JUDGMENT P.G. Agarwal, J. 1. The appellant before us is the owner of Aenakhal Tea. Estate. They instituted Title Suit. No. 38/1986 in the court of Munsif No. (I), Hailakandi against the respondent Bhagawat Sonar (since deceased) praying for a decree of eviction of the defendant and delivery of khas possession to the plaintiff by removing all structures from the suit land described in the schedule to the plaint. The case of the appellant plaintiff, in brief, is that they are the owner of the suit land and the defendant was allowed to occupy the same temporarily with the condition that he will vacate the same as and when asked by the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, the defendant, was occupying the land as a licensee. The plaintiff required the land for construction of labour quarters and when the defendant was asked to vacate the same, he refused to do so and hence, the suit. 2. The suit was resisted by the defendant by filing a written statement, stating inter alia, that they are in possession of the suit land for about 100 years as it was occupied by their forefathers and they are in possession by virtue of right of adverse possession and it has ripened to title. The trial court decreed the suit whereupon the defendant preferred Title Appeal No. 19 of 1992 before the Assistant District Judge, Hailakandi and vide impugned judgment and decree, the appellate court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and hence, the present second appeal. 3. Before proceeding further it may be mentioned that during the pendency of the second appeal, the respondent defendant died and his legal heirs were brought on record. 4. In this case, at the time of admission of the appeal, the following substantial questions of law were formulated :- 1. Whether the learned lower appellate court committed 'error of law in not relying on Ext. 1 (Register) which is regularly prepared and maintained for day to day business of plaintiff and the relevant entry thereof being proved? 2. Whether the learned appellate court below committed error of law in holding Ext. 1 as prepared mala fide merely on the ground that there is no scope for endorsement against the entries? 3. 1 (Register) which is regularly prepared and maintained for day to day business of plaintiff and the relevant entry thereof being proved? 2. Whether the learned appellate court below committed error of law in holding Ext. 1 as prepared mala fide merely on the ground that there is no scope for endorsement against the entries? 3. Whether the learned lower appellate court committed error of law in shifting the burden on the plaintiff for disproving the plea of adverse possession taken by the defendant although the defendant failed to prove the same? 4. Whether the learned lower appellate court committed error of law in not declaring the right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the suit land ? 5. Whether the learned appellate court below committed error of law in holding that the defendant acquired right title and interest by adverse possession merely due to the fact of long possession ? 6. Whether the findings of the lower appellate court are perverse ? 7. Whether the impugned lower appellate courts judgment is in violation of Order 51 Rule 31 of CPC? 5. Mr. N. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that although as many as seven substantial questions of law were formulated, there are only two vital questions for deciding the fate of the second appeal. 6. In this case, the defendant has raised the plea of adverse possession and hence the question for determination is whether the defendant has succeeded in establishing the plea of adverse possession without establishing the required ingredients of such plea. In a recent case of Santosh Hazari v. Puruahottani Tiwari, reported in the Apex Court has held that the court is not bound by the initial question framed and may hear any other questions. It was also held that improper functioning of the first appellate court also amounts to substantial question of law. We therefore propose to examine and consider the two substantial questions of law as regards adverse possession and evidentiary value of Exhibit 2. 7. On perusal or the pleadings of the respondent defendant, we find that he has merely stated that they are in possession of the land since the days of their forefathers. There is no dispute at the Bar that the land in question belongs to the plaintiff company. 7. On perusal or the pleadings of the respondent defendant, we find that he has merely stated that they are in possession of the land since the days of their forefathers. There is no dispute at the Bar that the land in question belongs to the plaintiff company. The law regarding adverse possession is more or less well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court as well as this court. It has been well settled that mere long possession does not amount to adverse possession and the party claiming adverse possession must establish that his possession was hostile to the original owner. 8. We have perused the evidence on record and find that none of the witnesses of the defendant anywhere stated their possession to be hostile to the real owner. Even in the pleadings the defendant nowhere claimed that their possession has become adverse. The law is well settled that the onus is on the person, who claims adverse possession against the real title owner. However, we find that the appellate court in total disregard of the settled proposition of law, had shifted the burden to the plaintiff and in spite of any evidence on record, held that the plea of adverse possession stands established. The plaintiff has produced witness to show that the defendant came to occupy the suit land in 1976 only and some neighbours have been produced and they have supported the plaintiffs case. We have perused the evidence on record and find absolutely no material in support of the plea of adverse possession. In the case of Meethiyan Sidhiqu v. Muhammed Kunju Pareeth Kutty and Ors. reported in the Apex Court held :- "It is, therefore, clear from the above facts that unless there is a specific plea and proof that the appellant has disclaimed his right and asserted hostile title and possession to the knowledge of the respondent within the statutory period and the latter acquiesced to it, he cannot succeed to have it established that he perfected his right by prescription. The High Court has taken the fact that there is neither a plea nor proof in this behalf. We cannot find any infirmity in this finding. Under these circumstances, the finding that the appellant has perfected his title by prescription is clearly illegal. The High Court has taken the fact that there is neither a plea nor proof in this behalf. We cannot find any infirmity in this finding. Under these circumstances, the finding that the appellant has perfected his title by prescription is clearly illegal. In this case we are concerned only with the validity of the sale in respect of the share of the respondent plaintiff and not of the share of the mother." 9. In view of the cryptic pleadings and in the absence of evidence to establish the requirement of subsisting claim for possession, we hold that the appellate court has failed to appreciate the evidence in proper perspective said the finding that the defendant had acquired title by adverse possession and a perverse finding. 10. The plaintiff in support of their plea stated that the defendant is a licensee for which they had led oral and documentary evidence. They have produced a register for registration of licensee in Aenakhal Tea Estate maintained in regular course of business which was exhibited as Ext. 2 in the suit. The relevant entry Ext. 2(1) shows the name of the defendant as a licensee. The evidence was accepted by the trial court. However, the appellate court observed as follows :- "21. On careful examination of Ext. 21 find it is not genuine as claimed by the respondent plaintiff because I marked some front pages are more dirty than the latter leaves of the register. It seems to me by very careful manner some sketches of very mild and removed blackish are used in the leaves of the register. It is not naturally old register. I doubt the genuineness of the contents also. 22. It must be looked into this point that this register is maintained one sidedly. There are so many particulars in the register along with remark but there is no particulars as to the endorsements of the licensees. It is so important register which cannot be one sided. If it is readly genuine there ought to have been endorsements of the licensees also. The remark columns are quite planck. The garden management is an intellectual agency. The licensees are needy. More, the respondent/plaintiff had he upper hand maintaining the register of licensees. To make it a perfect register of licensees the respondent/plaintiff are aware that there should be endorsements of licensees. The remark columns are quite planck. The garden management is an intellectual agency. The licensees are needy. More, the respondent/plaintiff had he upper hand maintaining the register of licensees. To make it a perfect register of licensees the respondent/plaintiff are aware that there should be endorsements of licensees. Otherwise it will not be a valid one to be used as genuine. If cannot be one sided. Hence non-appearance of the endorsement of the licences in the relevant register which itself doubtful lead to think that the names of the appellant/defendant are malafidely entered into this doubtful register." 11. We have perused the document (Ext. 2) and from the evidence on record we find that this register was maintained by the garden in the usual course of business. We find no force in the observations of the appellate court as stated above, as because the first page of any register will definitely be dirtier than the other unused pages. Further, there is no scope of endorsement by the licensee on all the documents, registers maintained by the company in usual course of business. We, therefore, find that the appellate court has thrown out the register on extraneous and non-existing grounds. The genuineness of Ext. 2 was not challenged in any mariner and we hold that the said documents/register is a genuine document and the entries are relevant entries to hold that the defendant was a licensee of the plaintiff company. 12. As the Plaintiff has been able to establish that the defendant was a mere licensee and as the plea of Adverse Possession is not established, we answer the questions in favour of the appellant and hold that Appellant-Plaintiff is entitled to decree as prayed for. 13. In view of the above, the second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the appellate court is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court is restored, there will, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed