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2003 DIGILAW 495 (DEL)

ROHTASH KUMAR v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

2003-05-19

BADAR DURREZ AHMED

body2003
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J. ( 1 ) ARNED counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 submits that no counter affidavit would be necessary and that she would argue on the basis of the documents filed by the petitioner and the original record which she has brought to Court. Accordingly, with the consent of the parties the matter was taken up for final hearing. ( 2 ) IN this petition the petitioner, inter alia, has prayed for the quashing and setting aside of the order of the learned Additional Judge. Delhi delivered on 7. 12. 2002 in an appeal No. EPA/350/2000 preferred by the petitioner under Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the "said act" ). ( 3 ) THE premises in question is House No. 42, arakpur, Bagh Mochi, Delhi. It is the petitioner s case that the ancestors of the petitioner and respondent No. 3 (who happens to be the petitioner s brother) were in possession and ownership of the property since 1938-39. The petitioner contends that they were in possession on account of some lease. I need not enter into this controversy in this petition. ( 4 ) IT was urged on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2 that several notices under Section 4 (1) of the said Act and call letters were served upon the petitioner. This was disputed by the petitioner. On behalf of the petitioner it was contended that no such notices/call letters were served upon the petitioner. In essence, it is the question of service of these notices/call letters which constitutes the meat of the matter. ( 5 ) THESE notices were alleged to have been served upon the petitioner during the period 1991-1993. On 18. 3. 1993 the Estate Officer directed exparte proceedings on account of non-appearance of the petitioner and other members of his family despite such alleged service of notices. By an ex-parte order dated 28. 12. ( 5 ) THESE notices were alleged to have been served upon the petitioner during the period 1991-1993. On 18. 3. 1993 the Estate Officer directed exparte proceedings on account of non-appearance of the petitioner and other members of his family despite such alleged service of notices. By an ex-parte order dated 28. 12. 1995 the Estate Officer IV, DDA, Vikas sadan, I. N. A. New Delhi in case No. EV/abm/ 62, after holding the petitioner and his family members to be unauthorised occupants of the premises in question in particular premises comprised in Khasra No. 224, ordered the petitioner and other legal heirs of late Shri kirpa Ram and all other persons concerned who may be in occupation of the land in question to vacate the same within fifteen days of the date of the order. This order was passed in purported exercise of the powers conferred under Section 5 (1) of the said Act. Being aggrieved by this ex parte order dated 28. 12. 1995 the petitioner filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 cpc before the Estate Officer for setting aside of the ex parte order dated 28. 12. 1995. In the said application it was stated that the petitioner came to know of the proceedings for the first time when a copy of the said order dated 28. 12. 1995 was delivered on 13. 3. 1996 to the petitioner s mother who is an old and illiterate lady. In the said application the petitioner and the other applicants stated that they were surprised to go through the contents of the order especially as regards the statement that they had allegedly been served on various dates and that in spite of service they did not turn up. The petitioner categorically stated in paragraph 4 of the said application that the petitioner and other applicants never received any notice/call letter from the Estate Officer for any of the dates mentioned in the copy of the order dated 28. 12. 1995. In paragraph 9 of the application it was stated that the non-appearance of the applicants was not intentional or deliberate and would cause grave injustice if they were not given an opportunity of being heard. Therefore, they prayed that the ex parte order dated 28. 12. 1995 be set aside. 12. 1995. In paragraph 9 of the application it was stated that the non-appearance of the applicants was not intentional or deliberate and would cause grave injustice if they were not given an opportunity of being heard. Therefore, they prayed that the ex parte order dated 28. 12. 1995 be set aside. ( 6 ) THE said application for setting aside the ex parte order dated 28. 12. 1995 was taken up for hearing by the Estate Officer. By an order dated 2. 4. 1996 the said Estate Officer, after considering the rival contentions of the parties, came to the conclusion that sufficient grounds for setting aside the ex parte order had not been disclosed in the application. While passing the said order the Estate Officer also observed that the. provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure were applicable to the Estate officer s proceedings to a very limited extent. He further contended that the order of eviction had already been passed and the same had been served upon the petitioner and that accordingly, he had no jurisdiction to recall his own order. The Estate Officer, therefore, rejected the application of the petitioner. ( 7 ) BEING aggrieved the petitioner and respondent No. 3 filed an appeal under section 9 of the said Act against the order of the Estate Officer dated 28. 12. 1995. It is pertinent to mention that in the Grounds of appeal the main ground, de hors the merit of the case, was with regard to the allegation that no show cause notice had ever been served upon the petitioner under Section 4 (1) of the Act and that no opportunity was given to him to file a reply and/or lead evidence in defence. The further ground was that the estate Officer had not applied his mind properly and had not ascertained the fact as to whether the petitioner had been served or not. ( 8 ) BY an order dated 17. 7. 2002 the Learned additional District Judge after noticing all the contentions of the petitioner and the respondents came to the conclusion that the show cause notice had indeed been served upon the petitioner and that on merits also the premises in question were public premises belonging to the DDA and that the petitioner and other members of his family were occupying the premises unauthorisedly. After examining all the aspects, the Learned ADJ dismissed the appeal and upheld the order dated 28. 12. 1995 passed by the Estate officer. ( 9 ) IT is against this judgment and/or order dated 28. 12. 1995 passed by the Learned adj that the petitioner has come to this court praying for quashing of the same under writ jurisdiction. ( 10 ) UNDER Article 226 of the Constitution, this court is not to sit in appeal over the decision of the learned ADJ dated 7. 12. 2002. Nor can this Court deal with disputed questions of fact which require elaborate evidence. Furthermore, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, this court cannot substitute its opinion in place of the findings and decisions of the learned ADJ. It can merely examine as to whether the decision making process has been proper and as to whether the rules of natural justice had been violated inasmuch as whether the petitioner has been granted a reasonable opportunity of hearing. ( 11 ) THE entire decision of this case hinges upon the question as to whether the notices/call letters had been served upon the petitioner. The issuance of these notice/call letters is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that these notices/call letters were received by adult members of the petitioner s family. What is in dispute is whether such receipt constitutes proper service of notice as provided under the Act? ( 12 ) BEFORE I examine the legal question, it would be pertinent to note the admitted facts with regard to the issuance and receipt of the notices/call letters. The position is summarised in the following table:the last of the said notices, i. e. notice at Serial no. 10 could not be served and the process server made a note that despite repeated attempts the occupant was not available and, therefore, requested for orders of affixation vide his report dated 3. 2. 1993. The Estate officer directed that the call letter be pasted at the site on the outer door or on some conspicuous part of the premises in the presence of some reliable witness. There is a noting of the process server of 9. 3. 1993 that the affixation had been carried out and the same is set out in page 84 of the paper book. There is a noting of the process server of 9. 3. 1993 that the affixation had been carried out and the same is set out in page 84 of the paper book. Along side the signature of the process server there is an another signature which, according to the respondents, is the signature of the witness to the affixation. However, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that this is not borne out by the documents as neither the name nor the address of the witness appears thereon and, in any event, the specific direction was for affixation in the presence of some "reliable witness". As aforesaid, as the petitioner did not appear, on 18. 3. 1993 ex parte proceedings were initiated. ( 13 ) IT is the petitioner s case that the mandatory provisions of Section 4 of the Act read with Rule 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Rules 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the "said rules") framed under the said Act have not been complied with. Section 4 of the said Act and Rule 4 of the Rules read as under:- section 4 reads as under: "4. Issue of Notice to show cause against order of eviction:- (1) If the estate officer is of opinion that any persons are in unauthorised occupation of any public premises and that they should be evicted, the estate officer shall issue in the manner hereinafter provided a notice in writing calling upon all persons concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. (2) The notice shall (a) specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made; and (b) require all persons concerned, that is to say, all persons who are, or may be, in occupation of, or claim interest in, the public premises,- (i) to show cause, if any, against the proposed order on or before such date as is specified in the notice, being a date not earlier than seven days from the date of issue thereof, and (ii) to appear before the estate officer on the date specified in the notice along with the evidence which they intend to produce in support of the cause shown, and also for personal hearing, if such hearing is desired. (3) The estate officer shall cause the notice to be served by having it affixed on the outer doo r or some other conspicuous part of the public premises, and in such other manner as may be prescribed whereupon the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to all persons concerned. "rule 4 of the Rules reads as under:- "4. Manner of service of notices and others:- (1) In addition to any mode of service specified in the Act, a notice issued under sub section (1) of section 4 or sub-section (1) of section 13 of the act shall be served by delivering or tendering a copy of the notice to the person for whom it is intended or to any adult member of his family, or by sending it by registered post acknowledgement due in a letter addressed to that person at his usual or last-known place of residence or business. (2) Whether the copy of the notice under sub-rule (1) is delivered or tendered, the signature of the person to whom the copy is so delivered or tendered should be obtained in token of acknowledgement of the service. (3) In respect of a notice issued under sub-section (1) of section 4 or sub section (1) of section 6 or sub section (1) or (2) of section 7 or sub-section (1) of section 1a of the Act, where the person or the adult member of the family of such person refuses to sign the acknowledgement, or where such person cannot be found after using all due and reasonable diligence, and there is no adult member of the family of such person, a copy of the notice shall be affixed on the another door or some other conspicuous part of the ordinary residence or usual place of business of such person and the original shall be returned to the estate officer who issued the notice, with a report endorsed thereon or annexed thereto stating that a copy has been so affixed, the circumstances under which it was done so and the name address of the person, if any, by whom the ordinary residence or usual place of business was identified and in whose presence the copy was affixed. (4) (i) If a notice issued under sub- section (1) of section 4 or sub-section (1) or (2) of section 7 or sub-section (1) section 13 of the Act cannot be served in the manner provided in sub- rule (1), the estate officer may, if he thinks fit, direct that such notice shall also be published in at least one news paper having circulation in the locality and he may also proclaim the contents of any notice in the locality by beat of drum. " ( 14 ) IT is the petitioner s contention that under section 4 (1) of the Act the Estate Officer is obligated to issue notice in writing calling upon the persons concerned to show cause why the order of eviction should not be made. It is also clear that the notice is to be issued in the manner "hereinafter provided". The notice must also specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made as indicated in Section 4 (2) and the said notice must contain other particulars such as date of hearing etc. Section 4 (3) prescribes the manner of service of the notice. Learned senior counsel Mr. Ashok Grover appearing for the petitioner submits that this provision of Section 4 (3) is clear and mandatory. It stipulates that notice shall be served by having it "affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises" and "in such other manner as may be prescribed. " it is only if these eventualities are satisfied that the notice can be deemed to have been duly served upon the persons concerned. Thus, according to Mr. Grover, the manner of service of notice specified in the Act is by affixation as aforesaid. In addition, there may be such other manner of service as may be prescribed. According to him the additional manner of service is prescribed under Rule 4 of the said Rules which begin with the words "in addition to any mode of service specified in the Act. " According to him, the mode of service prescribed under the Rules, is, by the words themselves, "in addition to" and not by way of substitution of the mode of service specified in the Act. " According to him, the mode of service prescribed under the Rules, is, by the words themselves, "in addition to" and not by way of substitution of the mode of service specified in the Act. It is his contention that unless and until a notice is served by affixing the same on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises it cannot be deemed that the persons concerned have been served in the prescribed manner. In this context the learned senior counsel submits that the only notice which could purport to be a valid notice under section 4 (1) of the said Act was the one which was issued on 11. 4. 1990. That notice, according to him, was admittedly not affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises. It was "merely" delivered to the daughter of the petitioner i. e. Veena Gupta on 18. 12. 1990. As such, according to him the mandatory requirement of Section 4 (3) of the Act of service of notice was not complied with and, therefore, the entire proceedings pursuant there to leading to the passing of the judgment in appeal dated 7. 12. 2002 are illegal, invalid and liable to be quashed. He submits that all the other notices were notices for production of evidence and not notices under Section 4 (1) of the Act and these notices were issued on the presumption that the notice under Section 4 (1) had already been served upon the petitioner. He submitted that the only notice that was affixed/pasted was a call letter as indicated in the record itself, copy whereof is produced at page 84 of the paper book mentioned hereinabove. Thus, it is his contention that the notice under Section 4 (1) dated 11. 4. 1990 was not affixed on the outer door of the public premises and, therefore, it cannot be deemed that the petitioner had been served. On the other hand, the notice dated 11. 1. 1993 was merely a call letter and not a notice under Section 4 (1) which had to contain various aspects including grounds as prescribedunder Section 4 (2) of the said Act. Affixation of this call letter, even if it is assumed that it was so affixed, does not imply or lead to the conclusion that a Section 4 (1) notice had been served upon the petitioner. Affixation of this call letter, even if it is assumed that it was so affixed, does not imply or lead to the conclusion that a Section 4 (1) notice had been served upon the petitioner. In this eventuality, he submitted, the entire proceedings are liable to be quashed. He took support from the decision of Hon ble Single judge of this Court reported in The United commercial Bank Vs. Bhim Sain Makhija and another, AIR 1994 Delhi 18 and in particular he relied upon paragraphs 5,6,7,8 and 10 thereof. Paragraph 10 thereof, which is material in the present case, is reproduced here in below: "10. Guided by the right of the principles noticed above I turn to Rule 4 of the rules Even a cursory look at the Rule - would go to show that it has been introduced primarily to protect the occupants. The legislature was not satisfied with service of notice being effected by affixation only as it could be exploited or even abused to deprive the occupants from putting in appearance and setting up a defence. Additional protection was thus afforded by introducing Rule 4 which insists upon service through a letter sent by registered post acknowledgment due. Rule 4 in its entirely would go to show that the emphasis is on service of notice which is evidenced by writing. The writing evidencing receipt of notice may be on the acknowledgment due if the notice is sent by registered post or on the copy of the notice or any other document. This then is the essence of the requirement. As in the present case, the service of notice is not evidenced by writing of the occupant or the adult member of his family, it cannot be said that the requirement of sub-section (1) of Section 4 read with rule 4 had been complied with. I feel that this answers the first limb of the question and so also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Rule 4 traverses beyond Section 4 of the Act. In any case it does not, for sub-section (3) of Section 4 itself carries within it the words "and in such other manner as may be prescribed" which leave the doors open for other manner to be prescribed in addition to the manner prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 4. In any case it does not, for sub-section (3) of Section 4 itself carries within it the words "and in such other manner as may be prescribed" which leave the doors open for other manner to be prescribed in addition to the manner prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 4. " ( 15 ) TO my mind, this decision does not advance the cause of the petitioner. Two things are clear from the above quoted passage. Firstly, the legislature was not satisfied with service of notice being effected by affixation only as it could be exploited or even abused to deprive the occupants from putting in appearance and setting up a defence. Additional protection was thus afforded by introducing Rule 4. Secondly, rule 4 does not traverse beyond Section 4 of the Act for, sub-section (3) of Section 4 itself carries within it the words "and in such other manner as my be prescribed" which leave the doors open for other manner to be prescribed in addition to the manner prescribed in sub-section (3) of Section 4. Thus, service would be complete if the notice is served upon the person concerned in any manner prescribed, be it under section 4 by affixation or under Rule 4 by tendering or by registered with acknowledgement due post. Apart from affixation, Section 4 (3) itself stipulates that service may be effected "in such other manner as may be prescribed whereupon the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to all persons". There is no dispute that the first notice under section 4 (1) was received by the petitioner s adult daughter - Veena Gupta. As such, there is no dispute that service in the manner prescribed under Rule 4 was completed. The petitioner s contention is that this still did not constitute service in as much as there was no affixation. I am unable to agree with this interpretation. Once service is completed in any of the modes prescribed under the Act and the Rules, the petitioner cannot be heard to say that he was not served with the notice or that he was deemed an opportunity of hearing. If, affixation, and affixation alone, was the mode of service then all other modes would be superfluous and would be of no consequence. If, affixation, and affixation alone, was the mode of service then all other modes would be superfluous and would be of no consequence. This is certainly not the purpose of the provisions of section 4 of the Act and rule 4 of the said Rules. Service having been effected upon the petitioner as indicated above through his adult daughter, the petitioner cannot be permitted to say that the notice under section 4 (1) of the Act was not served upon him or that he was denied an opportunity of hearing merely because the first notice was also not affixed on the outer door of the premises. On this score alone the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. ( 16 ) HOWEVER, as contended by Ms. Anusuya salwan, the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on two other counts as well. First of all, she contends, the writ petition itself is not maintainable. Secondly the learned counsel submitted that the conduct of the petitioner itself would disentitle him from claiming the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the constitution. ( 17 ) IN respect of her opposition to the maintainability of the writ petition, Ms Salwan argued that the writ petition challenging the order passed by the Additional District Judge in an appeal under Section 9 of the said Act is not maintainable. In support of her contention she has cited six decision of the Supreme court and High Courts. As will be clear from the discussion that follows, not all the decisions are germane to the question of maintainability. Anyhow, most of them do have some bearing on some aspects of the case. The decisions cited were:- 1. Sadhana Lodh Vs. National insurance Co. Ltd. (2003) 3 SDCC 524. 2. Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. R. P. Khaitan and Anr. 1995 (35) drj 604 (DB) 3. Indraj and others Vs. The collector, Delhi. AIR 1975 Delhi 153. 4. Tara Singh Vs. Additional District judge, Ferozepur AIR 1984 Punjab and Haryana 175 (DB ). 5. NDMC Vs. House of Handicrafts and another AIR 1993 Delhi 349 (DB) 6. M/s. Safari Airways Vs. The Estate officer and others AIR 1983 Delhi 347. 17. Indraj and others Vs. The collector, Delhi. AIR 1975 Delhi 153. 4. Tara Singh Vs. Additional District judge, Ferozepur AIR 1984 Punjab and Haryana 175 (DB ). 5. NDMC Vs. House of Handicrafts and another AIR 1993 Delhi 349 (DB) 6. M/s. Safari Airways Vs. The Estate officer and others AIR 1983 Delhi 347. 17. 1 The first case (Sadhana Lodh s case) is an authority for the proposition that the right of appeal is a statutory right and where the law provides remedy for filing an appeal on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under article 226/227 of the Constitution. The supreme Court further held that where the state Legislature has barred a remedy of filing a revision petition under Section 115 of the cpc, no petition under Article 226 of the constitution would lie for the reason that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract jurisdiction of the high Court under 226 of the Constitution. With regard to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 the Supreme court observed as under:- "7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less of an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under article 227 of the Constitution, the high Court does not act as an appellate court or the tribunal. It is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 of the constitution to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision. "17. 2 The second decision (Municipal corporation of Delhi v. R. P. Khaitan and Anr. (Supra), delivered by a Division Bench of this court holds that wherein aggrieved person has a remedy of revision under Section 115 of the CPC, the High Court would not ordinarily entertain a writ petition under Article 226 and 227. 17. "17. 2 The second decision (Municipal corporation of Delhi v. R. P. Khaitan and Anr. (Supra), delivered by a Division Bench of this court holds that wherein aggrieved person has a remedy of revision under Section 115 of the CPC, the High Court would not ordinarily entertain a writ petition under Article 226 and 227. 17. 3 The third decision (Indraj and others vs. The Collector, Delhi and others, (supra), which is a decision of a single bench of this court, deals with the requirements of a notice under Section 4 (1) of the Act and holds that the provisions are merely directory and not mandatory. It would be pertinent to set out the relevant passage:- "6. Even so, the petitioners would not be entitled to the relief sought by them. The non compliance of the provisions of Section 4 (1) of the Act would notvitiate the proceedings because the provisions of Section 4 do not appear to me to be mandatory but are only directory in nature intended to ensure that a person proposed to be evicted has a reasonable notice of the date of hearing, and sufficient time to file his reply to it. This purpose was more than satisfied because the notices were received by the petitioners on september 16, 1972 but the proceedings remained pending until november 19, 1973, when the final order was made by the Estate Officer. The petitioners, therefore, had - sufficient time even though less than 10 days time initially, to submit such objections as they may have or to produce such material as they may like to in support of their contention that they were not liable to be evicted. The fact that the petitioners made no grievance of this to the Estate Officer further establishes the fact that notice was too short for the. petitioners to submit a reply. "17. 4 The fourth decision (Tara Singh Vs. Additional District Judge, Ferozepur (supra), which is that of a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court also relates to the said Act and is relevant to the extent that in that case the petitioner had been served at least once to appear in the court of the Estate Officer and had absented himself on that date and thereafter, he had been given 2-3 more opportunities to appear before the Estate Officer. On these facts, it was held that the petitioner could not complain that no opportunity of hearing was granted to him. The relevant paragraphs are set out hereunder:- "3. In our opinion, there is no merit in this petition. Perusal of the order of the Estate Officer would show that a notice under Section 4 (1), Public premises Act, dated 29. 11. 1981 Exhibit e. 2 was served on Tara Singh petitioner to appear on 10. 12. 82 in the Court of the Estate Officer. When he did not appear on that date he was again summoned vide letter dt. 18-12-82 exhibit E-4 to appear on any date on or before 30-12-1982. He failed to appear on 30-12-1982 in the Court of the estate Officer. He was given another chance to appear in the Court of the estate Officer on any date between 10-1-1983 to 14-1-1983 vide Exhibit p. 6. The petitioner still did not appear in his Court. 4. In view of the fact that Tara Singh petitioner had been served, at least once to appear in the Court of Estate officer on 10-12-1982 and he absented himself on that date and thereafter he had been given 2-3 more opportunities to appear in the Court of Estate Officer, so it cannot be said that the petitioner had not been given opportunity of hearing by the Estate Officer. "17. 5 The fifth decision (NDMC v. House of handicrafts and another (supra)), which is of a Division Bench of this Court, is not really relevant to the issues involved in this petition. 17. 6 The sixth and last decision (M/s. Safari airways Vs. The Estate Officer and others. (supra), which is a decision of a single bench of this court, relates to the said Act and in particular the notice under Section 4 (1 ). It has been held that it is not at all necessary for the Estate Officer to disclose, in the notice under Section 4 (1) of the Act, the materials on which he founded his opinion that the notices were in anauthorised occupation. In the said decision it is clearly mentioned that the Form of notice is prescribed under the Rules which have been framed under the said Act and the same have been upheld by the Supreme Court. In the said decision it is clearly mentioned that the Form of notice is prescribed under the Rules which have been framed under the said Act and the same have been upheld by the Supreme Court. It is further stated that Form "a" which is the relevant Form nowhere prescribes that the estate Officer must disclose to the unauthorised occupant all the material on which he has formed the opinion about his unauthorised occupation. In this decision it is. further mentioned that the decision of the estate Officer is appealable under Section 9 of the Act to the District Judge, in this regard, it has been held that: - "the formation of opinion is a condition precedent to the issuance of the notice. The notice serves no other purpose. It merely sets the machinery of law into motion. It gives grounds of eviction. But it has no serious consequences because the affected party is heard before an order of eviction is made. He can show that the proposed order of eviction is not warranted in the facts and circumstances. " ( 18 ) TO my mind, these decisions apart, the writ petition is not maintainable for the simple reason that there is a complete machinery provided in the Act which is a complete code in itself inso far as eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises is concerned. A person aggrieved by an order of eviction passed by the Estate Officer has recourse to appeal under Section 9 of the Act. In the present case, the petitioner has availed of the appeal provision. The learned ADJ has examined all the contentions of the petitioner. As aforesaid, by an order dated 17. 7. 2002 the Learned ADJ after noticing all the contentions of the petitioner and the respondents came to the conclusion that the show cause notice under section 4 (1) of the act had, indeed, been served upon the petitioner and that on merits also the premises in question were public premises belonging to the DDA and that the petitioner and other members of his family were occupying the premises unauthorisedly. After examining all the aspects, the Learned ADJ dismissed the appeal and upheld the order dated 28. 12. 1995 passed by the Estate Officer. This court does not sit in appeal under its jurisdiction under Article. 226/227 of the constitution. After examining all the aspects, the Learned ADJ dismissed the appeal and upheld the order dated 28. 12. 1995 passed by the Estate Officer. This court does not sit in appeal under its jurisdiction under Article. 226/227 of the constitution. As such, this Court cannot interfere with the impugned order and the writ petition would not be maintainable. ( 19 ) THE second submission of Ms Salwan, as aforesaid, is that the conduct of the petitioner itself would dis-entitle him from claiming the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the constitution. From the table summarising the issuance of notices and receipt of notices it is apparent that the petitioner despite receipt of eight notices through his son, daughter and wife did not bother to appear in the proceedings. It seems that the petitioner was being over-clever and was watching the proceedings of which he was well-aware. A further indication of the fact that he did received the notices and was well aware of them is the fact that when a copy of the order dated 28. 12. 1995 passed by the Estate officer was served on the petitioner s wife on 13. 3. 1996, he immediately reacted to it and moved the application for setting it aside. When the petitioner received the copy of the order dated 28. 12. 1995 which was served upon him through his wife, how could he then say that notices/call letters which were received by his wife earlier had not reached him? The notices were issued and received during April, 1990 to February/march, 1993. A period of almost 3 years! The Estate Officer gave repeated opportunities to the petitioner to enter appearance and place his evidence and submissions. The petitioner, despite being aware of the notices did not even once bother to appear before the Estate Officer or to even make enquiries as to what these notices were which were being repeatedly sent to him and were received by one or the other adult member of his family. He cannot now be heard to say that he was not granted any opportunity of hearing. ( 20 ) THUS, for several reasons this petition must fail. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.