Judgment K. Raviraja Pandian, J. 1. This Writ Appeal has been filed against the order of the learned Single Judge, dated 21.2.1997, made in writ petition No. 11643 of 1996, setting aside the order of dismissal passed against the respondent herein on the solitary ground that the report of the Enquiry Officer was furnished to the respondent along with the show cause notice and before taking a decision with regard to punishment no opportunity was given to the writ petitioner. The learned Judge has taken the said view placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hydrabad v. B. Karunakar and others, 1993 (4) SCC 727 . In that case, the Apex Court has held that unless or otherwise the prejudice caused to the employee on account of the failure to issue the second show cause notice is made out, the second show cause notice would only be a mechanical ritual without any basis or purpose. In order to appreciate that finding, it is useful to refer paragraph 5 of the Judgment, which reads thus : "The provisions of Clause (2) of Article 311 were further amended by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act of 1976. It came into force from January 3, 1977. It expressly stated that "it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed". The words "such person" of course meant the person who was to be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank. In other words, the Forty-second Amendment of he Constitution while retaining the expanded scope of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage viz. during the inquiry as introduced by the fifteeth Amendment of the Constitution, did away with the opportunity of making representation against the penalty proposed after inquiry. It is this amendment to Article 311 (2) which has given rise to the controversy as to whether when the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the employee is entitled to a copy of the findings recorded by him, before the disciplinary authority applies its mind to the findings and the evidence recorded, or whether the employee is entitled to the copy of the findings of the enquiry officer only at the second stage, ..... when the disciplinary authority had arrived at its conclusions and proposed the penalty. when the disciplinary authority had arrived at its conclusions and proposed the penalty. Upon answer to this question depends the answer to the other question flowing from it, viz., whether the employee was entitled to make representation against such finding before the penalty was proposed even when Article 311(2) stood as it was prior to the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 2. In this case, the enquiry officer's report has been sent by the disciplinary authority along with the notice which called upon the respondent to offer his explanation on the proposed punishment. When the prejudice caused to the respondent has not been made out, the non-issuance of the second show cause notice by furnishing the enquiry officer's report would not by itself be a ground for setting aside the order of dismissal. The same principle has been followed by the Supreme Court in its following subsequent decisions State Bank of Patiala v. B.K. Sharma, 1996(3) SCC 364 ; Rajendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1996 (5) SCC 450 ; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1996(6) SCC 232 and Aligar Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, AIR 2000 SC 2782 . In order to appreciate the legal position it is appropriate to refer the relevant part of the ruling in Mansoor Alik Kahn's case which reads in paragraphs 20 to 24 as follows : " 20. As pointed recently in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1996 (6) SCC 237 : 1999 AIR SCW 2554 : AIR 1999 SC 2583 , there can be certain situations in which an order passed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For example where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned, interference under Article 226 is not necessary. Similarly, if the quashing of the order which is in breach of natural justice is likely to result in revival of another order which is in itself illegal as in Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1995(2) SCR 172 : AIR 1996 SC 828, it is not necessary to quash the order merely because of violation of principles of natural justice. 21. 21. In M.C. Mehta it was pointed out that at one time, it was held in Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40, that breach of principles of natural Justice was in itself treated as prejudice and that no other 'de facto' prejudice needed to be proved. But, since then the rigour of the Rule has been relaxed not only in England but also in our country. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, 1980 (4) SCC 379 : AIR 1981 SC 136 , Chinnappa Reddy, J., following Ridge v. Baldwin and set aside the order of supersession of the New Delhi Metropolitan Committee rejecting the argument that there was no prejudice though notice was not given. The proceedings were quashed on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. But, even in that case certain exceptions were laid down to which we shall presently refer. 22. Chinnappa Reddy J. in S.L. Kapoor's case, AIR 1981 SC 136 , laid two exceptions (at p. 395 of SCC) : at pp. 147 and 148 of AIR) namely, "if upon admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible", then in such a case, the principle that breach of natural justice was in itself prejudice would not apply. In other words, if no other conclusion was possible on admitted or indisputable facts, it is not necessary to quash the order which was passed in violation of natural justice. Of course, this being an exception great care must be taken in applying this exception. 23. The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several case. In K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India, 1984 (1) SCC 43 : AIR 1984 SC 273 :1983 Lab. I.C. 1680, Sabeyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) also laid down principle that not mere violation of natural justice but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of notice had to be proved. It was observed : quoting Wade Administrative. Law (5th Edn. pp. 472- 475) as follows (para 31): " It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as the scope and extent......There must have been some real prejudice to the complainant there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. Law (5th Edn. pp. 472- 475) as follows (para 31): " It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as the scope and extent......There must have been some real prejudice to the complainant there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject matter to be dealt with and so forth." Since, then, this Court has consistently applied the principle of prejudice in several cases. The above ruling and various other rulings taking the same view have been exhaustively referred to in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, 1996 (3) SCC 364 : 1996 AIR SCW 1740 : AIR 1996 SC 1669 . In that case, the principle of " prejudice" has been further elaborated. The principle has been reiterated again in Rajendar Singh v. State of M.P., 1996 (5) SCC 450 : 1996 AIR SCW 3424 : AIR 1996 SC 2736 . 24. The "useless formality" theory, it must be noted, is an exception. Apart from the class of cases of "admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion" referred to above, there has been considerable debate of the application of that theory in other cases. The divergent views expressed in regard to this theory have been elaborately considered by this Court in M.C. Mehta, 1999 AIR SCW 2754 ; AIR 1999 SC 2583 , referred to above. This Court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments in England by Lord Raid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Singham, Megarry, J. and Straughton, LJ, etc. In various case and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner, Craig, Demith, Wade, D.H. Clark, etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed, for otherwise the Court will be prejudging the issue. Some others have said that there is no such absolute rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via media rules. We do not think it necessary, in this case, to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis it may depend on the facts of a particular case". 3. Some others have said that there is no such absolute rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via media rules. We do not think it necessary, in this case, to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis it may depend on the facts of a particular case". 3. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments referred to above, we are of the view that the order of the learned Single Judge setting aside the order of dismissal of the respondent from service, on the solitary ground that a second show cause notice had not been served on the respondent prior to forming opinion as to the punishment to be inflicted is not sustainable in law. The impugned order of the learned single Judge is, therefore, set aside and the order of termination is restored. The appeal is allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.