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2003 DIGILAW 503 (KAR)

GANGALAXMAMMA v. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, BANGALORE

2003-06-27

N.K.JAIN, S.ABDUL NAZEER

body2003
S. ABDUL NAZEER, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an intra-Court appeal filed by Smt. Gangalaxmamma, challenging the legality of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, in w. P. No. 46238 of 1999, dated 4-2-2002. ( 2 ) FOR the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to by their respective ranks before the learned Single Judge. ( 3 ) THE petitioner is the widow of one" late R. Krishnappa, who was working in the Police Department and later, retired as a Sub-Inspector. She has filed the writ petition challenging the order passed by the respondents dated 14-12-1999 and 18-12-1999 respectively, and for certain other reliefs. ( 4 ) IN the writ petition, the petitioner has contended that she was residing along with her husband and children at house No. 1715, 31st Cross, Rajajinagar, Bangalore, for the past over 20 years. According to her, she has taken the house on rent from one Annaiah Naidu, in whose name the khata stands in the Corporation. It is her case that the whereabouts of Annaiah Naidu is not known since 15 years, and that when she came to know that the said house belongs to Karnataka Housing board, she has applied for allotment of the said house in her favour. It is contended that the Police Department has no authority to evict her from the said premises. ( 5 ) THE respondents have filed their objections. It is stated in the objections that the husband of the petitioner was working as a Sub-Inspector of Police at Kadugondanahalli Police Station. He had retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31-8-1998 and died on 12-6-1999. The premises in question is a Police Quarters, allotted to him when he was in service. The Department was deducting rents from his salary, till he was in service. The husband of the petitioner sought time to vacate the premises after his retirement, which was granted till 26-4-1999. Further request for time was rejected, since there is no provision to extend the time. The respondents have justified the action taken by them to evict the petitioner from the premises in question. ( 6 ) THE learned Single Judge, after hearing both sides, has rejected the said writ petition on 4-2-2002. However, the learned Single Judge has granted time to vacate the premises till 31-5-2002. The respondents have justified the action taken by them to evict the petitioner from the premises in question. ( 6 ) THE learned Single Judge, after hearing both sides, has rejected the said writ petition on 4-2-2002. However, the learned Single Judge has granted time to vacate the premises till 31-5-2002. ( 7 ) ON 13-5-2002, notice on the application for condonation of delay was issued. Learned Additional Government Advocate sought time on 27-5-2002, then again on 30-5-2002. In the meanwhile, status quo as it existed then was ordered to be maintained. On 17-9-2002, delay in filing the appeal was condoned. On 1-4-2003, it was found that as no notice on the main matter was issued and the learned Counsel for the appellant was also not in a position to argue the matter, the interim order granted on 30-5-2002 was discharged. An application-I. A. No. II was moved. However, on 17-4-2003 notice was ordered on the main matter to the learned Additional Government Advocate and it was ordered that in case after discharging the status quo order, the Government has not executed the order, the status quo as it existed on that day should be maintained and the matter may be listed on 9-6-2003 for final hearing at preliminary stage. However, the case was adjourned on 9-6-2003 and then again on 16-6-2003. Today, it has come up before us. ( 8 ) IN the appeal, the appellant/petitioner has filed an application raising additional grounds. It is stated in the application that during the lifetime of Krishnappa, the said house was taken on rent from one Annaiah Naidu, the Khatedar of the said property. The appellant has produced certain notices issued by the Corporation and some correspon- dence made by the petitioner with the Housing Board. ( 9 ) WE have heard Sri K. N. Subba Reddy, learned Counsel for the appellant and Sri M. N. Sheshadri, learned Additional Government Advocate for respondents. ( 10 ) THE learned Additional Government Advocate has made available the original records. A perusal of the record shows that the husband of the petitioner R. Krishnappa, retired on 31-8-1998, as a Sub-Inspector of Police. ( 10 ) THE learned Additional Government Advocate has made available the original records. A perusal of the record shows that the husband of the petitioner R. Krishnappa, retired on 31-8-1998, as a Sub-Inspector of Police. Three days prior to his retirement, i. e. , on 28-10-1998, he has written a letter to the Additional Police Commissioner (Administration), requesting him to extend three months' time to vacate the premises in question, on the ground that his children are studying in the nearby schools and colleges. He admits that the said premises is a Police Quarters. The said letter reads as follows: ( 11 ) CONSIDERING his request, the respondents permitted him to stay in the said premises from 29-10-1998 to 26-1-1999, upon payment of penal rent, in accordance with the rules applicable for the said purpose. He sought further extension of time by three months by his letter dated 7-1-1999, which was also allowed by the respondents, subject to the usual conditions and he was permitted to stay till 26-4-1999. Since he did not vacate the said premises on the extended date, the Department has issued reminders to vacate the premises. He died on 12-6-1999. His son, K. Ravikumar, by his letter dated 5-7-1999 sought time to vacate the premises stating that in view of his father's death, they are in great difficulty and that they require more time. It is admitted in the said letter that the premises in question is Police Quarters. The Department has considered the said request and granted one year's time to vacate the premises, subject to payment of penal rent. After the expiry of the said period of one year, the Department has again reminded the family members of late Krishnappa to vacate the premises. Once again, K. Ravikumar, by his letter dated 24-12-1999 has sought three more months' time on the ground that he has completed his M. B. B. S. Degree and that he is preparing to appear for an Entrance Test for a Postgraduate course in Medicine. The Department by the endorsement dated 28-12-1999 has finally granted one month's time to vacate the premises. It is also stated in the said endorsement that if they fail to vacate the premises within the said date, action will be taken for their eviction from the said premises. The Department by the endorsement dated 28-12-1999 has finally granted one month's time to vacate the premises. It is also stated in the said endorsement that if they fail to vacate the premises within the said date, action will be taken for their eviction from the said premises. Since, the occupants of the said premises did not vacate the premises accordingly, action was taken for their eviction from the said premises. ( 12 ) THE writ petition is filed by the widow of Krishnappa contending that they are tenants under one Annaiah Naidu, in respect of the said premises for more than twenty years and that the house belongs to the Housing Board. It is relevant to note here that the petitioner has not produced any lease deed or rent receipt issued by Annaiah Naidu, nor has she produced any document of title of Annaiah Naidu, in respect of the said property. It is contended that the khata of the said property stands in favour of Annaiah Naidu. Certain notices issued by the corporation have been produced. Neither Annaiah Naidu nor the Housing board are made parties to the writ petition. It is to be stated here that by no stretch of imagination, Khata' can be made a basis for conferring the title of the said property in favour of Annaiah Naidu. ( 13 ) BE that as it may, the question for consideration is whether the petitioner can be permitted to deny the title of the Police Department in respect of the premises in question. From the records, it is clear that the husband of the petitioner was allotted the said Police Quarters. The rents were deducted from his salary till the date of his retirement. In his letters referred to above, he has categorically admitted that the said premises is a Police Quarters and sought extension of time and the Department was kind enough to grant time, considering his hardship. After the death of Krishnappa, his son K. Ravikumar sought time pleading hardship. The Department has accordingly extended the time. After the expiry of the said time, wife of Krishnappa, files a writ petition denying the title of the Police Department while claiming tenancy under one Annaiah Naidu, without production of any documents supporting the said claim. After the death of Krishnappa, his son K. Ravikumar sought time pleading hardship. The Department has accordingly extended the time. After the expiry of the said time, wife of Krishnappa, files a writ petition denying the title of the Police Department while claiming tenancy under one Annaiah Naidu, without production of any documents supporting the said claim. ( 14 ) LEARNED Additional Government Advocate contends before us that the petitioner cannot deny the title of the Department because they have put the petitioner's husband in possession of the said quarters and that the petitioner cannot have any better right than her husband had. He further contends that in view of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, she is estopped from denying the title of the Department. Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act states that a tenant is estopped from denying his landlord's title to the property. Similarly, a licensee is also barred from denying the title of his licenser when such licence was given. In the instant case, the petitioner cannot be permitted to deny the title of the department at this belated stage. ( 15 ) SRI KN. Subba Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the department cannot evict her from the premises as per the notices issued. He states that they have to take action in accordance with the provisions of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. No such contention has been raised in the writ petition or in the appeal. ( 16 ) THE learned Additional Government Advocate contends that the action initiated by the respondents is referable to Section 30 of the Karnataka Police Act of 1963 ('act', for short ). For ready reference, Section 30 of the Act reads as under:"30. Occupation of and liability to vacate premises provided for Police Officers. (1) Any Police Officer occupying any premises provided by the Government for his residence (a) shall occupy the same subject to such conditions and terms as may, generally or in special cases, be specified by the Government; and (b) shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, vacate the same on his ceasing to be a Police officer, or whenever the Government in this behalf thinks it necessary and expedient to require him to do so. (2) If any person who is bound or required under sub-section (1) to vacate any premises fails to do so, the Government or any officer authorised by it in this behalf may order such person to vacate the premises and may direct any Police Officer with such assistance as may be necessary to enter upon the premises and remove therefrom any person found therein and to take possession of the premises and deliver the same to any person specified in the direction". ( 17 ) CLAUSE (a) to sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act states that the Police Officer occupying any premises provided by the Government for his residence is subject to such conditions and terms as may be specified by the Government. Clause (b) to sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act states that any Police Officer occupying such premises shall vacate the same on ceasing to be a Police Officer or'whenever the government in this behalf thinks it necessary and expedient to require him to do so, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. Sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Act empowers the government or any officer authorised by it to order such person to vacate the premises, if such person who is required under sub-section (1) to vacate any premises fails to do so. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act starts with a non obstante clause. The said section makes it clear that the right given to the Government or any officer authorised by it to order eviction of a premises, occupied by a Police Officer is notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force. It is obvious, the clause has an overriding effect. It follows, therefore, that the law gives right to the Government or any Officer authorised by it in this behalf to order such person to vacate the premises, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if the conditions in the section are fulfilled. To hold otherwise, would be making the non obstante clause redundant. Therefore, it is futile to contend that the petitioner has to be evicted in accordance with the provisions of the karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. To hold otherwise, would be making the non obstante clause redundant. Therefore, it is futile to contend that the petitioner has to be evicted in accordance with the provisions of the karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act. Hence, we are of the view that the action initiated by the Department is in accordance with law. ( 18 ) THE jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary in nature. Considering the entire aspect of the matter, the learned Single Judge has refused to exercise the discretion in favour of the petitioner. We do not find any error in the order of the learned Single Judge. The time granted by the learned Single Judge expired on 31-5-2002 and thereafter also till date, that is about 12 (twelve) months have passed. ( 19 ) UNDER the circumstances, 10 (ten) days time is granted (i. e. , till 7-7-2003) to vacate the premises in question from today, subject to payment of arrears of penal rent, if any, till this date and subject to payment of penal rent till 7-7-2003, for the use and occupation of the premises. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .