JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J. - This is plaintiffs second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (for brevity the Code) challenging the judgment and decree dated 5.12.2002 passed by the District Judge, Rohtak. The District Judge has allowed the appeal of the plaintiff-appellant holding that the Divisional Canal Officer, (DCO) WS Division, Rohtak, vide his order dated 30.7.1998 Ex. D-2 has violated the direction issued by the Superintending Canal Officer (SCO) in his order dated 26.6.1998 Ex. D-1. Further directions have been given to the Canal Authorities to decide the matter as per the decision of the S.C.O. dated 26.6.1998 Ex. D-1, which has directed the D.C.O. to frame a fresh scheme, that may be published for sanction of water course on the specified area i.e. either along line XY or along line MN because it goes on the side of the fields of defendant-respondents. In these circumstances, the appeal of the plaintiff-appellant was allowed and his suit has been decreed. However, the plaintiff-appellant has still preferred the present appeal. Facts of the case in brief are that plaintiff-appellant filed an application before the D.C.O. for providing link water course of let out RD 8600/L Jasrana Minor through the lands of one S/Sh. Rattan Singh, Balwan Singh, sons of Bakhtawar etc. The D.C.O. prepared a scheme under Section 17 of the Haryana Canal and Drainage Act, 1974 (for brevity the Act) and sanctioned a water course under Section 18(2) of the Act on compensation through killa No. 118/2 of the land belonging to defendant-respondent Rattan Singh. Even acquisition order was passed on 11.12.1997 by the D.C.O. after notice to the owner of the land defendant-respondent Rattan Singh and compensation of Rs. 2929-05 was awarded, which was also deposited by the plaintiff-appellant. The order dated 11.12.1997 was challenged before the S.C.O., who vide order dated 26.6.1998 Ex. D-1 directed the D.C.O. that a fresh scheme may be published for sanction of the water course by specifying the area observing that it may be either along line XY or along line MN and the decision may be taken on merit of the case. The D.C.O. did not implement the order of the S.C.O. inasmuch as no scheme was published afresh and a new order dated 30.7.1998 was passed. The D.C.O. did not implement the order of the S.C.O. inasmuch as no scheme was published afresh and a new order dated 30.7.1998 was passed. The plaintiff-appellant challenged the order dated 26.6.1998 passed by S.C.O. before the Chief Canal Officer (CCO), who dismissed his appeal on 6.8.1999. Thereafter, he filed a suit for declaration seeking annulment of the order dated 15/26.6.1998 passed by the S.C.O., order dated 30.7.1998 passed by the D.C.O. and order dated 6.8.1999 passed by the C.C.O. The suit of the plaintiff-appellant was dismissed by the Civil Judge (Sr. Division) Rohtak, vide his judgment dated 27.5.2000. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Civil Judge, he filed an appeal under Section 96 of the Code, which was allowed by the learned District Judge, Rohtak. The views of the learned District Judge read as under :- "A perusal of decision Ex. D-1 shows that the matter was decided by the Superintending Canal Officer on 26.6.1998 and he remanded the case to the Divisional Canal Officer, W/S Division, Rohtak with a direction that a fresh scheme may be published for sanction of water course either along line XY or along line MN and decision may be taken on the merit of the case. A perusal of decision Ex. D-2 shows that the Divisional Canal Officer vide his order dated 30.7.1998, sanctioned the water course MN Eastern side, one Karam width in the land comprised in Killa No. 118/3 on Bhaichara basis without any compensation, without any fresh publication of the scheme for water course. Instead of filing the appeal to the Superintending Canal Officer as against the order dated 30.7.1998, the appellant filed the appeal to the Chief Canal Officer, Chandigarh, so this appeal was dismissed. It is quite clear that the order passed by the Divisional Canal Officer, W/S Division, Rohtak dated 30.7.1998 is not as per the direction given by the Superintending Canal Officer in his order dated 26.6.1998. The Superintending Canal Officer clearly directed the Divisional Canal Officer that a fresh scheme may be published for sanction of water course either along line XY or along with line MN and decision may be taken on merit of the case, but instead of publishing the scheme afresh, the Divisional Canal Officer changed the decision and did not implement the order dated 26.6.1998. No doubt, the Authorities under the Canal Act can order for the sanction of a Khal but the Authorities cannot violate the provisions contained in the Haryana Canal and Drainage Act. In the present case, the Divisional Canal Officer violated the directions given by the Superintending Canal Officer as contained in document Ex. D-1, so, clearly the order passed by the Divisional Canal Officer on 30.7.1998 is illegal. The learned Lower Court did not appreciate the controversy involved in the case and has wrongly dismissed the suit. There is a merit in the appeal and the same is accepted, however, leaving the parties to bear their own costs, in the appeal. The impugned judgment and decree of the lower Court are set-aside. It is ordered that the Canal Authorities would decide the matter as per the decision of the Superintending Canal Officer dated 26.6.1998 which is Ex. D-1 that a fresh scheme may be published for sanction of water course either along line XY or along line MN and the decision may be taken on merits of the case. The suit of the plaintiff-appellant is decreed accordingly." 2. Sh. S.P. Sohri, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has argued that Rattan Singh defendant-respondent did not file any appeal or revision contemplated by Section 20 of the Act read with Rule 105 of the Haryana Canal and Drainage Rules 1976 (for brevity the Rules), and, therefore, the order passed by the S.C.O. dated 26.6.1998 remanding the case to the D.C.O. and directing him to publish the scheme afresh was null and void. According to the learned counsel vide order dated 21.1.1997, the amount of compensation was assessed after the water course was sanctioned out of the land owned by defendant-respondent and others. The failure to challenge order dated 21.1.1997 by defendant-respondent before the Canal Authorities should have been taken into consideration and the appeal by S.C.O. could not have been decided in the manner the order dated 26.6.1998 has been passed. On the basis of the afore-mentioned submissions, the learned counsel argued that the plaintiff-appellant became owner of the land, which was sanctioned for water course owned by defendant-respondent. On the basis of the afore-mentioned submissions, the learned counsel argued that the plaintiff-appellant became owner of the land, which was sanctioned for water course owned by defendant-respondent. Therefore, the learned counsel has argued that the District Judge has committed grave error in law by setting- aside the order of the D.C.O. Ex.D-2 dated 30.7.1998 and directing him to follow the direction issued by the S.C.O. in his order Ex.D-1 dated 26.6.1998. 3. After hearing the learned counsel and perusing the orders passed by the Canal Authorities Annexures A, B, C, D and the judgments of both the Courts below, I am of the considered view that there is no legal infirmity in the direction issued by the learned District Judge. Defendant-respondent has challenged before the S.C.O. order dated 11.12.1997 on the ground that the water course sanctioned by the D.C.O., Rohtak was bifurcating his land-holding and it caused great disadvantage to him. He requested for sanctioning of water course on one side of his hand-holding. It is in order to avoid fragmentation of the land-holding that the S.C.O. came to the conclusion that the water course can be sanctioned on one side of the land holding of the tenant-respondent. The decision of the S.C.O. dated 26.6.1998 Ex. D-1 reads as under :- "Revenue missal, khaka plan and other relevant record produced in the court examined. Both parties heard and arguments considered. Perusal of Khaka plan shows that watercourse AB was bifurcating the land holding of the appellant and will result in a loss to him. It is felt that some suitable watercourse can be given to the respondent either by sanctioning the same along line XY or along line MN and marked on the index plan in green ink. That should serve the purpose of the respondent and will avoid unnecessary loss to the appellant. The case is thus remanded back to D.C.O. Rohtak W.S. Divn. Rohtak with the direction that a fresh scheme may be published for sanctioning of watercourse either along line XY or along line MN and decision may be taken on the merit of the case. Decision given today the 26.6.1998 and all concerned be informed accordingly." (emphasis added) 4. The D.C.O. vide his order dated 30.7.1998 did not follow the directions issued by the S.C.O. The District Judge has directed the D.C.O. to comply with those directions by setting-aside his order dated 30.7.1998. 5. Decision given today the 26.6.1998 and all concerned be informed accordingly." (emphasis added) 4. The D.C.O. vide his order dated 30.7.1998 did not follow the directions issued by the S.C.O. The District Judge has directed the D.C.O. to comply with those directions by setting-aside his order dated 30.7.1998. 5. The argument of the plaintiff-appellant that the order dated 21.1.1997 was not challenged by the defendant-respondent before the S.C.O. may now be considered. The order dated 21.1.1997 has been passed under sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act whereas the order challenged before the S.C.O. dated 11.12.1997 was passed by the D.C.O. under Section 21 of the Act. A reference to Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Act would show that Sections 18 and 19 contemplate publication of a scheme and Section 20 deals with appeal and revision. Section 21 deals with acquisition of land and also provides for a remedy for appeal to an aggrieved person. The aforementioned Sections 18 to 21 are reproduced below for facility of reference:- "18. Publication of scheme - (1) Every scheme shall, as soon as may be after its preparation, be published in such form and manner as may be prescribed for inviting objections and suggestions in respect thereof within twenty-one days of its publication. (2) After considering such objections and suggestions, if any, the Divisional Canal Officer shall approve, modify or reject the scheme within thirty days of the time for the receipt of such objections and suggestions, unless this period is extended by the Superintending Canal Officer for good and sufficient reasons : Provided that in the following cases, the prior approval of the Chief Canal Officer shall be obtained for allowing - a) a new outlet on a main canal or branch canal; b) an outlet with discharge of less than 0.75 cusec. 19. 19. Publication of scheme after approval - (1) The Divisional Canal Officer shall, as soon as may be, publish the fact of rejection of scheme or the particulars of the scheme approved or modified by him under sub-section (2) of Section 18 in the prescribed manner and call upon the shareholders to implement it at their own costs within the period to be specified by him and if the shareholders fail to implement the same, he shall undertake the construction or implementation of the scheme himself, and recover the cost thereof from the shareholders in the manner and period to be specified by him. Any sum which remains unpaid, within the specified period for this purpose, may be recovered by the Collector from the defaulting person as arrears of land revenue. (2) An officer, not below the rank of Sub-Divisional Canal Officer, shall check the implementation of scheme at site. 20. Appeal and revision - (1) An appeal against the decision of the Divisional Canal Officer under sub-section (2) of Section 18 shall lie to the Superintending Canal Officer within thirty days of the publication of the scheme under Section 19. (2) An appeal shall lie against the decision of the Superintending Canal Officer passed under sub-section (1) in regard to any of the matters covered under clauses (a) (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 17, to the Chief Canal Officer within thirty days of the date of such decision. (3) The Chief Canal Officer or the Superintending Canal Officer may suo motu call for the record of any case, pending before, or disposed of by any subordinate authority, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any proceedings or of any order made therein and may pass such order in relation thereto as he may think fit : Provided that no such order shall be made without affording the person affected an opportunity of being heard. 21. Notice of acquisition of land - (1) The Divisional Canal Officer may, either of his own motion or on the application of a shareholder, publish in the manner prescribed a notice of his intention to acquire any land required for implementation of the scheme. 21. Notice of acquisition of land - (1) The Divisional Canal Officer may, either of his own motion or on the application of a shareholder, publish in the manner prescribed a notice of his intention to acquire any land required for implementation of the scheme. (2) Any person interested in the land notified under sub-section (1) may within twenty-one days from the publication thereof, apply to the Divisional Canal Officer by petition stating his objections to the proposed acquisition of his rights. (3) After considering the objections, the Divisional Canal Officer may proceed to take the occupation of the land so required on behalf of the shareholders. (4) Compensation, to be fixed by the Divisional Canal Officer on the principles set out under section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, shall be payable by the shareholders in proportion to the culturable commanded area under the scheme held by each one of them to the owner or occupier of any land for such acquisition and on failure of payment, the amount shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue. (5) Any person aggrieved from the order of the Divisional Canal Officer in respect of compensation may prefer an appeal, within thirty days of the passing of the order to the Collector whose decision shall be final." A perusal of sub-section (3) of Section 20 would make it evident that the S.C.O. or the C.C.O. have been given wide powers to call for record of any case pending before or disposed of by any subordinate authority like D.C.O. Sub-section (1) of Section 20 provides for an appeal against the decision of the S.C.O. taken under sub-section (2) of Section 18. The order passed by the D.C.O. under sub-section (1) of Section 21 was challenged in appeal by the defendant-respondents. Apart from the power of the appellate authority, the S.C.O. is also clothed with the revisional power to call for the record of any case in order to satisfy himself as to the legality or propriety of any proceedings or of any order made therein under sub-section (3) of the Section 20. The power exercised by the S.C.O. in this case would clearly flow from sub-section (3) of Section 20. It is, therefore, not correct for the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant to argue that the plaintiff-appellant had become owner of the acquired land after compensation has been paid to the defendant-respondents. The power exercised by the S.C.O. in this case would clearly flow from sub-section (3) of Section 20. It is, therefore, not correct for the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant to argue that the plaintiff-appellant had become owner of the acquired land after compensation has been paid to the defendant-respondents. The revisional power exercised by the S.C.O. does not suffer from any legal infirmity because fragmentation of holding has to be avoided as it is a declared object under Section 8 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Fragmentation) Act, 1948 which is applicable to the State of Haryana as well. The decision of S.C.O. advances an object which is for the public good. The S.C.O. in his order has highlighted that the watercourse proposed in the order of the D.C.O. would bifurcate the holding of the defendant-respondent whereas the watercourse can easily be provided to the plaintiff-appellant by sanctioning the same on the side line of the land holding of the defendant-respondent which is marked XY or MN. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant that the S.C.O. was not entitled to set-aside the order dated 21.1.1997 in the absence of any challenge to it cannot be accepted and is therefore liable to be rejected. The instant appeal is without any merit and is, thus, liable to be dismissed. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.