ORDER 1. The appellant is a stockbroker. He was holding shares and monies of Respondents 2, 3 and 4. On 6-6-1992, the Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Ordinance, 1992 (for short "the Ordinance") was issued in the light of large-scale irregularities and malpractices noticed in transaction in both government and other securities indulged in by some brokers in collusion with the employees in various banks and financial institutions. To ensure speedy recovery of the amount and to punish the guilty, the Ordinance was promulgated. The Ordinance inter alia provided under Section 3 for the appointment of a Custodian for the purposes of the Act. Under sub-section (2) of Section 3, the Custodian, on being satisfied on information received that any person has been involved in any offence relating to transactions in securities after the 1st day of April, 1991 and on or before 6-6-1992, may notify such person in the Official Gazette. Pursuant to this power the Custodian notified Respondents 2, 3 and 4 on 8-6-1992. As a result of such notification effected in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Ordinance, the properties of the notified parties stood attached with effect from the date of issuance of the a notification. 2. On 19-6-1992 and on 23-7-1992, the appellants premises were raided by the Income Tax Authorities. Various shares and some amount of money were seized by the Income Tax Department. Subsequent to this raid, it is the appellants case that it informed the Custodian that it was holding monies and equity shares of Respondents 2, 3 and 4. The Custodian has disputed the receipt of this letter. This dispute as it turns out, is not relevant for the purpose of disposal of this appeal. 3. The facts, which are relevant for the purpose of this appeal, are that the Income Tax Authorities had issued restraint orders in respect of the shares and monies held by the appellant of Respondents 2, 3 and 4. These restraint orders continued over a period of time. The Income Tax Authorities then passed an order under Section 132(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, that the properties which had been seized, pursuant to the aforesaid raid, belonged to the appellant. The appellant preferred an appeal contending that, in fact, even the seized properties belonged to Respondents 2, 3 and 4. The Income Tax Authorities then passed an order under Section 132(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, that the properties which had been seized, pursuant to the aforesaid raid, belonged to the appellant. The appellant preferred an appeal contending that, in fact, even the seized properties belonged to Respondents 2, 3 and 4. On 28-7-1992 the appellant had given details of the various assets belonging to Respondents 2, 3 and 4 in their custody to the Custodian. The Custodian called upon the appellant to deposit the assets of Respondents 2, 3 and 4 which were with the appellant. The appellant did not comply. According to it, it could not because of the restraint orders passed by the Income Tax Authorities. The Custodian filed an application before the Special Court set up under the aforesaid Act on 18-6-1993 in which the Custodian prayed for the following reliefs (wherein the appellant is referred to as Respondent 1 and Respondents 5 and 6 have been referred to as the Income Tax Authorities): "(a) That Respondent 1 be ordered and directed by this Honble Court to pay the applicant the said sum of Rs 6,70,83,853.10 together with interest at the rate of 22% p.a. from 8-6-1992 till payment. (b) That Respondents 1, 3 and 6 be ordered and directed by this Honble Court to hand over to the applicant the shares mentioned in para 3(a) hereinabove. (c) That if this Honble Court deems fit and proper, the said order of restraint (Exhibit E thereto) so far as it pertains to the applicant be set aside and/or listed. (d) That Respondent 1 be ordered and directed to hand over to the applicant any profit/gain that may have been made on account of the squaring off of the oversold position of 53,800 shares of Tata Iron and Steel Ltd. held on account of Respondent 2. (e) That pending the hearing and final disposal of this application, Respondent 1 be ordered and directed to submit a full and proper account of the squaring off of the oversold position of 53,800 shares of TISCO held on account of Respondent 2. (f) That pending the hearing and final disposal of this application Respondent 1 be ordered and directed the deposit of the said sum of Rs 6,70,83,853.10 in Court. (g) For ad interim reliefs in terms of prayers (e) and if). (h) For costs. (f) That pending the hearing and final disposal of this application Respondent 1 be ordered and directed the deposit of the said sum of Rs 6,70,83,853.10 in Court. (g) For ad interim reliefs in terms of prayers (e) and if). (h) For costs. (i) For such further and other reliefs as the nature and circumstances of the case may require." 4. The application was numbered as Miscellaneous Application No. 103 of 1993. While the application was pending on 8-10-1993 the appellant deposited an amount of Rs 5,42,84,835.10 with the Custodian, the application was taken up for hearing on 29-3-1994 and an order was passed granting reliefs in terms of prayers (b) and (e) above. The remaining portion of the order needs to be quoted verbatim as it is contended by the appellant that by this order the Court had disposed of the Custodians application: "Mr C.S. Aggarwal on behalf of Respondent 6 states that Respondent 6 has no shares in his possession. This to be set out on an affidavit. On the affidavit Respondent 1 to also disclose as to where was the amount of Rs 6.70 crores kept and/or utilised by him prior to the same being deposited in the Court? Application stands disposed of with no order as to costs." 5. According to the appellant pursuant to the direction of the Court, it filed an affidavit as to how Rs 6.70 crores had been utilised prior to the same being deposited in the Court. However, it is the appellants further case that when the affidavit was sought to be filed on 14-6-1994, it was found that Miscellaneous Application No. 103 of 1993 was listed despite its already having been disposed of. Thereafter the matter appeared again before the Court and was adjourned at the instance of the appellant. When the matter was listed on 16-8-1994, a further prayer was made by the appellant for adjournment. The Court allowed the adjournment while recording that it was agreed by the counsel for the appellant that "if interest is found to be payable then his clients would also pay interest for the delayed period on interest amount payable". On this agreement, the matter was adjourned to 10-101994. The Court allowed the adjournment while recording that it was agreed by the counsel for the appellant that "if interest is found to be payable then his clients would also pay interest for the delayed period on interest amount payable". On this agreement, the matter was adjourned to 10-101994. Thereafter, the appellant made an application being Miscellaneous Application No. 395 of 1994 in which it was contended that Miscellaneous Application No. 103 of 1993 had been finally disposed of on 29-3-1994 and that the Court had no jurisdiction to pass an order dated 16-8-1994. It was accordingly submitted that the concession made and as recorded in the order dated 16-10-1994 should be treated as having no effect. A prayer was made for proponing the date of hearing from 10-10-1994 to 31-8-1994. On 31-81994 the Special Court said that the miscellaneous application had been adjourned to consider the question whether interest was payable by the appellant. The order goes on to record that "as there is no prayer for payment of interest, the Custodian is given liberty to take out a fresh application, if so advised, to recover interest". The remaining portion of the order is not relevant for the purpose of this appeal. On the same date the application of the appellant for preponing the date of hearing of Miscellaneous Application No. 103 of 1993 was disposed of as having become infructuous. 6. On 3-3-1995 the Special Court passed the impugned order. By the a impugned order, the Special Court rejected the submission of the appellant that the order dated 29-3-1994 disposed of Miscellaneous Application No. 103 of 1993. The facts were noted in detail. It was also noted that the order of 29-3-1994 had wrongly recorded that the application was finally disposed of. It was stated that the application was pending because the Court had given direction to the respondents (the appellant before us) to file an affidavit since the Court had felt that the question whether the appellant was liable to pay interest could only be decided after first ascertaining whether the appellant had utilised the amount lying with him or whether because of the restraint orders passed by the Income Tax Authorities it was lying unutilised. It was further found that the parties had proceeded on the basis at least till 16-81994, that the question of interest was yet to be decided. It was further found that the parties had proceeded on the basis at least till 16-81994, that the question of interest was yet to be decided. It was found that the order dated 31-8-1994 also incorrectly recorded that the Court had observed that there was no prayer for interest in Miscellaneous Application No. 103 of 1993. It was found that there was a prayer for interest and that the question of interest was pending and that in any event a specific application had been filed by the Custodian for payment of interest pursuant to the order of the Court dated 31-8-1994. The submissions that this second application by the Custodian was barred by res judicata or by provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code were rejected. Having regard to the method of utilisation of the monies as disclosed by the appellant on affidavit, the Court fixed the rate of interest at 15% per annum and directed the appellant to pay the interest on the amount of Rs 5,42,84,835.10 for the period 8-6-1992 till 810-1993. According to the appellant the total amount of interest payable in terms of this order was Rs 1,08,56,767.02p. 7. When the notice was issued on the special leave petition stay of the operation of the impugned order was granted subject to deposit of Rs 40 lakhs by the appellant and subject to securing the balance amount. The appellant has deposited the amount of Rs 40 lakhs and secured the balance amount of Rs 1,08,56,767.02p. payable under the impugned judgment. 8. Before us the appellant has raised five contentions. The first submission was that the order dated 29-3-1994 had disposed of Miscellaneous Application No. 103 of 1993 and therefore the Court had become functus officio and could not have passed the impugned order. It was further submitted that the second application of the Custodian pursuant to the order of 23-8-1994 was barred by res judicata as well as by the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was further submitted that the second application of the Custodian pursuant to the order of 23-8-1994 was barred by res judicata as well as by the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. On the merits it was submitted that the Court had given the appellant to understand that if the entire amount lying with the appellant was deposited in one lump sum, no interest would be payable thereon and the appellant had made the deposit pursuant to the order of the Special Court immediately upon the lifting of the restraint order by the Income Tax Authorities. It is stated that the appellant could not be penalised for the period during which the restraint orders were operative. The Special Court had directed the appellant to deposit the entire amount by 30-9-1993 in the Court without interest. On 30-9-1993 the appellant made out a cheque for a Rs 5.40 crores drawn in favour of the Prothonotary and Senior Master, High Court at Bombay. Upon the refusal of the Prothonotary to accept the amount, the matter was mentioned before the Special Court and the Special Court extended the time for making the deposit till 8-10-1993. The appellant duly deposited the amount of Rs 5.40 crores on that date. The final submission was that since the Custodian had stepped into the shoes of the notified persons, he could not have a greater right than the notified persons and that in terms of the agreement between the notified persons and the appellant, there was no question of paying any interest at all on the amount payable to Respondents 2 to 4. 9. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has countered these submissions and supported the reasoning of the Special Court in the impugned order and submitted that since there was blatant manipulation of the minutes of the Special Court, this Court should not in any event exercise its discretion in favour of the appellant. 10. The fundamental contention of the appellant on which almost the entire superstructure of its arguments is based is the nature of the order dated 29-3-1994. Did it dispose of Miscellaneous Application No. 103 of 1993? The Special Court has expressly recorded what had actually happened in the course of the proceedings on 29-3-1994. We have no reason not to rely on the facts as recorded. Did it dispose of Miscellaneous Application No. 103 of 1993? The Special Court has expressly recorded what had actually happened in the course of the proceedings on 29-3-1994. We have no reason not to rely on the facts as recorded. There is also intrinsic evidence in the order itself to show that it could not have been an order finally disposing of Miscellaneous Application No. 103 of 1993 as has been recorded in the ultimate portion of the order. The express grant of relief was only in respect of prayers (b) and (e). Prayer (e) in terms was an interim prayer pending final disposal. Besides, there is no reference to the other prayers. This would show that consideration of the other prayers was pending. There is no reference to those prayers at all in the body of the order. Besides, the grant of time to the appellant to file an affidavit to show how the money has been utilised would be a meaningless exercise unless the application were still pending and the remaining issues were to be determined on the basis of the averments made in the affidavit so directed to be filed. Furthermore, even when the matter was listed before the Special Court on 14th June, it is not the appellants case that it was drawn to the Courts attention that the matter had already been disposed of. Indeed, the appellant proceeded on the basis that the application was pending till the application for preponement was made as noted above. If Miscellaneous Application No. 103 of 1993 was pending, there was, strictly speaking, no necessity for the Custodian to file a second application for payment of interest. It is true that the order dated 31-8-1994 has recorded that there was no prayer for payment of interest. But as the learned Special Court has observed, that was an incorrect recording of the order as dictated. Since there was no order to reject or allow interest, we have no reason to assume that the issue had been concluded by the order dated 29-3-1994. Miscellaneous Application No. 103 of 1993 was, in fact, pending. The question of the operation of the principles of res judicata or of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code does not arise. Since there was no order to reject or allow interest, we have no reason to assume that the issue had been concluded by the order dated 29-3-1994. Miscellaneous Application No. 103 of 1993 was, in fact, pending. The question of the operation of the principles of res judicata or of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code does not arise. It is also significant that the appellant has not challenged the order of 16-8-1994 nor the order dated 31-8-1994, both of which proceeded a on the basis that Miscellaneous Application No. 103 of 1993 was pending. 11. It is difficult for us to accept the submission that the Special Court had given any such understanding to the appellant to waive payment of interest if the appellant deposited the entire amount at a time. There is no record in support of this submission nor does the submission appear to have been raised before the Special Court at all. 12. As far as the period of payment is concerned, the Special Court has expressly recorded that during the period 8-6-1992 to 8-10-1993 the appellant was in fact utilising the amount which the law mandatorily required to be paid to the Custodian in terms of the Ordinance (subsequently replaced by the Act) read with the notification dated 8-6-1992. The restraint orders did not prevent the appellant from depositing the amount with the Custodian at all. Each of the restraint orders provided that the removal or parting and dealing of the assets was prohibited except with the previous permission of the authorised officer of the Income Tax Department. It does not appear that any such permission was sought for by the appellant before the Income Tax Authorities. Besides, the Special Court Act has an overriding effect by reason of Section 13 and the appellant was bound to have complied with the provisions thereof. The submission that the appellant could not have paid the money because of the restraint orders is therefore unacceptable. 13. Finally, whether or not there was an agreement to pay interest to the notified persons by virtue of any agreement between the parties is not a factor which would debar the Special Court from directing the payment of interest on the assets of the notified persons in the hands of the appellant. 13. Finally, whether or not there was an agreement to pay interest to the notified persons by virtue of any agreement between the parties is not a factor which would debar the Special Court from directing the payment of interest on the assets of the notified persons in the hands of the appellant. We have considered the reasoning of the Special Court as to why it exercised its discretion in fixing the rate of 15% per annum for the period specified. As far as rate is concerned, we see no cause to interfere with the same. However as far as the period for the payment of interest is concerned, since the appellant had undisputedly though mistakenly attempted to make payment of the amount on 30-9-1993 we relieve the appellant of its liability to pay interest on the outstanding amount for the period 30-9-1993 to 8-10-1993. 14. Except for this modification, the appeal is dismissed. Respondent 1 will be at liberty to recover the amounts deposited and to encash the bank guarantee and to realise the security which has been furnished by the appellant pursuant to the orders of this Court in pro tanto satisfaction of its claim as upheld by this decision .