BILAL NAZKI, J. ( 1 ) HEARD learned Counsel for the parties. ( 2 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 was facing charges of misconduct and after an enquiry into three charges the Enquiry Officer found Charge No. 1 was proved, Charge No. 2 not proved and Charge No. 3 partly proved. On the basis of these charges, the department passed an order of compulsory retirement of respondent No. 1. An appeal was filed by respondent No. 1,which was also rejected. Thereafter, respondent No. 1 went to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad, in o. A. No. 812 of 1994, which was allowed. Hence the writ petition by the petitioners. ( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners submits that the order of punishment has been set aside by the Tribunal mainly on three grounds and all the three grounds were not available to the Tribunal. He submits that the Tribunal agreed with the contention of respondent No. 1 that the order of punishment was passed by an authority who did not have the power to pass such an order. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that certain documents were supplied to 1st respondent on which the Department was relying, but sufficient time was not granted to him to go through those documents and prepare his defence in cross-examination of witnesses. The Tribunal also found that certain documents were relied upon by the Enquiry Officer, which were inherently bad and could not have been relied upon. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that the order of punishment was passed by the Director of Postal Services who, according to the learned counsel, was not a designated authority for passing the order of punishment in terms of central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,1965 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules" ). According to him, the competent authority to pass an order of punishment against respondent No. 1 was the divisional Superintendent and not the Director of Postal Services. ( 5 ) IT is the admitted case of the parties that the Director of Postal Services was not the designated authority to award punishment. But he was a higher authority to the designated authority. Therefore, the question which we have to resolve is whether the authority superior to the authority designated for awarding punishment can award punishment? ( 5 ) IT is the admitted case of the parties that the Director of Postal Services was not the designated authority to award punishment. But he was a higher authority to the designated authority. Therefore, the question which we have to resolve is whether the authority superior to the authority designated for awarding punishment can award punishment? ( 6 ) THE restriction is imposed in Article 311 of the Constitution of India itself that an order of removal or reduction in rank cannot be passed by an authority which is subordinate to the appointing authority. Keeping in view the mandate of article 311 of the Constitution of India, it can safely be said that there is no bar for an authority, who is higher in rank to the designated/appointing authority, to pass an order of punishment. However, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has drawn our attention to a judgment of the Supreme Court in surjit Ghosh v. Chairman and M. D, United Commercial Bank ( AIR 1995 SC 1053 ) to canvass before us that an authority who is higher in rank to the designated authority had no jurisdiction to pass an order of punishment. We have gone through that judgment and we do not agree with the contention of learned counsel for respondent No. 1 with regard to the interpretation of the judgment. A delinquent had been awarded punishment by a General Manager. The General manager in terms of the Rules was the appellate authority in case of punishments and the authority designated for awarding punishment was an Officer subordinate to the General Manager, and after punishment was awarded by that authority an appeal would lie to the General Manager. Therefore, in the case before the supreme Court, the delinquent official had lost the right to file appeal. Since right to file appeal is a valuable right and this right one cannot be deprived of, the Supreme Court passed the judgment which it had passed in the said case. But in the present case, in our view, no prejudice is caused to respondent No. 1. No doubt, he was punished by an authority higher in rank to the designated authority i. e. , the Director of Postal Services. But in the present case, in our view, no prejudice is caused to respondent No. 1. No doubt, he was punished by an authority higher in rank to the designated authority i. e. , the Director of Postal Services. But, the statute provides an appeal against the order of the Director of Postal Services as well and respondent No. 1 filed the appeal and availed of the opportunity of filing appeal. The net effect is that the petitioner had been punished by an authority higher than designated authority without loosing right to appeal, and as a matter of fact, the appeal was heard by a higher authority. Since no prejudice is caused to respondent No. 1, we do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that the order passed by the Director of Postal services cannot be sustained. We are fortified in our view with the judgment of the Supreme Court brought to our notice by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in Balbir Chand v. Food Corporation of India Limited (1997) 3 SCC 371 ). In this judgment, the Supreme Court categorically held that it is settled law that an order passed by an authority higher than the designated authority in the Rules would not be without jurisdiction and orders of punishment cannot be quashed on that ground unless prejudice is shown to have caused to the delinquent officer concerned. In that judgment, the Supreme Court considered its earlier judgment in Surjit Ghosh s case, referred to above, as well. The following paragraph of the judgment in Balbir Chand s case (supra) is reproduced:". . . . . It is now a well-settled legal position that an authority lower than the appointing authority cannot take any decision in the matter of disciplinary action. But there is no prohibition in law that the higher authority should not take decision or impose the penalty as the primary authority in the matter of disciplinary action. On that basis, it cannot be said that there will be discrimination violating Article 14 of the Constitution or causing material prejudice. In the judgment relied on by the counsel, it would appear that in the rules, officer lower in hierarchy was the disciplinary authority but the appellate authority had passed the order removing the officer from service. Thereby, the appellate remedy provided under the Rules was denied. In the judgment relied on by the counsel, it would appear that in the rules, officer lower in hierarchy was the disciplinary authority but the appellate authority had passed the order removing the officer from service. Thereby, the appellate remedy provided under the Rules was denied. In those circumstances, this Court opined that it caused prejudice to the delinquent as he would have otherwise availed of the appellate remedy and his right to consider his case by an appellate authority on question of fact was not available. But it cannot be laid as a rule of law that in all circumstances the higher authority should consider and decide the case imposing penalty as a primary authority under the Rules. In this case, a right of second appeal/revision also was provided to the Board. In fact, appeal was preferred to the Board. The Board elaborately considered the matter through the Chairman. It is not violative of Article 14of the Constitution". ( 7 ) FOR these reasons, we find that the Tribunal was in error in coming to the conclusion that the order of punishment was passed by an incompetent authority and on this score the order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained. ( 8 ) COMING to the two other grounds the Tribunal found in favour of respondent no. 1, we do not want to reappreciate the evidence as it is not within the permissive limits in the exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the constitution of India to reappreciate the evidence which has been appreciated by a Departmental authority created under a statute in a disciplinary proceeding. Law is well-settled that the Court would intervene only if a case is shown of no evidence. ( 9 ) THE allegations leveled against respondent No. 1 on the basis of which charges were framed were proved during the enquiry. The three Articles of charges framed against respondent No. 1 read thus:"article-I:- Sri A. Sudhakar while holding charge of office of the Marrimustial so as SPM failed to issue K. V. Ps for an amount of Rs. 5000/- after accepting the amount of Rs. 5000/- for issue of 5 year KVPs on 18. 5. The three Articles of charges framed against respondent No. 1 read thus:"article-I:- Sri A. Sudhakar while holding charge of office of the Marrimustial so as SPM failed to issue K. V. Ps for an amount of Rs. 5000/- after accepting the amount of Rs. 5000/- for issue of 5 year KVPs on 18. 5. 92 from one Smt. Laxmavva, resident of Marrimustial across Marrimustial P. O counter and thus failed to follow the provisions of Rule 8 read with Rule 7 of KVP Rules 1988 and also failed to maintain integrity and devotion to duty as prescribed in Rule 3 (1) (i) and (ii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules,1964. Article-II:- Sri A. Sudhakar while functioning as SPM, Cherial SO during the period 1987 to 1991 obtained a huge loan of Rs. 20,000/- from Sri b. Veereshalingam, teacher and entered into protracted correspondence about the loan and interest payment etc. , and thereby failed to manage his private affairs reasonably to a standard level and thereby contravened the provisions of Rule 17 of CCS (Conduct)Rules,1964. Article-III:-Sri A. Sudhakar while functioning as S. P. M, Marrimustial SO on 15. 7. 92 failed to take into account an amount of Rs. 5000/- credited by him on 15. 7. 92 vide ACG-67 receipt No. 77 dated 15. 7. 92 and thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty as prescribed in Rule 3 (1) (i) and (ii) of CCS (Conduct)Rules,1964". ( 10 ) THE other ground urged before us and the Tribunal is that the lady who had given the complaint had given a different name than the name she gave when she was examined before the Enquiry Officer. It is admitted that the lady, who gave the complaint was an illiterate woman, had got the complaint written by someone-else and it is not known under what circumstances a different name was shown at her thumb impression in the complaint than the name she gave when she was being examined before the Enquiry Officer. This was known to the delinquent official. Had he got any doubts about the identity of the witness, he could have cross-examined her. In any case, the lady who had appeared before the Enquiry officer categorically stated that on 18. 5. 1992 she had given a sum of Rs. This was known to the delinquent official. Had he got any doubts about the identity of the witness, he could have cross-examined her. In any case, the lady who had appeared before the Enquiry officer categorically stated that on 18. 5. 1992 she had given a sum of Rs. 5,000/- to respondent No. 1/delinquent for issuing Kisan Vikas Patras but the delinquent had failed to give her the said certificates or even return back the money she had given to him even after two months from the date of receipt of money from her. In any case, we are not going to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal on question of such fact. The allegation that sufficient time was not given to peruse certain documents is not borne by record. The documents were given well in advance and as a matter of fact the respondent had not expressed any grievance before the Enquiry Officer that he had not sufficient time to peruse the documents on which the department had relied. ( 11 ) ABOUT the third charge, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that it was partly proved and what was proved was not misconduct but it could have been merely a violation of certain norms. In any case, the order of punishment cannot be interfered with on that ground. The Enquiry Officer also held that this charge was partly proved. ( 12 ) FOR these reasons, the order passed by the Tribunal cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside and the writ petition is allowed. No costs.