JUDGMENT - KHARCHE S.T., J.:---Heard Mr. Patwardhan, learned Counsel for the applicant and Shri Ezaz Khan, learned Counsel for the respondent. 2. This is an application for suspension of the order of conviction recorded by the Special Judge on 1-6-2002 in Special Case No. 6/1992, during the pendency of this Criminal Appeal No. 333/2002. The short question that arises for consideration is: whether the order of conviction can be suspended during the pendency of the appeal in view of the powers under section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"). 3. Briefly stated facts are as under: The applicant/appellant has been convicted by the Special Judge on 1-6-2002 for the offences punishable under sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, (for short, "the P.C. Act") and sentenced him to undergo R.I. for one year for offence under section 7 of the P.C. Act and to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default, to undergo R.I. for four months, and further sentenced to undergo R.I. for one year and six months for the offence under section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the P.C. Act and to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default, to suffer R.I. for four months. The Special Judge directed that the substantive sentences shall run concurrently. The appellant takes exception to the impugned order of conviction and sentence and filed the Criminal Appeal No. 333/2002. This appeal has been admitted by this Court and the sentence is also suspended by granting bail to the applicant/appellant by this Court's order dated 19-6-2002. 4. The learned Counsel for the applicant contended that the applicant is working as Upper Division Clerk in the Income Tax Office, Ward II, Akola. He contended that neither the applicant has been served with any charge-sheet in the matter, nor any enquiry as per the procedure has been held by the department. Without following the procedure, the Commissioner of Income Tax, Nagpur, has issued a show cause notice and it has been mentioned in the said notice that opportunity of hearing has also been given to the applicant and it has been decided to impose major penalty of dismissal from Government service against the appellant. However, no opportunity has been given to him and he intends to challenge the departmental action separately. However, no opportunity has been given to him and he intends to challenge the departmental action separately. He contended that the Commissioner of Income Tax, Nagpur, has decided to impose major penalty for the reason that the appellant has been convicted by the Special Judge for the offences mentioned above and, therefore, in the circumstances, it is expedient in the interest of justice to stay the order of conviction till the decision on merits. In support of his submission, he relied on the decision of this Court in the case of (Pralhad Sitaram Yeole v. State of Maharashtra)1, reported in 2002(Cri. Supp.) Bom.C.R. (A.B.)930. 5. The learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the order of conviction need not be stayed though the present appeal has been admitted and sentence is also suspended by the order of this Court on 19th June, 2002, it did not follow that the order of conviction should be stayed. He contended that the conviction and sentences are for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the superior Court should normally suspend the sentence of the imprisonment until disposal of the appeal but conviction under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act de hors sentence of imprisonment as consequence thereto is a different matter. He contended that when public servant is convicted on a charge of corruption is allowed to hold public office, it would impair the moral of other employees and consequently that would erode the confidence of other people in such institutions, besides, demoralizing the other honest public servants who would be either colleagues or subordinates of the convicted person. Therefore, if the order of conviction if stayed till the decision of the appeal on merits the public interest would suffer. 6. The learned Counsel for the respondent further contended that the applicant being a public servant has demanded and accepted bribe amount of Rs. 4,000/- from the complainant and the prosecution filed a charge-sheet for trial under sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the said Act and he is also found guilty of corruption after due adjudication and it is in the public interest that the order of conviction should not be stayed and thus the application may kindly be rejected. 4,000/- from the complainant and the prosecution filed a charge-sheet for trial under sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the said Act and he is also found guilty of corruption after due adjudication and it is in the public interest that the order of conviction should not be stayed and thus the application may kindly be rejected. In support of this submission he relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (K.C. Sareen v. C.B.I., Chandigarh)2, reported in 2001 Cri.L.J. 4234. 7. I have carefully considered the contentions canvassed by learned Counsel for both the parties. It is not in dispute that the appellant/accused is working as Upper Division Clerk in the office of Income Tax, Ward II, Akola and he was prosecuted for the offence punishable under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act vide Special Case No. 6/1992. It is also an admitted position that the accused has been convicted of the offences punishable under sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by the Special Judge by his order dated 1-6-2002. It is also not in dispute that the Special Judge held the appellant guilty of the aforesaid offences because he being a public servant had demanded and accepted bribe amount of Rs. 4000/- from the complainant. 8. It is also not disputed that sentence is suspended by the order of this Court dated 19-6-2002. Now the question is whether the order of conviction during the pendency of this appeal deserves to be suspended. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that in view of the decision of this Court in Pralhad Sitaram Yeole (cited supra) the order of conviction deserves to be suspended. I may usefully refer the observations of this Court which are as under: "While considering the application for stay of order of conviction, the most relevant factor which is to be considered is whether the damage that would be caused to the applicant in the absence of suspension of the order of conviction could be undone, if ultimately, the applicant's appeal against conviction is allowed. Undoubtedly, if the damage is of trifling nature, it cannot be contended that the same cannot be undone. Undoubtedly, if the damage is of trifling nature, it cannot be contended that the same cannot be undone. Equally, it is also necessary to be taken into consideration the degree of probability of the appeal being finally allowed; the nature and gravity of offence; the age and conduct of the accused etc. It cannot be said in each and every case of conviction of an employee that the amount he is convicted; that he would be entitled to get stay of order of conviction. Each case will have to be decided independently, depending upon the facts of these of the case." 9. In that case, the appellant was employed as lower Division Clerk with the Maharashtra State Electricity Board and was held guilty of obtaining Rs. 1,000/- bribe from the complainant as an illegal gratification other than legal remuneration for doing an official act in exercise of his official function. He was convicted under sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced to R.I. for one year and fine of Rs. 3,000/-. The case against the applicant was that the appellant agreed to carry out certain repairs to the meter provided for the complainant, in consideration of receipt of a sum of Rs. 1,000/-. Absence of any instrument with the petitioner/appellant at the relevant time when the petitioner was said to have repaired the meter and if the contention as sought to be raised on behalf of the petitioner was found to be good on detailed appreciation of material on records, certainly, in the circumstances, it could not be said that the petitioner would not suffer irreparable injury in case of the termination of his service on account of conviction by the Special Judge. 10. The aforesaid decision of this Court would obviously be not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Herein, the appellant was working as public servant in the Income Tax Department and he has been convicted for accepting bribe of Rs. 4,000/- from the complainant. In these circumstances, I am of the considered view that the aforesaid authority is of not any avail to the appellant. 11. In this context, the learned Counsel for the respondent rightly relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of K.C. Sareen (cited supra), wherein it has been observed in para No. 10 that: "10... In these circumstances, I am of the considered view that the aforesaid authority is of not any avail to the appellant. 11. In this context, the learned Counsel for the respondent rightly relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of K.C. Sareen (cited supra), wherein it has been observed in para No. 10 that: "10... The legal position, therefore, is this.—Though apart the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the Court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The Court has a duty to look at all aspects including the remifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. It is the light of the above legal position that, we have to examine the question as to what should be the position when a public servant is convicted of an offence under the P.C. Act. No doubt, when the Appellate Court admits the appeal filed in challenge of the conviction and sentence for the offence under the P.C. Act, the Superior Court should normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose such appeal could be heard soon after the filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the offence under the P.C. Act, de hors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel thereto, is a different matter." 12. The Apex Court further observed that corruption by public servants has now reached a monstrous dismension in India. Its tentacles have started grappling even the institutions created for the protection of the republic. Unless those tentacles are intercepted and impeded from gripping the normal and orderly functioning of the public offices, though strong legislative, executive as well as judicial exercises the corrupt public servants could even paralyse the functioning of such institutions and thereby hinder the democratic polity. Proliferation of corrupt public servants could garner momentum to cripple the social order if such men are allowed to continue to manage and operate public institutions. Proliferation of corrupt public servants could garner momentum to cripple the social order if such men are allowed to continue to manage and operate public institutions. When a public servant was found guilty of corruption after a judicial adjudicatory process conducted by a Court of law, judiciousness demands that he should be treated as corrupt until he is exonerated by a superior Court. The mere fat that an appellate or revisional forum has decided to entertain his challenge and to go into the issues and findings made against such public servants once again should not even temporarily absolve him from such findings. If such a public servant becomes entitled to hold public office and to continue to do official acts until he is judicially absolved from such findings by reason of suspension of the order of conviction it is public interest which suffers and sometimes even irreparably. When a public servant who is convicted of corruption is allowed to continue to hold public office it would impair the morale of the other person manning such office, and consequently that would erode the already shrunk confidence of the people in such public institutions besides demoralising the other honest public servants who would either be the colleagues or subordinates of the convicted person. If honest public servants are compelled to take orders from proclaimed corrupt officers on account of the suspension of the conviction the fall out would be one of shaking the system itself. Hence it is necessary that the Court should not aid the public servant who stands convicted for corruption charges to hold any public office until he is exonerated after conducting a judicial adjudication at the appellate or revisional level. It is a different matter if a corrupt public officer could continue to hold such public office even without the help of a Court order suspending the conviction". 13. In the present case, the observations of the Apex Court apply with full force to the facts and circumstances. The appellant was employed as Upper Division Clerk in the Income Tax Office and he is found guilty of the offences punishable under sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) and 7(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Special Judge recording finding in his judgment that the appellant/accused has accepted the bribe amount of Rs. 4,000/- and he was caught red-handed. The Special Judge recording finding in his judgment that the appellant/accused has accepted the bribe amount of Rs. 4,000/- and he was caught red-handed. The appellant/accused also did not dispute seizure of money from his possession. Analysis of wash of sodium carbonate solution of the right hand fingers of P.W. 1 Mukesh and right pant pocket of the applicant/appellant was violet. The samples of wash at the time of post trap panchanama were collected in sample bottles and sent for chemical analysis and the report of chemical analyser, (Exhibit 169) shows that the test of phenolphthalein in solution of sodium carbonate is positive. 14. Though the power to suspend an order of conviction is not alien to section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional circumstances. The Court has duty to look at all aspects including ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the considered view that suspension of the order of conviction during pendency of the appeal is not permissible under section 389(1) of the Code. I may usefully reproduce section 389 of the Code, which reads thus: "389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail.---(1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against the suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond. (2) The power conferred by this section on an Appellate Court may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of an appeal by convicted person to a Court subordinate thereto. (2) The power conferred by this section on an Appellate Court may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of an appeal by convicted person to a Court subordinate thereto. (3) Where the convicted person satisfies the Court by which he is convicted that he intends to present an appeal, the Court shall,- (i) where such person, being on bail, is sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or (ii) where the offence of which such person has been convicted is a bailable one, and he is on bail, order that the convicted person, be released on bail unless there are special reasons for refusing bail, for such period of will afford sufficient time to present the appeal and obtain the orders, of the Appellate Court under sub-section (1), and the sentence of imprisonment shall, so long as he is so released on bail, be deemed to be suspended. (4) ...........................". 15. The scope of section 389(1) of the Code has been considered by the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.C. Sareen v. C.B.I., Chandigarh (cited supra). It is obvious that the decision of the Division Bench is binding on all courts wherein the legal position is laid down. The ratio unequivocally indicate that if conviction is on corruption charge against public servant, the Appellate Court or Revisional Court should not suspend the order of conviction during the pendency of appeal even if the sentence of imprisonment is suspended. It would be sublime policy that the convicted public servant is kept under disability of conviction inspite of keeping the sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal of appeal or revision. In that view of the matter, the impugned order of conviction cannot be suspended. This application stands rejected. Application rejected. -----