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2003 DIGILAW 484 (PNJ)

Ram Sarup v. Pala

2003-04-02

M.M.KUMAR

body2003
Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. This petition filed by one Ram Sarup, landlord of the demised premises invokes revisional jurisdiction of this Court under sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (for brevity, `the Act) and challenges judgment dated 13.6.1991 passed by the learned Appellate Authority, Jind upholding the order of the Rent Controller dated 19.1.1991. Both the Courts below have concurrently found that the tenant-respondent Pala Son of Dalip is not liable to be evicted from the demised premises on the ground of personal necessity as he required the demised premises for higher education of his family members and wanted to permanently settle at Jind, and also on the ground that there is material impairment of the value and utility of the demised premises as the tenant- respondent has made holes in the walls of the demised premises, fitted electric motor therein and has also encroached upon the verandah adjoining to the room by fixing a Gandasa and electric motor without prior permission of the landlord-petitioner. The ground of public nuisance has also been taken because the tenant-respondent has been cutting fodder in the Verandah and the fodder keeps on spreading in the nearby vicinity. The opinion of the lower appellate Court on the issues of public nuisance and as to whether the demised premises are residential or non-residential, read as under :- "10. Seemingly the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellant with reference to the authorities relied upon may impress but when the case is carefully examined with reference to the whole material on the file they have no real substance. Word Nuisance has not been defined in the Act. In fact, the term nuisance is incapable of exact and exhaustive definition. It depends upon the circumstances of the each case. In certain situation one particular act on the part of the tenant may amount to nuisance to the landlord and to the neighbours but in another case it may not. Thus it is in the light of this background that the merits of the plea taken by the appellant are to be considered. Though the landlord pleaded that the disputed premises were both residential and non-residential but he could support this plea during the trial. It is clearly proved on record that the premises in dispute are being used for commercial purpose from the very beginning. Though the landlord pleaded that the disputed premises were both residential and non-residential but he could support this plea during the trial. It is clearly proved on record that the premises in dispute are being used for commercial purpose from the very beginning. It is also the admitted case of the landlord. He is running a dairy in the remaining part of the premises. It is also clear from the record that the premise were let out to the tenant for the sale of fodder which is admittedly a commercial purpose. It is also borne out by the evidence on the file that the disputed premises are situated in commercial locality where there are dairy farms both in from (front ?) of the premises in dispute and in the line of the premises in dispute. It is also in evidence that there are also other fodder shops in that locality. It is admitted by the landlord himself that the motor was installed by the tenant 3-4 months after taking the premises in dispute. He also admitted that before electric meter (motor ?) he was having engine for some time. He also admitted that mainly barseem is cut from the motor no dust particles flow from the same. He has further has tend (hastened ?) to add that the tenant is also cutting dry bajra and jawar pullies. But there has been no specific plea in this regard. Even in the examination-in-chief he has not said anything which would suggest that it is an after - thought and cannot be given much weight. Thus it becomes clear that the tenant is having business of sale of fodder from the beginning of the tenancy. The appellant had never raised any objection in this regard till 1988 when he filed this petition. Thus his silence for this long 10 years by itself would operate an estoppel against him. Two authorities relied upon on behalf of the appellant in this respect deal with different provisions of Section 13 of the Act as such ratio of the same is of no help. 12. Turning to the oral evidence led by the appellant it may be noted that Soman Ram PW-3 is not only a person from his profession but otherwise he had been partner of his business for some time. Similarly PW.2 is also having the same profession. 12. Turning to the oral evidence led by the appellant it may be noted that Soman Ram PW-3 is not only a person from his profession but otherwise he had been partner of his business for some time. Similarly PW.2 is also having the same profession. Thus it could not be difficult for the landlord to pick up two such persons in order to depose in his favour. Thus, I am not prepared to attach much importance to their evidence specially when it is contradicted by the qual number of witnesses appearing on behalf of the respondents." 2. On the question whether there is material impairments in the value and utility of the demised premises, the learned Appellate Authority observed as under :- "17. xx xx xx xx xx As noted above, premises were let out for storing and sale of fodder. Tenant was supposed to cut fodder for which installation of fodder cutting machine and electric motor etc. were needed. Same were in existence soon after the premises were let out without any objection being raised. The landlord was supposed to have known about the installation of these items in the premises. Thus he is not supposed to have any genuine grouse because of the installation of the fodder machine and electric motor etc. which is totally vague. Landlord has not examined any Expert on the point and in the absence of that oral evidence led by the appellant is meaningless." 3. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length, I do not find any valid ground to interfere in the concurrent findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below. It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below cannot be interfered with by this Court under sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act. In Vaneet Jain v. Jagjit Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 1 : 2000(1) RCR(Rent) 507 (SC) while dealing with sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act their Lordships of the Supreme Court concluded that even on re- appreciation of evidence if the High Court reaches a conclusion different than the one recorded by the Courts below then revisional power cannot be exercised. This Court is obliged to test the orders of the Courts below to find out as to whether such an order is in accordance with law. This Court is obliged to test the orders of the Courts below to find out as to whether such an order is in accordance with law. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119 : 1998(2) RCR(Rent) 533 (SC) it has further been observed that if the findings are wholly unreasonable then re- appreciation of evidence is not prohibited. Similar view has been taken in Shiv Lal v. Sat Parkash, 1993 (Supply) 2 SCC 345 : 1994(1) RCR(Rent) 495 (SC) and Bhool Chand v. Kay Pee Cee Investments, (1991) SCC 343 : 1990(2) RCR(Rent) 694 (SC). It is, therefore, evident that in cases where the findings are perverse, without evidence or based on perfunctory and superficial approach or wholly unreasonable, then this Court enjoys the jurisdiction under sub- section (6) of Section 15. It has also been observed in Lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh, (1995-3) 111 PLR 276 (S.C.) : 1995(2) RCR(Rent) 480 (SC), that the power of revision under sub-section (6) of Section 15 is wider than the similar power conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but still it would not amount to exercising powers of the appellate Court. Similar view has also been taken in Molar Mal v. K. Iron Works Ltd., (2000) 4 SCC 285 : 2000(1) RCR(Rent) 354 (SC). 4. If the facts of the present case are examined in the light of the principles laid down in various aforementioned judgments of the Supreme Court as well judgment of this Court in the case of Harjit Singh v. M/s. Daya Ram Sat Narain, (2003-1) PLR 579 : 2003(1) RCR(Rent) 270 (P&H) it becomes evident that the ground of nuisance would not be available to the landlord-petitioner because right from day one the premises had been let out for the sale, purchase and storage of fodder. The fodder cutting machines and electric motor is required to be installed for the aforementioned purpose. The landlord himself is running a dairy in the remaining part of the premises. Thus fodder is admittedly a commercial purpose and the demised premises are also situated in commercial locality where there are dairy farms in front of the demised. There are other fodder shops in the locality. The landlord-petitioner himself admitted that the folder machine was installed by the tenant 3/4 months after taking the demised premises on rent. Thus fodder is admittedly a commercial purpose and the demised premises are also situated in commercial locality where there are dairy farms in front of the demised. There are other fodder shops in the locality. The landlord-petitioner himself admitted that the folder machine was installed by the tenant 3/4 months after taking the demised premises on rent. The demised premises was rented out in the year 1978 obviously for a commercial purpose. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the findings are perverse or are based on no evidence. It cannot be said that a reasonable person would not reach the conclusion as recorded by the Courts below. Therefore, I am not inclined to exercise the revisional power under sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act. The revision petitioner is liable to be dismissed. For the reasons recorded above, this petition fails and the same is dismissed.