JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. Put shortly, the facts giving rise to this revision are as follows : (i) The revision petitioner, as plaintiff, instituted Title Suit No. 63/96 in the Court of the learned Munsiff No. 1, at Sibsagar, seeking, inter alia, the reliefs of eviction of the defendant (i.e., opposite party in this revision) from the suit room and delivery of vacant possession thereof to the plaintiff. The process server reported, on the body of the summons issued to the defendant (opposite party), to the effect, inter alia, that the defendant had refused to accept the summons and that the summons had been hanged on the outer-side of the door of the house of the defendant. By order, dated 3.9.1996, the learned trial Court, while accepting service of the said summons on the defendant, fixed the case for ex parte hearing. The plaintiff accordingly examined himself, on 9.9.1996, as a witness and the suit was decreed, on 9.9.1996 itself, in favour of the plaintiff. This decree was executed on 10.10.1996. The defendant filed an application, on 18.11.1996, before the learned Court below under Order 9, Rule 13 and Section 144 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking, inter alia, the reliefs of setting aside of the said ex parte decree and also of restitution of the possession of the suit rooms on the ground, inter alia, that defendant had no knowledge of the said suit, he had never refused to receive the summons issued in the suit and no summons had been served on him. This application gave rise to Misc (J) Case No. 120/96. This application gave rise to Misc (J) Case No. 120/96. In this Misc (J) Case No. 120/96, the defendant also filed, on the same date, i.e., 18.11.1996, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in making the application for setting aside the said decree and also for seeking restitution of the possession of the suit room, his case being, briefly stated, thus : The petitioner was evicted from the suit room with the help of police, on 10.10.1996, as a result of the said ex parte decree, the petitioner remained busy in shifting his articles for the whole day on 11.10.1996 and could come to the court only on 12.10.1996 and upon his arrival there, he came to learn that the Civil Court stood closed due to Puja Vacation, the Court re-opened on 11.11.1996 and on that very day, he made an application for certified copy of the decree, the same was made available to the defendant on 14.11.1996, whereupon the defendant handed over the papers to his counsel and upon the applications aforementioned having been prepared by the defendant's counsel, the same was filed on 18.11.1996. (ii) By order, dated 18.11.1996, the learned trial Court, while dealing with the application for setting aside the said ex parte decree, issued notice to the plaintiff to show cause as to why the said ex parte decree be not set aside. Aggrieved by the fact that the learned trial Court had condoned the delay without hearing the plaintiff, the plaintiff came before this Court impugning the order, dated 18.11.1996, aforementioned in Civil Revision 105/97. This revision was disposed of on 14.3.1997, wherein this Court held to the effect that the order, dated 18.11.1996, did not suffer from error of jurisdiction and that the petitioner, while resisting the prayer for setting aside the decree, would have the liberty to raise his objection as to why the delay in making such application be not refused to be condoned. On receiving back the matter, the learned trial Court heard the parties and passed an order on 14.6.1999, whereby it condoned the delay in making the application, it also set aside the said ex parte decree and further directed restitution of the possession of the suit room in favour of the defendant. On receiving back the matter, the learned trial Court heard the parties and passed an order on 14.6.1999, whereby it condoned the delay in making the application, it also set aside the said ex parte decree and further directed restitution of the possession of the suit room in favour of the defendant. Aggrieved by the order, dated 14.6.1999 aforementioned, to the extent that the same relates to condonation of delay and setting aside of the said decree ex parte, the plaintiff has come before this Court in the present revision, but as regards the relief of restitution of the decretal property, the plaintiff has preferred Misc Appeal No. 16/99 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Div.), Sibsagar. 2. I have perused the materials on record including the impugned order. I have heard Mr. A.K. Goswami, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner, and Mr. B.K. Goswami, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of defendant-opposite party. 3. Presenting the case, on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioner, Mr. A.K. Goswami has submitted that the learned trial Court did not consider the question of condonation of delay afresh as had been directed by this Court by order, dated 14.3.1997, passed in Civil Revision 105/97. Mr. A.K. Goswami has also submitted that for condonation of delay, the learned trial Court has mentioned no sustainable ground. Mr. Goswami has further submitted that the summons was duly served on the defendant inasmuch as process server's report was supported by verification and the, learned trial Court was wholly justified in treating the summons as duly served in terms of Order 5, Rule 19, CPC. 4. Controverting the submissions made on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioner, Mr. B.K. Goswami has pointed out that the learned trial Court did take into consideration the question of condonation delay and it observed to the effect that the plaintiff had not raised any dispute on the question of condonation of delay and, hence, the delay was condoned and upon such condonation, the learned trial Court had sufficient reasons to set aside the said ex parte decree. Mr. Mr. B.K. Goswami has also pointed out that in the case at hand, there were ample justified reasons for the trial Court to condone the delay and also to set aside the said ex parte decree inasmuch as for accepting the service of summons, the learned trial Court had not really applied its mind as was required under the law and that in the facts and circumstances of the case, there were absolutely no reasonable ground for accepting the service of summons. Learned trial Court has, thus, according to Mr. B.K. Goswami, committed no error of law and/or of facts in condoning the delay and in setting aside said ex parte decree. 5. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the materials on record, I notice that the impugned order, dated 14.6.1999, clearly reveals that the question of condonation of delay was, indeed, raised before the learned Court, but relying upon the fact that the delay already stood condoned by his learned predecessor-in-office by order, dated 18.11.1996, aforementioned and that the plaintiff had not disputed the question of condonation of delay (when the order, dated 18.11.1996, aforementioned was passed) and that the question of condonation of delay was based on a technical ground, the learned trial Court refused to reverse the earlier order condoning the delay. Undoubtedly, when the question of condonation of delay had been raised before the learned trial Court on 14.6.1999, the learned trial Court ought to have considered the same irrespective of the fact as to what his learned predecessor-in-office had done and ought to have taken a decision on the basis of the materials on record and ought not to have swayed away by what his predecessor-in-office had observed. Viewed from this angle, it is clear that for condonation of delay, the learned trial Court has not assigned adequate reasons. However, in view of the fact that the ex parte decree already stands set aside, it will be unjust for the parties, who have been litigating since 1996, if this Court, now, remands the matter to the learned trial Court for hearing afresh on the question of condonation of delay. Thus, this Court is inclined to decide the question of condonation of delay in the light of the materials available on record and upon the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. Thus, this Court is inclined to decide the question of condonation of delay in the light of the materials available on record and upon the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. The matter has, accordingly, been heard at length. 6. While dealing with the question of condonation of delay and also of setting aside of the said ex parte decree, it is imperative to note that it is Order 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides for issue and service of summons. Order 5, Rule 19A provides that while issuing summons for service directly, the Court shall also issue simultaneously summons by registered post with acknowledgement due. The object obviously is to ensure effective service of summons on the parties concerned. A close reading of Order, 5 Rule 11 and Rule 15 shows that wherever it is practicable, service shall be made on the defendant in person unless he has an agent empowered to accept service of such summons and if the defendant is not found or is not likely to be found, service may be made on the adult male member residing with the defendant. Order 5, Rule 16 makes it mandatory for the serving officer to obtain the signature of the person on whom summons is served in acknowledgement of the receipt thereof. Order 5 Rule 17 lays down, inter alia, the procedure, when the defendant or his agent or such other person as aforesaid refuses to sign the acknowledgement or where the serving officer, after using all due and reasonable diligence, cannot find the defendant and there is no agent empowered to accept service of the summons on his behalf nor any other person on whom service can be made. In such circumstances, the serving officer shall, according to Order 5, Rule 17, affix a copy of the summons on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the house in which the defendant ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain and shall, then, return the original to the Court from which it was issued with a report endorsed thereon or annexed thereto stating that he had so affixed the copy, the circumstances under which he had done so and the name and address of the person by whom the house was identified and in whose presence the copy was affixed. 7. 7. Order 5, Rule 19 lays down as to how the service of a summons can be accepted by the Court and provides that where a summons is returned under Rule 17, the Court shall, if the return has not been verified by the affidavit of the serving officer, and may, if it has been so verified, examine the serving officer on oath, or cause him to be so examined by another Court, touching his proceedings, and may make such further enquiry in the matter as it thinks fit; and shall either declare that the summons has been duly served or order such service as it thinks fit. 8. A close reading of Order 5, Rule 19 shows that where the service report of summons is not verified by an affidavit, the Court shall examine the serving officer on oath. Order 5, Rule 19 also provides that even if the serving officer verifies the report, the Court may still examine the serving officer on oath. A bare reading of Order 5, Rule 19, thus, clearly reveals that it is not mandatory for the court to accept the service of summons merely on the ground it is verified by an affidavit. Order 5 Rule 19 leaves the Court with the discretion to examine the serving officer even if the summons has been verified. This exercise of the discretion, undoubtedly, requires application of mind and the order accepting service of notice in every case must disclose as to how the court applied its mind, while accepting the service of notice on the defendant. 9. In the case at hand, the order, dated 3.9.1996, whereby service of summons was accepted by the Court, reveals that the Court had merely recorded in its said order thus, "summons to the defendant has returned duly served. Perused the report of the process server". The observation so made in the order, dated 3.9.1996, give no indication at all as to how the learned Court below so confidently concluded that summons had been duly served on the defendant. Perused the report of the process server". The observation so made in the order, dated 3.9.1996, give no indication at all as to how the learned Court below so confidently concluded that summons had been duly served on the defendant. It is of paramount importance to note that since Order 5, Rule 19 gives the Court momentous power to accept the service of summons on a person on the basis of a process server's mere report, though verified by the serving officer, it logically follows that utmost attention is required to be given by the Court, while accepting such a report. Acceptance of the service report under Order 5, Rule 19 is a serious and solemn act of the Court and it cannot be considered as a hare formality. Viewed from this angle, the order accepting the report, as indicated hereinbefore, must disclose the reasons as to why service had been accepted. 10. In the case at hand, there is absolutely no indication at all from the materials on record as to why the Court deemed it fit to accept the service of summons on the defendant by order, dated 3.9.1996. Such an order is in view of the clear provisions made under Order 5 Rule 19, wholly unsustainable in law. 11. Coupled with the above, it is also worth noticing that in the case at hand, while the defendant examined himself as a witness to prove that he had not been served with the summons, the plaintiff neither came forward to give his evidence nor did he adduce any other evidence by examining the process server and/or the alleged witnesses to the service of the summons for dislodging the allegation levelled by the defendant that the service had not been made on him. This apart, the impugned order, dated 14.6.1999, discloses that the learned Court below also looked into the evidence on record and noticed the fact that one of the witnesses was the son of the plaintiff and the other one was also a relative of the plaintiff. 12. In the face of what have been discussed above, there were, it is clear, sufficient reasons for the learned Court below to feel inclined to set aside the ex parte decree holding that the summons had not been served on the defendant. 12. In the face of what have been discussed above, there were, it is clear, sufficient reasons for the learned Court below to feel inclined to set aside the ex parte decree holding that the summons had not been served on the defendant. Thus, once the learned Court below had come to the conclusion, as indicated hereinabove, that the service of summons had not been properly/duly made on the petitioner-defendant, the question of limitation having started running against the defendant on the date, when the summons was said to have been served on the defendant, did not arise at all. In other words, this Court is, now, required to determine as to when, in the face of the materials on record, the limitation can be said to have started running. 13. In the face of the materials on record, it is transparent that when no materials on record exist that at any time after the service of summons was accepted by the Court on 3.9.1996, the Court and/or the plaintiff brought, in any way, to the notice of the defendant about the existence of the TS 63/96 ; hence, there is no reason not to hold, as contended by the defendant, that the defendant came to know about the ex parte decree or the suit only when the decree was executed on 10.10.1996. In other words, knowledge of the ex parte decree can be safely attributed to the defendant earliest on 10.10.1996. When I go through the record, I find that the defendant, as already indicated hereinabove, remained busy in shifting his articles to another place on 11.10.1996 and when he came to the Court on 12.10.1996, he learnt that the Court stood closed for Puja Vacation and when the Court re-open on 11.11.1996, he made necessary application for certified copy, obtained the same on 14.11.1996, handed over the necessary papers to his counsel, who, in turn, prepared the applications aforementioned and the same were filed on 18.11.1996. There is nothing in the materials on record or in the cross-examination of the defendant to show that what he has stated in the application seeking condonation of delay was untrue or false. There is nothing in the materials on record or in the cross-examination of the defendant to show that what he has stated in the application seeking condonation of delay was untrue or false. It is, thus, clear that there was delay of barely 4 days in filing the applications for setting aside the said ex parte decree as well as for condonation of delay from the date, when the petitioner obtained certified copy and came to learn about the whole thing. Viewed from this angle, it is clear that there were justified and sufficient cause for condonation of delay and though the learned Court below has not assigned ample reasons for condonation of delay, the fact remains that on the basis of the materials on record, the delay ought to have been condoned. Considered thus, it cannot be said that there was injustice done to the plaintiff and/or that there was failure of justice in exercising the jurisdiction by the Court. 14. Considering, therefore, the matter in its entirety, I am firmly of the view that the impugned order condoning the delay in making the application as well as setting aside the said ex parte decree is wholly justified. 15. In the result, this revision fails. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I leave the respective parties to bear their own costs. 16. To ensure that the parties do not suffer from any further delay, it is hereby directed that the Misc. Appeal No. 16/99 aforementioned be heard and decided by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sibsagar, at the earliest and preferably within a period of 3 months from today. 17. The parties are hereby directed to appear in the Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sibsagar, on 19.1.2004. While considering the Misc Appeal No. 16/99 aforementioned, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sibsagar, shall not, in any way, be influenced by the observations made hereinabove with regard to the facts and/or the materials on record. 18. Send back the case records. Revision fails