JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. The writ petitioner, Arun Borah, who has not passed Class IX examination, was, while serving in 9th Assam Regiment, tried by a Court Martial and dismissed from service. Suppressing the fact that he was a dismissed army personnel and also projecting that he had passed Class IX examination by producing a certificate to this effect, the petitioner got himself employed as a Security Guard in North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Limited (in short, "NEEPCO"). When these facts came to be known to NEEPCO, the writ petitioner was served with a charge-sheet by his employer directing him to show cause as to why disciplinary action shall not be taken against him for wilfully holding the requisite information and for non-disclosure thereof and for violating thereby Rule 6(m) read with Rule 5(4) of the said Rule of NEEPCO Security Force Conduct Disciplinary and Appeal Rules. While submitting his reply to the notice of show cause, so served on him, the petitioner could not categorically dispute the fact that though he stood dismissed from the Army following his conviction by a Court Martial, he had not disclosed this fact at the time of seeking employment in NEEPCO nor could he dispute the fact that although he had not really passed Class IX examination, he had produced a certificate, while seeking employment in NEEPCO, indicating as if he had passed Class-IX examination. The petitioner, however, denied the allegations that he had wilfully suppressed the facts aforementioned. In course of time, the disciplinary authority appointed an Inquiry Authority, who, after holding inquiry, submitted his report to the effect that the charges framed against the petitioner-appellant stood proved. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings reached by the Inquiry Authority and imposed on the petitioner the penalty of dismissed from service by order, dated 15.11.2000. Along with the dismissal order, the petitioner was also furnished with a report of the Inquiry Authority. As the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the said order of dismissal also proved futile, the petitioner approached this Court with the help of WP(C) No. 7329/2001. By impugned judgment and order, dated 7.11.2002, the writ petition was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has, now, approached this Court with the present appeal. 2. We have perused the relevant records. We have heard Mr. T.C. Chutia, learned counsel for the writ petitioner-appellant, and Mr. By impugned judgment and order, dated 7.11.2002, the writ petition was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has, now, approached this Court with the present appeal. 2. We have perused the relevant records. We have heard Mr. T.C. Chutia, learned counsel for the writ petitioner-appellant, and Mr. K.P. Sarma, learned counsel for the respondents. 3. Presenting the case on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Chutia has submitted that the petitioner was not given adequate opportunity to defend himself in the disciplinary inquiry inasmuch as the defence assistance provided to him was sent on transfer and no other person was appointed as the defence assistance. Mr. Chutia has also submitted that the petitioner was made a victim for his trade union activities inasmuch as the charges allegedly proved against him did not warrant his dismissal from service. Mr. Chutia has further submitted that the enquiry report was not furnished to the petitioner before the impugned order of dismissal from service was passed against him and he was thereby denied the opportunity of persuading the disciplinary authority not hold him guilty of the charges framed against him. 4. Controverting the above submissions made on behalf of the appellant, Mr. K.P. Sarma has submitted that the inquiry conducted was in accordance with law, the petitioner received adequate opportunity to defend himself, he made no grievance regarding denial of fair opportunity to defend himself at any time either during the course of the inquiry or thereafter and even in the writ petition, he did not take the plea that he was not provided with defence assistance at any relevant point of time. Looking into the gravity of the charges found proved against the petitioner, the petitioner, according to Mr. Sarma, deserved to be dismissed from service inasmuch as his employment was as a security guard and a person, who stands dismissed from army, but suppresses such essential fact and gives false certificate regarding his educational qualification did not deserve to be retained in service. So far as non-furnishing of the enquiry report before passing of the impugned order of dismissal is concerned, Mr. Sarma submits that the petitioner could not show that he was, in any way, prejudiced by non-furnishing of the report. The non-furnishing of the report, contends Mr. Sarma, did not adversely affect the findings arrived at by the disciplinary authority inasmuch as the facts were not really in dispute. 5. Sarma submits that the petitioner could not show that he was, in any way, prejudiced by non-furnishing of the report. The non-furnishing of the report, contends Mr. Sarma, did not adversely affect the findings arrived at by the disciplinary authority inasmuch as the facts were not really in dispute. 5. Upon a careful scrutiny of the materials on record, we find that the writ petitioner neither during the course of the inquiry nor at the time of preferring his appeal against the impugned dismissal order expressed any grievance before the authorities concerned that he had not been provided with adequate defence assistance. This apart, even in the writ petition, nothing could be clearly mentioned by the writ petitioner to indicate that the writ petitioner was, on account of any act or omission on the part of the respondents, suffered any prejudice during the course of the inquiry or was not provided with adequate and effective opportunity to defend himself. 6. Coupled with the above, the petitioner is, admittedly, a dismissed personnel from the army and he has also not passed Class IX, yet at the time of seeking the employment, he suppressed these facts and produced a certificate of educational qualification falsely projecting himself as a person, who had passed Class IX. 7. In the above backdrop, when the case of the writ petitioner-appellant is considered, it clearly emerges that though the writ petitioner was not furnished with the report of the Inquiry Authority, before the impugned order of dismissal was passed, the fact remains that no prejudice could be shown to have been caused to the writ petitioner for non-furnishing of the inquiry report inasmuch as the allegations contained in the charges are, admittedly, correct and stood proved by the materials on record. In fact, in the departmental appeal, which was preferred by the writ petitioner, no grievance was, admittedly, expressed by the petitioner regarding any prejudice having been caused to him due to omission to furnish the copy of the enquiry report. In a situation, such as this, it is impossible to infer that the petitioner suffered from any prejudice due to non-furnishing of any copy of the enquiry report before the impugned order of dismissal was passed against him. 8. In a situation, such as this, it is impossible to infer that the petitioner suffered from any prejudice due to non-furnishing of any copy of the enquiry report before the impugned order of dismissal was passed against him. 8. It is trite that non-furnishing of the enquiry report would not ipso facto vitiate the findings arrived at by the disciplinary authority nor can non-furnishing of the inquiry report, in itself, be enough for Courts to interfere with the penalty imposed on a delinquent. For warranting interference by Courts, prejudice must be shown to have been caused to the employee concerned on account of omission to furnish him with a copy of the inquiry report. Learned Single Judge was correct in taking such a view inasmuch as this is what is reflected from the law laid down by the by the Apex Court in Managing Director, ECIL Hyderabad v. P. Karunakar and Ors., reported in. In other words, since no prejudice could be shown to have been caused to the appellant due to omission to furnish to him with a copy of the enquiry report, it logically follows that in the present case, it was not possible to interfere with the findings reached by the disciplinary authority and the learned Single Judge, in our firm view, committed no error in not interfering with the impugned order on the ground of omission to furnish a copy of the enquiry report to the appellant before the disciplinary authority passed the impugned order agreeing with the findings the enquiry report and imposing the penalty of dismissal from service. 9. Coming to the last leg of the submissions of Mr. Chutia that even if the charges are held to have been proved against the petitioner, the petitioner could not have been dismissed from service, suffice it to mention here that interference with the quantum of punishment is permissible only when the punishment imposed is so dis-proportionate to the gravity of the offences/charges that it shocks judicial conscience. It is, as rightly pointed out by the learned Single Judge, primarily for the employer to decide the quantum of penalty, which is to be imposed on an employee, who is found guilty of a charge, and interference by Court with the quantum of penalty has to be only in exceptional circumstances. 10. It is, as rightly pointed out by the learned Single Judge, primarily for the employer to decide the quantum of penalty, which is to be imposed on an employee, who is found guilty of a charge, and interference by Court with the quantum of penalty has to be only in exceptional circumstances. 10. In the face of the facts and circumstances of the present case, we have not been able to persuade ourselves to hold that the petitioner's dismissal from service is a punishment grossly dis-proportionate to the gravity of charges. Far from this, the penalty of dismissal from service, in the face of what stand proved against the petitioner, is the only deserving penalty, which could have been imposed on the petitioner. 11. In view of the above, we find no infirmity in the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge in reaching the conclusion that the writ petitioner deserved to be dismissed. We see no reason to take a view different from the one that the learned Single Judge has adopted. 12. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. 13. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed