JUDGMENT S.K. Kar, J. 1. This revision petition is intended to assail the judgment and order dated 8.7.97 passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Nagaon, in Sessions Case No. 122/91. The informant of the case is the Petitioner here. 2. On 12.10.90, it is alleged that Respondent Omar Ali had started a quarrel, in connection with the act of shifting and displacement of his fishing net, with the informant/Petitioner while the Petitioner/informant was making and clearing a small water channel to let the fishes enter into his pond. Soon thereafter the remaining Respondents armed with weapons like, stick, chopper, axe etc. appeared at the spot and conjointly started assaulting the inmates of the house of the informant/Petitioner. The inmates including female members sustained injuries and walls of the house was damaged (narration of details avoided). 3. FIR being lodge, case was registered and investigated by police under Sections 147 / 148 / 302 /427, IPC. Charge-sheet was submitted, case was committed to Court of Sessions and on trial all the Respondents were acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge, holding, inter alia, that the witnesses examined by prosecution were not at all trustworthy and accusation was not established on evidence beyond all reasonable doubts etc. 7 (seven) witnesses for prosecution and one for defence were examined. There was also a cross-case instituted by the Respondents under Sections 324 / 34, IPC, against the informant/Petitioners and two of his brothers, namely Kasem and Idris. 4. I have heard learned Counsel for the Petitioner as well as learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents. Examined the materials placed before this Court. learned Counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon citation (2003) 7 SCC 643 ; Sucha Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab while learned Counsel for the Respondents have referred to 2002 Cri LJ 3788 (SC); Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, in support of their respective contentions. 5. The quintessential feature of law under Section 397 of Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with the revisional power of the Court is well-settled to say that such power is not only limited in scope but also discretionary in nature and the revisional Court steps in to interfere only exceptional cases of flagrant miscarriage of justice. The power is supervisory and will be exercised to correct any misconception of law, irregularity of procedure and violation of rules of evidence etc. The power is supervisory and will be exercised to correct any misconception of law, irregularity of procedure and violation of rules of evidence etc. Then again, in so far the question of re-appreciation of evidence is concerned the revisional Court would have no power to record a different conclusion unless it is shown that the appreciation of lower Court is patently perverse and finding is perfunctory or illogical etc. In other words, there should be a case of either misreading or non-reading of the actual evidence on record leading to gross-miscarriage of justice for the revisional Court to interfere. 6. Going through the citation 2002 Cri LJ 3788; Bindeshwari Prasad Singh alias B.P Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and Anr. referred by learned Counsel for the Respondent, I find the facts of that case are quite identical with the facts of the present case. It will be convenient to refer to the facts of that case which has been cited before me. The Hon'ble Apex Court recorded the facts in the judgment as follows: 5. From the evidence on record it appears that an occurrence took place on 20th July, 1989 at about 4.00 p.m. The informant and Appellant No. 1 entered into an altercation in connection with removal of creepers which had climbed up to the balcony of the informant. The informant as well as Appellant 2 to 5 herein reside in the same building. The altercation took an ugly turn and abuses were exchanged between Appellant No. 1 and the informant. In the meantime son of the informant, namely Kumud came down and asked the Appellants as to why they had not removed the creepers. The case of the prosecution is that Appellant No. 1 and other Appellants shouted and ordered assault on Kumud. In the assault that followed, deceased Kumud was hit on the head with an iron rod, as a result of which he sustained a serious injury. He was taken to the Bokaro General Hospital, where he was declared dead. 7. There also the question of testimony of the prosecution witnesses came for appreciation and in view of the inconsistencies, the Court upheld the finding of the trial Court holding, inter alia, as follows: 13. He was taken to the Bokaro General Hospital, where he was declared dead. 7. There also the question of testimony of the prosecution witnesses came for appreciation and in view of the inconsistencies, the Court upheld the finding of the trial Court holding, inter alia, as follows: 13. In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct ofthe trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted. 14. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction at the instance of the informant. It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from that of the trial Court. But that by itself is no justification for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a judgment of acquittal. We cannot say that the judgment of the trial Court in the instant case was perverse. No defect of procedure has been pointed out. There was also no improper acceptance or re-jettion of evidence nor was there any defect of the procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial vitiating the trial itself. At best the High Court thought that the prosecution witnesses were reliable while the trial Court took the opposite view. this Court has repeatedly observed that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party, the Court exercises only limited jurisdiction and should not constitute itself into an appellate Court which has a much wider jurisdiction to go into questions of facts and law, and to convert an order of acquittal into one of conviction. It cannot be lost sight of that when a re-trial is ordered, the dice is heavily loaded against the accused, and that itself must caution the Court exercising revisional jurisdiction. We, therefore, find no justification for the impugned order of the High Court ordering retrial of the Appellants. 8. It cannot be lost sight of that when a re-trial is ordered, the dice is heavily loaded against the accused, and that itself must caution the Court exercising revisional jurisdiction. We, therefore, find no justification for the impugned order of the High Court ordering retrial of the Appellants. 8. In view of this observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court I find the case law referred by the learned Counsel of the Petitioner has no role to play. Rather the ratio of aforesaid 2002 Cri. L.J. (supra) will be exactly applicable in the present case. The case of Sucha Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab (2003) 7 SCC 643 , has dealt with a different aspect of the matter, particularly on the question of relationship of the witnesses with the deceased or the prosecutors. It was there that only on the ground that a witness is close relative of the victim, his evidence cannot be brushed-aside. Incidentally the Hon'ble Apex Court dealt with the matter of "prove beyond reasonable doubt", and commented as hereunder in para 20 of the judgment: 20. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let a hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting the guilty escape is not doing justice according to law (See Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh). The prosecution is not required to meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused (See State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava). A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some inevitable flaws because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One wonders-whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to illuminate a rare innocent from being punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to escape. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish [See Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)] Vague hunches cannot take the place of judicial evaluation. A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial, merely to see that no innocent man is punished. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish [See Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)] Vague hunches cannot take the place of judicial evaluation. A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial, merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties." [Per Viscount Simon in Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution quoted in State of U.P. v. Anil Singh (SCC p. 692 para 17).] Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. 9. Bearing in mind the aforesaid law, if we come to the facts of the present case we find, as rightly submitted by the learned Counsel for the Respondent/accused, that there was absolutely no consistency in the testimonies of the P.W's. Moreover, none of them mentioned how and why one of the accused Akbar Ali sustained cut injuries. It is also observed that during his cross-examination P.W. 1, the informant/Petitioner, has miserably disqualified himself as a witness by admitting that he has lodged a false FIR and most of the statements in the FIR were untrue. I think no reasonable person will give credit to such a person as a witness. On that occasion it was rightly submitted from the side of the Respondent/accused persons that all the witnesses examined have come out with false statements. The Investigating Officer (P.W. 6) has admitted that only the deceased was forwarded by him for medical examination. The evidence of doctor P.W. 5 shows that he examined more than one person. So, this is a case where the prosecution played hide and seek and tried to depose falsely against the accused/Respondents. That being the factual position the trial Court has rightly recorded the order of acquittal disbelieving the witnesses who made mutually conflicting statements on oath. Therefore, I find that there is nothing to interfere with the impugned judgment and order recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. 10. The revision is accordingly rejected. Send back the case record immediately. Revision dismissed