Order Heard the parties. Coal India Limited, through its General Manager (Personnel) has preferred this appeal against the order dated 17.12.2002, passed by the learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 2280 of 2001. 2. Mrs. Kiran, sole respondent was appointed as Welfare Officer, E-I Grade on 24.9.1985. She was promoted to the post of Personnel Officer, E-II Grade on 1.11.1989 and further on 30.3.1993 to the post of Senior Personnel Officer. On 23.9.1997 she was promoted to the post of Deputy Personnel Officer, E-IV Grade. 3. She filed C.W.J.C. No. 2280 of 2001 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in this Court claiming that she being the senior and eligible for promotion from E-IV Grade to the post of Personnel Manager, E-V Grade has been denied such promotion on the ground that a vigilance case was pending against her and as such she prayed for a direction for her promotion to E-V Grade with effect from 22.3.2001 when juniors to her were promoted. 4. However, during pendency of the writ application on 22.5.2002 she was promoted to the post of Personnel Manager in E-V Grade and was given notional seniority and notional fixation of pay with effect from 22.3.2001 under cluster concept, but without any financial benefit the writ application was amended accordingly. 5. The appellant, who was respondent in the writ application asserted that while promoting the writ petitioner from E-IV to E-V Grade she was given notional seniority and notional fixation of pay with effect from 22.3.2001 in terms of Office Memorandum No. C-5A/50972 (Vol I)/Pt/1334 dated 19/27.6.1979 and she wa:s not allowed any arrears of pay. The relevant extract of the Office Memorandum dated 19/27.6.1979 duly corrected on 10.7.1979 reads as under : (c) When an officer has been completely exonerated and he is subsequently promoted, his seniority should be fixed as if he had been promoted in accordance with the position assigned to him in the select list Period of his eligibility for consideration for promotion to the next higher grade should be reckoned with reference to the date his immediate junior has been promoted. The pay of such an executive on promotion should be fixed notionally by allowing the intervening period during which the officers could not be promoted due to his suspension and/ or pending departmental enquiry to be counted for increments in the higher grade, but no arrears would be admissible to him:' 6. It appears that disciplinary proceeding for major penalty was contemplated against the writ petitioner vide Vigilance Case No. VIG/RDA-29(2)/5/2001. The said vigilance case related to her involvement in irregular appointment made in CCL Liason Office, Patna. The Vigilance Department in course of investigation served questionnaire and she had furnished written statement in reply to the said questionnaire on 16.2.2001 before the Vigilance Investigation Team and subsequently also submitted a written supplementary on 19.2.2001 to the Chief Vigilance Officer, CCL. The writ petitioner in collusion and conspiracy with some other officials of CCL initially appointed five persons on the casual roll of CCL and subsequently their services were regularized during the• period from 1991-97 in violation of tile rules and guidelines of direct recruitment The Chief Managing Director, CCL/Disciplinary Authority agreed with the investigation report and recommended the charge sheet for major penalty on the alleged misconduct to be issued to her after receiving advise of the Central Vigilance Commission (in short CVC). The entire case record was forwarded to CVC. 7. The learned Single Judge applying the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India etc. VS. K.V. Jankiraman etc. ( AIR 1991 SC 2010 ) quashed the part of the order dated 22.5.2002 (wrongly typed in paragraph 21 in the impugned judgment as 26.7.2002) had held that the writ petitioner was entitled to all the monetary benefits of the promoted post with effect from 22.3.2001 and the respondents were directed to pay the same. In paragraph 17 of the impugned judgment the learned Single Judge observed : "Admittedly, neither the petitioner was under suspension nor against her a prosecution for criminal charge was pending or sanction for prosecution was issued or even preliminary inquiry either by CBI or departmental agency was pending or any opinion was formed for serving charge sheet upon the petitioner. In my considered opinion, therefore, denial of promotion of the petitioner along with others was absolutely illegal, arbitrary, capricious and malafide." 8. In my considered opinion, therefore, denial of promotion of the petitioner along with others was absolutely illegal, arbitrary, capricious and malafide." 8. In our opinion, in the aforesaid circumstances, pending the departmental enquiry on the charges levelled against the writ petitioner and the decision taken by the Disciplinary Authority to issue charge sheet to her subject to approval of the CVC, denial of promotion to the petitioner at the relevant time was justified. As soon as the vigilance clearance of the petitioner was obtained, she was promoted from E IV to E V grade on 22.5.2002. 9. In K.V. Jankiraman (supra) the following observations were made by the apex Court : "There may be cases where the proceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, are, for example, delayed at the instance of the employee or the clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in the criminal proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on account of non-availability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc. In such circumstances, the concerned authorities must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it life being complex, it is not possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively all the circum. stances under which such consideration may become necessary. To ignore, however, such circumstances when they exist and lay down an inflexible rule that in every case when an employee is exonerated in disciplinary/criminal proceedings he should be entitled to all salary for the intervening period is to undermine discipline in the administration and jeopardize public interests; Therefore to deny the salary to an employee would not in all circumstances be illegal. Supreme Court did not approve last sentence in the first sub-paragraph after CI (iii) of paragraph 3 of the said memorandum, viz "but no arrears of pay shall be payable to him for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion", and directed that in place of the said sentence the following sentence be read in the Memorandum: "However, whether the officer concerned will be entitled to any arrears of pay for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion, and if so to what extent, will be decided by the concerned authority by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the disciplinary proceeding/criminal prosecution. Where the authority denies arrears of salary or part of it, it will record its reasons for doing so." 10. It is relevant to state that Office Memorandum of the Government of India, Department of Personnel Training dated 31.1.1982 contained similar provision like the provision contained in Office Memorandum dail9d 19/27.6.1979 of the Coal India Limited, quoted above, which was considered by the Supreme Court in Janki Raman's case (supra) and it was held that all the Disciplinary Authorities must be vested with the power to decide• whether an employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it. 11. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge was fully justified in applying the ratio of Janki Raman's case to the extent that whether the officer concerned was entitled to any salary or pay of the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion and if so to what extent was to be decided by the concerned authority by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the disciplinary proceeding. While denying arrears of salary or part of it, the authority would record the reasons for doing so. While denying arrears of salary or part of it, the authority would record the reasons for doing so. Accordingly, we affirm the impugned order dated 17.12.2002 whereby part of the order dated 22.5.2002 relating to denial of monetary benefits aforesaid was quashed and set aside the direction given by the learned Single Judge to the concerned authority to pay to the writ petitioner the entire monetary benefits of the promoted post (E-V grade) with effect from 22.3.2001 after holding that she was entitled to all the monetary benefits of the promoted post and direct the concerned authority to consider all the facts and circumstances of the case and pass reasoned order in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above regarding payment of her arrears of salary for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion within three months from the date of receipt production of a copy of this order. If aggrieved by such determination, the respondent (Mrs. Kiran) is at liberty to challenge the same before the appropriate forum. 12. This Appeal is disposed of with the above observations/directions.