ASIT KUMAR BISI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is the appeal by the appellant against the judgment and decree passed by Shri T. K. Ghosh, learned Assistant District judge, 2nd Court, Hooghly on 31-5-88 in Title Suit No. 50 of 1982. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to the instant appeal may briefly be narrated thus. The plaintiffs presently the respondents instituted a suit for specific performance of contract, delivery of possession of the suit property after execution of the sale deed and mesne profits against the defendants. In a nutshell the case of the plaintiffs as made out in this plaint is that the suit property originally belonged to one Amarnath Chatterjee of 487, Circular Road, p. O. and P. S.- Shibpur, District - Howrah who possessed the same on payment of annual rent to the State and taxes to the Uttarpara-Kotrang Municipality. He intended to sell the suit property. Plaintiff No. 2 came to know about his intention and intended to purchase the suit property in her name and also in the name of plaintiff No. 1 who is her minor son for the benefit and interest of plaintiff No. 1. Plaintiff No. 2 proposed to purchase the suit property from the said Amarnath Chatterjee whereupon the latter agreed to sell the suit property to the plaintiffs at a consideration of Rs. 40,000/- which was the market value of the property existing at the relevant point of time. The plaintiffs agreed to purchase the suit property at the same price. The original owner Amarnath chatterjee executed an agreement for sale of the suit property in favour of the plaintiffs on receiving a sum of Rs. 501/- as an earnest money out of the total consideration of Rs. 40,000/- on 9-12-81. It was agreed upon between the parties that the original owner would execute and register a sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs within three months from the date of execution of the said agreement on receiving balance of consideration of Rs. 39,499/ -. Defendant No. 1 was an attesting witness in that agreement for sale. The original owner Amarnath chatterjee handed over the tax receipts, annual rent receipts, R. S. Record-of-rights and his purchase deed to the plaintiffs through Shri Sunil Kumar Dutta, the father of plaintiff No. 1 and the husband of plaintiff No. 2 in the first week of January, 1982. Defendant No. 1 was an attesting witness in that agreement for sale. The original owner Amarnath chatterjee handed over the tax receipts, annual rent receipts, R. S. Record-of-rights and his purchase deed to the plaintiffs through Shri Sunil Kumar Dutta, the father of plaintiff No. 1 and the husband of plaintiff No. 2 in the first week of January, 1982. Unfortunately within a few days after execution of the agreement for sale the said Amarnath Chatterjee expired. Plaintiffs then requested defendant No. 1 to execute the sale deed in their favour in terms of the said agreement for sale after receiving the balance of consideration. Defendant No. 1 was not the only heir of the original owner but he had disclosed that he would alone receive the balance of consideration and would execute and register the sale deed. But defendant No. 1 did not execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs whereupon the plaintiffs through their advocate served notice upon defendant No. 1 expressing their readiness and willingness to purchase the suit property as per the terms of the agreement. Inspite of receipt of the said notice defendant No. 1 had refused to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. Defendant No. 1 sent a reply through his authorised agent to the plaintiffs denying execution of any contract by his father. The plaintiffs sent further notice dated 24-3-82 to defendant No. 1 under registered post with A. D. requesting defendant No. 1 to execute the sale deed in their favour. Defendant No. 1 did not give any reply to that notice. Thereafter the plaintiffs served another notice dated 13-5-82 upon the daughter of the original owner under registered post with A. D. In spite of receipt of the said notice she was reluctant to reply showing acceptance to perform their part of the contract. The plaintiffs were and are willing to perform their part of the contract. They are always ready and willing to pay the balance of consideration money to the heirs of the said Amarnath Chatterjee for execution and registration of the sale deed. ( 3 ) THE suit has been contested by defendant No. 1 by filing the written statement wherein the material allegations contained in the plaint have been denied. They are always ready and willing to pay the balance of consideration money to the heirs of the said Amarnath Chatterjee for execution and registration of the sale deed. ( 3 ) THE suit has been contested by defendant No. 1 by filing the written statement wherein the material allegations contained in the plaint have been denied. It has been averred inter alia that the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file this suit that the suit is not maintainable in its present form, that the alleged contract being itself a void contract cannot be enforced and that the alleged contract was obtained fraudulently by practising undue influence upon the executor Amarnath Chatterjee. As per the case of defendant No. 1 at the time of the alleged execution of the deed of agreement the said Amarnath chatterjee was not of sound mind and had no sense to understand anything. He was suffering from several diseases. He died on 15th January, 1982. The specific case of defendant No. 1 is that his father Amarnath Chatterjee took loan of Rs. 500/- from the husband of plaintiff No. 2 and for the purpose of security the latter obtained signature of the said Amarnath Chatterjee and the signature of this defendant on the blank stamp papers. The said Amarnath chatterjee was rather compelled to execute the alleged deed as per dictation of the husband of plaintiff No. 2 but he had not the meatal capacity to understand anything properly. The father of plaintiff No. 1 managed to obtain signature of the said Amarnath Chatterjee on the stamp papers and some documents. Further case of defendant No. 1 is that the original owner never intended to sell the suit property to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs are not entitled to purchase the suit property enforcing the alleged agreement for sale. The original owner did not know the contents of the agreement. He put his signature on the blank paper as security for the said loan of Rs. 500/ -. ( 4 ) IN the additional written statement it has been pleaded inter alia by defendant No. 1 that the executant Amarnath Chatterjee was physically disabled to understand the purport of the alleged agreement and that the contract sought to be enforced is highly iniquitous. 500/ -. ( 4 ) IN the additional written statement it has been pleaded inter alia by defendant No. 1 that the executant Amarnath Chatterjee was physically disabled to understand the purport of the alleged agreement and that the contract sought to be enforced is highly iniquitous. The suit property is the only dwelling house belonging to this defendant and the value of the dwelling house was Rs. 1. 5 lakhs at the material time of execution of the alleged agreement. The plaintiffs owned and possessed extensive house properties and other properties in the District of Burdwan. The plaintiff will not lose if the contract is not performed. This defendant is agreeable to refund the alleged earnest money together with interest. ( 5 ) THE learned Trial Court on consideration of the materials on record has come to the finding that the plaintiffs have duly performed their part of contract and they are also ready and willing to perform their part of contract for purchasing the suit property on the basis of the agreement for sale (Ext. 1 ). The learned Trial Court has held that the plaintiffs are entitled to get decree for specific performance of the contract against the defendants. Consequently the learned Trial Court has decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. 1 ). The learned Trial Court has held that the plaintiffs are entitled to get decree for specific performance of the contract against the defendants. Consequently the learned Trial Court has decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. ( 6 ) BEING aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court defendant No. 1 as appellant has preferred the instant appeal contending inter alia that the learned Court below has erred in failing to appreciate and apply the proper legal tests and principles in determining whether the transaction in question was really an agreement for sale or a security for loan, that the learned Court below has erred in not applying its mind to the pleadings of the parties and the materials on record and erred in granting a decree for specific performance of contract, that the learned Court below has erred in not at all considering the evidence adduced by this defendant with regard to the actual market price of the disputed property at the material point of time which has clearly established that the value mentioned in the alleged agreement was shockingly low, that the learned court below has erred in holding that the agreement in question is legal, valid and enforceable as an agreement for sale, that the learned Trial Judge has erred in law by decreeing the suit without taking into account the hardship to the defendant/appellant owing to such decree, that the learned Court below has erred in failing to appreciate that the grant of specific relief is discretionary and has mechanically passed a decree for specific performance without considering the relevant facts and circumstances,. that the learned Trial Judge has failed to appreciate the true scope and purport of the provisions laid down under section 20. that the learned Trial Judge has failed to appreciate the true scope and purport of the provisions laid down under section 20. sub-section 2 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, that the learned Trial Judge has erred in law and fact by not at all considering that the suit property is the only dwelling house in which the appellant lives with his family, that the learned trial Judge has erred in law by decreeing the suit without taking into account that it would cause highest degree of hardship to the appellant, that the learned trial Judge has erred in law in holding that the plaintiffs have been able to prove by adducing cogent evidence both oral and documentary that the deed of agreement dated 9th December, 198. 1 is legal and valid without considering all the facts and circumstances of the case and that the learned Trial Judge has erred in failing to consider that section 20 of the Specific Relief Act states that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary which only means that mere existence of a legal right is not sufficient to attract the remedy under the said Act. ( 7 ) THE sole point awaiting decision in the instant appeal is whether or not the learned Trial Court is justified in granting decree for specific performance of contract in favour of the plaintiffs respondents in the face of the materials on record. ( 8 ) INDISPUTABLE is the fact that the suit property originally belonged to amarnath Chatterjee. As per the case of the plaintiffs respondents the original owner Amarnath Chatterjee executed the agreement for sale of the suit property (Ext. 1) in favour of plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 on 9-12-81 and consideration was fixed at Rs. 40,000 A out of which the original owner Amarnath Chatterjee received the sum of Rs. 501/- as earnest money. It is stipulated in the agreement (Ext 1) that the said Amarnath Chatterjee would execute and register the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs within three months from the date of the execution of the agreement on receiving the balance of consideration to the tune of Rs. 39,499/ -. Further case of the plaintiffs respondents is that defendant no. It is stipulated in the agreement (Ext 1) that the said Amarnath Chatterjee would execute and register the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs within three months from the date of the execution of the agreement on receiving the balance of consideration to the tune of Rs. 39,499/ -. Further case of the plaintiffs respondents is that defendant no. 1 presently the appellant who is the son of the original owner Amarnath chatterjee signed the said agreement as attesting witness and the original owner had handed over the tax receipts, annual rent receipt, R. S. Record and his purchase Kobala to the plaintiffs after execution of the said agreement for sale (Ext. 1 ). ( 9 ) THE case of the appellant, on the other hand, is that the original owner amarnath Chatterjee was disabled both physically and mentally to understand the purport of the alleged agreement for sale and he died on 15-1-82 at the age of 89 years. Further case of the appellant is that at the material time when the alleged agreement was executed the suit property was valued at Rs. 1,50,000/- and if the decree is passed for specific performance of the contract the defendant will suffer irreparable loss. The appellant has raised a plea that his father took loan of Rs. 500/- from the husband of plaintiff No. 2 for which he had to put his signature on the blank stamp papers and furthermore, his father Amarnath Chatterjee was compelled to execute the said deed at the dictation of the husband of plaintiff No. 2 although he had no capacity to understand anything with regard to the recitals of the said deed. It is the specific case of the appellant that his father who was the original owner never intended to sell the suit property to the plaintiffs respondents. ( 10 ) P. W. 1 Sunil Kumar Dutta who is the father of plaintiff No. 1 and husband of plaintiff No. 2 came as sole witness to prove case of the plaintiffs during trial. He proved the agreement for sale marked as Ext. 1, the title deed of the original owner lying with him marked as Ext. 2, the letters marked as exts. 3 and 3 (a) and copy of the notice marked as Ext. 3 (b ). Defendant No. 1 bijoy Kumar Chatterjee was examined as DW1 before the learned Trial Court. He proved the agreement for sale marked as Ext. 1, the title deed of the original owner lying with him marked as Ext. 2, the letters marked as exts. 3 and 3 (a) and copy of the notice marked as Ext. 3 (b ). Defendant No. 1 bijoy Kumar Chatterjee was examined as DW1 before the learned Trial Court. Bhabani Charan Koley who is the Moharar of the Sub-Registrar's Office, serampore was examined as DW 2. He proved the certified copies of the two deeds marked as Exts. A and A/1 respectively. DW 3 Hirakendu Pathak is a registered architect who assessed valuation of the suit property and submitted his report marked as Ext. 'b'. ( 11 ) THE learned Trial Court has disbelieved the case of defendant No. 1 presently the appellant and found that defendant No. 1 has failed to prove by adducing cogent evidence that the agreement dated 9-12-81 marked as Ext. 1 was not executed by the original owner Amarnath Chatterjee voluntarily in favour of the plaintiffs. The learned Trial Court is of the view that the plaintiffs have been able to prove by adducing cogent evidence that the deed of agreement dated 9-12-81 is legal, valid and binding upon the heirs of Amarnath Chatterjee since deceased and the said agreement was obtained by the plaintiffs from the original owner Amarnath Chatterjee without practising any fraud or exercising any misrepresentation upon him. In view of such findings the learned Trial court has granted decree for specific performance of contract in favour of the plaintiffs. ( 12 ) MR. Bhaskar Ghosh the learned Advocate for appellant has contended that the learned Trial Judge has not applied proper legal tests in adjudicating upon the case of the appellant that the transaction covered by Ext. 1 is in fact loan in substance. It has been further urged by Mr. Ghosh that the learned trial Judge appears to have treated the recitals made in the agreement for sale (Ext. 1) relating to consideration money as the proper market value without considering that the plaintiffs respondents have not adduced any evidence whatsoever regarding market value of the suit property at the relevant time and the learned Trial Judge has illegally rejected the valuation report filed by dw 3 who is a renowned architect and valuer. It has been next urged by Mr. It has been next urged by Mr. Ghosh that the learned Trial Judge has failed to consider the very tenor of the agreement for sale while adjudicating upon the defence case that the original owner Amarnath Chatterjee was compelled to put his signature on blank stamp papers. It has further been argued by Mr. Ghosh that the learned Trial Judge has not considered that the suit property being the only dwelling house of the appellant the performance of the contract would involve greater hardship upon the appellant whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiffs respondents in view of section 20 (2) (b) of the Specific Relief Act. ( 13 ) MR. Jaydeep Kar the learned Advocate for the plaintiffs respondents, on the other hand, has argued that had the transaction been merely a loan transaction, there was no necessity of handing over the title deed, tax receipts, annual rent receipts and R. S. Record relating to the suit property by the vendor since those documents are required only in case of sale transaction for carrying out searches. It has been contended by Mr. Kar that the fact that those documents were handed over by the vendor after execution of the agreement goes to show that the transaction was a genuine sale transaction and the parties intended to give effect to the said transaction. It is his further contention that the plaintiffs/respondents in terms of the bainanama paid a sum of Rs. 501/- which is normally a figure considered to be auspicious in a transaction like this and existence of a forfeiture clause in the agreement indicates that the transaction was a genuine transaction for sale. He has also contended that if it was a loan transaction as alleged by the appellant, the plaintiffs respondents would not have agreed to keep clause of forfeiture which runs contrary to their interest. Mr. Kar has further argued that the onus to show that the signature was obtained on the blank documents lay on the appellant, but the appellant failed to prove the same and on the contrary a perusal of the document would show that the signature was obtained on a duly filled up document and the appellant duly signed the same as a witness. Further argument advanced by Mr. Kar is that the appellant has been changing his defence from time to time. Further argument advanced by Mr. Kar is that the appellant has been changing his defence from time to time. He has pointed out that in reply to the notice prior to filing of the suit the only stand of the appellant was that the blank document was signed but at the time of filing of the written statement the appellant took an additional ground that his father did not have the mental capacity to understand what he was signing and subsequently at the stage of filing of the additional written statement it was alleged that the transaction was iniquitous and the valuation of the property would be Rs. 1. 5 lakhs. This, according to Mr. Kar, makes it clear that the question of hardship as raised in the additional written statement was an afterthought and it is not a genuine defence. It has been contended by Mr. Kar that the learned Trial Judge rightly disbelieved the case of the appellant and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs respondents in justifiable manner. ( 14 ) IT is settled law that the jurisdiction of the Court to decree specific performance is discretionary and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. This is precisely what is stated in section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Use of expression 'the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary' signifies that mere existence of a legal right is not sufficient to attract the remedy. "in addition to the facts, events and relations which give rise to the certain and absolute legal right, there may be other facts, circumstances and incidents which determine the existence of the equitable right, which modify the application of the legal right, and sometimes entirely prevent its exercise. The plaintiff may not be himself prepared to do equity, or his hands may not be clean. Either circumstances will determine the so-called discretion of the Court against the plaintiff, although where neither of these circumstances is present, and there is no other principle to bar specific performance, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction in his favour. "[p 325 of S. C. Banerjee's Law of Specific Relief (Tagore Law Lectures) Tenth Edition]. ( 15 ) SECTION 20 (2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 specifics certain circumstances where the Court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. "[p 325 of S. C. Banerjee's Law of Specific Relief (Tagore Law Lectures) Tenth Edition]. ( 15 ) SECTION 20 (2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 specifics certain circumstances where the Court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. If under the terms of the contract the plaintiff gets an unfair advantage over the defendant, the Court may not exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiff. Specific relief may not be granted where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff. The Court would desist from granting decree for specific performance to the plaintiff where it is found inequitable to grant such specific relief. ( 16 ) IN A. C. Arulappan vs. Ahalya Naik, reported in AIR 2001 Supreme Court 2783 at page 2786 (para 7) the Supreme Court observed as follows :-"the jurisdiction to decree specific relief is discretionary and the Court can consider various circumstances to decide whether such relief is to be granted. Merely because it is lawful to grant specific relief, the Court need not grant the order for specific relief; but this discretion shall not be exercised in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Certain circumstances have been mentioned in section 20 (2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as to under what circumstances the Court shall exercise such discretion. If under the terms of the contract the plaintiff gets an unfair advantage over the defendant, the Court may not exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiff. So also, specific relief may not be granted if the defendant would be put to undue hardship which he did not foresee at the time of agreement. If it is inequitable to grant specific relief, then also the Court would desist from granting a decree to the plaintiff. " ( 17 ) THE principal questions to be determined in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction of the Court to grant or not to grant specific performance should obviously be questions of fact in each case. Some of those questions may be formulated thus : (a) Whether or not the contract is fair, equal and reasonable; (b) Whether or not it will be just under the circumstances to enforce specific performance against defendant; (c) Whether or not the plaintiffs conduct has been conscientious. Some of those questions may be formulated thus : (a) Whether or not the contract is fair, equal and reasonable; (b) Whether or not it will be just under the circumstances to enforce specific performance against defendant; (c) Whether or not the plaintiffs conduct has been conscientious. ( 18 ) BEARING the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of A. C. Arulappan (supra) and the provisions of law and legal tests enumerated above let us now advert to the factual aspect of the instant case to ascertain whether in the facts and circumstances of this case the Court can grant decree for specific performance as prayed for by the plaintiffs respondents. It appears that the agreement for sale (Ext. 1) was executed by the original owner Amarnath Chatterjee on 9-12-81. Admittedly the said Amarnath chatterjee died on 15-1-82. It transpires from the evidence of defendant No. 1 (DW 1) that his father Amarnath Chatterjee died at the age of 88/89 years. His cross-examination clearly indicates that his father was very old and died due to heart failure as a result of disease. It is the specific finding of the learned trial Court that DW 1 had admitted that his father died due to heart failure and thus it cannot be said under any circumstances that the original owner was not in a good mental condition to understand the contents of the deed of agreement before he put his signature in it. While making such finding, the learned Trial Court has ignored the fact that the original owner Amarnath chatterjee was very old and he died a few days after the date of execution of the agreement (Ext. 1) for sale. In his evidence defendant No. 1 (DW 1) has stated that his father was not in good mental condition when the agreement was executed by him and he died due to his old age and heart failure as a consequence of his disease. Such evidence does not indicate that the original owner who admittedly died within a few days after the execution of the agreement was in sound state of health both physically and mentally at the relevant point of time when the agreement was executed. ( 19 ) IF we turn to the document (Ext. Such evidence does not indicate that the original owner who admittedly died within a few days after the execution of the agreement was in sound state of health both physically and mentally at the relevant point of time when the agreement was executed. ( 19 ) IF we turn to the document (Ext. 1) itself, it appears to us that the writings in the said document have been adjusted according to the already existing signatures of Amarnath Chatterjee. Mr. Ghosh the learned Advocate for the appellant has contended that the said document on the face of it shows that the signatures of the original owner were taken beforehand and the writings in the said document have been adjusted according to the signatures already existing therein. Mr. Kar the learned Advocate for the plaintiffs respondents, on the other hand, has submitted that it is the usual practice to have signature on the document on the right hand lop of each page and if it was really a case of filling up of blank document, the writings on the page would have gone over the signature. We have given our anxious consideration to this aspect of the matter. If we look closely at the document marked as Ext. 1. we find that the writings on three pages of the said document except the first page are evidently adjusted according to the respective signatures of amarnath Chatterjee appearing on the right side at the top of the said pages of the document. Furthermore, it is found that the signature of Amarnath chatterjee appearing on the right side top of the last page of the said document touches the writing as well. The manner in which the said writings were adjusted according to signatures of the original owner appearing on those pages of the document raises genuine suspicion in our mind. The reasons offered by mr. Kar the learned Advocate for the plaintiffs respondents to explain the said situation are wholly unconvincing. ( 20 ) AS mentioned hereinabove, one witness being DW 3 Hirakendu Pathak who is a registered architect assessed valuation of the suit property and submitted his report marked as Ext. 'b' wherefrom it appears that as per the said report the market value of the suit property was Rs. 1,14,100/- at the relevant time of execution of the deed. ( 20 ) AS mentioned hereinabove, one witness being DW 3 Hirakendu Pathak who is a registered architect assessed valuation of the suit property and submitted his report marked as Ext. 'b' wherefrom it appears that as per the said report the market value of the suit property was Rs. 1,14,100/- at the relevant time of execution of the deed. The plaintiffs respondents have not adduced any evidence whatsoever regarding market value of the suit property at the relevant time. The learned Court below has not taken into account the valuation report submitted by DW 3 and assigned no cogent reason for discarding the same. It transpires from the materials on record that price of the suit property as recited in the deed of agreement (Ext. 1) is Rs. 40,0007-whereas the valuation report submitted by DW 3, as referred to above, shows that the market value of the property was Rs. 1,14,1007- at the relevant time. Such shocking discrepancy between the price of the property recited in the deed and the market value of the property at the relevant time as assessed by dw 3 remains unresolved and no endeavour has been made on behalf of the plaintiffs respondents to resolve such discrepancy. ( 21 ) THE learned Trial Court, as it appears, has solely relied on the evidence of PW 1 and the contents of the agreement (Ext. 1) but failed to take notice of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the transaction covered by the agreement. It however appears from the evidence of PW 1 that they made correspondence with the original owner for purchasing the suit land in the names of the plaintiffs prior to execution of the agreement regarding sale of the suit property. But the said fact has neither been pleaded in the plaint nor there is any scrap of document to show that any such correspondence was ever made. ( 22 ) IN spite of specific allegations of the defendant that no agreement for sale was executed but signatures of Sri Amarnath Chatterjee and the defendant no. 1, Bejoy Kumar Chatterjee were obtained on blank paper and the transaction in question was really a loan transaction, P. W. 1 being the husband of plaintiff No. 2 in his evidence did not disclose when and where the negotiation of sale of the property in question took place and when and where Rs. 1, Bejoy Kumar Chatterjee were obtained on blank paper and the transaction in question was really a loan transaction, P. W. 1 being the husband of plaintiff No. 2 in his evidence did not disclose when and where the negotiation of sale of the property in question took place and when and where Rs. 40,000/-was fixed as consideration money for the sale of the suit land and the building. ( 23 ) ALTHOUGH it was alleged in his deposition by P. W. 1 that there was correspondence between him and Amarnath Chatterjee for purchasing the suit land, no such correspondence was exhibited before the Court. ( 24 ) THAT apart, in spite of specific case made out by the defendant that signatures of Amarnath Chatterjee were obtained on blank paper and amarnath Chatterjee in fact took loan of Rs. 500/-, the plaintiffs did not choose to examine other witness to the Bainanama and also did not examine the scribe who would have been vital witness. ( 25 ) IT is an admitted fact that the original title deed was handed over by the owner Amarnath Chatterjee to P. W. 1. The evidence of PW 1 clearly indicates that the original owner handed over the relevant papers to him after execution of the agreement. In fact PW1 has proved the title deed of the original owner which was lying in his custody and marked as Ext. 2. Mr. Ghosh has pertinently referred to the case of K. Bhaskaran Nair vs. Habeeb Mohammed and Ors. , reported in AIR 2002 Kerala 308 wherein at page 311 (para 12) the following observation is made :-"when an agreement for sale is executed, person who wants to purchase the property will have to see whether there is clear title for the vendor. It is not necessary for the due performance of the agreement for sale to keep in custody the title deed to the property. Normally, the title deed of the property is handed over when there is absolute assignment or when the property is given as security for loan. In the present case, since the original document is handed over, we are inclined to say that the transaction was intended as loan transaction. " ( 26 ) MR. Normally, the title deed of the property is handed over when there is absolute assignment or when the property is given as security for loan. In the present case, since the original document is handed over, we are inclined to say that the transaction was intended as loan transaction. " ( 26 ) MR. Kar on the other hand has argued that the fact that those documents including the title deed were handed over by the vendor goes to show that the transaction was a genuine sale transaction and the parties intended to give effect to the said transaction and the vendor by his handing over the aforesaid documents precisely knew that he had entered into an agreement for sale of his dwelling house and he acted in terms of the agreement and gave effect to the agreement by discharging his statutory obligations. But in our view such argument has got no force. The original title deed of the property is normally handed over when there is absolute assignment or in case where the property is given as security for loan as pointed out in the case of K. Bhaskaran Nair (supra ). The title deed is required to be shown by the vendor to the intending purchaser for the purpose of inspection but unless the sale is effected or there is a loan transaction question of handing over of the title deed by the original owner cannot arise. Viewed in this perspective we find that handing over of the title deed by the original owner to PW 1 in the instant case militates against the case of the plaintiffs respondents and makes the agreement for sale a suspicious one. ( 27 ) FROM the materials on record we find that the original owner Amarnath chatterjee who was very old and died a few days after execution of the agreement had to sign the agreement (Ext. 1) under compelling situation without being aware of the contents of the same. The suit property was the only dwelling house of the original owner Amarnath Chatterjee. We have already pointed out suspicious circumstances surrounding execution of the agreement (Ext. 1 ). It has been urged by Mr. 1) under compelling situation without being aware of the contents of the same. The suit property was the only dwelling house of the original owner Amarnath Chatterjee. We have already pointed out suspicious circumstances surrounding execution of the agreement (Ext. 1 ). It has been urged by Mr. Ghosh the learned Advocate for the appellant that the learned Trial Judge did not consider that the suit property being the only dwelling house of the original owner and presently the appellant the performances of the contract would involve greater hardship upon the appellant whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiffs in view of section 20 (2) (b)) of the Specific Relief Act. Mr. Kar the learned advocate for the plaintiffs respondents on the other hand has submitted that after the parties negotiated the deal with their eyes open, the plea of hardship is wholly untenable. He has cited the case of Baijnath vs. Kshetrabehari Sarkar reported in AIR 1955 Calcutta 210 and the case of yohannan and Anr. vs. Hari Krishnan Nair and Ors. reported in AIR 1992 Kerala 49 in support of his contention. But in our view none of the said two decisions cited by Mr. Kar applies to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. ( 28 ) AS mentioned hereinabove, the suspicious circumstances emerging from the materials on record glaringly reveal that PW 1 Sunil Kumar Dutta the father of plaintiff No. 1 and husband of plaintiff No. 2 obtained the agreement from the original owner Amarnath Chatterjee in order to gain unfair advantage over the latter with motive to purchase the only dwelling house of the said owner at shockingly low price whereas the evidence on record clearly indicates that the plaintiffs have sufficient landed properties. In our view such conduct of PW 1 brings about a situation when it would be inequitable to exercise jurisdiction to grant decree for specific performance in favour of the plaintiffs respondents. ( 29 ) IN Mademsetty Satyanarayana vs. G. Yelloji Rao and Ors. reported in "air 1965 Supreme Court 1405 at page 1410 (para 11) the Supreme Court held as follows :-"it is not possible or desirable to lay down the circumstances under which a Court can exercise its discretion against the plaintiff. ( 29 ) IN Mademsetty Satyanarayana vs. G. Yelloji Rao and Ors. reported in "air 1965 Supreme Court 1405 at page 1410 (para 11) the Supreme Court held as follows :-"it is not possible or desirable to lay down the circumstances under which a Court can exercise its discretion against the plaintiff. But they must be such that the representation by or the conduct or neglect of the plaintiff is directly responsible in inducing the defendant to change his position to his prejudice or such as to bring about a situation when it would be inequitable to give him such a relief. " ( 30 ) IN Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathew vs. Nedumbara Kuruvila's son and Ors. reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2328 at page 2332 (para 14) the Supreme Court has observed as under:-"section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preserves judicial discretion to courts as to decreeing specific performance. The Court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The Court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the litigation should also enter into the judicial verdict. The Court should take care to see that it is not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage to the plaintiff. " ( 31 ) APPLYING the legal tests formulated by the Supreme Court in the above-noted cases to the facts and circumstances of the present case we are clearly of the view that this is not a case where the discretionary jurisdiction to grant decree for specific performance in favour of the plaintiffs respondents can be exercised. Accordingly we hold that the learned Trial Court is not at all justified in granting decree for specific performance of contract in favour of the plaintiffs respondents. ( 32 ) THE suspicious circumstances surrounding execution of the agreement (Ext. 1) as pointed out hereinabove, the factum of delivery of the original title deed by the owner Amarnath Chatterjee to PW 1 who kept the same in his custody and shocking discrepancy between price of the property as recited in the deed and the market value of the property as assessed by the valuer coupled with other materials on record persuade us to hold unhesitatingly that the transaction was not intended by the original owner Amarnath Chatterjee for sale of the suit property. In view of ratio of the decision in K. Bhaskaran Nair (supra) it can be said that since the original title deed of the property was handed over when there was no absolute assignment, the property covered by the agreement was given as security for loan. Under the circumstances we are inclined to say that the transaction was intended as loan transaction. In his deposition defendant No. 1 (DW 1) has stated that his father took a loan of Rs. 500/- from the plaintiffs and he is agreeable to pay back the amount of Rs. 500/- along with interest to the plaintiffs. In view of such willingness of defendant No. 1 (DW 1) to repay the loan of Rs. 500/- with interest to the plaintiffs as evident from his deposition we consider it just and equitable to pass decree for the said sum of Rs. 500/- along with interest @ 6 per cent per annum from the date of agreement i. e. 9-12-81 till this date in favour of the plaintiffs against defendant No. 1 although no such prayer was made in the plaint. In our view the plaintiffs are entitled to get such equitable relief. ( 33 ) THE appeal is allowed in part. The judgment and decree passed by Shri t. K. Ghosh learned Assistant District Judge, 2nd Court, Hooghly on 31-5-88 in Title Suit No. 50 of 1982 is modified to the following extent. The plaintiffs will get decree for the sum of Rs. 500/- with interest @ 6 per sent per annum form 9-12-81 till this date against defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 is directed to pay the said sum along with interest to the plaintiffs within three months from this date failing which the plaintiffs will be entitled to recover the said dues by putting the decree into execution. In view of the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. ( 34 ) LET a copy of this judgment along with L. C. R be sent down to the learned Court below. ( 35 ) XEROX certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties as expeditiously as possible after observing the required formalities. Samaresh Banerjea, J. : I agree. Appeal allowed in part.