M. RAMACHANDRACHAR v. THE REGISTRAR, UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE, BANGALORE AND ANOTHER
2003-06-18
P.VISHWANATHA SHETTY
body2003
DigiLaw.ai
VISHWANATHA SHETTY, J, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, who was working as a Dairy Plant Assistant in the Dairy Science College, Hebbal, Bangalore in the 1st respondent -University of Agricultural Sciences, G. K. V. K. , Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the University ) has in this petition prayed for quashing of the order dated 20th December 2001, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-A to this petition, notifying him that he would attain the age of superannuation on 30th June 2002; and for a further direction to the University to implement the Judgment and decree dated 28th February 2002 made in O. S. No. 6985 of 1998 by the court of the XVI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge at bangalore by declaring that his correct Date of Birth was 10th June 1948 as against 10th June 1942 recorded in the Service Register; and to continue him in the service of the University till 10th June 2008. ( 2 ) SRI Devadass, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, in support of the relief sought for in the petition, strongly submitted that since the Civil Court by its Judgment and Decree dated 28th february 2002 in O. S. No. 6985 of 1998 had declared that the petitioner was born on 10th June 1948 and not on 10th June 1942 as found in the SSLC marks card and the Cumulative Record maintained by the State of Karnataka and the Commissioner for public Instructions, the University is bound by the said Judgment and decree and therefore the date of birth entered in the Service register of the petitioner maintained by the University should be correct as 10th June 1948 instead of 10th June 1942. Elaborating this submission, the learned Counsel pointed out that when a declaration is made by the Civil Court against the State, the same should be held to be binding on the University which is an instrumentality of the State. It is his submission that the University being an Instrumentality of the State must act in a fair and reasonable manner and the petitioner having obtained a decree with regard to his date of birth before the Civil Court, it is the prime duty of the university to comply with the declaration given in the decree.
It is his submission that the University being an Instrumentality of the State must act in a fair and reasonable manner and the petitioner having obtained a decree with regard to his date of birth before the Civil Court, it is the prime duty of the university to comply with the declaration given in the decree. He further pointed out that under similar circumstances when the university has acted upon the declaration given by the Civil Court in the case of one M. A. Shankar, it is not permissible for the University to take a different view in the case of the petitioner is concerned. In support of his submission, he relied upon the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of STATE OF KARNATAKA vs T. SRINIVAS1. He also relied upon the decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of PRAKASH NARAIN SHARMA vs BURMAH SHELL COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD. 2 in support of his submission that no individual or Authority can be permitted to ignore the order of the civil Court by assuming for itself to decide that the order of the Civil court is one by coram non judice. Sri Devadass also pointed out that since the Administrative Officer of the University, on consideration of the Judgment and Decree passed by the Civil Court, had recommended to recall the Order Annexure-A dated 20th December 1. AIR 1987 Kar 1843 2. (2002) 7 SCC 46 2001 and to continue the petitioner in service till he attains the age of superannuation on 10th June 2008, the University should have made an order to that effect; and since it has not been done a direction is required to be issued on that behalf by this Court. ( 3 ) HOWEVER, Sri R. V. Puttegowda, learned Counsel appearing for the University, strongly resisted the relief sought for by the petitioner. He pointed out that since the University is not a party to the Judgment and Decree made in O. S. No. 6985 of 1998, it is not permissible for the petitioner to seek for a direction before this Court to correct the date of birth entered in the Service Register of the petitioner maintained by the University.
He pointed out that since the University is not a party to the Judgment and Decree made in O. S. No. 6985 of 1998, it is not permissible for the petitioner to seek for a direction before this Court to correct the date of birth entered in the Service Register of the petitioner maintained by the University. It is his submission that the date of birth of the petitioner was entered in the Service Register as disclosed by the petitioner when he entered the service and also as reflected in the SSLC marks card and Cumulative Record. Therefore, it is his submission that the petitioner having accepted the date of birth entered in the Service Register all these years and having failed to make the University as a party to the Suit, should not be permitted to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to correct his date of birth in the service Register when the petitioner is about to retire from service. According to him, the conduct of the petitioner totally disentitles him from any equitable relief at the hands of this Court. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel also referred to me the decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of BURN STANDARD co. LTD. vs DINABANDHU MAJUMDAR3, in the case of secretary AND COMMISSIONER, HOME DEPARTMENT AND others vs R. KIRUBAKARAN ( 4 ) IN the light of the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the only question that would arise for consideration in this petition is as to whether a direction is required to be given to the University to correct the date of birth of the petitioner entered in the Service Register from 10th June 1942 to 10th June 1948 and to continue him in service till he attains the age of superannuation on the basis that his date of birth was 10th June 1948 ? ( 5 ) THE undisputed facts disclose that the petitioner had joined the service of the University as Dairy Plant Assistant. In the Service register, the date of birth of the petitioner was entered as 10th June 1942. This is clear from the Xerox copy of the service Register of the petitioner produced by the University as Annexure-R1 to the Writ petition.
In the Service register, the date of birth of the petitioner was entered as 10th June 1942. This is clear from the Xerox copy of the service Register of the petitioner produced by the University as Annexure-R1 to the Writ petition. It is also the case of the University in the statement of objections that the petitioner himself had affixed the signature in the Service Register accepting his date of birth as 10th June 1942. No doubt, the petitioner had filed suit O. S. No. 6985 of 1998 on the file of the XVI Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore on 9th September 1998 seeking for declaration that his correct date of birth was 10th June 1948 and not 10th June 1942 as found in the sslc marks card and the Cumulative Record maintained by the defendants in the said Suit i. e. , State and the Commissioner for public Instructions, Government of Karnataka. From the Xerox copy of the said Judgment, a copy of which has been produced as annexure-B to the Writ Petition, it is seen that though the suit was filed on 9th September 1998, the recording of evidence was commenced on 26th September 2001 and the Judgment was pronounced on 28th February 2002. The University was not made as a party to the said Suit. No doubt, in the said Suit a Judgment and decree was passed declaring that the petitioner was born on 10th June 1948 and not on 10th June 1942 as found in the SSLC marks card and Cumulative Record maintained by the Defendants in the Suit. In the said Suit a further decree was also made directing the defendants to make necessary corrections in the SSLC marks card and Cumulative Record and all other connected records maintained by the defendants as 10th June 1948 against 10th June 1942. No doubt, the said Judgment and decree was not appealed against and has become final as against the defendants in the said suit. The Judgment and decree made in the said suit, in my view, is binding only against the defendants in the said suit and it cannot be made binding on the University as neither the University nor any of its authorities or officers are parties to the Suit.
The Judgment and decree made in the said suit, in my view, is binding only against the defendants in the said suit and it cannot be made binding on the University as neither the University nor any of its authorities or officers are parties to the Suit. Therefore, the decree made in the said Suit, while it is binding on the State and its officers merely because University is an instrumentality of the State for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution of India; and came up to be established by virtue of the provisions contained in the University of agriculture Sciences Act, 1962, the said decree cannot be made binding on the University, while it is not permissible to the defendant 3. AIR 1995 SC 1499 4. AIR 1993 SC 2647 in the said Suit to ignore the decree made as laid down by the hon ble Supreme Court in the case of PRAKASH NARAIN SHARMA supra), it will not be binding on the University which is not a party to the said Suit. The observation made by the Hon ble Supreme Court at paragraph 7 of the said Judgment strongly relied upon by Sri devadass, is of no assistance to him. In the said Judgment the hon ble Supreme Court was examining the question that even when a decree passed by a Court is one without jurisdiction, whether it is open to the party to the proceedings to assume that the said decree is one without jurisdiction ? This is clear from the observation made at paragraph 7 of the Judgments. As noticed by me earlier, it is not the position here. Therefore, since the University was not a party to the decree made in the said suit, it is open to the University to contend that the said Decree is not binding on the University. The declaration given in the Suit, as noticed by me earlier, is against the defendants in the said suit, i. e. , against the State of Karnataka and commissioner for Public Instructions with regard to the entry made in the SSLC marks card and Cumulative Record and other connected records maintained by the defendants in the suit.
The declaration given in the Suit, as noticed by me earlier, is against the defendants in the said suit, i. e. , against the State of Karnataka and commissioner for Public Instructions with regard to the entry made in the SSLC marks card and Cumulative Record and other connected records maintained by the defendants in the suit. Further, it is also pertinent to note that though the petitioner was notified by the university by means of its Order Annexure-A that he would attain the age of superannuation on 30th June 2002, nearly six months in advance and the suit filed by the petitioner was pending consideration before the Civil Court, the petitioner did not choose to make the university as party to the proceedings; and did not seek for a declaration against the University and the date of birth of the petitioner as entered in the Service Register pertaining to him maintained by the University, i. e. 10th June 1942 was not correct and it should be corrected as 10th June 1948. The petitioner is bound by the Service conditions of the University and the entry made in his Service Register maintained by the University. Undoubtedly, the said entry shows that he was born on 10th June 1942. According to the University, the said date of birth was accepted by the petitioner and he had put his signature to that effect in the Service Register. Though the said entry was made long back, the petitioner did not make a grievance of the said entry till he obtained the decree on 28th February 2002 in O. S. No. 6985/98. It is only after the said decree, he gave a representation to the University to correct the date of Birth entered in his Service Register. To decide the age of superannuation of the petitioner, the University is required to act upon the entry made in his Service Register maintained by the university. So long as the same is not corrected in accordance with law, the petitioner is bound by the entry made in the Service Register. Admittedly, there is no decree made against the University by the civil Court directing the correction of the date of birth entered in the service Register.
So long as the same is not corrected in accordance with law, the petitioner is bound by the entry made in the Service Register. Admittedly, there is no decree made against the University by the civil Court directing the correction of the date of birth entered in the service Register. No doubt, as pointed out by Sri Devadass, university rejected the claim of the petitioner for correction of his date of birth on the ground that the petitioner has not taken steps to correct the date of birth as provided under Karnataka State Servants (Determination of Age) Act, 1974, (hereinafter referred to as the act ). While Sri B. V. Puttegowda would strongly urge that the provisions of the Act would apply to the case of the employees of the University is concerned, however, I am unable to accede to that submission. Sri B. V. Puttegowda has not placed any decision of the university wherein it has resolved to apply the provisions of the Act to the employees of the University are concerned. The employees of the University cannot be considered as Government servants. The act applies only to the Government Servants. Therefore, it is true as contended by Sri Devadass that the reasoning assigned in Order annexure-A dated 20th December 2001 to reject the claim of the petitioner for correction of date of birth is not correct. However, that cannot be a ground to grant the relief sought for by the petitioner in this petition, if he is not on merits on his claim, entitled for the relief. This Court while exercising its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is required to examine the substance and justness of the claim made by the petitioner. This Court cannot issue any futile writ. Therefore, the question is, when the petitioner invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, he should be granted relief directing the university to correct his date of birth as entered in the service register on the basis of the decree of the Civil Court relied upon by him? As noticed by me earlier, since the University is not a party to the Suit, the said decree will not be binding on the University. Further, the declaration made by the Civil Court is only against the State and the Commissioner for Public Instructions.
As noticed by me earlier, since the University is not a party to the Suit, the said decree will not be binding on the University. Further, the declaration made by the Civil Court is only against the State and the Commissioner for Public Instructions. Under these circumstance, the question is in the light of the said and judgment and decree, whether it is appropriate for this Court to direct the University to make suitable correction in the Service Register of the petitioner with regard to his Date of Birth ? In my view, the petitioner is not entitled for such a relief at the hands of this Court while exercising its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The averments made in paragraph 5c of the Writ Petition indicates that on the basis of the Horoscope dated 11th June 1949, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-F to this petition, he came to know about his date of birth as 10th June 1948 in November 1995. He filed the suit only on 9th September 1998. The petitioner who was aware that his date of birth was entered in the Service register maintained by the University as 10th June 1942 did not make the University as party-defendant while filing the Suit O. S. No. 6985 of 1998. Though he was informed by means of Order Annexure- a dated 20th December 2001 that he would be attaining the age of superannuation on 30th June 2002, even then he did not choose to make the University as a part to the suit. From the facts of the case, I am inclined to accept the submission of Sri B. V. Puttegowda that the petitioner did not deliberately make the University as party to the suit apprehending that the claim of the petitioner may be rejected if the University is given an opportunity to contest his claim. Otherwise, I do not find any ground for him not to make the University as party to the Suit. It is well settled by the decision of the Hon ble supreme Court that the persons who approach the Court at the fag end of their service career seeking for correction of date of birth should be denied of the relief.
Otherwise, I do not find any ground for him not to make the University as party to the Suit. It is well settled by the decision of the Hon ble supreme Court that the persons who approach the Court at the fag end of their service career seeking for correction of date of birth should be denied of the relief. In this connection it is useful to refer to the observation made by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of BURN STANDARD CO. LTD. (supra) at paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment which reads as hereunder: 10. Entertainment by the High Courts of Writ applications made by employees of the Government or its instrumentalities at the fag end of their services and when they are due for retirement from their services, in our view, is unwarranted. It would be so for the reason that no employee can claim a right to correction of birth date and entertainment of such writ applications for correction of dates of birth of some employees of Government or its instrumentalities will mar the chances of promotion of his juniors and prove to be an undue encouragement to the other employees to make similar applications at the fag end of their service careers with the sole object of preventing their retirements when due. Extraordinary nature of the jurisdiction vested in the high Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution in our considered view, is not meant to make employees of Government or its instrumentalities to continue in service beyond the period of their entitlement according to dates or birth accepted by their employers, placing reliance on the so-called newly found material. The fact that an employee of Government or its instrumentality who will be in service for over decades, with no objection whatsoever raised as to his date of birth accepted by the employer as correct, when all of a sudden comes forward towards the fag end of his service career with a writ application before the High court seeking correction of his date of birth in his Service Record, the very conduct of non-raising of an objections in the matter by the employee, in our view, should be a sufficient reason further, the High Court, not to entertain such applications on grounds of acquiescence, undue delay and laches.
Moreover, discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court can never be said to have been reasonably and judicially exercised if it entertains such writ application, for no employee, who had grievance as to his date of birth of his Service and Leave record could have genuinely waited till the fag end of his service career to get it corrected by availing of the extraordinary jurisdiction of a High Court. Therefore, we have no hesitation, in holding, that ordinarily High Courts should not, in exercise of its discretionary writ jurisdiction entertain a writ application petition filed by an employee of the Government or its instrumentality towards the fag end of his service, seeking correction of his date of birth entered in his Service and Leave record or Service register with the avowed object of continuing in service beyond the normal period of his retirement. 11. Prudence on the part of every High Court should, however, in our considered view, prevent it from granting interim relief in a petition for correction of the date of birth filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by an employee in relation to his employment, because of the well settled legal position governing such correction of date of birth, which precisely stated, is the following: when a person seeks employment, he impliedly agrees with the terms and conditions on which employment is offered. For every post in the service of the Government or any other instrumentality there is the minimum age of entry prescribed depending on the functional requirements for the post. In order to verify that the person concerned is not below that prescribed age he is required to disclose his date of birth. The date of birth is verified and If found to be correct is entered in the service record. It is ordinarily presumed that the birth date disclosed by the incumbent is accurate. The situation then is that the incumbent gives the date of birth and the employer accepts it as true and accurate before it is entered in the service record. This entry in the service record made on the basis of the employee s statement cannot be changed unilaterally at the sweet will of the employee except in the manner permitted by service conditions or the relevant rules.
This entry in the service record made on the basis of the employee s statement cannot be changed unilaterally at the sweet will of the employee except in the manner permitted by service conditions or the relevant rules. Here again considerations for a change in the date of birth may be diverse and the employer would be entitled to view it not merely from the angle of their being a genuine mistake but also from the point of its impact on the service in the establishment. It is common knowledge that every establishment has its own set of service- conditions governed by rules. It is equally known that practically every establishment prescribes a minimum age for entry into service at different levels inthe establishment. The first thing to consider is whether on the date of entry into service would be employee have been eligible for entry into service on the revised date of birth. Secondly, would revision of his date of birth after a long lapse of time upset the promotional changes of others in the establishment who may have joined on the basis that the incumbent would retire on a given date opening up promotional avenues for others. If that be so and if permitting a change in the date of birth is likely to cause frustration down the line resulting in causing an adverse effect on efficiency in functioning, the employer may refuse to permit correction in the date at a belated stage. It must be remembered that such sudden and belated change may upset the legitimate expectation of others who may have joined service hoping that on the retirement of the senior on the due date there would be an upward movement in the hierarchy. In any case in such cases injunction for continuance in service should not be granted as it visits the juniors with irreparable injury, in that, they would be denied promotions a damage which cannot be repaired if the claim is ultimately found to be unacceptable. On the other hand, if no interim relief for continuance in service is granted and ultimately his claim for correction of birth date is found to be acceptable, the damage can be repaired by granting him all those monetary benefits which he would have received had he continued in service.
On the other hand, if no interim relief for continuance in service is granted and ultimately his claim for correction of birth date is found to be acceptable, the damage can be repaired by granting him all those monetary benefits which he would have received had he continued in service. We are, therefore, of the pinion that in such cases it would be imprudent to grant interim relief. ( 6 ) THE same is the view expressed by the Hon ble Supreme court in the case of SECRETARY AND COMMISSIONER, HOME department AND OTHERS vs R. KIRUBAKARAN (supra ). In my view, the principle laid down by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of BURN STANDARD CO. LTD. , (supra) would fully apply to the facts of the present case. It is also necessary to point out that the persons that would be affected by the correction of date of birth of the petitioner would be the University and its staff. Therefore, when the University was not made as a party to the proceedings before the Civil Court in Suit OS No. 6985 of 1998, in my view, it will be dangerous and unwise to make the decree of the Civil Court binding on party who was not heard and given an opportunity before the Civil Court, by this Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. If that is done in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, it will amount to making a decree of the Civil Court binding on the person who was not made as a party before the Civil Court and who was entitled to be heard by the Civil Court and denied of an opportunity to resist the said claim. Therefore, I am of the view, it is inappropriate for this Court, in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, to direct the University to correct the date of birth of the petitioner in his Service Register as 10th June 1948 as against 10th June 1942 already entered. ( 7 ) IN the light of the discussion made above, this petition is liable to be rejected. Accordingly it is rejected. However, no order is made as to costs. --- *** --- .