JUDGMENT S.L. Jain, J. 1. Being aggrieved by the order dated 13-1-2003 passed by the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 6/99, appellants have filed this Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. 2. Brief resume of the facts required to be stated for disposal of the appeal is as follows: During second world war 44 barracks were constructed in the village Laukhedi, Tahsil Huzur, Bhopal State for prisoners of war. These barracks were constructed on the land of Ex Ruler of Bhopal. It was settled between the Government of India and Ex Ruler of Bhopal that the structures of the barracks would be the property of the State and the land would continue to remain of the Ruler. Consequently, the State Government had the title, control and management of the said barracks. The appellant-society had purchased the land measuring 7.95 acres consisting of parts of Khasra Nos. 102/2, 103/2, 104/2, 105/2, 109/1, 116/2, 117/1 and 118 vide registered sale deed dated 12th March, 1971 from Her Highness Nawaj Maihar Taj Sajta Sultan Begum. Out of the 44 barracks mentioned above, 15 barracks were on the land purchased by the appellant-society. The State Government had let out the barracks to its employees who had been paying the rent according to rules in force. The members of the appellant-society wanted to build their own houses on the land purchased by the society from the former Ruler of Bhopal which they could not do on account of barracks constructed thereon, hence they made an application to State Government through Public Works Department (hereinafter re-ferred to as "PWD") and proposed to purchase the structure of the 15 barracks. PWD accepted the proposal of the appellant-society and fixed the price of 15 barracks at Rs. 1,61,210.00. The society in turn, agreed to purchase the structure at the price quoted and communicated their acceptance to the Government on 31-5-1973. The State Government finally decided in the year 1981 to sell the aforesaid barracks to the petitioner-society for the consideration as proposed by PWD, namely, Rs. 1,61,210.00. Therefore, the society went on requesting the authorities to complete the formalities of the sale but structure of the barracks were not transferred by the Government. 2-A. A legal notice was issued by appellant-society on 25-7-1982. The appellant-society deposited the entire amount of Rs. 1,61,210.00. Therefore, the society went on requesting the authorities to complete the formalities of the sale but structure of the barracks were not transferred by the Government. 2-A. A legal notice was issued by appellant-society on 25-7-1982. The appellant-society deposited the entire amount of Rs. 1,61,210.00 and vide communication dated 10-10-1991 requested the State Government to transfer structures in favour of the society. Vide communication dated 19-7-1996 Under Secretary, PWD directed the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 to complete the formalities within a period of 15 days. The appellant-society went on motivating the State Government to effect the transfer deed but their attempts proved to be futile. 3. Since the authorities of the State Government were not prepared to transfer the barracks, invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, the appellant-society filed Writ Petition No. 6 of 1999 praying for issue of a writ of Mandamus, directing the Government to forthwith transfer the structures of 15 barracks, in question, in favour of the petitioner-society. 4. Combating the allegations made in the writ petition, respondents filed their reply reserving their right to file detailed reply, if required. The respondents stated that while accepting the proposal of the society to sell the barracks, in question, the State Government put a condition as per Annexure R-l that the petitioner-society will recover arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 19,40,987.65 from the occupants of the barracks and deposit the same with Division No. 2 of PWD, Bhopal and obtain a No Dues Certificate. It was put forth by the respondents that as the amount of arrears of rent was not deposited, the petitioners are also liable to pay interest in addition to the amount of arrears of rent. The amount of interest claimed comes to Rs. 17,51,775.00. It was submitted by the respondents that the petitioner-society themselves did not comply with the condition and is in default of huge arrears of rent. They also submitted that petitioner-society must obtain No Objection Certificate from PWD before seeking direction for transfer of barracks as per the terms of Annexure R-1. The formalities of transfer could have been made only on payment of this amount and after No Dues Certificate is submitted. 5. They also submitted that petitioner-society must obtain No Objection Certificate from PWD before seeking direction for transfer of barracks as per the terms of Annexure R-1. The formalities of transfer could have been made only on payment of this amount and after No Dues Certificate is submitted. 5. The learned single Judge disposed of the writ petition with the following direction: Let the rent be paid within three months from today w.e. from the date it is due till the amount of sale consideration was deposited by the petitioner society in the year 1990. On fulfilment of the conditions of R/1 obviously the respondents are bound to take steps to transfer the structure of the barrack in question to the petitioner society in accordance with law. Writ petition is disposed of with direction made above. Costs on parties. 6. We have heard Shri A.S. Usmani, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-society at the admission stage and perused the record. 7. The main thrust of the contention of Shri Usmani is that after accepting the proposal of the society to sell the barracks to them, PWD stopped to carry out repairs and necessary maintenance, consequently, the condition of the barracks went on deteriorating and by passage of time some of the barracks have been dilapidated, therefore, there was no justification for recovering the arrears of rent from the occupants. However, this contention cannot be accepted. If there was no proper maintenance of the barracks, the occupants thereof were at liberty to vacate the barracks and escape the liability of paying the rent. After having occupied barracks they are now estopped from saying that they are not liable to pay the rent. 8. The terms of the proposed sale have been given in the communication No. F/12/11/73-S-19, dated 14-10-1989, marked as Annexure R-l. Conditions No. 3 of this communication is reproduced below: 9. Since the rent was not paid by the appellant-society and No Dues Certificates was not filed, the delay, if any, in the execution of the sale deed cannot be attributed to the respondents. Since there was an inordinate delay on the part of the appellant-society, it should have been saddled with reasonable interest. However, the learned single Judge keeping in view the facts that most of the members of the appellant-society are widows or pensioners, did not award the interest on compassionate ground. Since there was an inordinate delay on the part of the appellant-society, it should have been saddled with reasonable interest. However, the learned single Judge keeping in view the facts that most of the members of the appellant-society are widows or pensioners, did not award the interest on compassionate ground. Since the deposit of the arrears of rent was an essential condition for transfer of barracks, the learned single Judge was justified in directing the appellant-society to deposit the rent due till the date of depositing the sale consideration. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that communication dated 14-10-1989 was never sent to the appellant-society. This contention cannot be accepted. The communication, Annexure R-l contains that the copy was sent to the appellant-society. Therefore, it can well be presumed that the copy was dispatched in ordinary course because all official acts are deemed to be regularly performed as per the maxim 'omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta' i.e. all acts are presumed to be done rightly and regularly. When the acts of official nature went through the process, the presumption arises in favour of the regular performance. Therefore, the contention that the copy of Annexure R-1 was not sent to appellant-society was rightly rejected. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant next contended that the decision to sell the structures was taken in the meeting of the Cabinet held on 18-6-1980. The resolution of the Cabinet is Annexure P-4. In this resolution the condition of deposit of arrears of rent does not find place. This contention also cannot be accepted. The Cabinet takes the decision only on policy matters. The terms and conditions in detail are settled by the department, therefore, it cannot be said that since the Cabinet did not impose the condition of depositing the arrears of rent, the authorities of the State Government could not have imposed the condition beyond the Cabinet's decision. The appellant-society having agreed to submit No Dues Certificate of arrears of rent cannot now say that the sale deed should be executed without the submission of No Due Certificate. 12. Shri Usmani, learned counsel for the appellant-society lastly submitted that most of the members of the society are widows and pensioners and there is already a Long delay in the completion of formalities of transfer, therefore, the direction of learned single Judge regarding deposit of arrears of rent is harsh. 13. 12. Shri Usmani, learned counsel for the appellant-society lastly submitted that most of the members of the society are widows and pensioners and there is already a Long delay in the completion of formalities of transfer, therefore, the direction of learned single Judge regarding deposit of arrears of rent is harsh. 13. The learned single Judge has already shown compassion by not saddling the appellant-society with the interest on arrears of rent due against the society. Without complying the terms of the sale, the appellant-society cannot expect the State Government to complete the formalities of transfer. So far as the grievance of the appellant-society with regard to the delay is concerned, the appellant-society itself is responsible for the delay and they can have no grudge in this regard. 14. No other point was raised before us for consideration. 15. For the reasons stated hereinabove, we do not find it appropriate to interfere with the order impugned. The appeal is devoid of merit and the same is dismissed in limine.