R. M. DOSHIT, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revision Application under Section 115 CPC has been preferred by the judgment-debtor against the order dated 13th September, 2001 made by the learned Civil Judge (S. D.), Vadodara on Non-Judicial Misc. Civil Application No. 10/2001 and against the order dated 1st October, 2001 made by the learned Civil Judge (S. D.), Rajkot in Special Execution Application No. 154/2001. ( 2 ) THE petitioner herein had instituted Special Civil Suit No. 303/2000 in the Court of Civil Judge (S. D.), Vadodara against the respondents defendants for recovery of a sum of Rs. 7,21,18,013=00 and for other reliefs. The said dispute was settled out of the Court and a decree was passed on 11th September, 2000 in terms of the consent terms. Pursuant to the said consent decree, the defendants (claiming to be the judgment-creditors under the consent decree) moved above referred Non-Judicial Misc. Application No. 10/2001 under Section 39 CPC for transfer of decree to the Civil Court at Rajkot. According to the judgment-creditors the judgment-debtor (the plaintiff) has properties situated at Rajkot which could satisfy the decree. Under the impugned order dated 13th September, 2001 the said Application is allowed and the decree is ordered to be transferred to the Civil Court (S. D.), Rajkot. On such transfer being made, the judgment-creditors moved above referred Special Darkhast No. 154/2001. In the said Darkhast, on 1st October, 2001 under Application Ex. 7, the judgment-debtor applied for adjournment. The same was granted in the following terms:-"time is hereby granted subject to maintaining prevailing position to safeguard the interest of the J. C. In the mean time, kept on 4/10/2001 as agreed. " ( 3 ) ON the said order having been made the judgment-debtor moved Application Ex. 8 for an adjournment for 20 days with a view to challenging the above order dated 1st October, 2001. On the said Application, the Court made order as under :"heard. Read the objections. The time is conditionally granted as per the convenience of the L. A. for the J. D. who is sick and that too after hearing his L. representatives. Just to avoid further complications and in the larger interests of justice the interim order is passed. Hence, it is hereby rejected. "feeling aggrieved, the judgment-debtor has preferred the present Revision Application. ( 4 ) MR. Just to avoid further complications and in the larger interests of justice the interim order is passed. Hence, it is hereby rejected. "feeling aggrieved, the judgment-debtor has preferred the present Revision Application. ( 4 ) MR. TANNA has strenuously urged that the suit was instituted by the petitioners for recovery of more than Rs. 7 crores from the defendants. Under the consent decree, the petitioner had agreed to pay certain amounts to the defendants provided the defendants carry out the rest of the terms of the consent decree. The defendants have failed to carry out the terms of the said consent decree. The petitioners, therefore, are under no obligation to pay any amount to the defendants pursuant to the said consent decree. No execution application, therefore, could be maintainable against the petitioner. ( 5 ) I am of the opinion that the maintainability of the execution application or the construction/ interpretation of the consent terms is not the matter at issue in the present Revision Application. The contentions raised in that behalf are besides the point. I, therefore, do not deal with the same. ( 6 ) MR. TANNA has submitted that the petitioner has number of properties at Vadodara. There was no need for transfer of decree as envisaged under Section 39 CPC. Further if at all, such transfer was required, the petitioner ought to have been given notice of the same and an opportunity of being heard. Had the petitioner been given such opportunity the petitioner could have pointed out the number of properties situated at Vadodara which the petitioner owns. Mr. Tanna has also submitted that on account of the status quo ordered by the learned Civil Judge (S. D.), Rajkot all the construction activities taken up by the petitioner at Rajkot have come to a standstill. The petitioner is unable to carry out the development work in respect of the properties in question undertaken by it. In support of his contention, Mr. Tanna has relied upon the judgment in the matter of Sm. Saralabala Devi v/s. Shyam Prosad Chatterjee and others [air 1953 Calcutta 765]. ( 7 ) THE learned advocate Mr. Shah has contested the Revision Application. He has submitted that a composite revision application against the orders made by two different Courts is not maintainable. Tanna has relied upon the judgment in the matter of Sm. Saralabala Devi v/s. Shyam Prosad Chatterjee and others [air 1953 Calcutta 765]. ( 7 ) THE learned advocate Mr. Shah has contested the Revision Application. He has submitted that a composite revision application against the orders made by two different Courts is not maintainable. He has relied upon Section 39 CPC and has submitted that in the event the judgment-creditor establishes existence of any of the three contingencies mentioned therein, the judgment-creditor would be entitled for transfer of a decree. In the submission of Mr. Shah admittedly the judgment-debtor carries on business at Rajkot. The judgment-creditors, therefore, can legitimately seek transfer of decree to a court of competent jurisdiction at Rajkot. In the circumstances the fact that the judgment-debtor has sufficient property at Vadodara, i. e. within the jurisdiction of the Court that passed the decree pales into insignificance. Mr. Shah has also relied upon Rule 291 of the Civil Manual. He has submitted that as provided in Rule 291 of the Civil Manual, applications under Section 39 to transfer a decree to another Court for execution does not require a judicial inquiry. The Court is, therefore, not obliged to issue notice upon the judgment-creditor nor it is obliged to give an opportunity of hearing to the judgment-debtor. ( 8 ) IN support of his contentions Mr. Shah has relied upon the judgments in the matters of Nehar Ganguli and others v/s. Rai Anath Nath Basu and others [air 1956 Patna 269]; of Narain Das Dutt and another v/s. Banku Behari Chattopadhaya and others [air 1925 Calcutta 213]; of Shiyali Vengu Chetti v/s. Valjee Kanjee and Co. Madras [air 1936 Madras 99]; of Banku Behari Chatterji v/s. Narain Das Datt and others [air 1927 Privy Council 73]; of Banaras Bank Ltd. v/s. Jyoti Bhushan Gupta and another [air 1951 Allahabad 362]; of Devi Das v/s. Mohamed Akbar Khan and others [air 1935 Lahore 508]; of In re Janki Prasad Poddar Assignee of the decree. Baijnath Ramchander v/s. Binjraj Joowarmal Batia and Co. [air 1937 Bombay 365] and of Mohanlal Goenka v/s. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee and others [air 1953 S. C. 65]. ( 9 ) NEXT, Mr. Shah has contended that in any view of the matter the powers of Revision under Section 115 CPC are discretionary powers. Baijnath Ramchander v/s. Binjraj Joowarmal Batia and Co. [air 1937 Bombay 365] and of Mohanlal Goenka v/s. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee and others [air 1953 S. C. 65]. ( 9 ) NEXT, Mr. Shah has contended that in any view of the matter the powers of Revision under Section 115 CPC are discretionary powers. Such powers may not be exercised against the orders where the substantial justice has been done. In support thereof, he has relied upon the judgments in the matters of Chunilal Maijibhai v/s. Shankerbhai Harjibhai and Anr. [20 (2) GLR 123]; of Patel Jayantilal Sendhidas v/s. Ambalal Maganlal Kothari [23 (2) GLR 676] and of Dena Bank v/s. Devi Exhibitors and Ors. [25 (2) GLR 1040]. ( 10 ) IN the matter of Sm. Saralabala Devi (supra), in an appeal arising from the execution proceedings, the judgment-creditor raised objections against the order of transmission of decree made on an application made by the judgment-creditor without issuing notice to the judgment-debtor. The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court observed that ". . . I have already pointed out that the order for transfer was made ex parte without service of any notice on the judgment-debtors. The order for transfer of a decree is not a ministerial act but is a judicial act and like all judicial acts it did not acquire finality as no notice was served on the parties affected thereby. . . The ex parte order for transfer cannot therefore be binding on the judgment-debtors. " ( 11 ) IN the matter of Nehar Ganguli and others (supra), in an appeal arising from an order of transfer of decree, the Patna High Court held that ". . . There is no warrant in law for hearing the judgment-debtors before transferring the decree to another Court for execution. Section 39 has been enacted entirely for the benefit of the decree-holder to facilitate speedier and fuller satisfaction of the decree. Subject to any contract, or directions of a Court of law, it is for the decree-holder to decide the venue of the execution and the judgment-debtor cannot legitimately impose any limitation or restriction upon the power of the decree-holder to obtain satisfaction of the decree in the manner provided by Ss. 38 and 39. It is for this reason that none of these sections provides for hearing the judgment-debtor before transferring the decree for execution to another Court. 38 and 39. It is for this reason that none of these sections provides for hearing the judgment-debtor before transferring the decree for execution to another Court. The transfer of a decree is a quasi-administrative order and may be passed ex parte without notice to the judgment-debtors. " Similarly, in the matter of Narain Das Dutt and another (supra), the Honble Court, with respect to the application for transmission of decree, observed that ". . . No notice of this application was given to the widow or the appellants, nor does the law require that in such cases such notice should be given. " Similar is the view expressed by various High Courts, the Honble Supreme Court and the Privy Council in the above referred judgments relied upon by Mr. Shah. In substance all the said courts have uniformly held that, ". . . The act of transmitting a decree for execution is a ministerial act. Such an order can be passed even ex parte. " ( 12 ) IN the matter of Chunilal Maijibhai (supra), this Court has observed that ". . . Even if his plea is legally sound, this court is not bound to exercise its revisional jurisdiction, which is discretionary in its character from the very nature of things. " Similar is the view expressed in the matters of Patel Jayantilal Sendhidas (supra) and Dena Bank (supra ). ( 13 ) AS to the scope of interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, there cannot be any dispute and there is none. It is also not disputed that the powers of revision under Section 115 CPC are discretionary powers and the Court may, in the interest of justice, refuse to exercise the said powers. ( 14 ) WHETHER the petitioner ought to have been given notice or an opportunity of hearing, is the question to be considered. The judgment in the matter of Sm. Saralabala Devi (supra) shall not lend support to the petitioner. In the said matter, the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court found that the order of transmission of decree was obtained by the judgment-creditor by stating misleading facts and by misrepresentation. The judgment in the matter of Sm. Saralabala Devi (supra) shall not lend support to the petitioner. In the said matter, the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court found that the order of transmission of decree was obtained by the judgment-creditor by stating misleading facts and by misrepresentation. ( 15 ) IN view of all the above referred judgments, I have no reason to take any other view but the view that transmission of a decree to another court of competent jurisdiction for execution is a ministerial act and can be made ex parte. Hence, the challenge to the order dated 13th September, 2001 on the ground that no notice was given to the judgment-debtor should necessarily fail. ( 16 ) SECTION 39 CPC deals with transfer of decree for execution to another court of competent jurisdiction on application of the decree holder. Sub section (1) thereof provides for four conditions, on satisfaction of any of which, the Court would be justified in making the order of transfer. Sub clause (a) thereof provides, inter alia, that the person against whom the decree is passed actually and voluntarily carries on business or personally works for gain within the local limits of jurisdiction of such other court. In the present case, indisputably, the petitioner, judgment-debtor, carries on business at Rajkot. The Court at Vadodara, therefore, was justified in making the impugned order of transfer. The fact that the judgment-debtor has the property at Vadodara (within the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree) and that such property is sufficient to satisfy the decree, is irrelevant. ( 17 ) IN above view of the matter, the challenge to the impugned order dated 13th September, 2001 is rejected. As to the orders dated 1st October, 2001 made by the learned Civil Judge (S. D.), Rajkot below Applications Exs. 7 and 8, I am of the view that the learned Judge made the order to maintain status quo below Application Ex. 7 with a view to accommodating the learned advocate who was reported sick. It was a mere ad-interim arrangement made in the interest of justice. The order made below Application Ex. 8 is a discretionary order. No advocate or a litigant can claim adjournment as a matter of right. Such orders need not be interfered with in a revision application preferred under Section 115 CPC. It was a mere ad-interim arrangement made in the interest of justice. The order made below Application Ex. 8 is a discretionary order. No advocate or a litigant can claim adjournment as a matter of right. Such orders need not be interfered with in a revision application preferred under Section 115 CPC. ( 18 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the Civil Revision Application is dismissed with costs. Rule is discharged. Ad-interim relief is vacated. The learned advocate Mr. D. J. Bhatt requests that the stay operating pending this Revision Application against the execution proceedings be continued for a period of six weeks to facilitate the petitioner herein to approach the Honble Supreme Court. ( 19 ) THE request is granted. The stay of the impugned execution proceedings shall continue to operate till 20th October, 2003 on condition that the petitioner judgment-debtor shall maintain status quo with respect to the properties mentioned in the Execution Application. .