P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE unsuccessful plaintiff, aggrieved by the reversing Judgment and decree had preferred the present Second Appeal, raising the following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether the boundary recitals in ex. B-7 to which the plaintiff is not a party are relevant and admissible under any of the provisions of the indian Evidence Act? (2) Whether Kailash Chandra Padhi continues to be a co-sharer even after partition so as to make a boundary recital relevant as an admission under Section 18 of the indian Evidence Act? (3) Whether the evidence of P. W. 2 can be relied upon in part and discarded in part? ( 2 ) THE suit O. S. No. 37/80 on the file of district Munsif, Palasa is one for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property and for costs of the suit. The 1st plaintiff died and the 2nd plaintiff is prosecuting the litigation. It is a case where the ownership is not in dispute. The stand taken by the plaintiffs is that they have been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property as on the date of the institution of the suit whereas the defendants have taken a stand that they have been the cultivating tenants and have been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property as such and hence the relief of permanent injunction cannot be granted. The Court of first instance after recording of evidence of P. W. 1, the G. P. A. holder of the 2nd plaintiff, and P. W. 2 and also D. W. 1 and D. W. 2 and after marking exs. A-1 to A-5 and Exs. B-1 to B-26, and on appreciation of both the oral and documentary evidence had arrived at the conclusion that the defendants miserably failed in establishing that they are the cultivating tenants and one over-all consideration of the entire material placed before it, the Court of first instance came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs had been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property as on the date of the suit and accordingly decreed the suit with costs as prayed for. The defendants, aggrieved by the same, had preferred A. S. No. 31/87 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Sompeta, and inasmuch as the 3rd appellant therein died appellants 7 to 14 therein were added as legal representatives of deceased 3rd appellant therein, in I. A. No. 212/91 by the order dated 4-8-1992. The appellate Court after framing the points for consideration had arrived at the conclusion that the Court had got jurisdiction to try the suit, but however reversed the Judgment and decree of the Court of first instance holding that the appellants therein are the cultivating tenants as pleaded by them and aggrieved by the said Judgment and decree, the 2nd plaintiff had preferred the present Second Appeal. ( 3 ) SRI Subba Reddy, the learned counsel representing the appellant/2nd plaintiff in the Second Appeal had taken me through the oral and documentary evidence available on record and also the findings which had been recorded by the Court of first instance and also by the appellate Court and had contended that the approach of the appellate Court is totally erroneous since absolutely there is no evidence on record to establish that the respondents are the cultivating tenants, in relation to the plaint schedule property. The learned counsel also had contended that P. W. 1, the G. P. A. holder, is a person having knowledge about the family affairs and his evidence is clear on this aspect and hence he is a competent person to speak about the facts and circumstances of the case and on such a ground the reversal is definitely bad. The learned counsel also had submitted that the appellate Court having held that the ownership of the appellant/plaintiff is not in dispute in relation to plaint schedule property in the light of the cist receipts and also the evidence of P. W. 2 should have arrived at the conclusion that the appellant/ plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction in stead of driving him to yet another litigation reversing the well considered Judgment and decree of the trial court and on the ground that the respondents/defendants are the cultivating tenants. The learned counsel also had pointed out that when Kailash Chandra padhi had ceased to be a co-sharer after partition, a boundary recital made by him cannot be held to be binding as admission on the appellant/plaintiff. The learned counsel also had pointed out that when Kailash Chandra padhi had ceased to be a co-sharer after partition, a boundary recital made by him cannot be held to be binding as admission on the appellant/plaintiff. The learned counsel also had made elaborate submissions relating to cist receipts relied upon by the other side and had commented that since the respondents/defendants had purchased the rest of the property they are taking this untenable stand only with a view to put the appellant/plaintiff into trouble by just complicating the litigation. The learned counsel also had drawn my attention to srichand Gupta v. Gulzar Singh and pandurang v, Ramchandra. ( 4 ) ON the contrary, Sri Srinivas, the learned counsel representing the respondents/defendants had submitted that the question which party was in possession of the plaint schedule property as on the date of institution of the suit they had been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property, the remedy of permanent injunction is a misconceived remedy and the remedy available to the appellant/plaintiff is elsewhere and hence such a finding need not be disturbed in a second Appeal. The learned counsel also had submitted that the G. P. A. is not competent to represent the plaintiff. The learned counsel also had taken me meticulously through the findings which had been recorded by the appellate Court and had submitted that absolutely there is no erroneous approach and since all these are findings of fact, such findings cannot be disturbed in a Second Appeal. The learned counsel made elaborate submissions about the scope and ambit of interference under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, hereinafter in short referred to as "code", and also had placed reliance on Kondiba dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar. Reliance also is placed on Kanakapudi bharathi v. Authority under Section 50 of A. P. Shops and Establishments Act. ( 5 ) HEARD both the counsel. ( 6 ) THE substantial questions of law raised by the appellant/plaintiff had been referred to supra. The facts in nutshell/ as narrated in the respective pleadings of the parties, are as hereunder: it was pleaded in the plaint that the narayana Rajaguru had two sons nandikeswara Rajaguru and Apparao rajaguru who are having lands in raghunadhapuram, Rajagopalapuram and bantukotturu. ( 6 ) THE substantial questions of law raised by the appellant/plaintiff had been referred to supra. The facts in nutshell/ as narrated in the respective pleadings of the parties, are as hereunder: it was pleaded in the plaint that the narayana Rajaguru had two sons nandikeswara Rajaguru and Apparao rajaguru who are having lands in raghunadhapuram, Rajagopalapuram and bantukotturu. After their death, the 1st plaintiff, the daughter of Nandikeswara rajaguru and Kailashchandra Padhi @ khirodchandra Padhi, son of Apparao rajguru succeeded to them and divided their properties. In the said partition, kailash Chandra Padhi was given lands of rs. 5,000/- in value as he was managing the family and the 1st plaintiff was given at rs. 400/- in value. The 1st plaintiff was in possession of her separate property. Subsequently, a partition deed was executed and registered by both the share holders on 18-12-1957 which clearly shows the separate possession. A patta was also issued in the name of the 1st plaintiff and others. The 1st plaintiff is paying land revenue to the government for lands that fell to her share. Since the 1st plaintiff died, the 2nd plaintiff had been brought on record and had been recorded as sole legal heir of the deceased 1st plaintiff. Kailash Chandra Padhi had alienated all his lands that fell to his share to defendants and others. On the strength of the sale deeds the defendants are threatening to enter into the plaint schedule lands and dispossess the 1st plaintiff without any manner of right. The plaintiff is not aware of any sale deeds and even if they are true, they cannot confer right in the plaint schedule lands which fell to the share of the 1st plaintiff. ( 7 ) THE 1st defendant filed a written statement and the other defendants had adopted it. The allegations in the plaint were denied and it was pleaded that the boundaries are not correct. The extent of item No. 1 is Acs. 2-26 cents but not Acs. 2-92 cents. Item No. 2 is only Ac. 0-50 cents but not ac. 0-91 cents. Item No. 3 is also Ac. 0-50 cents but not Ac. 0-87 cents. Item No. 4 is only ac. 0-75 cents, but not Acs. 1-26 cents. The survey numbers are also not correct. 2-26 cents but not Acs. 2-92 cents. Item No. 2 is only Ac. 0-50 cents but not ac. 0-91 cents. Item No. 3 is also Ac. 0-50 cents but not Ac. 0-87 cents. Item No. 4 is only ac. 0-75 cents, but not Acs. 1-26 cents. The survey numbers are also not correct. It was further pleaded that right from nandikeswara Rajaguru, himself and the other defendants had been cultivating the lands of Rajaguru to the knowledge of the plaintiff. They are cultivating the lands as tenants and paying Rajabhagam to Kailash chandra Padhi. The suit lands are subsequent inam lands. Even 10 years prior to Inam Abolition Act, these defendants and their predecessors-in-title had been in possession and enjoyment of the lands and they are still continuing in possession. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff with an intention to take possession of the property got created some documents behind the back of the defendants. It was also pleaded that the landlord and tenants relationship still exists in between the plaintiff and that of the defendants. Under the guise and colour of temporary injunction, the plaintiff intended to trespass into the suit land taking undue advantage of the absence of written tenancy. They are entitled to the benefits of inam Abolition Act and also Andhra pradesh Tenancy Act. It was further pleaded that the Headman of Loddabadra had engineered this litigation. The suit is not maintainable and there is no cause of action for the suit. ( 8 ) ON the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties, the following Issues were settled: (1) Whether the plaintiff is in possession of the plaint schedule properties on the date of the suit? (2) Whether the defendants are cultivating the suit lands as tenants? (3) Whether the suit in this form is maintainable under law? (4) Whether this Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit? (5) Whether the boundaries, extents of the suit schedule are correct? (6) To what relief? ( 9 ) P. W. I, the G. P. A. holder of the 2nd plaintiff was examined and Exs. A-1 to A-7 were marked on behalf of the plaintiff. Ex. A-1 is the partition deed. Ex. A-2 is the g. P. A Exs. A-3 to A-5 are the land revenue receipts. (6) To what relief? ( 9 ) P. W. I, the G. P. A. holder of the 2nd plaintiff was examined and Exs. A-1 to A-7 were marked on behalf of the plaintiff. Ex. A-1 is the partition deed. Ex. A-2 is the g. P. A Exs. A-3 to A-5 are the land revenue receipts. P. W. 1 had deposed in detail about the affairs of the family and also had stated that the 1st plaintiff is dead and the 2nd plaintiff is the only legal representative of the 1st plaintiff and the schedule property devolved on the 1st plaintiff from her father. He further deposed that Ex. A-1 is the partition deed, Ex. A-2 is the G. P. A. executed by the 2nd plaintiff in his favour and the 1st plaintiff got her share on 18-12-1957 by way of partition deed and Exs. A-3 to A-5 are the cist receipts. P. W. 1 had narrated all the details relating to the family which clearly go to show that he is having personal knowledge about the affairs of the family. It is needless to say that a person having knowledge about all the affairs of the family definitely can be a competent witness to speak about such aspects. No doubt, certain submissions were made about the competency of P. W.-1 to represent the 2nd plaintiff as the G. P. A. holder. Apart from the evidence of P. W. 1, the evidence of P. W. 2 is available which is crucial. The Court of first instance had dealt with the evidence of p. W. 2 in detail and the minor discrepancies had not been taken into consideration and ultimately relying upon the evidence of p. W. 2 a specific finding had been recorded that the plaintiffs had been cultivating the land by engaging coolies personally and the respondents/defendants are not the cultivating tenants. No doubt, D. W. 1 and d. W. 2 had deposed about the substantial stand taken by the respondents/defendants that they are the cultivating tenants. Exs. B-1 to B-6 are the land revenue receipts. Ex. B-7 is the registered sale deed executed by Kailash chandra Padhi in favour of the defendants. Ex. B-8 is the certificate issued by P. W. 2. Exs. B-9 to B-26 are the land revenue receipts. Exs. B-1 to B-6 are the land revenue receipts. Ex. B-7 is the registered sale deed executed by Kailash chandra Padhi in favour of the defendants. Ex. B-8 is the certificate issued by P. W. 2. Exs. B-9 to B-26 are the land revenue receipts. The appellate Court while discussing about the cist receipts filed by the respondents/ defendants had arrived at the conclusion that P. W. 1 and P. W. 2 had not specifically stated that these cist receipts do not to relate the plaint schedule property and hence it can be taken that they relate to the plaint schedule property and had doubted the evidence of P. W. 2 in view of his denial of ex. B-8 certificate having been issued by him and on the strength of certain minor discrepancies, came to the conclusion that the respondents/defendants are the cultivating tenants. The appellate Court in fact had observed as follows:"as argued by the learned Counsel for the appellants the payment of rajabhagam is a matter between the tenants and landlords and when the payment of Bhagam is in dispute, the landlord has to enter the witness box and say that no Rajabhagam was paid to him or her and the defendants are not the tenants. In the instant case, the contention of the appellants is that since the relationship between them and the landlord were cordial they were paying bhagam to the landlord without obtaining any receipts. Only the landlord is competent to deny the contention of the appellants. The landlord, either deceased respondent no. 1 or respondent No. 2 did not enter the witness box to deny the contention of the appellants. P. W. 1 who is holding power of attorney on behalf of the landlord is not a competent person to speak about the non-payment of the rajabhagam by the appellants. Therefore, merely because the appellants have not filed the receipts of payment of Rajabhagam it cannot be held that the appellants are not the tenants. "it is also pertinent to note that the appellate court no doubt had arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff is not bound by ex. B-7, but however, since Kailash Chandra padhi was managing all the properties till partition, the admission made by one of the common ancestors is binding on the parties. "it is also pertinent to note that the appellate court no doubt had arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff is not bound by ex. B-7, but however, since Kailash Chandra padhi was managing all the properties till partition, the admission made by one of the common ancestors is binding on the parties. This approach of the appellate Court in my considered opinion cannot be sustained for the reason that Ex. B-7 was executed by kailash Chandra Padhi subsequent to partition and hence at any stretch of imagination, it cannot be said that the recitals in the said document can be taken as admissions binding on the appellant/ plaintiff. Section 18 of the Indian Evidence act reads as hereunder:"admission by party to proceeding or his agent; by suitor in representative character; by party interested in subject-matter; by persons from whom interest derived. Statements made by a party to the proceedings, or by an agent to any such party, whom the Court regards, under the circumstances of the case, as expressly or impliedly authorized by him to make them, are admissions. Statements made by the parties to suits, suing or sued in a representative character, are not admissions, unless they were made while the party making them held that character. Statements made by (1) persons who have any proprietary or pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the proceeding, and who make the statement in their character of persons so interested, or (2) Persons from whom the parties to the suit have derived their interest in the subject matter of the suit are admissions, if they are made during the continuance of the interest of the persons making the statement". ( 10 ) IN the decision referred (1) supra it was held:"section 18 of the Evidence Act postulates that statements made by a party to the proceeding, or by an agent to any such party, whom the Court regards, under the circumstances of the case, as expressly or impliedly authorized by him to make them, are admissions. Equally statement made by a person who has any proprietary or pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the proceedings or persons having derivative interest make statements during the continuance of the interest also are admissions. Equally statement made by a person who has any proprietary or pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the proceedings or persons having derivative interest make statements during the continuance of the interest also are admissions. Where a tenant s brother makes a statement before the income-tax authorities that he is the sole tenant of the demised premises, the same cannot be taken as admission on behalf of the tenant as envisaged by section 18 of the Evidence Act. Thus the inference of sub-tenancy could not be drawn on the basis of the statement of the tenant s brother. In view of the specific stand taken by the tenant s brother that he is the sole tenant, he could not claim to have any pecuniary interest or any joint interest along with his brother in the demised premises. The tenant was not a party to the affidavit signed by his brother before the Income-tax authorities and therefore the admission by his brother did not bind him. "hence, in view of the same, the recital in ex. B-7 is of no consequence. It is also pertinent to note that certain properties were purchased by the respondents/defendants and the cist receipts relied upon by them may be in relation to other properties. But however, the appellate Court had made some guess work to the effect that the other cist receipts do relate the plaint schedule property only inasmuch as P. W. i and P. W. 2 had not made any negative statement relating to this aspect. The evidence of P. W. 1 is available on record and apart from the evidence of P. W. 1, the evidence of P. W. 2 also is available on record. It is no doubt true that P. W. I is only a G. P. A. holder and he deposed about all the facts specifically stating that he had been managing the affairs of the family and he has knowledge about all the affairs of the family. The specific stand taken by the respondents/ defendants is that they are the cultivating tenants and absolutely there is no evidence to establish the same except the oral assertion. The same was explained away by the appellate Court stating that due to belief, no documents had been received by these cultivating tenants. This approach of the appellate Court definitely cannot be sustained. The same was explained away by the appellate Court stating that due to belief, no documents had been received by these cultivating tenants. This approach of the appellate Court definitely cannot be sustained. In the decision referred (2) supra it was held that where a party fails to appear in Court drawing an adverse inference may arise only when there is no other evidence on record on the Point in issue. The only ground on which the appellate Court had reversed the Judgment and decree of the court of first instance is that the respondents/defendants are the cultivating tenants relating to which the material available on record is definitely highly insufficient. The non-examination of the party had been made a ground by the appellate Court to reverse the Judgment and decree of the trial Court. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances, especially in the light of the fact that the respondents/ defendants had not substantiated their stand that they are the cultivating tenants and inasmuch as a finding had been recorded relating to the title to the property in favour of the appellant/plaintiff, in my considered opinion, it is just and reasonable to give an opportunity to the parties concerned to adduce further evidence on the crucial aspect and hence for this purpose, I am inclined to remit the matter to the appellate court for the purpose of affording opportunity to both the parties to let in further evidence relating to the aspect whether the respondents/defendants are cultivating tenants or not and for this limited purpose, the matter is remanded to the appellate Court. Inasmuch as the matter is sufficiently an old matter, the appellate court is directed to dispose of the same within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the order. ( 11 ) ACCORDINGLY, the Second Appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs.