Research › Search › Judgment

Jharkhand High Court · body

2003 DIGILAW 480 (JHR)

Mathura Sao v. State Of Bihar

2003-04-16

D.N.PRASAD

body2003
JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan Prasad, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 28.7.1998 passed by Shri Anant Vijay Singh, 3rd Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi in Sessions Trial Case No. 395 of 1997 in Sessions Trial No. 24 of 1998, whereby and whereunder, the learned Additional judicial Commissioner, Ranchi convicted the appellants for the offences Under Sections 304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code and also Under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years each Under Section 304B/34 of, the Indian Penal Code, three years rigorous imprisonment Under Section 498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code, five years rigorous imprisonment to appellant Nds. 1, 2 and 3 Under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and two years Under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act to all the appellants. However, the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. The prosecution case in short as alleged is that one Ram Lagan Sao submitted a written report before the police alleging therein that his daughter Munni Devi was married with Babu Lal Sao (appellant No. 2) in the year 1996. Thereafter she went to Sasural and for about six months she remained peacefully there, but thereafter the appellants started demanding a cycle, watch and money by way of dowry and when the said demand could not be fulfilled, the accused/ appellants started torturing the deceased. It is further alleged that the husband (appellant No, 2) also sent a letter (Ext. 2) demanding money, cycle, radio etc., and that articles could not be given to the husband, as a result of which, the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment. On 11.5.1997 it was informed that his daughter committed suicide by putting herself on fire. The informant and others rushed to the spot and found his daughter dead by burn injury. Accordingly, a First Information Report was lodged on the basis of a written report Under Sections 498A, 304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The police investigated into the case and submitted charge sheet against the accused persons. Accordingly, a First Information Report was lodged on the basis of a written report Under Sections 498A, 304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The police investigated into the case and submitted charge sheet against the accused persons. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions and thereafter the accused persons/appellants appeared before the Sessions Court and charges Under Sections 304B/34, 498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of the dowry Prohibition Act was framed to which the appellants pleaded not guilty. 3. Altogether eight witnesses have been examined on behalf of the prosecution in support of its case of whom P.W. 8 is the doctor who held post mortem on the dead body of the deceased Munni Devi. He opined that death was due to shock as a result of burn. To this effect there is no denial that Munni Devi died due to burn injury in the house of the appellants. 4. P.W. 1 is the informant. He has stated that the brother of appellant No. 2 Babu Lal Sao came to his house on 11.5.1997 and informed that his daughter Munni Devi died due to burn injury by sprinkling Kerosene Oil. Thereafter he went to Sasural of Munni Devi and found the dead body lying there. He further clalmed that the accused persons/appellants were demanding Cycle, Watch, Radio and money, which could be given due to paucity on the part of him. There was a demand of money by the husband because he was intending to start a business of Ready-made Clothes. He also produced a letter (Ext. 2) written by appellant No. 2 (Babu Lal Sao) whereby the appellant No. 2 demanded the said articles along with money. He further stated that due to non-fulfilment of the demand as made by the appellants, they started torturing his daughter and she was done to death. He further stated in his cross-examination in clear terms that Babu Lal Sao, his son-in-law had sent the said letter just before Dipawali and he was demanding money for running a shop. 5. P.W. 2 is the brother-in-law of the informant and he also supported the prosecution case. According to him, the accused persons/appellants used to torture Munni Devi because they could not fulfil their demand of dowry. 5. P.W. 2 is the brother-in-law of the informant and he also supported the prosecution case. According to him, the accused persons/appellants used to torture Munni Devi because they could not fulfil their demand of dowry. He is very clear in stating in his cross-examination that it is the husband who used to torture Munni Devi and pressing hard on her for money and articles demanded by him. 6. P.W. 4 is a witness of seizure list. According to him, the said letter was sent by appellant Babu Lal Sao who had given the said letter to him in his house. 7. P.W. 7 is the Investigating Officer who submitted the charge sheet after completion of investigation. He deposed in his cross-examination that the witnesses were examined and they stated about the demand of Cycle and Watch just after six months of the marriage. It is true that the witnesses could not say about the date, day or month of the said demand. He denied flatly that he got the said letter written by Babu Lal with force. Thus by this suggestion itself, it goes to establish that the said letter (Ext. 2) was actually written by appellant Babu Lal Sao who was also examined Under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code) but he has not denied in his statement about the said letter (Ext. 2). Even if no question specifically was put as regards to the letter (Ext. 2) Under Section 313 of the Code, the appellant Babu Lal Sao could have easily denied about the said letter emphatically in his statement which he has not done; proving clearly that the said letter was actually written by Babu Lal Sao, the husband of deceased Munni Devi and that letter indicates clearly about the demand of Cycle and money. 8. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that the Court below convicted the appellants without appreciating the evidence on record and the prosecution has totally failed to establish about cruelty to the deceased just soon before her death and, therefore, the presumption as lal down Under Section 113B of the Evidence Act will not be attracted. It is further argued that there is no direct or specific evidence against appellant Nos. 1 and 3 for demand of dowry or torturing the deceased at any point of time. It is further argued that there is no direct or specific evidence against appellant Nos. 1 and 3 for demand of dowry or torturing the deceased at any point of time. The learned Counsel for the appellants also relied upon the case of Sham Lal etc. v. State of Haryana etc., 1997 (1) Supreme (Cr.) 264, and the case of Mungeshwar Prasad Chaurasia and Anr. v. State of Bihar, 2002 (2) East Cr. C. 79 (SC). 9. There is specific and direct allegation against appellant No. 2 (Babu Lal Sao) for demand of Cycle, Watch and money by way of dowry and to this effect he also wrote a letter (Ext. 2). The allegation is also there that due to non- fulfilment of the said demand, the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment before her death, Munni Devi was married with Babu Lal Sao in the year 1996 and she admittedly died by burn injury in the year 1997 and she also died in the house of the appellants which proves itself that she died in otherwise circumstance. Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code reads as under : "304-B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death" and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation : For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Explanation : For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life." This section has the following ingredients : "(1) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (2) Such death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (3) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; (4) Such cruelty or harassment should be for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry." 10. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 defines "dowry" as under : " dowry means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly : (a) by any party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of said parties." 11. Section 113B of the Evidence Act raises a presumption against the accused and reads as under : ~ "113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death." 12. In the case at hand it is evident that the appellant No. 2/husband wrote a letter to the informant, the father of the deceased, demanding some articles and also money by way of dowry and due to non-fulfilment of the said demand, there is consistent evidence that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and torture in her Sasural. There is no iota of evidence or any document corning from the side of the defence to show that actually the deceased committed suicide by sprikling Kerosene Oil on her body. There is no iota of evidence or any document corning from the side of the defence to show that actually the deceased committed suicide by sprikling Kerosene Oil on her body. It was the duty on the part of the defence itself to prove the story of suicide if it was alleged by them rather it has come in evidence clearly that the deceased was treated with cruelty or harassed because of non-fulfilment of demand of dowry during that period and that period would be treated just before her death. The cruelty conduct is a continuous process and it starts from the day, the demand is made. In such type of cases, direct evidence cannot be expected as none of the neighbours would dare or like to say against the accused who is the permanent resident of the village. Thus it is unequivocally established from the evidence collected that the prosecution has fully established the case against appellant No. 2 (Babu Lal Sao) beyond all reasonable doubts. 13. The word cruelty is defined in the Explanation appended to Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code with Explanation cruelty means : "(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as it likely to drive, the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person relate to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand." 14. For the purpose of this Section "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Thus the acts of teasing beatings, demanding dowry and harassment to bring money clearly attract the term "cruelty". The cruel conduct of the husband (appellant No. 2) is quite obvious from the letter (Ext. 2) itself. 15. In the result, I am constrained to hold that the Court below has rightly passed the order of conviction against appellant No. 2 (Babu Lal Sao) and, hence the order of conviction as against him is confirmed. 16. So far appellant Nos. 2) itself. 15. In the result, I am constrained to hold that the Court below has rightly passed the order of conviction against appellant No. 2 (Babu Lal Sao) and, hence the order of conviction as against him is confirmed. 16. So far appellant Nos. 1 and 3, namely, Mathura Sao and Bhola Sao are concerned, it is true that except general and vague allegation, there is nothing specific against them and there is also lack of direct evidence against these two appellants whereby much suspicion arose in their participation. In the result, in my opinion, both the appellant Nos. 1 and 3, namely, Mathura Sao and Bhola Sao are entitled for the benefit of doubts. Hence their conviction and sentence passed by the Court below are hereby set aside and they are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. They are on bail and, as such, they are discharged from the liabilities of their bail bonds. 17. So far the order of sentence as regards to appellant No. 2 (Babu Lal Sao) is concerned, it appears that he has been in jail custody since May, 1997 and, therefore, he has sufficiently been punished. 18. In the result, in my view, the period already undergone by appellant No. 2 (Babu Lal Sao) will meet the ends of justice in the facts and circumstances of the case. The sentences passed by the Court below as against different offences also ordered to run concurrently and thus the order of sentence is hereby modified and the appellant No. 2 is sentenced to undergo for the period already undergone by him in the jail custody. Appellant No. 2 is directed to be released from the jail custody forthwith if not wanted in any other case. 19. With this modification in the sentence only as regards to appellant No. 2 (Babu Lal Sao), this appeal is dismissed.