ORDER In terms of Notification No. S.O. 95 dated April 4, 1994 (which was based upon Industrial Policy Resolution of 1993 giving incentive to the Entrepreneurs) the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes had granted exemption and issued exemption certificate in form "B" in favour of the writ petitioner in so far as the payment of sales tax on the purchase of raw material was concerned. Exercising suo motu power of revision under section 46(4) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes issued a notice dated February 26, 1998 upon the petitioner calling upon it to show cause and explain as to why the aforesaid order of the Deputy Commissioner granting exemption from payment of sales tax on the purchase of raw materials be not set aside. Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid show cause and notice, the petitioner filed a writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 770 of 1998 (R). By order dated March 30, 1998 the writ petition was disposed of. The following is the order passed by this Court on March 30, 1998 : "The joint Commissioner, Commercial Taxes (Administration) Dhanbad, by order dated February 26, 1998 issued notice under section 46(4) of the Bihar Fiance Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why orders granting exemption from payment of tax under the Act be not re-called. Earlier an order dated February 25, 1998, directing the Steel Authority, Bokaro, not to supply the tax free raw materials to the petitioners was issued. Being aggrieved by the said orders, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. By order dated February 26, 1998 the Joint Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, decided to exercise revisional power suo motu and accordingly issued notice to the petitioner fixing March 10, 1998 to appear and show cause. Mrs. I. Sen Choudhary, learned Senior Counsel I, has stated that the petitioner did appear on March 10, 1998 and had taken time up to April 2, 1998 for filing show cause and the case is now fixed on April 2, 1998. As the matter has not been decided so far and has been fixed on April 2, 1998 before the Joint Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Dhanbad, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to interfere with under article 226 of the Constitution of India. As the matter has not been decided so far and has been fixed on April 2, 1998 before the Joint Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Dhanbad, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to interfere with under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The concerned authority however, should decide the controversy at the earliest. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, this writ application is disposed of with the direction to the petitioner to file show cause on April 2, 1998. The Joint Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Dhanbad, thereafter will decide it by a speaking order as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a week." The Joint Commissioner proceeded to decide the suo motu revision with respect to and arising out of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner and ultimately passed an order on April 15, 1998 holding that the petitioner was not entitled for tax-free purchase of raw materials under the aforesaid S.O. 95 dated April 4, 1994 since the petitioner was not engaged in manufacture of a new or different commodity or a product which might be different than the raw material purchased. Accordingly, the Joint Commissioner set aside the order dated December 30, 1996 passed by the Deputy Commissioner against which he had exercised his suo motu revisional jurisdiction and remanded the matter back to the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes with direction to hold fresh enquiry and pass appropriate order in the light of the observations made by the Joint Commissioner in his order dated April 15, 1998. The operative portion of the Joint Commissioner's order reads thus : "In view of above facts and circumstances it is fully established beyond doubt that cutting and processing of iron and steel materials adopted by the dealer do not result into emergence of a new or distinct, commercial commodity other that the raw material purchased. Therefore, the dealer is not entitled for tax-free purchase of raw materials under S.O. 95 dated April 4, 1994 since the dealer is not engaged in manufacture of a new or different commodity or goods from different raw materials purchased. As such the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner dated December 30, 1996 and the exemption certificate issued is not legal and proper and therefore the same is set aside. As such the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner dated December 30, 1996 and the exemption certificate issued is not legal and proper and therefore the same is set aside. The case is remanded back to the Deputy Commissioner with direction to hold fresh enquiry and pass appropriate order in the light of above observation in respect of those raw materials which are directly used for manufacture of finished products by way of conversion or transformation of distinct commercial commodity." Aggrieved by the passing of the aforesaid order by the Joint Commissioner even though the Deputy Commissioner had not started proceedings afresh on remand, the petitioner filed yet another writ petition in this Court being C.W.J.C. No. 1887 of 1998 (R) and a division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated August 19, 1998 ([2000] 117 STC 91 (Steel India v. State of Bihar)) while dismissing the writ petition clearly held that the petitioner was not engaged in any manufacturing process and that the petitioner was only engaged in the process of cutting and rolling, etc., of the same product. While dismissing the writ petition of the petitioner the Division Bench took into account the definition of the term" manufacture" as occurring in section 2(n) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 and taking into consideration the operational aspects of the manufacturing process carried on by the petitioner disagreed with the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner and held that in view of the definition of the term "manufacture" the petitioner could not be held entitled to the grant of exemption from the purchase of raw material. The word "manufacture" has been defined in section 2(n) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 and reads thus : "2(n) 'manufacture' with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means producing, making, extracting, altering, ornamenting, finishing or otherwise processing, treating or adopting any goods but does not include such manufacture or manufacturing process as may be prescribed." Apparently not satisfied with the aforesaid judgment passed in C.W.J.C. No. 1887 of 1998 (R) (Steel India v. State of Bihar [2000] 117 STC 91 (Pat.)) the petitioner filed Civil Review Petition, being Civil Review No. 69 of 1998 (R) but the Division bench vide its order dated December 2, 1998 (Steel India v. State of Bihar [1999] 2 BLJR 942) stuck to the judgment and declined to review the same. The Review Application was accordingly dismissed as being without merit. Aggrieved the petitioner filed special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court being S.L.P. No. 20301-20302 of 1998 and the same was dismissed vide order dated March 30, 1999. Even with respect to this order the petitioner filed review petition which also was dismissed vide order dated August 17, 1999. It is in the aforesaid background that the Deputy Commissioner, on remand (as was directed by the Joint Commissioner on April 15, 1998) took up the matter and vide order dated April 18, 2000 rejected the petitioner's request for grant of exemption certificate as in his considered opinion the petitioner was not held entitled to the grant of exemption on the purchase of raw material. Aggrieved the petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P. (T) No. 5849 of 2001 but since the aforesaid order of the Deputy Commissioner was revisable, the petition was dismissed but with liberty to the petitioner to approach the Commissioner exercising his revisional jurisdiction. It is in this background that the impugned order dated May 21, 2002 was passed by the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Jharkhand, whereby he having held that the petitioner had failed to prove that a commodity or product was being manufactured from the raw material, dismissed the revision petition. The following is the operative part of the aforesaid order : "After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and the Departmental Representative and after perusing the documents on record, I am of the opinion that (a) the merit of the case regarding eligibility of the petitioner for tax incentive under the scheme was examined by the honourable High Court while disposing the writ petition C.W.J.C. 1897 of 1998 (R) and the petitioner's case was rejected by the honourable the High Court and later by the honourable Supreme Court of India, on merit, (b) the petitioner has failed to prove that a different commodity is being manufactured from the raw materials. Therefore, it will not be proper to allow the claim of the tax exemption, as prayed by the petitioner. The revision petition, is accordingly dismissed." We have heard Mr. Poddar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Jhunjhunwala, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. Therefore, it will not be proper to allow the claim of the tax exemption, as prayed by the petitioner. The revision petition, is accordingly dismissed." We have heard Mr. Poddar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Jhunjhunwala, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. The only issue involved in this case is as to whether the petitioner is engaged in any manufacturing process as is covered by section 2(n) of Bihar Finance Act, 1981. Actually, Mr. Jhunjhunwala submitted that the Notification No. S.O. 95 dated April 4, 1994 defined and prescribed the extent of the exemption parameter in clause 2 of the said Notification to convey that the exemption is available only with respect to such raw material as is directly used for manufacture. Raw material as is directly used for manufacture has been defined to mean only such raw material which is directly consumed for conversion into a finished product but the raw material which is indirectly used in the process of making of the finished products such as coal, fuel, oil, etc., would not be included in the definition of raw material for attracting the exemption provision. We are convinced that in this petition we cannot grant any relief to the petitioner nor we can interfere with the order of the Commissioner or with the order of the Deputy Commissioner and on two grounds, firstly because the petitioner has not made out any case whereby we can be persuaded to take a view contrary to the one taken by the authorities of the Commercial Taxes Department. We seem to be in agreement with that view that in the totality of the operational activities carried on by the petitioner, the petitioner cannot be considered to be engaged in any manufacturing process as such within the ambit and scope of section 2(n) of the Act. It may be advantageous to cull out from the order of the Joint Commissioner the nature of the operational activities of the petitioner, to find out at first hand whether by such operational activities, the petitioner has been manufacturing or merely re-shaping the raw material by some mechanical process like cutting, etc., etc. We quote : "16. In the present case it is found on enquiry of fact and documents produced that no different goods are produced after the so called processing and cutting process. We quote : "16. In the present case it is found on enquiry of fact and documents produced that no different goods are produced after the so called processing and cutting process. The goods remain the same only the size is changed. 17. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the dealer argued that the definition of manufacture in Orissa Act and Bihar Finance Act are slightly different inasmuch as the use of power is not mandatory in Orissa and as such the ratio the above Supreme Court judgment is not applicable in Bihar case. It was also argued that power is being used in cutting and processing and as such the exemption in admissible to the dealer. 18. I have carefully examined all the aspects of the case and considered the submission made on behalf of the parties upon consideration of submission and documents produced before me, I am fully satisfied that no new commodity or goods is produced by the dealer after cutting/processing and the goods brought as raw materials continue to be same goods such as M.S. Slab. Prime steel ingot, H.R. Sheet, Plate, coils, mixed steel scrap which was commercially known as such before that process.The dealer is neither registered in Central Excise Act nor paying excise duty on processed material. The argument of the learned counsel of the dealer was also considered pointing out distinction in Orissa case cited above, it has been urged that use of power is not required in the definition of "Manufacture" in Orissa Sales Tax Act and as such ratio of Supreme Court judgment, is not applicable. The argument of the dealer as to use of power is not relevant as the ratio of the Supreme Court judgment in the aforesaid case is emergence of different goods, as result of application of process. This position has also been explained by the honourable Supreme Court in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills AIR 1963 SC 791 . 19. In view of above facts and circumstances it is fully established beyond doubt that cutting and processing of iron and steel materials adopted by the dealer do not result into emergence of a new or distinct commercial commodity other than the raw material purchased. 19. In view of above facts and circumstances it is fully established beyond doubt that cutting and processing of iron and steel materials adopted by the dealer do not result into emergence of a new or distinct commercial commodity other than the raw material purchased. Therefore, the dealer is not entitled for tax-free purchase of raw materials under S.O. No. 95 dated April 4, 1994 since the dealer is not engaged in manufacture of a new or different commodity or goods from different raw materials purchased. As such the order passed by the Deputy commissioner dated December 30, 1996 and the exemption certificate issued is not legal and proper and therefore the same is set aside. The case is remanded back to the Deputy Commissioner with direction to hold fresh enquiry and pass appropriate order in the light of above observation in respect of those raw materials which are directly used for manufacture of finished products by why of conversion or transformation of distinct Commercial Commodity." Having dealt with the aforesaid first question, we now proceed to consider the second ground, viz., the judicial pronouncements earlier on the subject first by the division Bench of this Court on two occasions and then by their Lordships of the Supreme Court twice, initially while dismissing the Special Leave Petition and later on while rejecting the review application. As has been earlier observed, the petitioner approached this Court twice before and even if we ignore the order passed in the first round being order dated March 30, 1998 in C.W.J.C. No. 770 of 1998 (R) the order dated August 19, 1998 in C.W.J.C. No. 1887 of 1998 (R) (Steel India v. State of Bihar [2000] 117 STC 91 (Pat.)) and the order passed on December 2, 1998 in Review Petition No. 69 of 1998 (R) (Steel India v. State of Bihar [1999] 2 BLJR 942) are all binding in nature and in these two judgments/orders the division Bench of this Court clearly held that the operational activity of the petitioner would not amount to "manufacture" as contemplated by section 2(n) of the Act. It is noteworthy to observe that the Supreme Court upheld the High Court judgment firstly while dismissing the Special Leave Petition and secondly while declining to allow the Review Application of the petitioner. All arguments as have been put forth today by Mr. It is noteworthy to observe that the Supreme Court upheld the High Court judgment firstly while dismissing the Special Leave Petition and secondly while declining to allow the Review Application of the petitioner. All arguments as have been put forth today by Mr. Poddar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner including the argument relating to the non-availability of the power with the respondents whereby they sought to retrospectively undo the exemption entitlement, were available to the petitioner at the earlier stages and by the aforesaid judgments of the division Bench of this Court all these questions and issues have been duly answered, settled and set at rest. We are afraid that we cannot reopen these issues. Mr. Poddar relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashirwad Ispat Udyog v. State Level Committee reported in [1999] 112 STC 207; (1998) 8 SCC 85 to contend that the scope of the expression "manufacture" has been expanded by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment. He particularly relied upon para 8 of the aforesaid judgment (para 9 in STC) which reads thus : "8. Decisions construing the meaning of the word 'manufacture' as used in other statutes do not apply unless the definition of that word in the particular statute under consideration is similar to that construed in the decisions. The plain construction of the special definition of the word in a particular Act must prevail. In the special definition given in section 2(j) of the said Act 'manufacture' has been defined as including a process or manner of producing, collecting, extracting preparing or making any goods. There can be no doubt whatsoever that 'collecting' goods does not result in the production of a new article. There is, therefore, inherent evidence in the definition itself that the narrow meaning of the word 'manufacture' was not intended to be applied in the said Act. Again, the definition speaks of 'the process of lopping the branches (of trees), cutting the trunks'. The loping of branches and the cutting of trunks of trees also, self-evidently, does not produce a new article. Again, the definition speaks of 'the process of lopping the branches (of trees), cutting the trunks'. The loping of branches and the cutting of trunks of trees also, self-evidently, does not produce a new article. The clear words of the definition, therefore, must be given due weight and cannot be overlooked merely because in other contexts the word 'manufacture' has been judicially held to refer to the process of manufacture of new articles." We are clearly of the view that the aforesaid judgment cannot be any help to the petitioner inasmuch as in the same judgment their Lordships have clearly held that in so far as the scope and meaning of the word "manufacture" is concerned, each statue would carry its own meaning and therefore, based on the definition of the term "manufacture" in each such statute, such a meaning has to be applied to the fact situation of each case. The definition of the term "manufacture" in the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1959 upon which the aforesaid judgment was dealing was different that the definition of term "manufacture" in section 2(n) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981. For ready reference we reproduce hereinbelow the definition of word "manufacture" in the Madhya Pradesh Act, 1959 which reads thus : "2(j) 'manufacture' includes any process or manner of producing, collecting extracting, preparing or making any goods, and in respect of trees which have been severed from the land or which have been felled, also the process of lopping the branches, cutting the trunks or converting them into logs, poles or bailies or any other articles of wood, but does not include such manufactures or manufacturing processes as may be prescribed." Actually, based on the aforesaid definition therefore, when we look at para 8 (para 9 in STC) we notice that their Lordships in the aforesaid judgment were referring to the expression "collecting" as was occurring in the aforesaid definition. It is noteworthy that the word "collecting" does not find any mention in the definition of the term "manufacture" as occurring in section 2(n) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981. For the aforesaid reasons, we have no hesitation in holding that this court cannot interfere with the aforesaid impugned order passed by the respondent No. 2. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.