V. V. S. RAO, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners seek a Writ of Certiorari to quash First Information report (FIR) in Crime No. 65 of 1998 of Godavarikhani II Town Police station, Khammam District pending on the file of Judicial Magistrate of first Class, Mandhani/godavarikhani. Petitioners 2 and 3 are father and mother of first petitioner. Petitioners 4 and 5 are sister and brother-in-law of first petitioner, and petitioners 6 and 7 are his uncle and aunt. The petitioners filed the writ petition in the facts and circumstances as noticed below. ( 2 ) THE first petitioner married one Manjula on 10. 3. 1993. She is daughter of second respondent herein. She died on 3. 6. 1997 allegedly committing suicide by hanging to fan at Quarter No. ST2-2802 situated at 8th Incline colony, Godavarikhani where she was residing along with first petitioner. ( 3 ) THE second respondent on the same day lodged a complaint with II Town police Station, Godavarikhani and the same was registered as Crime No. 90 of 1997. In the complaint he alleged that his daughter committed suicide due to dowry harassment made by the first petitioner herein. The first petitioner was arrested and sent to judicial remand on 12-6-1997. A charge sheet was also filed before the Court of Judicial Magistrate of first Class, Manthani on 18. 7. 1997 under Sections 304-B of IPC and sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1977. The learned magistrate took up committal proceedings and committed the case to the court of Assistant Sessions Judge, Peddapalli. The said case being s. C. No. 14 of 1998 is pending before the Assistant Sessions Judge, peddapally. ( 4 ) THE second respondent filed another complaint on 13. 4. 1998 alleging that investigating Officer of II Town Police Station, Godavarikhani did not investigate the case properly, that petitioners 1 to 7 herein on many occasions, demanded dowry from Manjula and harassed her. Therefore, he requested to register the crime against all the petitioners. On 13. 4. 1998 he filed a private complaint before the Court of Judicial Magistrate of first Class, Manthani. It is not necessary to refer to the details of the complaint dt. 13. 4. 1998. Suffice to notice, in the said complaint the second respondent gave various details of harassment and also alleged that the petitioners encashed Fixed Deposit of Rs. 4. 1998 he filed a private complaint before the Court of Judicial Magistrate of first Class, Manthani. It is not necessary to refer to the details of the complaint dt. 13. 4. 1998. Suffice to notice, in the said complaint the second respondent gave various details of harassment and also alleged that the petitioners encashed Fixed Deposit of Rs. 50,000/- from State Bank of hyderabad, No. 8 Incline, Godavarikhani. The learned Magistrate, Jagityal returned the complaint with an endorsement observing that the Judicial magistrate of First Class, Manthani is only competent to take cognizance of the case as earler crime was registered by II Town Police Station, godavarikhani. The second respondent submitted the complaint before the court of Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Manthani, who by order dt. 16. 4. 1998 forwarded the same to II Town Police Station, Godavarikhani for investigation and filing report. Subsequent thereto, on 25. 4. 1998 the said Police Station registered Crime No. 65 of 1998 under Sections 304-B, 498-A of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry prohibition Act. First respondent took up investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( cr. P. C ) and arrested petitioners 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 and they were remanded to judicial custody. ( 5 ) A writ petition being W. P. No. 2621 of 1998 was filed for Writ of Habeas corpus to release petitioners 2, 4, 5 and 7 alleging that their arrest and detention is illegal and amounts to wrongful detention. This Court directed release of the petitioners. The petitioners contend that pursuant to the first complaint given by the second respondent, Crime no. 90 of 1997 was registered and after following procedure the matter was sent to Sessions Court and therefore, the learned Mgistrate, Manthani has no jurisdiction to order investigation again either under Section 156 (3) or under Section 202 (2) of Cr. P. C. ( 6 ) FIRST and second respondents filed two separate counter affidavits opposing the writ petition. It is the case of the second respondent that the first respondent without conducting proper investigation has shown the first petitioner as accused and did not rope in petitioners 2 to 7. He also justifies the complaint against the petitioners. P. C. ( 6 ) FIRST and second respondents filed two separate counter affidavits opposing the writ petition. It is the case of the second respondent that the first respondent without conducting proper investigation has shown the first petitioner as accused and did not rope in petitioners 2 to 7. He also justifies the complaint against the petitioners. Learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri M. A. Bari, submits that when the complaint filed by the second respondent being Crime No. 90 of 1997 was already enquired into and charge sheet was already filed, whereupon the learned Judicial Magistrate of I Class, committed the matter to the sessions being S. C. No. 14 of 1998, the private complaint filed by the second respondent under Section 200 Cr. P. C. within a period of one year, cannot be referred by the Magistrate under Section 210 or Section 202 of the Cr. P. C. for further investigation. The complaint filed by the second respondent discloses an offence under Section 304-B IPC. The offence is triable only by the Court of Sessions, in which event proviso to Section 202 of the Cr. P. C. prohibits Judicial Magistrate to direct investigation by the police officer. The Magistrate has acted without jurisdiction in directing investigation under Section 156 (3) of Cr. P. C. whereupon Crime no. 65 of 1998 was registered. He further contends that as the case is triable by Sessions Court, the Magistrate has no power to refer the matter to police under Section 156 (3) of Cr. P. C. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the second respondent, Sri V. Ramachandra Rao, submits that even where cognizance is taken by the Magistrate, the law does not prohibit the Magistrate to order investigation under Section 156 (3) of cr. P. C. when a private complaint is made. Reliance is placed on Sections 190, 200, 202, 204 and 299 Cr. P. C. The victim, learned counsel submits, is entitled to prosecute his own case by filing a private complaint and filing of charge sheet by the police in a related case is not a bar for exercising private complaint and ordering investigation by the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. The victim, learned counsel submits, is entitled to prosecute his own case by filing a private complaint and filing of charge sheet by the police in a related case is not a bar for exercising private complaint and ordering investigation by the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. Learned counsel placed reliance on a number of decisions of this Court as well as the Supreme Court in support of the submission that the orders passed by the Magistrate ordering investigation are not invalid. ( 8 ) IT is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that power does not inher in the Magistrate to order investigation under Section 156 (3) of Cr. P. C. when the case is triable by Sessions Court, especially when in relation to the same set of facts, a complaint has already been registered as a crime and the same has been committed to the sessions by the learned Magistrate. This submission cannot be accepted. The second respondent gave a complaint initially at P. S. , Godavarikhani and the same was registered as crime and after due process of law, the same is now pending before the Court of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Manthani being sessions Case No. 14 of 1998. When the second respondent filed a private complaint on 13-4-1998 alleging that the investigation at P. S. , godavarikhani into Crime No. 90 of 1997 (earlier complaint) was not proper and that petitioners 2 to 7 also harassed late Manjula, in effect the case is not in relation to Crime No. 90 of 1997 and it is altogether a different case though it might be a second complaint in relation to petitioner No. 1 who was sole accused in Crime No. 90 of 1997 (S. C. No. 2 of 1995 ). Insofar as petitioners 2 to 7 are concerned, it is not a second complaint, but it is a fresh complaint directly filed under Sections 199 and 200 Cr. P. C. ( 9 ) THEREFORE, it was always competent for the Magistrate to refer the present complaint of the second respondent under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. to the sessions Judge having cognizance to take the offence on file. Even where the Magistrate has power under Section 190 Cr. P. C. to take cognizance, he is not precluded of his power under Section 200 Cr. P. C. to the sessions Judge having cognizance to take the offence on file. Even where the Magistrate has power under Section 190 Cr. P. C. to take cognizance, he is not precluded of his power under Section 200 Cr. P. C. A reference may be made to D. Lakshminarayana v. V. Narayana wherein it was laid down as under. ( 10 ) IN the instant case the Magistrate did not apply his mind to the complaint for deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding; but only for ordering an investigation under Section 156 (3 ). He did not bring into motion the machinery of Chapter XV. He did not examine the complainant or his witnesses under Section 200, Cr. P. C. , which is the first step in the procedure prescribed under that Chapter. The question of taking the next step of that procedure envisaged in Section 202 did not arise instead of taking cognizance of the offence, he has, in the exercise of his discretion, sent the complaint for investigation by police under s. 156. . . . . . . This being the position, Section 202 (1), 1st Proviso was not attracted. Indeed, it is not necessary for the decision of this case to express any final opinion on the ambit and scope of the 1st Proviso to section 202 (1) of the Code of 1973. Suffice it to say, the stage at which section 202 could become operative was never reached in this case. We have therefore in keeping with the well established practice of the Court, decided only that much which was essential for the disposal of this appeal, and no more. ( 11 ) THE principles in D. Lakshminarayana v. V. Narayana (supra) were reiterated in Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh, M/s. India Carat Pvt. Ltd. v. State of karnataka, Madhu Bala v. Suresh Kumar and Suresh Chand Jain v. State of madhya Pradesh. In Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh (supra), the Supreme Court, after referring to the earlier case law, held thus:. . . . . . . . . . Thus on a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case the following legal propositions emerge:1. In Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh (supra), the Supreme Court, after referring to the earlier case law, held thus:. . . . . . . . . . Thus on a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case the following legal propositions emerge:1. That a Magistrate can order investigation under S. 156 (3) only at the pre-cognizance stage, that is to say, before taking cognizance under sections 190, 200 and 204 and where a Magistrate decides to take cognizance under the provisions of Chapter 14 he is not entitled in law to order any investigation under Section 156 (3) though in cases not falling within the proviso to Section 202 he can order an investigation by the police which would be in the nature of an enquiry as contemplated by sec. 202 of the Code. 2. Where a Magistrate chooses to take cognizance he can adopt any of the following alternatives: (a) He can peruse the complaint and if satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can straightaway issue process to the accused but before he does so he must comply with the requirements of Section 200 and record the evidence of the complainant or his witnesses. (b) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by himself. (c) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by any other person or an investigation by the police. 3. In case the Magistrate after considering the statement of the complainant and the witnesses or as a result of the investigation and the enquiry ordered is not satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can dismiss the complaint. 4. Where the Magistrate orders investigation by the police before taking cognizance under S. 156 (3) of the Code and receives the report thereupon he can act on the report and discharge the accused or straightaway issue process against the accused or apply his mind to the complaint filed before him and take action under Section 190 as described above. ( 12 ) IN M/s. India Carat Pvt. Ltd. V. State of Karnataka (supra), the Supreme court dealt with the procedure to be followed by a Magistrate under sections 173 (2), 190, 200 and 202 Cr. ( 12 ) IN M/s. India Carat Pvt. Ltd. V. State of Karnataka (supra), the Supreme court dealt with the procedure to be followed by a Magistrate under sections 173 (2), 190, 200 and 202 Cr. P. C. and held thus: ( 13 ) THE position is, therefore, now well settled that upon receipt of a police report under Section 173 (2) a Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190 (1) (b) of the Code even if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out against the accused. The magistrate can take into account the statements of the witnesses examined by the police during the investigation and take cognizance of the offence complained of and order the issue of process to the accused. Section 190 (1) (b) does not lay down that Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if the investigating officer gives an opinion that the investigation has made out a case against the accused. The Magistrate can ignore the conclusion arrived at by the investigating officer and independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the case, if he thinks fit, in exercise of his powers under Section 190 (1) (b) and direct the issue of process to the accused. The Magistrate is not bound in such a situation to follow the procedure laid down in Sections 200 and 202 of the Code for taking cognizance of a case under Section 190 (1) (a) though it is open to him to act under Section 200 or Section 202 also. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 14 ) IN Suresh Chand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), the Supreme Court observed that before taking cognizance of the offence, the Magistrate can order investigation under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. It was also observed that it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR for the purpose of enabling them to start investigation. ( 15 ) AS observed by the Supreme Court, Section 202 Cr. P. C. comes into operation only when the police file a report under Section 173 (2) Cr. P. C. and based on such report the Magistrate is required to take cognizance of the offence. ( 15 ) AS observed by the Supreme Court, Section 202 Cr. P. C. comes into operation only when the police file a report under Section 173 (2) Cr. P. C. and based on such report the Magistrate is required to take cognizance of the offence. At the stage of taking cognizance, if it is a case triable by sessions Court, Section 202 Cr. P. C. bars the Magistrate from ordering further investigation. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners must be rejected. ( 16 ) THIS Court in a number of decisions, following the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, has taken a view that even where the case is triable by a Sessions Court, it is competent to the Magistrate of I Class to direct the police under Section 156 (3) Cr,p. C. to investigate the case and that after taking cognizance of the case, before issuing any process, the magistrate can still order investigation in which event it will be in relation to the power vested in the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) cr. P. C. and not under Section 202 (1) Cr. P. C. If the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and issues process, the taking of cognizance is complete and by reason of clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 202 Cr. P. C. , the Magistrate cannot order further investigation by a police officer. A reference may be made to the decisions reported in t. K. Kodandaram v. State of A. P. , Kedarmal Agarwal v. State of A. P. , annie Koshy v. State of A. P. and Rokkala Saimanraju v. State and others. ( 17 ) IN Rokkala Saimanraju v. State of A. P (supra), this Court held that it would be illegal for a Judicial Magistrate to dismiss the private complaint only on the ground that the police case filed in respect of the same incident has already been committed to the Court of Sessions. The principle of law was laid down as under. ( 18 ) IT is no doubt true that the police case has been committed to the court of Sessions long back and it is now pending before the learned assistant Sessions Judge, Tadepalligudem and it is said to be the oldest sessions case on his file. The principle of law was laid down as under. ( 18 ) IT is no doubt true that the police case has been committed to the court of Sessions long back and it is now pending before the learned assistant Sessions Judge, Tadepalligudem and it is said to be the oldest sessions case on his file. The question is whether the complainant is entitled to file a private complaint even though the police case is pending in respect of the same incident. It is needless to emphasise that a victim is entitled to prosecute his own case by filing a private complaint. Even in a police case the de facto complainant is entitled to engage his own counsel and to have an effective say in the matter though the prosecution is conducted by a Public Prosecutor. In a recent judgment in Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy, a three-Judge bench of the Supreme Court considered the question as to when a second complaint in respect of the same incident would be maintainable under criminal law. After referring to its earlier decisions in Pramatha Nath talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar and Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali singh the Supreme Court laid down as under. ( 19 ) IT is settled law that there is no statutory bar in filing a second complaint on the same facts. In a case where a previous complaint is dismissed without assigning any reasons, the Magistrate under Section 204 Cr. P. C. may take cognizance of an offence and issue process if theer is sufficient ground for proceeding. As held in Pramatha Nath Talukdar case (supra) second complaint could be dismissed after a decision has been given against the complainant in previous matter upon a full consideration of his case. Further, second complaint on the same facts could be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, namely, where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on record in the previous proceedings, have been adduced. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the matter, therefore, should have been remitted back to the learned Magistrate for the purpose of arriving at a finding as to whether any case for cognizance of the alleged offence had been made out or not. ( 20 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners, Sri M. A. Bari, placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in T. T. Antony etc. etc. v. State of kerala and others, etc. . In paragraph 21 of the judgment, the Supreme court summarised the law as under. . . . . . . . . . . . . Under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of Cr. P. C. only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 Cr. P. C. Thus there can be no second FIR and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. On receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering the FIR in the station house diary, the officer in-charge of a Police Station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 of the cr. P. C. ( 21 ) THE case on hand is altogether different. The second respondent filed a private complaint before the Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Jagityal and the same was reported for being presented to the Judicial Magistrate for investigation under Section 156 (3), Cr. P. C. It is not a case where the second respondent gave a second complaint in relation to the same incident against petitioners 2 to 7 or for that matter petitioner No. 1 as well. A reading of the private complaint filed before the learned Judicial magistrate would show that the incidents of harassment imputed to petitioners 2 to 7 prima facie have been brought out presumably based on subsequent information. A reading of the private complaint filed before the learned Judicial magistrate would show that the incidents of harassment imputed to petitioners 2 to 7 prima facie have been brought out presumably based on subsequent information. An allegation was also made that investigation into Crime No. 90 of 1997 was not proper. Therefore, the authority in T. T. Antony etc. etc. v. State of Kerala and others etc. (supra) is of little assistance to the learned counsel for the petitioners. Learned counsel for second respondent, Sri Ramachandra Rao, placing reliance on various decisions of this Court as well as Supreme Court contends that at the stage of investigation the power under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be exercised. It is not necessary to refer to all the judgments. Suffice to refer to State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and anr. , wherein the apex Court, after referring to the earlier case law, laid down as under. ( 22 ) AS noticed above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 23 ) A reading of the relevant provisions of the Cr. P. C. especially Sections 156 (3), 190 and 202 as well as the decisions relied on by both the counsel would show that at the stage of investigation, the questions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners are irrelevant. . . . . . . . . ( 23 ) A reading of the relevant provisions of the Cr. P. C. especially Sections 156 (3), 190 and 202 as well as the decisions relied on by both the counsel would show that at the stage of investigation, the questions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners are irrelevant. At the time of taking cognizance after filing of the report by the police under Section 173 (2), cr. P. C. , the Magistrate has to apply his mind and decide as to whether or not to take cognizance of the case keeping in mind S. C. No. 14 of 1998. As observed by the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddyd (supra), the second complaint would be dismissed after a decision has been given against the complainant in the previous matter after due consideration of his case. But at the stage of taking cognizance, the complaint cannot be rejected only on the ground that the case is taken cognizance of on a police complaint. ( 24 ) IN the result, for the above reasons, the writ petition is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Any observations made in this order are prima facie observations and the criminal court or the investigating officer shall act independently without in any manner being influenced by the observations made hereinabove. There shall be no order as to costs.