JUDGMENT - MARLAPALLE B.H., J.:-Both these appeals arise from the decrees passed in Special Civil Suit Nos. 265 and 266 of 1991, respectively, by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division at Aurangabad and the said decrees were drawn in terms of the Award made by the Arbitrator. In the first decree, appellant No. 1 Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority, which is a State Government Undertaking, was directed to pay an amount of Rs. 21,08,100/- alongwith interest at the rate of 18% per annum, whereas, in the second decree it was directed to pay an amount of Rs. 19,01,100/- alongwith interest at the rate of 18% per annum for the post pendente lite period. 2. The relevant facts leading to these appeals and which are not in dispute could be set-out as under: Respondent-plaintiff i.e. Rajendra Construction Company a partnership firm, was awarded contract for construction of tenements pursuant to the Tender Notice No. 4 of 1987-88 under the Middle Income Group Scheme and the Work Order was issued on 16-11-1987 with a time limit of 18 and 12 months, respectively. However, the execution of the construction work was delayed. The request for extension was considered from time to time and in the first case, the extension was granted upto 30-11-1990, whereas, in the second case, it was granted upto 31-3-1990. The construction work was finally completed by the date of extention so granted. However, a dispute arose between the parties before, at the time and after payment of final bill. The plaintiff served notices for the recovery of dues in respect of both the works and as the appellants defendants did not relent to the said notices, the above- mentioned special civil suits came to be filed in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Aurangabad, for recovery of amounts mentioned above. 3. The appellants filed their written statement and contested the recovery suits on various grounds and mainly contended that the delay caused in execution of the Work Orders was not attributed to them and the delay caused was solely attributed to the plaintiff-firm. The maintainability of civil suits on the grounds of limitation as well as jurisdiction was also challenged. 4. On 3-9-1993, the trial Court framed similar issues in both the suits including the issues regarding maintainability of the suits. 5. The maintainability of civil suits on the grounds of limitation as well as jurisdiction was also challenged. 4. On 3-9-1993, the trial Court framed similar issues in both the suits including the issues regarding maintainability of the suits. 5. On 5-1-1994, an application at Exhibit 48 in Special Civil Suit No. 266 of 1991 came to be filed by the plaintiff under section 21 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, for referring the disputes to an arbitrator. The appellants defendants filed reply to the said application and consented for appointment of an Arbitrator by suggesting three different names and finally by order dated 6-4-1995, the learned Judge of the trial Court was pleased to pass the following order: "In view of the instant petition for appointment of arbitrator, Shri, S.R. Wadekar, Ex-Chief Engineer, as proposed by the defendants, to be appointed as sole arbitrator to which the plaintiff has no objection. Hence, it is hereby directed that Shri. S.R. Wadekar, Ex-Chief Engineer is appointed as sole arbitrator who shall settle the terms of the agreement along with the record, if any, relevant and necessary. The sole arbitrator shall also collect the record from the Court and shall write Award within 60 days from the date of passing of this order and without any further delay. The plaintiff to deposit necessary sole Arbitrator's fees of Rs. 2,000/- in the Court within the stipulated period." 6. Accordingly, the arbitration proceedings commenced and the plaintiff filed its statement as well as rejoinder thereto. On the other hand, the defendants also filed their reply and rejoinder thereto. It was specifically pleaded by the defendants that the claim for recovery made by the plaintiff firm was not tenable and the delay caused in execution of the work orders was solely attributable to the plaintiff. Various documents were brought on record by both the parties before the Arbitrator in support of their respective claims. The Arbitrator passed his final Award on 17-8-1995 and it came to be filed before the Court under section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, on 5-9-1995 (Exhibit 64) in a sealed envelope. However, the sealed envelope was opened on 16-9-1995 and the defendants filed their objections under section 30 of the Act on 13-10-1995. 7. The Arbitrator passed his final Award on 17-8-1995 and it came to be filed before the Court under section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, on 5-9-1995 (Exhibit 64) in a sealed envelope. However, the sealed envelope was opened on 16-9-1995 and the defendants filed their objections under section 30 of the Act on 13-10-1995. 7. The trial Court heard both the parties, considered the objection petition, accepted the Award made by the Sole Arbitrator and accordingly, the said Award was made rule of the Court. 8. Shri H.T. Joshi, learned Advocate appearing for the appellants-defendants, submitted that the trial Court committed grosserrors in law in accepting the Award made by the sole Arbitrator as the said Award did not give any reasons for the claims allowed and it was totally a non-speaking Award. It was submitted that when in the agreement entered into between the parties for execution of the subject work-orders there was no clause for arbitration and for payment of interest as well, the issues framed by the trial Court were required to be adjudicated by the Arbitrator who substituted the Court and the findings recorded without giving reasons vitiated the entire Award. The directions to pay interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of the Award till payments are finally made have also been objected to by the defendants on the ground that there is no justification for the same and there was no such clause in the agreement and therefore, the Arbitrator was bound by the provisions of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In any case, at the relevant time the rate of interest charged by the nationalised banks on their lendings was not at 18% per annum. 9. Per Contra Shri, H.M. Karwa, learned Advocate for the plaintiff has supported the Award and submitted that the objection petition filed by the defendants before the trial Court on 13-10-1995 was beyond limitation and therefore, it could not have been considered by the trial Court. He took exception to the findings of the trial Court that the objection petition was filed within limitation of 30 days as set out in Article 158 of the Limitation Act, 1963. He took exception to the findings of the trial Court that the objection petition was filed within limitation of 30 days as set out in Article 158 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It was further argued that the arbitrator, being an expert he is not expected to give reasons in support of his findings and the Award cannot be vitiated on the grounds that no reasons were given or the reasons given were unsustainable. In support of these contentions, he relied on the following enunciations. 1. (State of West Bengal v. A.K. Ghosh Bros.)1, A.I.R. 1975 Cal. 227. 2. (Sudarsan Trading Co. v. Govt. of Kerala another)2, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 890. 3. (Raipur Development Authority v. Chokhamal Contractors)3, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1426. 4. (Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar another)4, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 2346. 5. (Madan Lal (dead) by his legal representatives v. Sunder Lal another)5, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1233. 10. In the suits, the plaintiff-firm had claimed money dues on the following grounds:- Special Civil Suit No. 265 of 1991. (i) Loss caused due to continued expenses Rs. 13.373 lakhs of over heads and consequential loss of profit due to delayed work for a period of 28½ months, delay being caused due to the lapses on the part of the defendants. (ii) Increase in cost due to increased rates on account of revision of rates/extra ex- penses actually incurred for carrying out the work in the extended period of contract while the extension was caused on account of the delayed step and reciprocal promises to be complied by the defendants. Rs. 0.998 lakhs (iii) Deficit in price escalation claim as the escalation order by defendants is erroneous and not in conformity with the conditions of contract and there- fore, plaintiff is entitled to deficit sum under this head. Rs. 0.11392 (iv) Difference of amount of bill paid towards non-plumb side plaster which is done as per instructions of 20 mm thickness whereas bill paid is considering the plaster to be of 12 mm sized plaintiff is entitled to difference of cost of plastering actually done being 20 mm thick plaster and the amount actually paid. Thus, the net claimed i.e.: Rs. 2.2864 (v) The Item No. 12 of Schedule, the rate has been wrongly reduced and the amount of Rs. 29117.38 wrongly deducted and as such entitled to payment. Thus, the net claimed i.e.: Rs. 2.2864 (v) The Item No. 12 of Schedule, the rate has been wrongly reduced and the amount of Rs. 29117.38 wrongly deducted and as such entitled to payment. (vi) Increased/cost incurred and actually suffered by the plaintiff towards maintenance of watch and ward till 10-4-1991 for a period of 1-4-1990 to 10-4-1991. Rs. 1.9535 --------------------- Total Rs. 19.016 lakhs --------------------- Special Civil Suit No. 266 of 1991 (i) Loss caused due to continued expenses Rs. 11.78 lakhs of overheads and consequential loss of profit due to delayed works for a period of 36 months of delayed work delay being caused due to the lapses on the part of the defendants. (ii) Increases in cost due increased rates on Rs. 3.02 lakhs account of revision of rates/extra expenses actually incurred for carrying out the work in the extended period of contract while the extention was caused on account of the delayed steps and reciprocal promises to be complied by the defendants. (iii) Compensation towards rendering machinery Rs. 3.01 lakhs and equipment so also the labour idle and reduced productivity on account of the lapses and delay on the part of the defendants. (iv) Refund of unreleased part of final bill withheld Rs. 0.15 lakhs towards defect liability period, as the defect period of 3 months commenced from the date of completion of work and request for recording of measurements. No defects were revealed and communicated to plaintiff during this period and hence plaintiff is entitled to refund full amount. (v) Deficit in price escalation claim as the Rs. 0.30 lakhs escalation reckoned by defendants is erroneous and not in conformity with the conditions of contract and therefore, plaintiff is entitled to the deficit sum under this head. (vi) Difference of amount of bill paid towards Rs. 2.30 lakhs non-plumb side plaster which is done as per instruction of 20 mm thickness whereas bill paid is considering the plaster to be of 12 mm size. Plaintiff is entitled to difference of cost of plaste- ring actually done being 20 mm. thick plaster and the amount actually paid. Thus, the net sum claimed is. (vii) The item No. 47 of the contract has been Rs. 0.088 lakhs wrongly settled and the plaintiff is entitled to the deficit which comes to: (viii) Increased cost incurred and actually Rs. thick plaster and the amount actually paid. Thus, the net sum claimed is. (vii) The item No. 47 of the contract has been Rs. 0.088 lakhs wrongly settled and the plaintiff is entitled to the deficit which comes to: (viii) Increased cost incurred and actually Rs. 0.0433 lakhs suffered by the plaintiff towards main- tenance of watch and ward till 10-4-1991 for a period of 1-12-1990 to 10-4-1991 at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per month. --------------------- Total Rs. 21.081 lakhs --------------------- 11. The issues framed by the trial Court for its consideration were not altered when it passed an order referring the dispute between the parties to the sole Arbitrator and admittedly, the Arbitrator also did not frame any specific issues for his consideration and it appears that he proceeded to examine each of the claims made in the plaint of the suits by the plaintiff firm. Some claims were discarded, some claims came to be withdrawn and others were allowed. By his final Award dated 17-8-1995 the Arbitrator allowed the recoveries for an amount of Rs. 11,80,935/- and Rs. 14,36,708/- with simple interest at the rate of 18% on the principal amount of the Award namely, Rs. 7,40,979/- and Rs. 9,01,464/- from the date of the award to the date of payment or to the date of decree by the appropriate Court of law whichever was earlier. 12. On the issue of limitation to the objection petition, the arguments advanced by Shri H.M. Karwa, learned Advocate for the respondent, cannot be accepted more so because the subject arbitration proceedings were not by way of agreement but they were on account of an order passed by the Court in the recovery suits. Section 14(2) of the Act is applicable in such a case and the date of filing of the Award is not the only relevant event for counting the limitation under Article 158 of the Limitation Act. The Court is required to notice the parties of the filing of the Award and this notice could be in formal form or informal form. Even appearance of the Advocates before the trial Court on the date on which Award was filed or was brought to their notice could be treated as informal notice to the respective parties. The Court is required to notice the parties of the filing of the Award and this notice could be in formal form or informal form. Even appearance of the Advocates before the trial Court on the date on which Award was filed or was brought to their notice could be treated as informal notice to the respective parties. In the instant case, though the Award was filed on 5-9-1995 before the trial Court, it was kept in a sealed envelope which was opened by the Court on 16-9-1995. Thus, both the parties had notice of the Award on that date. The limitation of 30 days would, therefore, commence from 16-9-1995 and the objection petition under section 30 of the Act having been filed on 13-10-1995 it was rightly held by the trial Court to be within limitation. This view is supported by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of (Nilkanth Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti others)6, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 666. 13. In the case of (Ct. A.Ct. Nachiappa Chettiar others v. Ct.A.Ct. Subramaniam Chettiar)7, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 307 the Apex Court considered the scope of section 21 of the Act and held that in a pending suit, the Court has powers to refer the dispute between the parties to the Arbitration at any point of time and such power is also available to an Appellate Court. In the instant case, the agreement governing the Work Contracts did not contain a clause for arbitration in case of dispute between the parties and therefore, the plaintiff resorted to recovery proceedings by filing special civil suits. The Court had framed issues as referred to hereinabove. However, once the defendants had given consent for referring the dispute between the parties to the sole Arbitrator it must be inferred that they gave up the challenge to the maintainability of the suits on the ground of limitation as well as jurisdiction and other issues framed by the trial Court were left to be adjudicated by the Arbitrator, who replaced the Court for the time being. 14. 14. In the Award, the arbitrator has stated that he visited the site, considered the records submitted by both the parties and without giving any reasons he proceeded to allow certain claims partly inspite of the fact that the defendants, on the basis of the documents submitted by them, had contended that none of these claims were maintainable. It was, therefore, necessary for the arbitrator, in such circumstances, to give reasons in support of his directions for entertaining the monetary claims under some heads. However, no reasons have been set out. It is true that the reasons given by the arbitrator in support of his findings cannot be subject matter of an appeal before the Court as the arbitrator being an expert, his opinion cannot be examined by the Court. The reasons, howsoever short they may be, cannot be gone into or criticized by the Court unless such reasons are perverse. The status of an arbitrator is that of an expert in the field and therefore, his opinion is normally to be treated as expert's opinion. Nevertheless, when the parties were at variance in the civil suits and there was no agreement for arbitration between the parties, the issues framed by the trial Court shall stand referred to the arbitrator and the arbitrator is required to be adjudicated upon them. The process of adjudication does not mean only findings and it must contain reasons in support of each of the findings to be given after considering the rival submissions made or the documents submitted by either of the parties. The case at hand cannot be compared with the arbitration proceedings initiated as per the agreement clause between the parties. All the authorities cited by Shri H.M. Karwa, learned Advocate for the respondent, are not applicable to this case and even though the arbitrator was an expert person nothing stopped him from setting out the reasons, howsoever short they may be, in support of each claim that he allowed, as, he was acting in place of the Court which appointed him. 15. Section 30 of the Arbitration Act sets out the grounds for setting aside an award and they are: "30. 15. Section 30 of the Arbitration Act sets out the grounds for setting aside an award and they are: "30. Grounds for setting aside Awards.-An Award shall not be set aside on one or more of the following grounds, namely :- (a) that an arbitrator or Umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings; (b) that an Award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under section 35. (c) that an Award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid." It has been held by a catena of decisions that the Award can also be set aside if it suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record. Section 16 of the Act deals with the powers of the Court to remit Award to the arbitrator. If the Court sees no reasons to remit the Award, it is required to pronounce the judgment according to the Award and a decree shall follow under section 17 of the Act. Under section 15 of the Act, the Court has powers to modify or correct an award on the grounds stated therein. 16. There is no dispute between the parties that the trial Court, while framing the issues, had not framed any issue regarding payment of interest post pendente lite and in the claim made by the plaintiff, the interest at 18% was claimed from the date of the suit i.e. interest pendente lite. But the trial Court did not frame even such an issue i.e. the claim for interest pendente lite. The arbitrator proceeded to grant interest at 18% post pendente lite and no reasons have been given. Shri H.M. Karwa, learned Advocate appearing for the plaintiff firm, was called upon to show any clause in the agreement regarding payment of interest post pendente lite and he fairly conceded that there was no such clause in the agreement for payment of interest even if the defendants were at fault in settling the claims. He also admitted that in such a case, the issue regarding payment of interest will have to be considered on the lines of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads as under: "34. He also admitted that in such a case, the issue regarding payment of interest will have to be considered on the lines of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads as under: "34. Interest.-(1) Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate not exceeding six per cent, per annum as the Court deems reasonable on such principal sum, from the date of the decree to the date of payment, or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit: Provided that where the liability in relation to the sum so adjudged had arisen out of a commercial transaction, the rate of such further interest may exceed six per cent, per annum, but shall not exceed the contractual rate of interest or where there is no contractual rate, the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to commercial transactions. Explanation I.:---In this sub-section, "nationalised bank" means a corresponding new bank as defined in the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (5 of 1970). Explanation II.:---For the purpose of this section, a transaction is a commercial transaction, if it is connected with the industry, trade or business of the party incurring the liability. (2) Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest on such principal sum from the date of the decree to the date of payment or other earlier date, the Court shall be deemed to have refused such interest, and a separate suit therefore shall not lie." 17. In the case of (Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa others v. G.C. Roy)8, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 732 a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that an arbitrator has powers to Award pendente lite interest even though the agreement between the parties was silent as to grant of such interest. In the case of (Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa others v. G.C. Roy)8, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 732 a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that an arbitrator has powers to Award pendente lite interest even though the agreement between the parties was silent as to grant of such interest. To answer the issue regarding interest to be granted for the post pendentelite period, it was necessary for the arbitrator to consider the provisions of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure and more particularly, proviso thereunder. The arbitrator was required to ascertain rate of interest on lendings by the nationalised banks at the relevant time and was also required to examine the reasons for delay in settling the dispute either before him or before the trial Court. 18. In the case of (Central Bank of India v. Ravindra others)9, 2002(2) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)616 a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court considered the scope of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure and held that it is a general procedural proviso and its applicability or inapplicability or extent of applicability is dependent on the fact situation of each case. It, more particularly, observed thus: "Award of interest pendente lite and post decree is discretionary with the Court as it is essentially governed by section 34 C.P.C. de hors the contract between the parties. In a given case if the Court finds that in the principal sum adjudged on the date of the suit the component of interest is disproportionate with the component of the principal sum actually advanced the Court may exercise its discretion in awarding interest pendente lite and post decree interest at a lower rate or may even decline awarding such interest. The discretion shall be exercised fairly, judiciously, and for reasons and not in arbitrary or fanciful manner." 19. We are, therefore, of the view that the Award of the sole arbitrator which has been made rule of the Court by the trial Court is unsustainable on the ground that it suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record and the sole arbitrator misdirected the proceedings, inasmuch as, he was required to adjudicate upon the issues framed by the trial Court and give reasons thereof in respect of the claims allowed by him. In addition, the directions to pay interest at 18% per annum for the post-pendente lite period are not supported by any reasons, howsoever short they may be and therefore, the said directions are also unsustainable. We, therefore, deem it appropriate to remit the arbitration proceedings to the sole arbitrator for fresh Award and thereupon the trial Court would examine the same for its decision under section 21 of the Act. 20. In the result, the appeals are allowed and the decrees passed by the trial Court in Special Civil Suit Nos. 265 and 266 of 1991 are hereby quashed and set aside. The arbitration proceedings initiated pursuant to the order passed by the trial Court are restored to the sole arbitrator Shri S.R. Wadekar. He shall pass a fresh award within a period of 60 days from the date of appearance of the parties before him. The parties shall appear before the sole arbitrator on 16-6-2003. No order as to costs. Appeals allowed. -----