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2003 DIGILAW 490 (JHR)

Dulal Chand Ghosh v. State of Bihar

2003-04-16

AMARESHWAR SAHAY

body2003
JUDGMENT : Amareshwar Sahay J.-In this application, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order dated 07.06.1999 passed by the Special Judge, E.C. Act-cum-IVth Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi, by which the petition filed on behalf of the petitioner, for dropping the proceeding as against the petitioner was rejected. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding initiated against him on the basis of the F.I.R. i.e. Doranda P.S. Case No. 46 of 1999, registered under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, for violation of Clause 3 of the Bihar Trade Articles (Licences Unification) Order, 1984. 2. The informant-Block Supply Officer, Namkum lodged the first information report on 20.02.1999, against the petitioner and one another, under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, alleging therein that on 20.02.1999, he reached at the residence of the petitioner and in course of inspection, it was found that hundred bags containing hundred quintals of Sugar and 2740 liters of Kerosene Oil were stored at the residential premises of the petitioner. On demand made by the informant, the Petitioner who was present there at that time, failed to produce any paper in respect of the aforesaid Sugar and Kerosene Oil kept in his residential premises. On interrogation, the petitioner is said to have disclosed that on 19.02.1999 one Jogendra Singh a fair price shop dealer came to his residence and told him that since there was no space in his godown to keep those articles i.e. Sugar and Kerosene Oil which belonged to him and, therefore, he requested the petitioner to keep the said Sugar and Kerosene Oil in his Godown on the assurance that he would take back those articles within two or three days. It was alleged that for the purpose of storage and for sale and purchase of more than five bags of Sugar a licence was required to be taken but the petitioner had no such licence to store such quantity of Sugar. Similarly for storage of more than 20 liters of Kerosene Oil, licence was required to be taken but the petitioner was not having the said licence and as such, it was alleged that the petitioner had contravened the provisions contained in clause 3 of the Bihar Trade Articles (Licences Unification) Order, 1984. 3. Similarly for storage of more than 20 liters of Kerosene Oil, licence was required to be taken but the petitioner was not having the said licence and as such, it was alleged that the petitioner had contravened the provisions contained in clause 3 of the Bihar Trade Articles (Licences Unification) Order, 1984. 3. The police after completing the investigation, submitted chargesheet against the petitioner, under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act on 22.04.1999. On the basis of the said chargesheet, it appears that the learned Special Judge had taken cognizane of the offences under Section 7 of the E.C. Act against the petitioner. 4. It further appears that at the stage of explaining the substance of acquisition to the accused as envisaged under Section 251 of the Cr.P.C., a petition was filed on behalf of the petitioner, before the Special Judge to the effect that since no case for explaining the substance of acquisition (sio-accusation?) is made out against the petitioner and, therefore, the criminal prosecution against him be dropped. 5. The learned Special Judge by his impugned order dated 07.06.1999 after considering the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner and also after considering the decisions cited, rejected the prayer f of the petitioner for dropping the proceeding holding that there was no provision in law for dropping the criminal case under the Essential Commodities Act. 6. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has filed the present application for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding against him. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has firstly submitted that the petitioner is neither a dealer nor a trader of Sugar or Kerosene Oil and, therefore, nor case under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act for contravention of Clause 3 of the Bihar Trade Articles (Licences Unification) Order, 1984 is made against him. 8. The second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Special Judge, E.C. Act had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences under the E.C. Act, which was without jurisdiction because after 25.04.1998 the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1981 by which the Special Courts were constituted and empowered to try the offences under the Essential Commodities Act has expired and, therefore, after the expiry of the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1981 the learned Special Judge had no jurisdiction to proceed in the case against the petitioner. In support of his submission the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on a decision of this Court reported in 2001 (1) Eastern India Criminal Cases, 24 and the decision of this court reported in 2001 (2) J.L.J.R. 57 . 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has next contended that since there was no evidence on record to show that the articles recovered from the premises of the petitioner were for the purpose of sale and business and, therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner has contravened the provisions contained in Clause 3 of the Bihar Trade Articles (Licences Unification) Order, 1984. He further submits that mere storage of foodgrains in access of limit does not amount to violation of the said provision unless it is established that the storage was for the purpose of carrying on business of those articles. For this proposition, he has relied on a decision reported in 1990 (2) P.L.J.R. 474. 10. So far as the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that after the expiry of the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1981 in the year 1998 the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to deal with the cases of Essential Commodities Act and, therefore the proceeding is liable to be quashed is concerned, the complete answer to the said submission is in the decision of the Supreme Court decided in the case of State of Tamilnadu vs. Parmasiva Pandian reported in A.I.R, 2001, S.C 2972 wherein it has been held that on a fair reading of the provisions of Essential Commodities. Act and Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1918, it is clear that during the period the E.C. (Special Provisions) Act, 1981 was in force, the special court constituted for trial of offences under Essential Commodities Act had exclusive jurisdiction to try such cases but the position changed after the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1981 lapsed by an efflux of time. Thereafter, the position that used to prevail before the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1981 was enforced, stood restored and the Judicial Magistrate who were previously competent to try the E.C. Act Cases got the jurisdiction to deal with such cases. Therefore, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court it cannot be said that the prosecution against the petitioner is liable to be quashed on this ground. Therefore, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court it cannot be said that the prosecution against the petitioner is liable to be quashed on this ground. Now the cases under the E.C. Act can be tried by a competent criminal court. 11. Regarding the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that mere storage of foodgrains in access (sic-excess ?) of limit does not amount to violation of Clause 3 of the Bihar Trade Articles (Licences Unification) Order, 1984, unless it is established that the storage was for the purpose of sale and business is concerned. In my view for establishing those facts the evidence is required to be gone into at the appropriate stage. The stage of adducing evidence by the prosecution has not even reached and only at the stage of explaining the substance of acquisition (sic-accusation ?) the petitioner has jumped before the Special Judge to drop the proceeding. The learned court below rightly held that there is no provision under the law for dropping the proceeding at the stage of Section 251 of the Cr. P.C. The decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard i.e. 1990 (2) P.L.J.R. 474 is also not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case because in the aforesaid decision, the Patna High Court was dealing with a case after conviction in which the prosecution did not adduce any evidence during the trial to establish the fact that the storage of articles were for the purpose of sale or business. In the present case, the trial has not yet concluded and the evidence has not yet been adduced by the prosecution, therefore, at this stage it cannot be said that there is no evidence to establish the fact that the articles recovered from the possession of the petitioner was for the purpose of sale or business. In that view of the matter, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted and hence it is rejected. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion and findings, I hold that no case for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding against the petitioner or for interference with the order of the learned Special Judge is made out at all. In the result, this application has got no merit. Accordingly, it is dismissed. 13. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion and findings, I hold that no case for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding against the petitioner or for interference with the order of the learned Special Judge is made out at all. In the result, this application has got no merit. Accordingly, it is dismissed. 13. The interim order dated 07.07.1999 passed by this Court in this application is hereby vacated and the learned trial court is directed to conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible. Let the lower court records and the case diary called for in this case, be sent down forthwith.