P.G. AGARWAL, J.— This common order disposes of Crl. RevisionNos. 545/1996,205/1998 and Crl. Revn. No. 192/1998 as all these revisions are directed against the order passed in Case No. 206 C/85 of the Court of C.J.M., Kamrup, and presently pending as special Case No. 5C/93 of the Court of Special Judge, Kamrup and the order dated 20.4.98 has been challenged in the two revision petitions. As a matter of fact, the revision petitioners before us have prayed for quashing of the trial in the above cases. 2. The facts. Case No. RC/3/80/CIU(C) dated 10th November, 1980 was registered by the Delhi Special Police Establishment. In the FIR it was alleged that during the year 1978-79 the accused persons had entered into a conspiracy for cheating the State Government including the Steel Authority of India Ltd., and for obtaining certain pecuniary benefits to the tune of Rs.1,53,000/-. In the year 1985, charge-sheet was submitted against 26 accused persons u/s 120B/420/467/477A, IPC read with Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act read with Clause 7 of the Iron & Steel (Control) Order, 1956 and also u/s 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Out of these 26 persons, two of the accused persons were pardoned u/s 306 CrPC and they were cited as approvers-. Subsequently, 4 of the accused persons, who were all public servants, approached this Court for quashing of the charge sheet against them and the petitions were allowed and the prosecution was quashed against them. In the meantime, 3 of the accused perSons including one approver R.K. Goyal expired. 3 of the accused persons absconded and they were declared as absconders. 3. The petitioner Durgalal Sharma filed an application before the trial Court for dropping of the proceeding on the following counts:-(1) This Court which has been created in the year 1981 after amendment of the Es­sential Commodities Act has no jurisdic­tion to try this case as the offences relat­ing to this case took place prior to con­stitution of this Court. (2) One of the accused has been made approver by the learned CJM granting pardon u/s 306 Cr.P.C. (3) The Charge-sheet of the case was not sub­mitted before the competent Court but the committal Magistrate who has no ju­risdiction to commit this case. (2) One of the accused has been made approver by the learned CJM granting pardon u/s 306 Cr.P.C. (3) The Charge-sheet of the case was not sub­mitted before the competent Court but the committal Magistrate who has no ju­risdiction to commit this case. (4) FIR in question was filed in the year 1980 and the charge-sheet was submitted in the year 1985 and the case is committed to this Court in 1991 and in this way since the date of filing the FIR period of 14 years have been elapsed for which the petitioner has been deprived for consti­tutional right of getting speedy trial. (5) Another ground stated by the petitioner in the petition is that a period of 14 years has already been over and the trial of the case is yet to start and hence after examining 245 witnesses and 1246 documents in connection with this case shall take another 20 years and hence it is clear violation of the speedy trial as embodied in the spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution.” The matter was heard by the Sessions Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati who vide order dated 20.4.98 however refused to drop the proceeding but transferred the case to the file of Special Judge, Assam, Guwahati who has been appointed and has got jurisdiction to try the cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act. 4. In the present case, we find that me prosecution is faced with a strange dilemma. The charge sheet has been submitted under the Essential Commodities Act as well as the Prevention of Corruption Act. So far the offence under the Essential Commodities Act is concerned, the jurisdiction is with the Sessions Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati who was appointed as Special Judge under the Act and on the other hand so far the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act is concerned, the Sessions Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati has got no jurisdiction as the exclusive jurisdiction is vested with the Special Judge, Assam, Guwahati. However, the Special Judge, Assam, Guwahati has not been empowered to take up the cases under the Essential Commodities Act. This aspect of the matter need not detain us at this stage as we propose to dispose of the other points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 5. The petitioners have alleged violation of their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution for speedy trial. This aspect of the matter need not detain us at this stage as we propose to dispose of the other points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 5. The petitioners have alleged violation of their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution for speedy trial. It is submitted that although the alleged incident took place in the year 1978, FIR was lodged in the year 1980 and the charge sheet was submitted in the year 1985. After filing of the charge sheet also, long 17 years have elapsed but still the trial has not commenced as no charges have been framed. As there is raging dispute regarding jurisdiction of the Court as stated above, there are as many as 245 witnesses and as many as 1246 number of documents and it is submitted that it may take another 25 years to complete the trial and in the meantime, most of the accused persons or the witnesses will not be available. Some of the witnesses and accused persons have already expired as for long 25 years the trial has not commenced. 6. The Apex Court in various cases namely Hussainara Khatoon-Vs-State of Bihar, reported in (1980)1 SCC 81 , A.R. Antulay-Vs-R.8. Nayak, reported (1992)1 SCC 225 , Raj Deo Sharma-Vs-State of Bihar, reported in (1999) 7 SCC 604 and Anil Rai-Vs-State of Bihar reported in (2001) 7 SCC 318 held that the right of speedy trial is a part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Constitution Bench of 7 Judges in the case of P. Ramachandra Rao-Vs-State of Karnataka, reported in (2002)4 SCC 578 observed:- "No person shall be deprived of his life or his personal liberty except according to procedure established by law-declares Article 21 of the Constitution. Life and liberty, the words employed in shaping Article 21, by the founding fathers of the Constitution, are not to be read narrowly in the sense drearily dictated by dictionaries; they are organic terms to be construed meaningfully. Embarking upon the interpretation thereof, feeling the heart-throb of'the preamble, deriving strength from the directive principles of State policy and alive to their constitutional obligation, the Courts have allowed Article 21 to stretch its arms as wide as it legitimately can. Embarking upon the interpretation thereof, feeling the heart-throb of'the preamble, deriving strength from the directive principles of State policy and alive to their constitutional obligation, the Courts have allowed Article 21 to stretch its arms as wide as it legitimately can. The mental agony, expense and strain which a person proceeded against in criminal law has to undergo and which, coupled with delay, may result in impairing the capability or ability of the accused to defend himself have persuaded the constitutional Courts of the country in holding the right to speedy trial a manifestation of fair, just and reasonable procedure enshrined in Article 21. Speedy trial, again, would encompass within its sweep all its stages including investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial - in short everything commencing with an accusation and expiring with the final verdict-the two being respectively the terminus a quo and terminus ad quern - of the journey which an accused must necessarily undertake once faced with an implication. The constitutional philosophy propounded as right to speedy trial has though grown in age by almost two and a half decades, the goal sought to be achieved is yet a far-off peak. Myriad fact situations bearing testimony to denial of such fundamental right to the accused persons, on account of failure on the part of prosecuting agencies and the executive to act, and their turning an almost blind eye at securing expeditious and speedy trial so as to satisfy the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution have persuaded this Court in devising solutions which go the extent of almost enacting by judicial verdict bars of limitation beyond which the trial shall not proceed and the arm of law shafl lose its hold. In its zeal to protect the right to speedy trial of an accused, can the Court devise and almost enact such bars of limitation though the legislature and the statutes have not chosen to do so - is question of far-reaching implications which has led to the constitution of this Bench of seven-Judge strength." 7. In the case of 'Common Cause' A Regd. Society-Vs-Union of India, reported in AIR 1996 SCI 619, certain time limits were fixed by the Apex Court for termination of the criminal trial. In the case of 'Common Cause' A Regd. Society-Vs-Union of India, reported in AIR 1996 SCI 619, certain time limits were fixed by the Apex Court for termination of the criminal trial. However, the constitution Bench of P. Ramachandra Rao (supra) held that Supreme Court cannot fix any time limit but the question of delay has to be decided by the Court having regard to the totality of circumstances of an individual case. The Constitution Bench further observed: "The Constitution Bench turned down the fervent plea of proponents of right to speedy trial for laying down time-limits as bar beyond which a criminal proceeding or trial shall not proceed and expressly ruled that it was neither advisable nor practicable (and hence not judicially feasible) to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Having placed on record the exposition of law as to right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution, this Court lietd that it was necessary to leave the rule as elastic and not to fix it in the frame of defined and rigid rules. It must be left to the judicious discretion of the Court seized of an individual case to find out from the totality of circumstances of a given case if the quantum of time consumed up to a given point of time amounted to violation of Article 21, and if so, then to terminate the particular proceedings, and if not, then to proceed ahead. The test is whether the proceedings or trial has remained pending for such a length of time that the inordinate delay can legitimatelybe called oppressive and unwarranted, as suggested in A.R. Antulay. In Kartar Singh case the Constitution Bench while recognising the principle that the denial of an accused's right of speedy trial may result in a decision to dismiss the indictment or in reversing of a conviction, went on to state: Of course, no length of time is per se too long to pass scrutiny under this principle nor the accused is called upon to show the actual prejudice by delay of disposal of cases. On the other hand, the Court has to adopt a balancing approach by taking note of the possible prejudices and disadvantages to be suffered by the accused by avoidable delay and to determine whether the accused in a criminal proceeding has been deprived of his right of having speedy trial with unreasonable delay which could be identified by the factors - (1) length of delay, (2) the justification for the delay, (3) the accused's assertion of his right to speedy trial, and (4) prejudice caused to the accused by such delay." The Apex Court further observed that in appropriate cases, the jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 482, Cr.P.C. and Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief or suitable directions. 8. In the light of the above, let us examine whether in the present case the prosecution is liable to be terminated at this stage. The matter relates to alleged loss to the tune of Rs. 1,53,0007- to the Steel Authority of India. The incident took place in the year 1978 and long 25 years have elapsed and the trial has not commenced as yet as there is dispute regarding jurisdiction. The learned P.P. was fair enough to submit that even if the impugned order passed by the Sessions Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati is retained or not disturbed, the trial can not proceed before the Special Judge, Assam, Guwahati, firstly because all the public servants against whom charge-sheet was submitted have already been discharged by this Court and secondly, the Special Judge, Assam has no jurisdiction to try the offence u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the entire case hinged on the testimony of the approver R.K. Goyal, who is no more in this world. The other approver is a hearsay witness only claiming that he was informed by R.K. Goyal. Till now, no charges have been framed and considering the number of witnesses involved and number of documents to be produced, we do not see any prospect of commencement of trial or completion of the trial within a near future or within any stipulated period. Till now, no charges have been framed and considering the number of witnesses involved and number of documents to be produced, we do not see any prospect of commencement of trial or completion of the trial within a near future or within any stipulated period. On consideration of the parametres laid down in the cases quoted above and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that the impugned proceeding should be terminated at this stage as the accused persons have suffered a lot, both mentally and physically during the last 25 years. 9. In the result, the revision petitions are allowed and further proceeding of Case No. 206C/85 is hereby quashed in exercise of power u/s 482, Cr.RC, read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India.