, there appears to have no earthly reason to arrive at a different conclusion. 12. 4,000/- would be appropriate valuation for the purpose of Court fee as well as the valuation under Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. This portion of the finding has been approved and affirmed by the First Appellate Court. Therefore, there appears to have no earthly reason to arrive at a different conclusion. 12. In so far as the plaintiff’s title is concerned, both the Courts after perusal of the documents of title, i.e., the Lease deed, Record of Rights and other documents held that the plaintiff has an indefeasible right. The defendant has taken a plea of adverse possession which pre-supposes admission of title of the plaintiff. It is a well settled position of law that he who has advanced a plea of adverse possession must by trite, unequivocal, clear and cogent evidence prove that he acquired such right by expressing hostile animus. It is further not dis¬puted that any fugtive act of trespass does not amount to adverse possession. The possession must be clear, unambiguous, hostile and continuous to the knowledge of person against whom title is set up. In this case, both the Courts below have also held that the plaintiff has acquired title whereas the defendant has sig¬nificantly failed to prove as to from which date, time and year he expressed hostile animus. There is no evidence adduced by the appellant to come to a contrary conclusion, other than concurring the findings of the Courts below. The learned appellate Court has also, decided against the defendant regarding the claim of ad¬verse possession. On the basis of the decision of the Apex Court in 1995 Civ. CR 380 (SC) in the case of Anam Saheb Baqusaheb Patil and others V. Balwant alias Balasaheb Babu Saheb Patel. 13. Mr. Mishra while winding up his submission emphatically contended that since the plaintiff has admitted defendant’s possession it is, therefore, not obligatory on her part to prove the same and the trial Court have dismissed the suit on the basis of such admission. In support of his contention, he has relied upon a judgment reported in AIR 1981 SC 2085 in the case of Ramji Dayawala and Sons (P.) Ltd. v. Invest Import wherein it has been held that the party must place the admission on which he claims title. Upon proof of title, the admission so relied by him would further strengthen it. Upon proof of title, the admission so relied by him would further strengthen it. But in the absence of title, any admission what-so-ever, cannot confer any right on the party. Therefore, on the sole basis of admission, the defendant cannot claim title over the suit property. 14. I have carefully gone through the facts stated in the Supreme Court Judgment referred above. But the facts are quite distinguishable from the facts stated here. Therefore, there cannot be an uniform and/or universial application that by mere admission a right could accrue in favour of party, even if he does not have the same. 15. Next question shall arise that the plaintiff having not been represented by a duly recognised agent, the suit, therefore, should not have been accepted. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the defendant has relied upon the provisions of Rules 1 & 2 of Order 3, C.P.C. The plaintiff had authorised her brother by a power of attorney to sign in the plaint, which was filed in the Court. The Court on the basis of such signature made by the power of attorney holder admitted the plaint. Afterwards an amendment to the plaint was prayed for by the plaintiff and she herself signed on the application for amendment. Besides, she herself was examined in Court. Therefore, the power of attorney so given to her brother loses it importance, after she deposed in this case. She does not state that she has not given any power of attorney. In that view of the matter the objection by the appellant that it was not properly presented does not merit any consideration. Whatsoever defect might be there, it has been rectified during pendency of the suit. 16. In the aforesaid circumstances, while affirming the judgments and decrees passed by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court, the plaintiff is directed to pay the deficit Court fee, if any, in the Execution Proceeding provided she is required to pay the same. The defendant is directed to deliver possession of the suit land after getting it demarcated through the Civil Court Commissioner on plaintiff’s depositing the requi¬sites fees, failing which it is open to the plaintiff to recover possession through Court after getting the suit land demarcated as directed by the trial Court. 17. The defendant is directed to deliver possession of the suit land after getting it demarcated through the Civil Court Commissioner on plaintiff’s depositing the requi¬sites fees, failing which it is open to the plaintiff to recover possession through Court after getting the suit land demarcated as directed by the trial Court. 17. With the above observation, the appeal is dismissed at the admission stage, but in the circumstances, no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.