ORDER 1. WHEN THE NOTICES WERE ISSUED TO THE RESPONDENTS PURSUANT TO THE ORDER DATED 25-9-1993, CHARGING FROM THEM LICENCE FEE FOR OCCUPATION OF THE RESPECTIVE HOUSES WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN TO THEM ON RENT-FREE BASIS, THEY APPROACHED THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CHALLENGING THE SAME, CONTENDING THAT PROVIDING OF RENT-FREE ACCOMMODATION WAS A CONDITION OF SERVICE; THE APPELLANTS COULD NOT VARY A CONDITION OF SERVICE TO THEIR DISADVANTAGE ON THE BASIS OF CLARIFICATION GIVEN BY THE FINANCE MINISTRY IN 1990. FURTHER, SUCH ACTION COULD NOT BE TAKEN WITHOUT GIVING ANY NOTICE OR OPPORTUNITY. THE TRIBUNAL FOUND THAT THE NOTICES ISSUED TO THE RESPONDENTS CHARGING FROM THEM LICENCE FEE, WITHOUT GIVING ANY OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW CAUSE, WAS BAD IN LAW. IN THAT VIEW, THE ORDERS THAT WERE IMPUGNED WERE QUASHED, BUT, HOWEVER, LIBERTY WAS RESERVED TO THE APPELLANTS TO PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW, IF SO DESIRED. AGGRIEVED BY THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL, THE APPELLANTS ARE BEFORE US IN THIS APPEAL. 2. THE RESPONDENTS, THOUGH SERVED, HAVE REMAINED UNREPRESENTED. 3. THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANTS CONTENDED THAT PROVIDING OF RENT-FREE ACCOMMODATION WAS NOT A CONDITION OF SERVICE OF THE RESPONDENTS AND THE TRIBUNAL COMMITTED AN ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PROVIDING OF RENT-FREE ACCOMMODATION WAS A CONDITION OF SERVICE. HE DREW OUR ATTENTION TO CERTAIN DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF HIS SUBMISSIONS. HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO DISPUTE THAT NO OPPORTUNITY WAS GIVEN TO THE RESPONDENTS BEFORE ORDERS WERE ISSUED DEMANDING LICENCE FEE FROM THEM. 4. APART FROM THE FACT WHETHER PROVIDING RENT-FREE ACCOMMODATION WAS A CONDITION OF SERVICE OF THE RESPONDENTS OR NOT, THE FACT REMAINED THAT THEY WERE PROVIDED RENT-FREE ACCOMMODATION WHEN THEY JOINED SERVICE. THEY HAVE BEEN IN OCCUPATION OF THE RESPECTIVE HOUSES FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. EVEN IF THE APPELLANTS WANTED TO CHARGE LICENCE FEE, THEY COULD DO SO ONLY AFTER GIVING A SHOW-CAUSE NOTICE TO THE RESPONDENTS AND AFTER CONSIDERING THEIR REPRESENTATION. 5. IN OUR VIEW, THE TRIBUNAL ON THIS GROUND WAS RIGHT IN QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER AND GIVING LIBERTY TO THE APPELLANTS TO PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AFRESH, IF SO DESIRED. THIS BEING THE POSITION, WE DO NOT WISH TO EXPRESS ONE WAY OR THE OTHER ON THE MERITS OF THE CONTENTIONS ADVANCED BEFORE US. 5. IN OUR VIEW, THE TRIBUNAL ON THIS GROUND WAS RIGHT IN QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER AND GIVING LIBERTY TO THE APPELLANTS TO PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AFRESH, IF SO DESIRED. THIS BEING THE POSITION, WE DO NOT WISH TO EXPRESS ONE WAY OR THE OTHER ON THE MERITS OF THE CONTENTIONS ADVANCED BEFORE US. ALL THAT WE CAN SAY IS THAT ALL THE CONTENTIONS MUST BE LEFT OPEN TO BE URGED AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE BEFORE AN APPROPRIATE FORUM, IF NEED ARISES. SINCE THE TRIBUNAL HAS GIVEN LIBERTY TO THE APPELLANTS TO PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AFRESH AFTER GIVING NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO THE RESPONDENTS, WE CANNOT FIND FAULT WITH THE IMPUGNED ORDER. IN THIS VIEW, WE FIND NO MERIT IN THE APPEAL. CONSEQUENTLY, IT STANDS DISMISSED, BUT, WITH NO ORDER AS TO COSTS. 6. WE MAY ADD THAT ALL THE CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES ARE LEFT OPEN TO BE URGED BEFORE THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING THE QUESTION WHETHER PROVIDING RENT-FREE ACCOMMODATION IS A CONDITION OF SERVICE OR NOT.