ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. This special appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 4th December, 2002 given in writ petition No. 27582 of 2002, Kumar Gandhrva v. Principal, Madan Mohan Malviya Engineering College, Gorakhpur and others), allowing the writ petition filed by respondents No. 1 to 6. 2. We have heard Sri Neeraj Tiwari, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-University, Sri H. R. Mishra learned Counsel appearing for contesting respondents No. 1 to 6 and Sri Ramesh Upadhyaya appearing for respondents No. 7 and 8. 3. Facts giving rise to this special appeal are not much in dispute. Respondents No. 1 to 6 are students of bachelor of technology course studying in Madan Mohan Malviya Engineering College, Gorakhpur. By notice dated 7th July, 2002, University issued a list of students of bachelor of technology first year and second year along with the names of certain other students who were debarred from appearing in second semester examination which was commencing from 8th July, 2002 because their attendance was less than 60%. The names of respondents No. 1 to 6 were included in the said notice. Writ petition was filed by respondents No. 1 to 6 praying for quashing the notice dated 7th July, 2002. A writ of mandamus was also sought commanding the respondents to permit the petitioners (respondents No. 1 to 6) to appear in the examination of second semester of bachelor of technology first year which had already commenced on 9th July, 2002. In the writ petition counter affidavit was filed by Madan Mohan Malviya Engineering College in which it was stated that U. P. Technical University, Lucknow had framed ordinances for bachelor of technology course. It was stated in the counter-affidavit that ordinances required the students to attend all the lectures, tutorials, practicals and other prescribed curriculum. It provides that attendance can be condoned up to 25% on medical ground or other genuine reasons. Ordinances further provides relaxation up to 15% by Principal/dean/director of the Institution to the students who have absented with prior permission, for the reasons acceptable to the Head of the Institution. It was stated that list of 55 students was issued by the notice dated 7-7-2002 who were stopped from appearing in the examination due to shortage of attendance. It was further stated that writ petitioners even did not have average of 60% in both semesters. It was stated that list of 55 students was issued by the notice dated 7-7-2002 who were stopped from appearing in the examination due to shortage of attendance. It was further stated that writ petitioners even did not have average of 60% in both semesters. The writ petitioners also pleaded before the learned single Judge that two students, namely, Abhisekh Srivastava of second year computer science and another Gaurav Anand Srivastava of first year computer science who did not have 60% attendance were permitted to appear in the examination. The said facts were stated in a supplementary affidavit filed in the writ petition. The learned single Judge by an interim order directed that writ petitioners be provisionally permitted to appear in the examination. It was further directed, however, the result shall not be declared without leave of the Court. The writ petition was finally allowed by learned single Judge question the notice dated 7-7-2002 so far as it related to the writ petitioners. The learned single Judge also directed for declaration of the result and further directed the college to do the needful with regard to those papers in which the petitioners could not appear. The said judgment of learned single Judge has been challenged by this special appeal. 4. The Counsel for the appellant has raised following submissions in support of the special appeal: (i) Under ordinances framed by the U. P. Technical University, Lucknow maximum condonation of attendance permissible is 25%+15%, hence a student not having attendance of atleast 60% cannot be permitted to appear in the examination. The writ petitioners, admittedly, having not achieved 60% attendance in second semester and even in average of both the semesters, were rightly not permitted to appear in the examination. (ii) The fact two students who did not have 60% attendance were permitted to appear by the college even if true, could not have been made basis for issuing a writ in favour of the writ petitioners since an irregularity committed earlier cannot be directed to be repeated by Court. Plea of discrimination is not available when it is based on a decision which was not in accordance with law. In support of the aforesaid submission, the learned Counsel for the appellant has relied on several judgments of the apex Court and this Court which will be referred while dealing with the submission. 5. Plea of discrimination is not available when it is based on a decision which was not in accordance with law. In support of the aforesaid submission, the learned Counsel for the appellant has relied on several judgments of the apex Court and this Court which will be referred while dealing with the submission. 5. The Counsel appearing for the College who was respondent in the writ petition and had opposed the writ petition supported the case taken by the appellant and justified its decision to stop the writ petitioners from appearing in the second semester examination. 6. Sri H. R. Mishra, learned Counsel appearing for respondents No. 1 to 6 (writ petitioners) supported the judgment of learned single Judge and submitted that action of the university in directing two students, as mentioned above, to appear in the examination was clearly discriminatory and arbitrary and the writ petitioners were also entitled for same treatment by the University and no error was committed by the learned single Judge in allowing the writ petition. Reference to circular dated 30th May, 2002 issued by the Vice-Chancellor of U. P. Technical University was also made. Learned Counsel also stated that writ petitioners having already permitted to appear by interim order by this Court in several papers of first semester, it is in the interest of justice that the order of learned single Judge be not interfered with. 7. We have considered the submissions of Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. There is no dispute of facts between the parties. It is not denied to the writ petitioners that they did not have 60% attendance in the second semester of bachelor of technology first year. The basis of the writ petition as submitted during course of argument by the Counsel for the writ petitioners is, permitting two students similarly situated to appear in the examination whereas the said benefit was denied to the writ petitioners. The decision of the University stopping the writ petitioners to appear in the examination has been challenged as discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 9. Ordinances of U. P. Technical University, Lucknow for bachelor of technology, have been brought on the record as Annexure 1 to the stay application filed in support of the special appeal. It is useful to extract the ordinances relating to attendance. 9. Ordinances of U. P. Technical University, Lucknow for bachelor of technology, have been brought on the record as Annexure 1 to the stay application filed in support of the special appeal. It is useful to extract the ordinances relating to attendance. Regulation 3 which pertains to attendance is quoted below: " (3) Attendance. (3. 1) Every candidate is required to attend all the lectures, tutorials, practicals and other prescribed curricular and co-curricular activities. It can be condoned up to 25% on medical grounds or for other genuine reasons. (3. 2) A further relaxation of attendance up to 15% can be given by Principal/dean/director of the Institution for the students who have been absent with prior permission for reasons acceptable to head of the Institution. (3. 3) No candidate will be allowed to appear in the end semester examinations if he/she does not satisfy the overall overage attendance requirement of Clause Nos. 3. 1, 3. 2. " 10. The ordinances framed by the University are statutory in nature. Ordinance 3. 1 provides that attendance can be condoned up to 25% on medical grounds or for other genuine reasons. A further relaxation provided is only of 15% for the students who have absented with prior permission for reasons acceptable to the head of the institution. Further Ordinance No. 3. 3 which is in negative term provides that no candidate will be allowed to appear in the end of semester examinations if he/she does not satisfy the overall average attendance requirement of Clause Nos. 3. 1, 3. 2. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid ordinances clearly spells out that a candidate who does not achieve the required attendance percentage even after giving the benefit of condonation allowable under Ordinances 3. 1 and 3. 2 shall not be allowed to appear in the end of semester examination. 11. The students who have taken admissions in bachelor of technology course are required to attend all the lectures as per statutory provision. The requirement of attending all the lectures is for the benefit of students. Looking to the nature of course insistence of attending all the lectures is desirable. The object of desirability of students to attend lectures is that students should learn the course in systematic manner by listening the lecture from experienced teachers. 12. The requirement of attending all the lectures is for the benefit of students. Looking to the nature of course insistence of attending all the lectures is desirable. The object of desirability of students to attend lectures is that students should learn the course in systematic manner by listening the lecture from experienced teachers. 12. The apex Court also considered the similar controversy in a case reported in 2000 (10) SC 216; 2001 (1) LBESR 78 (SC), Regional Engineering College, Hamirpur and another v. Ashutosh Pandey. In that case before the apex Court a students who could not achive the required attendance percentage in the last semester was stopped from appearing by the college. A writ petition was filed by the students which was allowed by the High Court. In the case before the apex Court, there were also statutory regulations. Regulation provided for maximum condonation permissible. The condonation provided was of 25% in addition to 10%. In that case before the apex Court the shortage of attendance was more than permissible discretionary percentage granted to the principal. The apex Court upheld the decision of principal and set-aside the judgment of High Court. The apex Court in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the judgment held as under: " (9) In addition, Regulation 4. 3 is specific that the condonation on account of reasons listed under (4. 2) shall not exceed 10% of the total lectures delivered during the semester. It also states that a candidate will have to apply to the concerned head of Department on prescribed proforma along with the reasons and documents in proof of his absence. Condonation can be granted by the concerned Head of the Department with the prior approval of the Principal. Thus, 10 in excess of 25% done, is maximum that can be condoned. (10) In the present case, the respondent did not make any application in the prescribed proforma. Therefore, it is not possible to say whether his case comes within the contingencies mentioned in Regulation 4. 2. It is no doubt stated that the respondent had gone to Delhi to appear in the examination/interview, but it is not clear whether that was an examination/interview held by a Government organization/public Limited Company. In any event, admittedly after deducting admissible 25% exemption further absence of the respondent comes to 11% which is more than the permissible discretionary percentage granted to the Principal. In any event, admittedly after deducting admissible 25% exemption further absence of the respondent comes to 11% which is more than the permissible discretionary percentage granted to the Principal. Therefore, the Principal was night in saying he had no power to condone the absence in excess of 10% in addition to 25%. (11) We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court fell into an error in permitting the condonation of absence beyond 10% in addition to 25%. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court and the directions given therein. " The aforesaid judgment of the apex Court is fully applicable in the facts of the present case. 13. The submission of Counsel for the respondents No. 1 to 6 (writ petitioners) is about discriminatory treatment by the University by permitting two similarly situated students to appear whereas denying the said permission to the writ petitioners. No other provision in Ordinances or in any other statutory provision has been brought before us giving any other power of condonation in attendance except those mentioned in Ordinances 3. 1 and 3. 2. Assuming that college permitted two students, named above, to appear in the examination who did not have 60% attendance, can the same be made basis for allowing all other students who are short of attendance to appear is the question raised in the present appeal. If it is accepted that above can be basis for permitting other students who are short of attendance then the provision of regulation will become redundant. Any incorrect/invalid decision by the college may be taken benefit by all other students. The notice dated 7th July, 2002 which is on the record, shows that along with the notice list of 55 students have even circulated who were found short of attendance. A perusal of the said list discloses that some of the students have been 0% attendance and some of them have less than 2% attendance. If any of the students is permitted in the examination who is short of the attendance can be line of distinction be drawn as to which of them can be admitted in the examination and which of them can be denied. The authorities of the college/university have to function in accordance with the Act, Statute and Ordinances. If any of the students is permitted in the examination who is short of the attendance can be line of distinction be drawn as to which of them can be admitted in the examination and which of them can be denied. The authorities of the college/university have to function in accordance with the Act, Statute and Ordinances. In case there is breach of provision the endeavour has to be to set right the breach and not to act in a manner to keep on repeating the breach. Apex Court while considering the scope and ambit of equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution had held that illegal orders passed by an authority earlier cannot be ground for issuing direction by the Court to commit the same illegality again. The apex Court in AIR 1995 SC 705 , Chandigarh Administration and another v. Jagjit Singh and another, laid down in paragraph 8 as under: " (8) We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be colled one, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many such instances we think it necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length. Generally speaking the mere that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranting order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extra-ordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The extra-ordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be correct if it can be done according to law indeed, wherever it is possible, the Court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law, but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see law it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct respondent-authority to repeat the illegality the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be (prejudicial) to the interests of law and (will be) incalculable mischief of public interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 14. Again in (1997) 1 SCC 35 , Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain and others, the apex Court reiterated the same proposition in paragraph 27 which is quoted below: "27. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The mere fact that the respondent-authority had passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated, can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order could not be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality to cause another unwarranted order. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order could not be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality to cause another unwarranted order. The extra-ordinary and desicretional power of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be exercised for such a purpose. " 15. The same propositions have been reiterated by the apex Court in (1999) 7 SCC 89 , Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and others and (2000) 4 SCC 186 , CSIR and others v. Ajay Kumar Jain. 16. In view of the law laid down by the apex Court in the aforesaid cases, it is clear that the discrimination can be made basis for issuing a writ only when earlier order made by an authority claiming parity was in accordance with law and not contrary to any statutory provisions. In facts of the present case even if college had given permission to two students to appear in the examination who had to their credit 60% attendance, the said decision was clearly contrary to ordinances as quoted above. The aforesaid decision clearly not in accord with law cannot form any basis for issuing a writ. 17. The learned single Judge while allowing the writ petition has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Parvez Ahmad and others v. Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh and others, 1987 UPLBEC 517 , for taking the view that if there is conscious discrimination, the said discrimination can be a basis for granting relief. In the aforesaid case the Division Bench repelled the contention of the writ petitioner on discrimination in condoning the shortage of attendance. The Division Bench held that in those cases where condonation was granted there were legitimate grounds. Following was said in paragraph 17: " (17) In paragraph 39 of the counter-affidavit of the Aligarh Muslim University elaborate and detailed reasons have been mentioned explaining as to how was the shortage in attendance of these persons condoned. We have examined ourselves those cases and found that the charge of discrimination made against the Aligarh Muslim University by the petitioners is unjustified. There were legitimate grounds for condoning the shortage. We have examined ourselves those cases and found that the charge of discrimination made against the Aligarh Muslim University by the petitioners is unjustified. There were legitimate grounds for condoning the shortage. Even if the attendance was calculated minutely, it could not be said that any favour was done to them while condoning the same. " 18. The Division Bench had ultimately dismissed the writ petition of the students. The Division Bench also noticed in paragraph 20 of the said judgment which is as under: " (20) It was said by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Durga Charan Das, AIR 1966 SC 1547 , that it could not be contended that because a mistake was committed in one case, the same should be allowed to continue in other cases. " 19. What was noticed in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid judgment has been explained by the apex Court in above cited cases. Thus, the Division Bench was not considering a case in which condonation was allowed contrary to permissible provisions nor the Division Bench had allowed the writ petition of the students on the basis of discrimination in that case. We do not find that the aforesaid Division Bench comes to the rescue of writ petitioners in any manner. Learned single Judge has not found that permitting two students i. e. Abhisekh Srivastava and Gaurav Anand Srivastava was in accordance with permissible authority of the College. Without there being finding that the said permission was in accordance with law, the parity could not have been extended to the writ petitioners in the present case. 20. In view of what has been said above, we are of the view that no ground has been made out in the writ petition for question the notice dated 7-7-2002 with regard to the writ petitioners. The writ petitioners were rightly stopped from appearing in the examination by the college and their decision to stop the students was in accord with the Ordinances 3. 1, 3. 2 and 3. 3 as quoted above. The judgment the of learned single Judge cannot be sustained. 21. It is true that writ petitioners were directed to appear in left over examination of second semester by interim order dated 12th July, 2002 passed in writ petition and they also appeared, however, the interim order itself has clearly stated that said permission is only provisional. The judgment the of learned single Judge cannot be sustained. 21. It is true that writ petitioners were directed to appear in left over examination of second semester by interim order dated 12th July, 2002 passed in writ petition and they also appeared, however, the interim order itself has clearly stated that said permission is only provisional. The apex Court in 1999 (7) SCC 89 , Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, while considering the consequences of grant of an interim order by the Court held in paragraph 15: " (15 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It is a settled principle of law that as and when a party applied and obtains a stay from the Court of law, it is always at the risk and responsibility of the party applying. Mere passing of an order of stay cannot be presumed to be the conferment of any additional right upon the litigation party. This Court in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of Sought India Trust Assn. Held that the said portion of order by the Court means only that such order would not be operative from the date of its passing. The order would not mean that the order stayed had been wiped out from existence. The order of stay granted pending disposed of a case comes to an end with the dismissed of a substantive proceeding and it is the duty of the Court in such cases to put the parties in the same position they would have been but for the interim orders of the Court. " 22. However, having regard to the fact that petitioners were permitted to appear in certain papers of second semester we only observe and leave it open to the college either to ask the writ petitioners to appear in all the examination again or to permit them only to appear in left over papers of second semester. We again clarify that by appearance in the examination of second semester writ petitioners had not acquired any right and since the judgment of learned single Judge is not being upheld by us, the college is free to ask the writ petitioners to appear again in second semester. We again clarify that by appearance in the examination of second semester writ petitioners had not acquired any right and since the judgment of learned single Judge is not being upheld by us, the college is free to ask the writ petitioners to appear again in second semester. This liberty is being given to the college in the facts of the present case without in any manner fettering the discretion of the college. 23. Subject to observations as made above, this special appeal is allowed and the judgment of learned single Judge dated 4th December, 2002 is set aside. 24. Parties will bear their own cost. S. P. Srivastava, J.-I have had the opportunity to go through the judgment in draft prepared by my learned brother, Ashok Bhushan, J. I agree that allowing the Special Appeal, the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge dated 4-12-2002 be set aside. I would, however, like to add a few words. 26. The provisions contained in the U. P. Technical University Act, 2000 amongst other things deal with the powers and duties of the University. Apart from various duties specified in Section 6 of the aforesaid Act a duty stands cast-upon the University to provide and upgrade education, training and research in technical education and to create entrepreneurship and a conducive environment for pursuit of the technical education in close co-operation with industries. The provisions contained in the Act also require the University to confer degree diploma and other academic distinctions and to hold examinations for and to grant and confer degrees, diploma and other academic distinctions to and on persons who have perused prescribed course of study in a college. 27. It must be emphasised that in order to achieve the true ideal and aim of the University as contemplated under the provisions of the U. P. Technical University Act, 2000 an action of the University which is in violation of statutory norms laid down either in the Act or Regulations/ordinances/rules or Statutes framed thereunder cannot be permitted to be violated by the University itself. Further a degree in any speciality should be conferred only on those deserving students who having studied the subject in the manner provided for in the Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations/rules have pursued the prescribed course of study for the minimum period as mandated have taken the appropriate examination at the end of such studies and deserve the degree on the basis of their performance. 28. A course of study which under the Regulations/rules/ordinances is required to be spread over a specified period cannot be permitted to be squeezed or reduced to a lesser period, by any administrative action contrary to the provision having statutory force and that explicit legislative intent insisting upon pursuing of a course of study spread over a particular period. 29. The University or its authorities have no jurisdiction whatsoever to by-pass or ignore the mandate of the statutory provisions contained in the State Universities Act or the Statutes and the Ordinances framed thereunder or the U. P. Technical University Act or the Regulations framed thereunder. The candidate has to satisfy the minimum requisite conditions which is to be complied with before he becomes eligible for appearing at the final examination either for an under graduate course or a post graduate course of studies as provided for in the relevant Statutes and the Ordinances or Regulations. 30. It must also be emphasized that any University established under the provisions of the State Universities Act or the U. P. Technical University Act is bound to ensure that the standard of education is not jeopardised on account of any such action on its part which has the effect of preventing a student from pursuing the prescribed course of studies before he is permitted to appear at a final examination either for an under graduate degree or a post graduate degree or has the effect of permitting the student who has not pursued the prescribed course of studies to appear at any such examination at the final examination for an under graduate or a post-graduate degree even though the period elapsing between the grant of admission and the date of examination is too short for completing the prescribed course of study as provided for in the Statutes and the Ordinances deserves condemnation as it has the obvious effect of lowering down the standard of education and reducing the final examination to a farce. 31. 31. The students who have not completed the prescribed course of studies spread over a period specified in the Statutes or the Ordinances should not be permitted to appear at the final examination as they cannot be deemed to be eligible for that if the legislative policy is that before appearing at the final examination the candidate must pursue the prescribed course of studies spread over for a certain period. It is not permissible for the University to squeeze that period entirely ignoring the legislative intent and purpose for spreading over of a particular course of studies for a particular period. 32. The Honble apex Court in its decision in the case of Gurdeep Singh v. State of J and K, AIR 1993 SC 2638 , had indicated that the consideration of judicial policy dictates that a tendency where advantage gained by illegal means is permitted to be retained has the effect of jeopardizing the purity of the selection process itself and embolden errant authorities and candidates into a sense of complacency and impunity that gains achieved by such wrongs can be retained by an appeal to the sympathy of the Court. The apex Court had emphasized that such instances reduced the jurisdiction and discretion of Courts into private benevolence. Drawing support from the aforesaid observations, a Division Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Ganga Prasad Yadav v. Allahabad Agricultural Institute, Naini, 1995 (2) LBESR 212 (All); 1995 (2) UPLBEC 1097 , had pointed out that it will not be proper to continue the student to pursue his studies merely on the ground that he had studied for over a year. Appeal allowed. .