ORDER : Y.K. Sabharwal, J. This appeal has been filed by the State against the judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court. The respondent was convicted for the offence under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and life imprisonment was imposed on him by judgment and order of the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Dharwad. 2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that deceased, Suresh Ghodke, a cobbler was done to death by the respondent. The accused for some time had worked under the deceased. There were some differences between the deceased and one Shankar. The deceased tried to assault Shankar on which the accused intervened, whereupon the accused was slapped by the deceased. On this account the accused stopped working under the deceased and bore a grudge against the deceased and wanted to take revenge. On 5-8-1984, at about 9.00 p.m., after taking meals, the deceased went out to purchase pan from the shop of PW 10. When the deceased was returning after chewing pan and was still at some distance from his house, the respondent-accused, near a neem tree, suddenly attacked the deceased and assaulted him with a rambigi (an instrument used by a cobbler for cutting leather). The deceased was given 3-4 blows by the accused and he ran away thereafter. The deceased sustained injuries, went to the close-by house of one of his relatives (PW 7) and fell down on the bed in the said house. The incident was witnessed by PW 1 wife of the deceased, PW 6 sister of the deceased and PW 7. The FIR was recorded at 10.30 p.m. The accused was named in the FIR as having assaulted the deceased. 3. The trial court, on appreciation of evidence, convicted and sentenced the accused as aforesaid. The judgment and order of the trial court has been set aside by the High Court and the accused acquitted by the impugned judgment, for, in the view of the High Court there is discrepancy in the time and place of occurrence, delay in forwarding of FIR to the Magistrate and doubt about the source of light so as to identify the accused. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Using a mild expression and applying any standard of interference while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained as the findings recorded therein are wholly and entirely contrary to the record. 5. Regarding the discrepancy of time and place of occurrence, the High Court has referred to the testimony of PW 10 and PW 7. In respect of the testimony of PW 10 from whose shop the deceased had purchased pan, the High Court has stated that according to the said witness (PW 10) the deceased had purchased pan at about 7.30 or 7.45 p.m. But according to the case of the prosecution and the testimony of PW 7, the incident had taken place at 9.00 p.m. Therefore, the High Court has expressed the view that the time of occurrence as per one witness is 7.30 or 7.45 p.m. and according to another witness 9.00 p.m., and therefore, the discrepancy of time is vital and material affecting the case of the prosecution. Without going into the question whether on the facts and circumstances it can be said that discrepancy of about one hour is material or vital, we find that, in fact, the so-called discrepancy is non-existent. PW 10 in the very next breath after deposing that the deceased had purchased pan from his shop at about 7.30 or 7.45 p.m. has stated that he heard some galata at about 8.45 p.m. and when he came out he learnt that the deceased Suresh had been taken to the hospital. He had further deposed that he did not have a watch and had given the time approximately. The High Court has not even referred to the statements of the other two eyewitnesses PW 1 and PW 6 but has preferred to come to the conclusion that there is discrepancy of time and place of occurrence. In respect of place of occurrence, the High Court is of the view that since bloodstained earth from near the neem tree had not been seized, there is a serious doubt about the place of occurrence. On this count, the judgment of the High Court is self-contradictory. In respect of place of occurrence, the High Court is of the view that since bloodstained earth from near the neem tree had not been seized, there is a serious doubt about the place of occurrence. On this count, the judgment of the High Court is self-contradictory. Bloodstained earth from close to the neem tree had been seized has been noticed by the High Court while narrating facts in the earlier part of its judgment but later while finding fault with the judgment of the trial court, it has held that such earth was not seized. The finding is even contrary to the evidence of PW 19, the investigating officer who has deposed that he had seized the bloodstained and ordinary earth. PW 19 was not cross-examined on this aspect. The High Court has not given any reason, whatsoever, for disbelieving the other two eyewitnesses PW 1 and PW 6. In fact, their testimony has not been adverted to despite the fact that the trial court relying upon their testimony as also the testimony of other witnesses had reached the conclusion that the prosecution had proved its case against the accused. 6. Regarding delay in sending FIR, the High Court states that although there has been no cross-examination on the aspect of delay in sending the FIR to the Magistrate, but a possibility of some deliberation before registration of FIR cannot be ruled out as a result of delay in sending the FIR. We fail to understand how the High Court held that there was delay in sending of FIR to the Magistrate or there was any possibility of deliberation before the matter was reported to the police. The incident had taken place at 9.00 p.m. The deceased was taken to the hospital. He was declared to have been brought dead to the hospital. The FIR was recorded at 10.30 p.m. It was handed over to the constable at 11.30 p.m. and within one-and-a-half hours during midnight the FIR reached the Magistrate. All these facts have been noticed by the trial court. None has been adverted to by the High Court. The High Court has not held that the trial court was in error in recording the facts regarding the FIR. The findings of the trial court on this count have not been shown to be incorrect by the learned counsel for the respondent. None has been adverted to by the High Court. The High Court has not held that the trial court was in error in recording the facts regarding the FIR. The findings of the trial court on this count have not been shown to be incorrect by the learned counsel for the respondent. Clearly, therefore, the conclusion reached, without any factual basis, that there was delay in sending of FIR to the Magistrate is nothing but perverse. 7. The conclusion of the High Court that there was any difficulty in the identification of the accused is again wholly unsustainable. It is established from evidence that there was an electric pole near the place of occurrence and also that there was a pan shop, but the High Court concludes that since the light could be spread in the radius of 100 ft, only figures could be seen distinguishing man from animal and that light was not sufficient to identify a person from a distance. There is no basis for such a conclusion. PWs 1, 6 and 7 are the eyewitnesses of the occurrence. The accused was not a stranger. He was earlier working with the deceased. Without adverting to these facts, the High Court held that there is doubt about the source of light so as to identify the accused. We have also perused the testimony of PW 7. We find no contradiction, let alone material contradiction, in her testimony. The same is the position in respect of the testimony of PW 1 and PW 6. 8. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are unable to sustain the impugned judgment of the High Court. Thus, allowing this appeal, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment and order of the trial court. We have been informed that as a result of execution of non-bailable warrants, which were directed to be issued while granting leave, the respondent is already in jail. He will so continue so as to undergo the sentence awarded by the trial court. Appeal allowed.