JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal under section 30 of the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 (for short 'the Act') is directed against the judgment and award dated 15.2.91 passed by Commissioner, Workmen Compensation, Bikaner (for short 'the Commissioner') whereby the learned Commissioner awarded compensation of Rs. 17,481.44 and directed to deposit the same within sixty days from the date of the judgment, falling which the awarded amount shall carry Interest @ 15% p.a. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and award, the employer Assistant Engineer (Rural Electrification) (for short 'the employer') filed the instant appeal. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the judgment and award impugned as also the material available. 3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant employer that the respondent sustained personal injuries due to the accident out of and in the course of employment on 1.7.77 while attending a complaint of a consumer for jumper-tightening on the electrical pole at village Talanpur, met with an accident and received electric shock. As a result of electric shock, the respondent workman. (for short 'the workman') fell down and sustained injuries. He was treated in the hospital and on 8.7.77, after about a period of one month, he resumed his duty and since then he has been continuously on duty with the employer. The workman filed a claim for compensation before the Commissioner on 1.7.88, i.e. after a lapse of period of 11 years. The claim was not accompanied by an application seeking condonation of delay. 4. Obviously, the claim filed by the workman was time- barred. Section 10(1) of the Act envisages that no claim for compensation shall be entertained by a Commissioner unless notice of the accident has been given in the manner hereinafter provided as soon as practicable after the happening thereof and unless the claim is preferred before him within two years of the occurrence/accident or, in case of death, within two years from the date of death. Fifth proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act provides further that the Commissioner may entertain and decide any claim to compensation in any case notwithstanding that the notice has not been given, or the claim has not been preferred, in due time as provided in this sub-section, if he is satisfied that the failure so to give the notice or prefer the claim, as the case may be, was due to sufficient cause and, therefore, the learned counsel contended that in the instant case, the period of limitation provided by the Act is two years from the date of the accident to file the claim for compensation and if it is preferred beyond the period of two years, then it is for the workman to seek condonation of delay by filing an application showing sufficient cause by which the workman was prevented to file the claim within the period of limitation provided by the Act. 5. In the instant case, according to the learned counsel for the employer, neither the claim was filed within the period of limitation nor the application seeking condonation of delay was filed showing sufficient cause. He further contended that the Commissioner also has not reached to the conclusion that there was sufficient cause preventing the workman to file the claim within the period of limitation. The claim was filed after 11 years from the date of occurrence which has resulted in inordinate delay of 9 years, which according to the learned counsel for the appellant, does not deserve to be condoned. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the employer filed the written statement to the claim case before the Commissioner and seriously disputed the claim by joining various issues, therefore, the parties were at various and joined the issues. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the employer filed the written statement to the claim case before the Commissioner and seriously disputed the claim by joining various issues, therefore, the parties were at various and joined the issues. It was incumbent for the Commissioner to frame proper issues before the trial of the case proceeded and undisputedly, in the instant case, the learned Commissioner filed to frame proper issue on which the parties were at variance, as envisaged ~n rule 28 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1924 (for short 'the Rules') and lastly, it has been contended that the alleged injuries were caused on 1.7.77 and the workman was examined by the Medical Board on 4.10.89, almost after more than a period of 12 years from the date of sustaining the injuries and, therefore, it cannot be said that the opinion given by the Medical Board after 12 years of the injuries would be a conclusive proof thereon. Moreso, in the instant case, the injuries are non-scheduled injuries and to assess the loss of earning capacity for non-scheduled injuries, the qualified medical practitioner is required to prove the loss of earning capacity. He contended that in the instant case, the qualified medical practitioner has not been examined and as such, the injuries have not been proved. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that although the plea of limitation has not been set up as defence in the written statement but it is the duty of the Commissioner to examine the issue of limitation before entertaining the claim. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short 'the Act of 1963') provides that every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period, shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the Commissioner fell in error in entertaining the claim after lapse of period of 9 years beyond expiry of limitation. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court In Sitaram Ramcharan & Ors. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the Commissioner fell in error in entertaining the claim after lapse of period of 9 years beyond expiry of limitation. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court In Sitaram Ramcharan & Ors. v. M.N. Nagrashana, Authority under the Payment of Wages Act for Ahmadabad Area, Ahmadabad & Ors., AIR 1960 SC 260 , wherein the Apex Court held on facts that the failure of the applications to establish sufficient cause for the delay in filing their applications under Section 15(2) after the expiry of the period of limitation, was fatal to their claim. 7. Further reliance was placed on a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajesh Helmandge & Anr., 2001(89) FLR 959 , wherein the Andhra Pradesh High Court, while considering to asses the loss of earning capacity in case of non-scheduled Injury, held that it is mandatory to examine qualified medical practitioner as in case of an injury not specified in Schedule-1 (non-scheduled injuries), the percentage of compensation payable in the case of permanent total disablement as is proportionate to the loss of earning capacity (as assessed by the qualified medial practitioner) permanently caused by the injury, is a clear indication that Schedule-1 does not apply. It was further held that Section 4(1)(c)(i)(ii) and the explanation to the said provisions clearly indicates that the evidence of qualified medical practitioner shall be relevant and the Commissioner shall have due regard to the percentage of compensation payable as assessed by a qualified medical practitioner. Therefore, non-examination of the doctor, who issued medical certificate does not satisfy the requirement of law, because the Tribunal may not be in a position to determine whether the disablement would lead to total loss of earning capacity or whether the workman suffered permanent partial disability, enabling him to discharge normal duties with the employer or any other employer. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent- workman-contended that the injuries sustained by the workman on 1.7.77 during the course of employment of the employer, have not been disputed and, therefore, the claimant is entitled for compensation even if the claim is filed belatedly. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent- workman-contended that the injuries sustained by the workman on 1.7.77 during the course of employment of the employer, have not been disputed and, therefore, the claimant is entitled for compensation even if the claim is filed belatedly. He further contended that the whole trial has taken place with the participation of the employer and, therefore, the Commissioner is deemed to have condoned the delay by exercising the powers conferred in it. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondent has relied on an unreported judgment of this Court in M/s. Vishwajyoti Theatre & Anr. v. Prescribed Authority & Anr., S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4846/2001, decided on 6.5.2002 , wherein this Court, while considering the provisions of Section 28-A of the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishment Act, 1958 (for short 'the Act of 1958'), observed as under: "The petitioner has raised a grievance about the delayed filing of the petition before the Prescribed Authority. If the whole trial has taken place with the participation of the petitioner, then it will be deemed that the power available to the Prescribed Authority for condonation of delay will be deemed to have been exercised. The condonation of delay being a question of fact cannot form basis for an order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, more particularly when the trial was after a contest and the Authority had a right of condonation of delay." 9. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions made at the Bar. In the instant case, undisputedly, the workman sustained injuries on 1.7.77, and after the treatment, he resumed duties on 7.8.77 i.e. after a period of one month from the date of the injuries. The period of limitation for filing the claim for compensation under the Act. is two years. Admittedly, the claim was filed by the workman after 9 years beyond expiry of period of limitation. No application was filed by the workman showing sufficient cause for making the claim beyond limitation and as such, the workman failed to establish sufficient cause for not making the claim within the period of limitation. The learned Commissioner has failed to consider this aspect of the matter. No application was filed by the workman showing sufficient cause for making the claim beyond limitation and as such, the workman failed to establish sufficient cause for not making the claim within the period of limitation. The learned Commissioner has failed to consider this aspect of the matter. Section 3 of the Act of 1963 provides that where the suit, appeal or application Is filed after the prescribed period of limitation, it shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Thus, it casts a duty upon the Commissioner, before entertaining a claim, to see as to whether the claim has been filed within the period of limitation or not and if beyond limitation then workman has to show sufficient cause for making the claim beyond the period of limitation. There is no deeming provision of condonation of delay in the Act. 10. The law of limitation Is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation. The maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium cannot be given go-bye. The time-barred cases should not be entertained by the Courts as the rights, which have accrued to others by reason of delay In approaching the Court, cannot be allowed to be disturbed unless there Is a reasonable explanation for delay. The Privy Council, in General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, AIR 1941 PC 6 , quoted from Tagore Law Lecturs, Edn. 6(1932) Vol. I, p. 256, that a law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly or unjustly 'in particular cases, but where such law has been adopted by the State, it must if unambiguous be applied with stringency. The rule must be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party. The Judge cannot on equitable grounds enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exception not recognised by it. 11. The rule must be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party. The Judge cannot on equitable grounds enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exception not recognised by it. 11. In Vedabai @ Vaijayantabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil & ors., JT 2001 (5) SC 608 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering distinction between the "delay of few days" and 'inordinate delay", held that the distinction must be made between a case where the delay is "inordinate" and a case where the delay is of a "few days." Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudiced to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the letter case, no such consideration may arise. 12. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala & Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 556 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that "the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained." 13. From the above, it emerges that the law of limitation has to be applied with all its rigorous and claim made by an inordinate delay cannot be entertained unless such delay is satisfactorily explained. In the instant case, the respondent not only filed the claim after an inordinate delay of nine years but also could not show any cause much less "sufficient cause" for filing the claim beyond the period of limitation. Thus, the claimant failed to explain the inordinate delay. 14. In the light of the above, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent-workman cannot be of any help. Moreso, it is also distinguishable on the facts as in that case the Court held that the condonation of delay, being a question of fact, cannot form basis of an order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. I have carefully gone through the written statement filed by the employer. The employer has disputed various facts pleaded in the claim and joined the issue. 15. I have carefully gone through the written statement filed by the employer. The employer has disputed various facts pleaded in the claim and joined the issue. Since parties were at variance on various issues, therefore, the Commissioner was required to frame issue/issues for determination as envisaged in rule 28 of the Rules of 1924. Rule 28 reads as under: "28. Framing of issues. - (1) After considering any written statement and the result of any examination of the parties, the Commissioner shall ascertain upon what material propositions of fact or of law the parties are at variance and shall thereupon proceed to frame and record the issues upon which the right decisions of the cases appears to him to depend. (23) In recording the issues, the Commissioner shall distinguish between those issues which in his opinion concern points of facts and those which concern points of law." 16. The judgment impugned nowhere records that the parties were not at variance on the parties did not joint the issue. Under the circumstances, the Commissioner fell in error in holding the trial of the case without framing proper issues arising out of the pleadings of the parties. 17. So far as medical evidence is concerned, the Medical Board examined the workman on 4.10.89 after about more than 12 years from the date of the injuries. The workman resumed duty almost on completion of one month from the date of the injuries showing himself to be fit to undertake the duty and for 12 years, he did not get himself examined by a Medical Board and on examination by the Medical Board, it was opined that the percentage of permanent impairment is 35%. The certificate issued by the Medical Board does not disclose the duration of the injuries. In the instant case, the workman failed to establish the nexus between the injuries sustained on 1.7.77 and the opinion of the Medical Board given on 4.10.89. In the certificate issued by the Medial Board, it is mentioned that (i) there is old compression fracture of Lumber 2nd Vertebdarae healed without any Neurological deficit; (ii) no Neurological deficit in Lower limbs; (iii) Persistent pain aggravated by Trauma and movements; and (iv) There is restriction of movements of spine. In the certificate issued by the Medial Board, it is mentioned that (i) there is old compression fracture of Lumber 2nd Vertebdarae healed without any Neurological deficit; (ii) no Neurological deficit in Lower limbs; (iii) Persistent pain aggravated by Trauma and movements; and (iv) There is restriction of movements of spine. Moreso, the doctor who examined the workman and issued the said certificate, had not been produced and examined before the Commissioner and, therefore, it remained undisclosed as to whether this certificate relates to the injures suffered by the workman on 1.7.77 or subsequent thereto. These events coupled with such an inordinate delay make the case of the claimant more suspicious. Moreso, failure of the claimant to establish sufficient cause for delay of nine years in filing the claim after expiry of period of limitation, is fatal and, therefore, judgment and award under challenge cannot be sustained and requires tope set-aside. 18. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this appeal succeeds and is allowed.`The judgment and award impugned is hereby set-aside. There shall be no order as to costs.Appeal Allowed - Award set aside.. *******