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2003 DIGILAW 489 (JHR)

Santosh Kumar Bhuwania, Om Prakash Bhuwania, Indra Mohan Lal and K. v. Ramna Rao VS State of Bihar & Panul Ansari

2003-04-16

AMARESHWAR SAHAY

body2003
Judgment Amareshwar Sahay, J.-In the instant application the petitioners have prayed for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding initiated against them in connection with C.P. case no. 1493 of 1998 as well as the order dated 23.6.1999 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad whereby cognizance of the offences under Sections 269,270,277,278 and 290 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code has been taken against the petitioners. 2. The opposite party no. 2 who is said to be the Mukhiya of Gortopa Bara Nawatand Gram Panchayat, situated in Dhanbad filed a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, which was registered as C.P. case no. 1493 of 1998. 3. It was alleged in the complaint petition that factory of the petitioners namely, Dhanbad Chemical Factory, Govindpur, was established 14-15 years back and was engaged in manufacturing of various types of chemicals goods such as Acid, Ammonia Gas and other poisonous substances and gaseous product. It is said that because of manufacturing and transaction of the business of the gas and chemicals, the atmosphere, climate, air and water became polluted and because of that many fertile land of the locality became unfertile, due to the flows of acid and poisons water of the said factory. The wells, water taps and tanks within area of 4 K.M. in radius became polluted. 4. In respect of the information given to the local administration and the police, the authorities kept silent and did not lake any step for prevention of pollution of air and water and having no other option the complainant lodged the complaint in court. A copy of the complaint petition has been annexed as Annexure-1 to this application. 5. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad started examination of the complainant on solemn affirmation and thereafter started enquiry under section 202 Cr. P.C. During the enquiry four witnesses were examined on behalf of the complainant and thereafter the learned trial court took cognizance of the offences under sections 269, 270, 277, 278 and 290 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner finding prima facie case under the aforesaid sections. 6. Mr. M.M. Banerjee learned counsel appearing for the petitioner assisted by Mr. 6. Mr. M.M. Banerjee learned counsel appearing for the petitioner assisted by Mr. Indrajit Sinha submitted that no case at all under the aforesaid sections of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioner, even if the allegation made in the complaint petition are taken to be true in its entirety. The learned counsel next submitted that aforesaid factory of the premises was granted the EMISSION CONSENT ORDER on 6.3.1999 by the Bihar State Pollution Control Board, Patna, both for Air and discharge of water in the year 199899. The said consent orders has been annexed as Annexure 3 to this application. The petitioner-company was regularly complying with the provision of The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and they were also complying the conditions mentioned in the Emission consent order. From time to time Bihar State Pollution Control Board, also made inspections making analysis in respect of discharge of water as well as the air emission from the factory of the petitioner. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted that lodging of the complaint itself by opposite party no. 2 i.e. the Mukhiya is illegal, as he had no authority to file complaint. He further submits that as a matter of fact, for the offences alleged in the complaint petitioner, there is a Special Act i.e. the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981. The object of the said Act is to provide for the prevention, control and abatement of air pollution for the establishment, with a view to carry out the aforesaid purposes. Similarly for prevention of pollution of water there is a special Act, namely the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 which provides for prevention and control of water pollution. Mr. Banerjee, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that for the commission of the offences, which have been alleged in the complaint petition one can only be tried and punished under the aforesaid Special Act, namely the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974. He further submits that when for the offences alleged are covered by the provisions under the Special Act enacted by the legislature then for the same offences the provisions of general Act cannot be made applicable. Mr. He further submits that when for the offences alleged are covered by the provisions under the Special Act enacted by the legislature then for the same offences the provisions of general Act cannot be made applicable. Mr. Banerjee further submits that Section 43 of the (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, provides that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act except on a complaint made by a Board or any Officer authorized in his behalf or by any person who has been given notice of not less than sixty days in the manner prescribed of the alleged offence and his intention to make a complaint to the court or a person authorized as aforesaid. Similar is the provision in Section 49 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 also which speaks in the same line, as that of section 43 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act. 8. In support of his submission the learned counsel has relied on the decision of J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1961 S.C. 1170 . 9. The Principle of Law regarding the application of general Act and special statute dealing with a special kind of thing, is that when there is conflict between a special statute dealing with a special kind of thing and a general statute, the rule is that general provisions do not derogate from special provisions. But to what extent the provision of special enactment, over ride the provision of a general enactment, depends upon language of Special Act. The intention to limit the operation of general provisions must be cleared. 10. Sections 37 to 41 and 43 contains provisions regarding offences committed under the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 whereas Sections 41 to 49 contains provisions regarding offence committed under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 for taking cognizance of such offence and penalties imposeable therefor. The above provisions under both Acts have created certain new offences and penal provision under the Acts. The offences created under the Act are not the same, as delineated under chapter XIV of the Indian Penal Code. The above provisions under both Acts have created certain new offences and penal provision under the Acts. The offences created under the Act are not the same, as delineated under chapter XIV of the Indian Penal Code. In my view, therefor, the special provisions under the special Acts i.e. the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 do not over ride the provisions of chapter XIV of the Indian Penal Code. 11. In the case reported A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1170 (supra), it has clearly been held that in conflict between specific provision and general provision, the specific provision will prevail over general provision. The general provision would apply only to such cases, which are not covered by special provision. The said finding was given by the Supreme Court while dealing with a case; in which there was particular provision and general provision in the same Statute and therefore it was held that the specific provision in the said Statute would prevail over the general provision of that very statute. But in the present case the position in not same. In the present case, the dispute is with regard to the provisions contained in two different statutes and therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court does not help the petitioner. 12. In view of the discussion made above I come to the conclusion that bar for taking cognizance provided under these two Acts namely the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, did not debar the opposite party (Complainant) in filing the complaint under the provision of the Chapter XIV of the Indian Penal Code and the offences provided of the Indian Penal Code. 13. In that view of the matter, the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners in that regard is devoid of any merit. 14. So far as the submission of the learned counsel that no case at all is made out it appears from the order taking cognizance, passed by the trial court that the cognizance has been taken on the basis of the averments made in the complaint petition, the statement of the witnesses recorded during the enquiry under section 202 Cr. P.C., I do not find any illegality in the said order. P.C., I do not find any illegality in the said order. The documents annexed with the present application by the petitioner which can be said to be a document in defence cannot be looked into at this stage to verify the truthfulness or genuineness or otherwise of the allegation made in the complaint petition. Therefore, the submission of the petitioners in this regard cannot be accepted. 15. In the result, I find no merit in this application. It is accordingly dismissed.